SCENESETTER FOR AFRICOM COMMANDER GENERAL WARD'S VISIT TO DJIBOUTI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 DJIBOUTI 000991 SIPDIS NOFORN STATE FOR AF, AF/E AND AF/RSA LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA-WATCHER AFRICOM AND CJTF-HOA FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/07/28 TAGS: MASS MOPS PREL KPKO DJ SO ER JA XA SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR AFRICOM COMMANDER GENERAL WARD'S VISIT TO DJIBOUTI REF: 09 DJIBOUTI 951; 09 DJIBOUTI 919; 09 DJIBOUTI 895 09 DJIBOUTI 881; IIR 6 830 0100 09; 09 DJIBOUTI 761; 09 DJIBOUTI 449 09 DJIBOUTI 309; 09 DJIBOUTI 255; 09 DJIBOUTI 38 CLASSIFIED BY: Eric Wong, Charge d'affaires, ad interim, U.S. Department of State, U.S. Embassy, Djibouti; REASON: 1.4(A),(D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Embassy Djibouti warmly welcomes AFRICOM Commander General Ward and his party to Djibouti. A stable, moderate Muslim ally, Djibouti not only hosts Camp Lemonier -- the only U.S. military base in Africa -- but also key USG broadcasting facilities used by Arabic-language Radio Sawa and the Voice of America Somali Service, the only USAID Food For Peace warehouse for pre-positioned emergency food relief outside CONUS, and naval refueling facilities for U.S. and coalition ships. Situated between Somalia and Eritrea, and adjacent to the Gulf of Aden, Djibouti's key political-military concerns currently focus on providing diplomatic and military support to Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG),led by President Sheikh Sharif; as well as on countering the persistent threat from Eritrea's continued occupation of Djiboutian territory along their common border, and from ethnic Afar rebels suspected to have infiltrated Djibouti from training camps in Eritrea. Despite the relatively small size of its armed forces (approximately 5,000),Djibouti is making significant contributions to promoting regional peace and security in the Horn of Africa: actively engaged in providing basic military training to approximately 500 Somali TFG recruits; monitoring Djibouti's border with Eritrea; and also working with other critical regional partners like Rwanda and Uganda to prepare for a large-scale field training exercise in November 2009 involving the African Union's East Africa Standby Force. Bilateral engagement with Djibouti remains robust: construction of a USD 120 million New Embassy Compound is now underway, scheduled for completion in 2011; and a resident defense attache (DATT) is scheduled to arrive in early September. The 2006 bilateral agreement on access to and use of Camp Lemonier imposes a September 30, 2009 deadline for the USG to inform the GODJ in writing of its intent to renew access to Camp Lemonier, with no change in terms, for the years 2010-2015. Japan, which now has approximately 150 troops resident on Camp Lemonier in support of counter-piracy operations, is expected to begin talks with the GODJ on establishing a separate Japanese military base, given Japan's long-term and strategic interests in the region. END SUMMARY. -------------- URGENT NEED TO BOLSTER SOMALI TFG FORCES -------------- ¶2. (C) Djibouti has provided significant diplomatic and military support to the TFG in neighboring Somalia, a country with whom a majority of the Djiboutian population shares a common language and ethnicity. Djibouti was instrumental in garnering international support for TFG President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, and hosted UN-sponsored Somali reconciliation talks from May 2008 to January ¶2009. This "Djibouti Peace Process" culminated in President Sharif's inauguration at Djibouti's Kempinski Hotel in January 2009, in the presence of international observers (including the U.S. Special Envoy for Somalia). These efforts were opposed by Hassan Dahir Aweys, formerly head of the Asmara-based extremist wing of the Alliance of the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS),and now head of Hizb al-Islam. ¶3. (C/NF) Deteriorating security conditions in Mogadishu have made strengthening military support of the TFG one of Djibouti's highest DJIBOUTI 00000991 002 OF 005 priorities. Djiboutian plans to assist with the military training of up to 1,000 TFG recruits have involved the most senior GODJ principals--including President Guelleh and the CHOD, Major General Fathi Ahmed Houssein. Foreign Minister Mahmoud Ali Youssouf has informed the USG that the GODJ provided at least two shipments of weapons to the TFG in May 2009 (ref E). At the direction of President Guelleh, beginning July 5, the GODJ began airlifting TFG recruits from cantonment areas in Mogadishu to Djibouti for basic military training, using charter aircraft. ¶4. (C) Somali TFG Foreign Minister Mohamed Abdullahi Omaar has highlighted Djibouti's training of 500 TFG recruits as a critical element in achieving the TFG's aim of training up to 3,000 recruits to form a new Somali army (ref B). The Djiboutian Armed Forces (FAD) are currently training approximately 500 Somali military recruits at the FAD's "President Gouled" Military School, its primary training center, located in Hol Hol, 45km southwest of Djibouti's capital. Training began in early July and is expected to last for approximately three months, ending in late September. FAD instructors are providing the recruits with basic infantry training; live-fire training commenced July 26. Senior U.S. officials, including VADM Moeller, visited the Hol Hol site on July ¶12. CJTF-HOA has delivered material items (including tents, cots, and water tanks) to Hol Hol, to support Djiboutian training efforts. ¶5. (C) Separately, French forces in Djibouti (FFDJ) anticipate training an additional 160 TFG forces (150 recruits and 10 officers) at French facilities in Arta, approximately 40km west of the capital. According to the Somali DCM, a first tranche of 43 TFG trainees arrived in Djibouti via commercial air on July 25, to begin training with French forces in Djibouti; at the same time, 300 TFG trainees reportedly arrived in Uganda for training by the UPDF. ¶6. (C) According to Djiboutian Foreign Minister Youssouf, Djibouti may also consider deploying a small contingent of troops to Mogadishu, in support of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM),should the AU allow frontline states bordering Somalia to contribute forces. -------------- REQUESTS FOR USG ASSISTANCE FOR TFG TRAINING -------------- ¶7. (C) Djibouti has requested material assistance from the USG to support its efforts to train and equip Somali TFG forces (ref A). On July 4, Djibouti's CHOD requested individual equipment (e.g., desert uniforms and other clothing items) and camp items (e.g., tents, cots, water bladders, and cooking materials) for 400 Somali TFG troops. Djibouti also seeks financial assistance to offset the cost of charter transport of the 500 trainees from Mogadishu to Djibouti. Additionally, Djiboutian Foreign Minister Youssouf has requested financial assistance from the USG for its two arms shipments to the TFG in May 2009. ¶8. (C) Regrettably, despite the availability of PKO funds for Somalia, Embassy Djibouti has been unable to formally commit the USG to a favorable response to any of these GODJ requests, pending the outcome of continuing interagency discussions. DJIBOUTI 00000991 003 OF 005 -------------- NO CHANGE IN BORDER STANDOFF WITH ERITREA -------------- ¶9. (C) Despite condemnation by the international community (e.g., AU, IGAD, UNSC, LAS, OIC),the Eritrean military continues to occupy fortified positions on Djiboutian territory at Ras Doumeira, a full year after June 2008 hostilities. Djibouti reports 19 FAD troops remain missing in action, including a prominent colonel; coincidentally, Djibouti is holding 19 Eritreans as POWs. The ICRC reports that the 19 POWs in Djiboutian custody are in good condition; Eritrea has refused to acknowledge that it is holding any POWs from Djibouti. Approximately 40 per cent of Djibouti's relatively modest (5,000-strong) military remains deployed at the border with Eritrea; Djibouti's Prime Minister has publicly asserted that this continued deployment costs USD 5 million/month, a figure that IMF officials assess may be accurate. To help reduce the necessity of maintaining so many Djiboutian troops along the border, the USG has provided imagery-derived analyses of Eritrean troop locations at the border to Djiboutian officials. ¶10. (C) Djibouti also asserts that it has captured several ethnic Afar rebels who infiltrated Djibouti to conduct subversion, after being trained at camps in Eritrea (refs F, J). ¶11. (C) On the diplomatic front, Djibouti seeks international sanctions against Eritrea -- for its military occupation of Djiboutian territory, as well as for its support of al-Shabaab extremists in Somalia. -------------- EASBRIG FTX SCHEDULED FOR NOVEMBER 2009 -------------- ¶12. (C) Despite the security challenges posed by its immediate neighbors, Somalia and Eritrea, Djibouti plans to host a large-scale field training exercise (FTX) on behalf of the African Union's East African Standby Force (EASBRIG),in November 2009. The FTX is to involve 1,500 troops as well as 400 support personnel, and may include a sealift element. Final decisions on EASBRIG member country participation and contributions will be made at an August 2-3 meeting of regional defense ministers (ref C). To date, countries that plan to participate include Djibouti, Kenya, Rwanda, and Uganda; Burundi has stated it will not participate (likely due to its deployment in support of the African Union Mission in Somalia). According to EASBRIG Commander, Brigadier General Osman Nour Soubagleh (one of four flag officers in the Djiboutian military),the GODJ will likely seek tents, sanitation equipment (e.g., portable toilets),support for site preparations, and local ground transportation from the USG (ref C). Representatives of potential donor governments (including the USG) have urged that the EASBRIG FTX be scaled down in scope; Djiboutian military officers assert, however, that Djibouti can execute the EASBRIG FTX at the same time that it is training TFG forces and monitoring the border with Eritrea. -------------- -------------- BILATERAL ENGAGEMENT TO STRENGTHEN MARITIME CAPABILITIES DJIBOUTI 00000991 004 OF 005 -------------- -------------- ¶13. (C) Your visit to Djibouti follows senior military engagement by other AFRICOM principals: VADM Moeller visited Djiboutian training of TFG recruits at Hol Hol on July 12; AFRICOM Deputy Amb. Yates visited in March 2009 (ref H). Your participation in a July 30 ribbon-cutting ceremony with the Commander of the Djiboutian Navy, COL Abdourahman Aden Cher, marks the launch earlier this month of a U.S. Navy harbor security unit at the Port of Djibouti to provide improved force protection to visiting U.S. ships. The USG obtained GODJ concurrence to establish the USN harbor security unit in an April 2009 meeting by NAVEURAFSWA Commander RADM Mercer with Djiboutian National Security Advisor Hassan Said Khaireh (ref G); this concurrence was codified in a formal MOU signed between COL Cher and the Camp Lemonier commanding officer. ¶14. (U) Earlier this month, a full-time U.S. Navy liaison officer (O-3 level) began a three-month assignment to Djiboutian Navy headquarters -- fulfilling a long-term request by Djiboutian Navy Commander, COL Cher, for a USN LNO. The presence of a USN LNO at Djiboutian Navy headquarters highlights the number of Embassy-managed security assistance projects aimed at strengthening Djibouti's maritime capabilities, including: the provision of patrol boats to the Djiboutian Navy; the December 2008 completion of the USD 14 million FMF-financed Obock naval pier (approximately 75 km south of the strategic Bab-al-Mandeb Strait); and ongoing installation of an USD 8 million Regional Maritime Awareness Capability (RMAC),comprising AIS, coastal radar, and the establishment of an operations center for the Djiboutian Navy. In addition, the Embassy is coordinating with the U.S. Department of Energy's National Nuclear Safety Administration (DOE/NNSA) on a USD 6 million "Megaports" project to install sensors at the Port of Djibouti's new Doraleh Container Terminal, which will detect the transshipment of radioactive materials. Construction is slated to begin in 2010. -------------- RENEWING CAMP LEMONIER AGREEMENT -------------- ¶15. (C) During a visit in mid-June 2009, DASD Huddleston verbally informed Foreign Minister Youssouf of the USG's intent to exercise its option to renew the May 2006 Implementing Arrangement, for access to and use of Camp Lemonier. The May 2006 Implementing Arrangement (signed in Washington, DC, by then DASD Whalen) expires September 30, 2010. However, it may be extended for two five-year periods (i.e., 2010-2015 and 2015-2020) "without renegotiation of terms or compensation" if the USG provides written notice in advance (i.e., by September 30, 2009, and September 30, 2014 respectively). As of July 28, draft language for a formal diplomatic note to the GODJ was under review by the Department of State, following clearance by OSD. Embassy Djibouti strongly favors seeking extension, with no change in current terms or compensation. ¶16. (U) Djibouti continues to serve as a key hub for international counter-piracy operations, including the EU's "Atalanta" naval task force, and a historic overseas deployment by the Japanese military. The foreign ministers of Japan and Djibouti signed a bilateral status of forces agreement (SOFA) in Tokyo on April 4, 2009. Beginning on May 31, Japan deployed approximately 150 Japanese Self-Defense Force (JSDF) troops to Camp Lemonier, to support two P-3C maritime reconnaissance aircraft conducting counter-piracy DJIBOUTI 00000991 005 OF 005 missions off the coast of Somalia. In addition, Japan has deployed two destroyers to Djibouti for counter-piracy operations (ref I). ¶17. (C) Japanese diplomats report that Japan seeks to establish its own military base in Djibouti, likely in the vicinity of Camp Lemonier, due to plans for a long-term presence in Djibouti. According to Japanese contacts, strategic interests led to Japan's parliament revising the constitution to expand the Japanese contingent's rules of engagement; approximately 10 per cent of international shipping going through the Bab-Al-Mandeb Strait is Japanese, including all of Japan's automobile exports to Europe. WONG