SOMALIA: TFG FOREIGN MINISTER COMMENTS ON MILITARY AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DJIBOUTI 000919

SIPDIS
STATE FOR AF/E AND AF/RSA
NAIROBI FOR SOMALIA UNIT
AFRICOM AND CJTF-HOA FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/07/14
TAGS: PREL MASS MOPS KPKO AU SO DJ ER ET XA
SUBJECT: SOMALIA: TFG FOREIGN MINISTER COMMENTS ON MILITARY AND
DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO COMBAT AL-SHABAAB

CLASSIFIED BY: Eric Wong, DCM, U.S. Department of State, U.S.
Embassy, Djibouti; REASON: 1.4(A),(B),(D)


1. (C) SUMMARY. Djibouti's ongoing effort to train nearly 500
troops for Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG) is
"critical" for achieving the TFG's aim of training up to 3,000
recruits to form a new Somali army, according to Somali TFG Foreign
Minister Mohamed Abdullahi Omaar, who hopes to have additional
tranches of troops arriving every two months. Force generation
(possibly by recruiting from Puntland and Somaliland) and forming
an officer corps from the Somali diaspora are other objectives for
the TFG military. Omaar, who is from Hargeisa, also signaled
interest in exploring closer TFG security cooperation with
Somaliland and Puntland, even without first resolving their
long-term political status. On the diplomatic front, a July 10
IGAD ministerial highlighted the need to strengthen the mandate for
the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM),while relaxing
AMISOM's rules of engagement. TFG FM Omaar, Djiboutian FM
Youssouf, and Ugandan FM Kutesa plan to travel to New York to lobby
the UNSC on these points, as well as on imposing sanctions on
Eritrea for its support to terrorist al-Shabaab fighters. END
SUMMARY.




2. (C) Ambassador and DCM met on July 12 with Somali TFG Foreign
Minister Mohamed Abdullahi Omaar and Abdirahman Mohamed Hirabe, DCM
of Somalia's Embassy in Djibouti. Earlier in the day, Emboffs and
U.S. military personnel paid a separate visit to Djibouti's
military school at Hol Hol, where the GODJ is training nearly 500
TFG troops (septel).



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TRAINING IN DJIBOUTI "CRITICAL" TO FORMATION OF SOMALI ARMY

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3. (C) FM Omaar expressed appreciation for Djibouti's ongoing
efforts to train nearly 500 TFG military recruits (approximately
466 had arrived since July 5),noting that recruits had begun to
assemble in Mogadishu since May 2009. Formation of a national
Somali army had been the TFG's objective since hard-liner Hassan
Dahir Aweys had returned to Somalia on April 23. Training in
Djibouti was therefore "critical" to the aim of training
2,000-3,000 troops; Omaar said he hoped additional tranches of
recruits would arrive in Djibouti every two months for training.
The "most difficult" objective of training was to instill a sense
of discipline and order. Separately, some 575 TFG troops had
graduated from nine months of training in Uganda.




4. (C) TFG forces could also draw on youth abandoning al-Shabaab.
As 15- to 17-year-old youths were often "enticed into al-Shabaab"
on a clan basis, many sought to cross over to the TFG. Several
hundred had done so within the last few days, Omaar said, but the
challenge was how to facilitate such forces doing so safely.



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CRITICAL NEED FOR OFFICERS AND HARDWARE

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5. (C) A "critical gap" in the Somali national security forces was
the absence of a professional officer corps, Omaar added. The TFG
was therefore approaching some 10-20 former officers from the Siad
Barre-era (army captains to colonels, i.e., 0-3 to 0-6 level, as
general officers were too old) to have them return from East Africa
and the UK for service in Somalia. Even these officers, however,
had been out of service so long that they required refresher

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training.




6. (C) The TFG sought to develop a military strategy that would
allow TFG forces to cover an area larger than just Mogadishu's port
and airport, Omaar said. He hailed July l2 military operations as
successful, observing that AMISOM's recent deployment of tanks in
Mogadishu had boosted the confidence of TFG troops, and had helped
drive al-Shabaab fighters out of the Karan district. TFG ground
forces were now conducting house-to-house searches for al-Shabaab
fighters who had fled. (NOTE: We understand that the TFG may
later have lost these gains. END NOTE.) Al-Shabaab could not take
Mogadishu so long as AMISOM was present, Omaar added.




7. (C) On prospects for additional AMISOM forces, Omaar said Sierra
Leone's foreign and defense ministers had asserted to him that one
battalion from Sierra Leone was ready to deploy. Nigeria, on the
other hand, was not ready. Omar said he was satisfied with Kenya's
decision to have its forces advance toward Somalia to "close the
border", but not enter Somalia.



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SOMALILAND MUST RECOGNIZE THREAT FROM AL-SHABAAB

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8. (C) The TFG was examining recruiting troops from among
unemployed youth in relatively stable regions of Somalia,
specifically Puntland and Somaliland, Omaar said. While the
remainder of Somalia was engaged in a critical struggle against
al-Shabaab, these areas were "doing nothing." Recruitment would be
done on "an individual basis," not through Somaliland government
authorities.




9. (C) Citing the October 29, 2008, terrorist bombings in Hargeisa
and Bosasso--which included the Somaliland presidential palace--FM
Omaar observed that Somaliland could not "ignore the issue of the
al-Shabaab." If al-Shabaab took over Mogadishu and Kismayo, then
"Hargeisa would be the next target." Stabilizing Mogadishu was in
the TFG and Somaliland's common interest; perhaps a "modus vivendi
limited to the security sector" could be jointly established to
address the threat posed by al-Shabaab.




10. (C) Omaar, himself originally from Hargeisa, noted that most
TFG parliamentarians had spouses residing in Hargeisa; two key
al-Shabaab leaders were also from Somaliland. Asked whether
September 27 elections in Somaliland could present political
obstacles for Somaliland engagement with the TFG, Omaar said he
hoped all three Somaliland political parties could agree on the
need to cooperate with the TFG against al-Shabaab.



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IGAD MINISTERS TO LOBBY THE UNSC

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11. (C) On the diplomatic front, FM Omaar highlighted the aim of
obtaining a more aggressive mandate, and more relaxed rules of
engagement (ROE),for AMISOM. Omaar asserted that, on the margins
of the July 1-3 African Union Summit in Sirte, AU Peace and

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Security Commissioner Ramtane Lamamra had agreed to change AMISOM's
ROE.




12. (C) Building on consensus within the AU's Peace and Security
Council, the 33rd Extra-ordinary Session of the IGAD Council of
Ministers had agreed on July 10 on an action plan to approach the
UN Security Council. Omar said that Djiboutian Foreign Minister
Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, Ugandan Foreign Minister Sam Kutesa, and
himself would appear before the UNSC to advocate strengthening
AMISOM's mandate, relaxing AMISOM's rules of engagement, allowing
states bordering Somalia (i.e., Kenya and Djibouti) to contribute
troops to AMISOM, and imposing sanctions against Eritrea for its
support to al-Shabaab. Omaar characterized Djibouti as "absolutely
committed" to supporting the TFG. Djibouti, Kenya, and Uganda all
saw Somalia as "a regional issue"--not as simply a feud between two
rival factions.



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ETHIOPIA WILL NOT SEND TROOPS TO SOMALIA

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13. (C) Despite currently holding the IGAD presidency, Ethiopia
"stood back" to allow others within IGAD to take the lead on
Somalia: Ethiopia neither offered troops for AMISOM, nor planned
to participate in the IGAD delegation to New York, Omaar said.
Once the AMISOM mandate was changed to permit bordering countries
to send troops, it would be "essential" for Ethiopia to publicly
announce it did not intend to send troops to Somalia; the TFG would
then acknowledge such a statement, Omaar said, noting that it was
important to "exempt" both Ethiopia and Eritrea from Somalia.
According to Omaar, at Sirte, Ethopian Prime Minister Meles had
told the TFG that he did not believe it necessary for the Ethiopian
military to enter Somalia.




14. (C) FM Omaar hailed the July 9 UNSC presidential statement
(PRST) as "very positive," especially for its consideration of
sanctions, and welcomed the U.S. PermRep's statement. It was
essential to "shut off the tap" for Eritrea, Omaar said, adding
that even "token measures" (such as a travel ban on Eritrean
leadership) provided a significant psychological boost to forces
fighting against al-Shabaab.




15. (C) COMMENT. Djibouti played a key role in Somali
reconciliation, hosting UN-sponsored talks that culminated in
power-sharing agreements and the election of Sheikh Sharif as TFG
President. Recent events not only highlight the active steps that
regional actors are taking to strengthen the TFG and AMISOM's
capacity and mandate, but also the growing international consensus
-- among IGAD members and within the African Union -- that Eritrea
must be sanctioned for its support of FTO-designated al-Shabaab.
END COMMENT.
SWAN