QATARI MINSTATE AL-MAHMOUD LOOKS TO NEXT STEPS ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DOHA 000100

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/09/2019
TAGS: PREL PHUM SU QA
SUBJECT: QATARI MINSTATE AL-MAHMOUD LOOKS TO NEXT STEPS ON
DARFUR MEDIATION, SAYS QATAR WANTS NO PART OF ICC
POSTPONEMENT

REF: A. 08 DOHA 854

B. DOHA 38

C. KHARTOUM 153

Classified By: Ambassador Joseph E. LeBaron, for reasons 1.4 (b, d).

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(C) KEY POINTS
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-- Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Ahmed Al-Mahmoud
reported that he and UN/AU Mediator Djibril Bassole are
exchanging draft Frameworks in advance of the February 9
meeting in Doha between the Government of Sudan and the
Justice and Equality Movement.

-- Al-Mahmoud and Senior Representative for Sudan Tim
Shortley agreed February 5 that the Government of Sudan must
urgently enact confidence-building measures to entice the
rebel groups to participate in the peace process.

-- Both agreed that the ICC process should take its course.
Al-Mahmoud said he wanted no part of lobbying the UN Security
Council to delay the process. Al-Mahmoud added that the
prospect of indictments serves as a pressure on the parties
to come to agreement.

-- Describing his work with Bassole to bring in civil
elements (as opposed to militias) on board with the mediation
effort, Al-Mahmoud welcomed Shortley's reporting that four
Darfur tribes may send representatives to Doha for talks in
the coming weeks.

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(C) COMMENTS
--------------

-- Al-Mahmoud did not express concern that Qatar's tense
relations with Egypt over policy differences on Gaza threaten
to derail Qatar's Initiative on Darfur. Still, this prospect
concerns us and bears continued monitoring.

-- This is the first time Al-Mahmoud has provided his views
on the January 14 communique, and his assertion that he does
not want to influence the ICC process is very welcome.

End Key Points and Comments.


1. (C) Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Ahmed Al-Mahmoud
outlined February 5 for the State Department Senior
Representative for Sudan, Tim Shortley, the next steps he and
Djibril Bassole, the UN and African Union Mediator, envision
on Darfur. First, the Government of Sudan (GOS) and the
Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) would meet February 9
with the mediators in Doha. Al-Mahmoud acknowledged the
danger that other rebel groups would refuse to participate in
the process if JEM meets with the GOS first, but he said the
other advantages of moving forward outweighed this concern.
Namely, it is vital to "start putting the train on the track"
and merely having a train may encourage the other parties to
climb aboard.


2. (C) For the GOS, Al-Mahmoud reported that he and Bassole
would also like to see it put in place some
confidence-building measures. Al-Mahmoud raised this with
President Bashir recently on the margins of an Arab League
meeting in Kuwait, and Bashir reacted positively.


3. (C) Stopping hostilities is the first step that must be
taken, said Al-Mahmoud, followed by the establishment of
committees, with a representative of the government and
various rebel groups, under Bassole's direction. Once the
committees made progress in their work, the aim is to have a
final agreement that all groups can agree to sign.
Al-Mahmoud added that he believes the Darfur Peace Agreement
(DPA) should not be touched for now. Shortley responded that
we want to build on the DPA.

ENCOURAGING THE REBELS TO PLAY
--------------


4. (C) Sudan Liberation Movement founder Minni Minawi, the
only rebel leader to sign the DPA, remains suspicious,
reported Al-Mahmoud, that Qatar is conspiring with JEM
against him. Al-Mahmoud had tried to call him without
success. He said Minawi needs to "be helpful to the
process." He was courageous to sign the DPA, but his role
now must be to help others move toward a broader peace. As
for Abdul Wahid, Al-Mahmoud said he had asked the French to

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convince him to travel to Doha for the February 9
discussions. He is not expected to come. SLM Unity was
invited, but Al-Mahmoud said internal problems would prevent
that group's attendance. Shortley agreed, adding that Abdul
Wahid and Minawi would also stay away. Al-Mahmoud told
Shortley that he and Bassole are exchanging drafts back and
forth on next steps, and they will propose something to the
participants February 9.


5. (C) Ambassador, expressing concern that Egypt and Libya
could be spoilers, asked Al-Mahmoud if there had been any
change in their support. Al-Mahmoud indicated there was no
apparent change from either country since both had assured
him of their support for Qatar's Initiative on Darfur in
December. The only change detected of late is that JEM
decided to make a stop in Cairo for consultations with the
Government of Egypt en route to the February 9 meetings in
Doha.

STEPS NEEDED BY THE GOS
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6. (C) Shortley thanked Al-Mahmoud for outlining next steps
(and for his presentation, see Ref A, detailing Qatar's
earlier actions on Darfur),expressed U.S. support for his
personal efforts and the positive role Qatar is playing, and
observed that Al-Mahmoud enjoyed the respect of the parties
across the board. Al-Mahmoud in turn thanked Shortley for
U.S. support, underscoring how helpful former Special Envoy
Richard Williamson had been in guiding Qatar on these issues.
Al-Mahmoud said he hoped both Williamson and Shortley would
have the opportunity to witness in Doha the signing of a
peace agreement down the road.


7. (C) Turning to the long road ahead, Shortley noted that
the GOS continues aerial bombardments and ground operations
with janjaweed, in advance of International Criminal Court
(ICC) indictments rather than making the dramatic changes on
the ground to end the conflict and improve humanitarian
access.

ICC INDICTMENTS NOT QATAR'S AFFAIR
--------------


8. (C) Al-Mahmoud said both he and Bassole believe that
establishing both peace and justice is important. Justice,
said Al-Mahmoud, is in the hands of the ICC. Even peace was
in the hands of the parties to the conflict, not Qatar's or
Bassole's to give. Al-Mahmoud offered that a peace agreement
is more likely before the ICC indictments come down. Once
GOS leaders are indicted, the rebels have no incentive to
deal with the current government in a quest for peace. GOS
officials, once indicted, would likewise have little
incentive to search for peace.


9. (C) Al-Mahmoud said the GOS should convince the UN
Security Council (UNSC) that there is progress on securing a
peace agreement if it wants the indictments put on hold.
Referencing the communique that resulted from the January 14
Arab League-African Union Ministerial in Doha (Ref B),
Al-Mahmoud said he didn't want a communique, because any
written communication went against Qatar's mediation role.
Still, the other ministers wanted one, so Qatar agreed to a
more cautious version than what was first proposed. The
communiques commits the group to lobbying the UNSC to
postpone the indictments. Al-Mahmoud said he wants no part
of it and has resisted several attempts to secure his
participation, citing his busy schedule. Al-Mahmoud said,
with a smile, "I'm not lying. I am very busy working on
bringing peace to Darfur." Qatar, he said, would stay clear
of pressuring the UNSC on indictments. Shortley responded
that the U.S. believes the ICC process should take its course
and the U.S. opposed an Article 16 deferral.

BRINGING IN CIVIL SOCIETY
--------------


10. (C) Shortley reported on his just-ended meetings in
Khartoum and told Al-Mahmoud he was encouraged that civil and
tribal leaders, Arab and Fur, are preparing to announce their
readiness for peace (Ref C). The Fur in particular have now
indicated that they will participate without Abdul Wahid if
necessary.


11. (C) Al-Mahmoud welcomed this development. He said
building support from civil society, including tribal leaders
and women, for peace is a key component of the plan he and
Bassole are developing.


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12. (U) Senior Representative for Sudan Tim Shortley has
cleared this message.
LeBaron