QATARI MINSTATE AL-MAHMOUD LOOKS TO NEXT STEPS ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DOHA 000100 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/09/2019 TAGS: PREL PHUM SU QA SUBJECT: QATARI MINSTATE AL-MAHMOUD LOOKS TO NEXT STEPS ON DARFUR MEDIATION, SAYS QATAR WANTS NO PART OF ICC POSTPONEMENT REF: A. 08 DOHA 854 ¶B. DOHA 38 ¶C. KHARTOUM 153 Classified By: Ambassador Joseph E. LeBaron, for reasons 1.4 (b, d). -------------- (C) KEY POINTS -------------- -- Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Ahmed Al-Mahmoud reported that he and UN/AU Mediator Djibril Bassole are exchanging draft Frameworks in advance of the February 9 meeting in Doha between the Government of Sudan and the Justice and Equality Movement. -- Al-Mahmoud and Senior Representative for Sudan Tim Shortley agreed February 5 that the Government of Sudan must urgently enact confidence-building measures to entice the rebel groups to participate in the peace process. -- Both agreed that the ICC process should take its course. Al-Mahmoud said he wanted no part of lobbying the UN Security Council to delay the process. Al-Mahmoud added that the prospect of indictments serves as a pressure on the parties to come to agreement. -- Describing his work with Bassole to bring in civil elements (as opposed to militias) on board with the mediation effort, Al-Mahmoud welcomed Shortley's reporting that four Darfur tribes may send representatives to Doha for talks in the coming weeks. -------------- (C) COMMENTS -------------- -- Al-Mahmoud did not express concern that Qatar's tense relations with Egypt over policy differences on Gaza threaten to derail Qatar's Initiative on Darfur. Still, this prospect concerns us and bears continued monitoring. -- This is the first time Al-Mahmoud has provided his views on the January 14 communique, and his assertion that he does not want to influence the ICC process is very welcome. End Key Points and Comments. ¶1. (C) Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Ahmed Al-Mahmoud outlined February 5 for the State Department Senior Representative for Sudan, Tim Shortley, the next steps he and Djibril Bassole, the UN and African Union Mediator, envision on Darfur. First, the Government of Sudan (GOS) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) would meet February 9 with the mediators in Doha. Al-Mahmoud acknowledged the danger that other rebel groups would refuse to participate in the process if JEM meets with the GOS first, but he said the other advantages of moving forward outweighed this concern. Namely, it is vital to "start putting the train on the track" and merely having a train may encourage the other parties to climb aboard. ¶2. (C) For the GOS, Al-Mahmoud reported that he and Bassole would also like to see it put in place some confidence-building measures. Al-Mahmoud raised this with President Bashir recently on the margins of an Arab League meeting in Kuwait, and Bashir reacted positively. ¶3. (C) Stopping hostilities is the first step that must be taken, said Al-Mahmoud, followed by the establishment of committees, with a representative of the government and various rebel groups, under Bassole's direction. Once the committees made progress in their work, the aim is to have a final agreement that all groups can agree to sign. Al-Mahmoud added that he believes the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) should not be touched for now. Shortley responded that we want to build on the DPA. ENCOURAGING THE REBELS TO PLAY -------------- ¶4. (C) Sudan Liberation Movement founder Minni Minawi, the only rebel leader to sign the DPA, remains suspicious, reported Al-Mahmoud, that Qatar is conspiring with JEM against him. Al-Mahmoud had tried to call him without success. He said Minawi needs to "be helpful to the process." He was courageous to sign the DPA, but his role now must be to help others move toward a broader peace. As for Abdul Wahid, Al-Mahmoud said he had asked the French to DOHA 00000100 002 OF 003 convince him to travel to Doha for the February 9 discussions. He is not expected to come. SLM Unity was invited, but Al-Mahmoud said internal problems would prevent that group's attendance. Shortley agreed, adding that Abdul Wahid and Minawi would also stay away. Al-Mahmoud told Shortley that he and Bassole are exchanging drafts back and forth on next steps, and they will propose something to the participants February 9. ¶5. (C) Ambassador, expressing concern that Egypt and Libya could be spoilers, asked Al-Mahmoud if there had been any change in their support. Al-Mahmoud indicated there was no apparent change from either country since both had assured him of their support for Qatar's Initiative on Darfur in December. The only change detected of late is that JEM decided to make a stop in Cairo for consultations with the Government of Egypt en route to the February 9 meetings in Doha. STEPS NEEDED BY THE GOS -------------- ¶6. (C) Shortley thanked Al-Mahmoud for outlining next steps (and for his presentation, see Ref A, detailing Qatar's earlier actions on Darfur),expressed U.S. support for his personal efforts and the positive role Qatar is playing, and observed that Al-Mahmoud enjoyed the respect of the parties across the board. Al-Mahmoud in turn thanked Shortley for U.S. support, underscoring how helpful former Special Envoy Richard Williamson had been in guiding Qatar on these issues. Al-Mahmoud said he hoped both Williamson and Shortley would have the opportunity to witness in Doha the signing of a peace agreement down the road. ¶7. (C) Turning to the long road ahead, Shortley noted that the GOS continues aerial bombardments and ground operations with janjaweed, in advance of International Criminal Court (ICC) indictments rather than making the dramatic changes on the ground to end the conflict and improve humanitarian access. ICC INDICTMENTS NOT QATAR'S AFFAIR -------------- ¶8. (C) Al-Mahmoud said both he and Bassole believe that establishing both peace and justice is important. Justice, said Al-Mahmoud, is in the hands of the ICC. Even peace was in the hands of the parties to the conflict, not Qatar's or Bassole's to give. Al-Mahmoud offered that a peace agreement is more likely before the ICC indictments come down. Once GOS leaders are indicted, the rebels have no incentive to deal with the current government in a quest for peace. GOS officials, once indicted, would likewise have little incentive to search for peace. ¶9. (C) Al-Mahmoud said the GOS should convince the UN Security Council (UNSC) that there is progress on securing a peace agreement if it wants the indictments put on hold. Referencing the communique that resulted from the January 14 Arab League-African Union Ministerial in Doha (Ref B), Al-Mahmoud said he didn't want a communique, because any written communication went against Qatar's mediation role. Still, the other ministers wanted one, so Qatar agreed to a more cautious version than what was first proposed. The communiques commits the group to lobbying the UNSC to postpone the indictments. Al-Mahmoud said he wants no part of it and has resisted several attempts to secure his participation, citing his busy schedule. Al-Mahmoud said, with a smile, "I'm not lying. I am very busy working on bringing peace to Darfur." Qatar, he said, would stay clear of pressuring the UNSC on indictments. Shortley responded that the U.S. believes the ICC process should take its course and the U.S. opposed an Article 16 deferral. BRINGING IN CIVIL SOCIETY -------------- ¶10. (C) Shortley reported on his just-ended meetings in Khartoum and told Al-Mahmoud he was encouraged that civil and tribal leaders, Arab and Fur, are preparing to announce their readiness for peace (Ref C). The Fur in particular have now indicated that they will participate without Abdul Wahid if necessary. ¶11. (C) Al-Mahmoud welcomed this development. He said building support from civil society, including tribal leaders and women, for peace is a key component of the plan he and Bassole are developing. DOHA 00000100 003 OF 003 ¶12. (U) Senior Representative for Sudan Tim Shortley has cleared this message. LeBaron