QATARI AG AND AMBASSADOR DISCUSS POSSIBLE NEW CT

S E C R E T DOHA 000167 NOFORN SIPDIS JUSTICE FOR BRUCE SCHWARTZ E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/05/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER QA SUBJECT: QATARI AG AND AMBASSADOR DISCUSS POSSIBLE NEW CT COOPERATION MECHANISM Classified By: Ambassador Joseph LeBaron, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). -------------- KEY POINTS -------------- -- In a meeting with Ambassador March 3, the Qatari Attorney General deflected responsibility for former Guantanamo detainee Jarallah al-Marri's recent travel outside of Qatar. He claimed that he is only bound by signed judicial assistance agreements, not diplomatic notes. -- The Qatari AG expressed a strong desire to cooperate on CT, but acknowledged that he is not privy to all information provided to Qatar State Security through intelligence channels, nor information developed independently by QSS, and so is not always in a position to act. -- Ambassador told the Qatari AG that an official visit to Washington in the near term was not in the cards, explaining that the timing of such a visit was critical, and an effective mechanism needed to be put in place to improve our bilateral CT cooperation. -- The remainder of the 90-minute meeting explored that mechanism. The Qatari AG and Ambassador agreed that Ambassador would propose the following US-Qatari CT information and action mechanism to the USG: (1) the U.S. intelligence community supplies to the U.S. AG intelligence releasable to the Qatari AG on terrorism-related activities in Qatar; (2) the U.S. AG conveys that releasable information to the Qatari AG through Embassy Doha; (3) the Qatari AG takes appropriate action, in concert with Qatar's State Security and Ministry of Interior, as appropriate. -------------- COMMENT -------------- -- The CT information and action mechanism might introduce more negative sentiment by State Security towards GRPO. It could also impact the visit in May to GRPO HQS by Qatar's director of State Security. -- That said, the US-Qatar CT relationship is not working now and has not worked well for several years now. Embassy strongly believes aggressive steps must be taken to improve the relationship. -- Ambassador has requested a meeting to see the head of State Security. Following that meeting, Ambassador intends to see the Crown Prince, who is responsible for all of Qatar's security and military elements. -- The Qatari AG's explanation for Jarallah al-Marri's travel abroad ) essentially that he had no legal obligation to block him from traveling - was far from satisfying. Beyond the exchange of diplomatic notes ) which we regard as an official undertaking by the GOQ - the Qatari AG had given Embassy officials oral assurances in 2008 that Jarallah would be prevented from traveling for three years. -- Whether the Qatari AG was being disengenuous, his response was emblematic of our conversations with the GOQ on CT: evasive of responsibility and indicative of a lack of strong internal GOQ coordination. -- We may be able to leverage this incident, however, to improve our CT cooperation if we can develop a mechanism that ensures information is shared more fully within the GOQ, particularly with law enforcement authorities. END KEY POINTS AND COMMENT ¶1. (S/NF) On March 4, 2009, Ambassador and Legat met with Qatar Attorney General Dr. Ali Al-Marri (QAG) regarding the recent travel of former Guantanamo detainee Jarallah Al-Marri to the UK, as well as the GOQ's lack of counterterrorism cooperation in general. ¶2. (S/NF) The Qatari AG told Ambassador he did not receive any instructions from MFA in regards to agreed upon terms between USG and GOQ on the repatriation of Jarallah al-Marri. When Ambassador told the Qatari AG that that the MFA advised him that all concerned agencies within the GOG were consulted, the Qatari AG stated there are is a "separation of power, and that MFA should not speak for him." QAG acknowledged that USG had legitimate concerns regarding security restrictions placed on Jarallah al-Marri, and said the Ambassador would have answers the next day. (Note: On March 5, the Qatari AG's Director of International Relations advised that further information would be provided on Monday, March 9). ¶3. (S/NF) When the Qatari AG asked about his proposed visit to Washington, DC in April 2009 for meetings with Attorney General Holder and other USG officials, Ambassador replied that it needed to be put off until an effective strategy could be developed between the GOQ and USG to address GOQ,s lack of counterterrorism cooperation. The Qatari AG asked if putting the visit on hold was linked to political issues; the Ambassador assured him it was not. Ambassador continued that he would be passing the same message to both the Crown Prince and QSS Director Mohammad Al-Misnad, hopefully in the next several days. ¶4. (S/NF) The Qatari AG again acknowledged Jarallah al-Marri was an issue that needed to be resolved to both countriessatisfaction, and then asked if there were other counterterrorism issues as well, particularly any that he might not be aware of. Ambassador replied that a number of significant counterterrorism issues have been brought to the attention of QSS, but he was unsure if QSS had shared them with the Qatari AG. Al-Marri replied that he was the single GOQ judicial authority over Qatari security services, including QSS, particularly on counterterrorism matters, and asked for specifics on what those issues were. He added that he was prepared to "oblige" others within the GOQ to respect the law. ¶5. (S/NF) Ambassador said that CT issues could not be resolved through a single GOQ entity or official, but rather through the collaborative efforts of QAG and Qatar State Security (QSS) and their USG counterparts. The division of responsibilities within the GOQ on CT matters appeared unclear, making it difficult for him to suggest ways to improve cooperation between the two governments. Al-Marri replied that he was the sole, competent legal authority within GOQ, and had wide discretion in the application of criminal procedures, particularly on counterterrorism matters, and he could order someone,s arrest, surveillance or supervision. QAG added that both QSS and MOI had defined periods by law in order to conduct their investigations before turning them over to QAG for action. ¶6. (S/NF) Al-Marri then sought to move the discussion to U.S. "mistakes" in CT cooperation, citing the issue of former Guantanamo detainee Sami Al-Hajj, a Sudanese citizen and Al-Jazeera employee. Al-Marri lamented that he had been ready to sign an agreement with the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) setting clear restrictions on Al-Hajj,s travel and political activities if he were returned to Qatar. Instead, al-Marri complained, Al-Hajj was returned to Sudan, and then allowed by that government to travel to Qatar on his own. Al-Marri felt that Al-Hajj,s deportation to Sudan sent a clear message from the USG to GOQ that he, the Qatari AG, was of no importance, likening it to "a slap in the face." ¶7. (S/NF) Al-Marri stated that he had also been prepared to sign an agreement on restrictions pertaining to Jarallah al-Marri if he were returned to Qatar, but at the time the U.S. Department of Defense was more interested in seeking his assistance in mediating the return of 23 Algerians. Al-Marri said that Jarallah is now in Qatar with no signed agreement governing restrictions he was subject to. ¶8. (S/NF) Ambassador reminded QAG that there was in fact an agreement between the USG and GOQ, in the form of an exchange of diplomatic notes, on restrictions to be imposed on Jarallah al-Marri. QAG replied that an "agreement" implies "signatures," and there were none his office was party to. Al-Marri said he is obligated by signed judicial assistance agreements, not diplomatic notes. ¶9. (S/NF) Al-Marri remained adamant about his commitment to CT cooperation with the USG, citing his actions in the Khalifa al-Subaie case. Ambassador said that there was new information of concern about al-Subaie that had been shared with QSS, and asked if QSS had shared it with him. Al-Marri responded that QSS was an intelligence organization, and that they did not always share everything with him. He offered to provide whatever assistance he could on al-Subaie, adding that his office was already coordinating with the UN on financial restrictions required to be imposed against him. Al-Marri said that in order to keep al-Subaie from continuing his terrorist activities, he needs to be brought back into society. One way of doing that was to let him have a bank account so he could take care of his family. ¶10. (S/NF) Ambassador raised the possibility that, if information is not reaching the Qatari AG, perhaps a mechanism should be found through which intelligence can be provided via law enforcement channels ) i.e. from USDOJ to the Qatari AG. This would help ensure that there is full coordination and follow up between the Qatari AG, QSS, and the Qatari Ministry of Interior, and that whatever action is legally permitted is taken. ¶11. (S/NF) Ambassador assured Al-Marri that he had Washington,s respect, and that in order to ensure the success of any visit there, the timing would be crucial. Ambassador went on, stating that the solution to CT cooperation between the USG and GOQ started with QAG, but did not end with him. Al-Marri again offered to provide whatever assistance he could, but needed to know precisely what the issues were. He reiterated that he had wide discretion on how to address CT matters, and suggested that Attorney General Holder send him a letter laying out exactly what he needs. Regarding al-Subaie, Al-Marri asked for all information against him so he could take the steps necessary, and in accordance with Qatari law, to address the issue. LeBaron