DJIBOUTI: PRESIDENT GUELLEH ON SOMALIA, ERITREA, AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DJIBOUTI 000913 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/07/13 TAGS: PREL PGOV MASS PINS DJ ER EG QA LY SO SUBJECT: DJIBOUTI: PRESIDENT GUELLEH ON SOMALIA, ERITREA, AND DOMESTIC ELECTIONS REF: 09 DJIBOUTI 893; 09 DJIBOUTI 881 CLASSIFIED BY: James Swan, Ambassador; REASON: 1.4(A),(B),(D) 1.(C) Summary: Djiboutian President Ismail Omar Guelleh reviewed key regional concerns with Ambassador July 12. Guelleh said that Egypt, Libya, and Qatar - prompted by their antipathy to Ethiopia -- are playing unhelpful roles in Somalia that undermine the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). Urging stronger support for the TFG, Guelleh thanked the USG for its modest material assistance to the GODJ military, which is training TFG forces, but said much more aid is needed. The border dispute with Eritrea is static, as the Asmara government has shifted to an indirect strategy of fomenting instability through disaffected domestic groups within Djibouti. Guelleh urged strong action to sanction Eritrea at the planned July 21 UN Security Council meeting on the Djibouti-Eritrea border dispute. Regarding the need to ensure credible presidential elections in 2011, Guelleh stressed Djibouti's traditions of dialogue and tolerance and rued the weakness of the current opposition, but acknowledged the importance of creating conditions to encourage opposition participation. Djibouti will be engaged in the next two months in a busy period of diplomatic activity centered on Eritrea and Somalia at the United Nations, as well as continuing material support for the beleaguered TFG. Guelleh seeks further USG assistance in both efforts. End summary. ¶2. (U) Ambassador met morning July 12 at his request for approximately one hour with Djiboutian President Ismail Omar Guelleh, who was joined for part of the meeting by Foreign Minister Mahmoud Ali Youssouf. Guelleh began by reviewing the heavy development challenges facing Djibouti: funding the GODJ's increased commitment to healthcare (which now accounts for 12% of GDP, up from just 4% five years ago),creating education and employment opportunities for youth, satisfying growing demand for electricity, and other key inputs for growth. The conversation then quickly turned to regional security developments. Egypt, Libya, Qatar Undermine Somali TFG -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) Guelleh warned that multiple international actors are "torpedoing" the TFG - not because they support the insurgents, but because they see this as an indirect way to punish Ethiopia. While Eritrea is the most obvious example, there are others. He ascribed Egypt's motives to longstanding differences with Ethiopia over sharing Nile waters. Guelleh repeated concerns raised by Foreign Minister Youssouf on July 9 (ref A) that the Egyptian Government sought recently to open a new round of "peace talks" that would have weakened the legitimacy of the "Djibouti process" and by extension TFG President Sheikh Sharif and his government. Libya's "Brother Leader" has personal antipathy toward Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles, whom he fears as a rival for African leadership. Qatar, which has broken relations with Ethiopia, continues to use Eritrea and its proxies in Somalia as an instrument against Addis. He noted that Qatar-based "Al Jazeera" has established its Mogadishu office in an al-Shabaab-controlled zone, and has blatantly featured programming intended to undercut the TFG (e.g., a report contrasting Mogadishu's suffering with the comparative prosperity in Kismayo, under al-Shabaab control). Guelleh urged that the U.S. use its influence in Cairo and Doha, and its improving relationship with Tripoli, to dissuade further moves against the TFG. Somali TFG Trainees Need Further Support -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) The TFG needs additional military support, Guelleh said. The GODJ is now training TFG forces in Djibouti (ref B). He said there are approximately 460 trainees at Hol Hol who have DJIBOUTI 00000913 002 OF 003 undergone initial screening and medical evaluations. A small number (fewer than 10) have already been sent back to Somalia for failure to pass their medical tests (weak eyesight, bullet-wounds that prevent mobility, etc.). Ambassador reviewed recent USG financial and indirect military assistance to the TFG, and also outlined in-kind support from Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) for the Djiboutian forces. Guelleh expressed appreciation for this aid, but said the material support to the Djiboutian training site so far was "not much" ("pas important") and requested significant augmentation. (Note: The GODJ has provided a detailed list of equipment needs for the trainees, as well as a request for transportation of trainees to/from Mogadishu. Post has forwarded these requests to AF/RSA. End note.) Eritrea Shifts Strategy; Djibouti Wants Sanctions -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) Guelleh explained that, while the Djibouti/Eritrea border conflict remained static, with no new fighting since June 2008, the Eritreans are now pursuing a new strategy. In keeping with their approach elsewhere in the region, Asmara is trying to foment instability in Djibouti by exploiting disaffected youth from Djibouti's northern Afar community. Foreign Minister Youssouf interjected that the African Union made clear in Sirte its support for sanctions against Eritrea. Even Libya, which in the past had sought to protect Eritrea, has acquiesced in this call for sanctions, he said. The GODJ now intended to pursue them aggressively at the scheduled July 21 UNSC meeting on the Djibouti/Eritrea border dispute. Djibouti fully understands the need for an African lead in this effort, and looks to Uganda (with its non-permanent seat on the Security Council and holding the UNSC presidency in July) to play this role. Discreet Dialogue on 2011 Election Planning -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) Ambassador urged Guelleh to begin now to plan for credible presidential and regional elections in Djibouti in spring 2011. Ambassador noted that he had begun a discreet dialogue on this topic already with the Prime Minister, Interior Minister, Communications Minister, and senior presidential advisors. As Djibouti's development strategy is based on being a stable and reliable business and service hub in a turbulent region, further progress on democracy and transparency would reinforce this position. Some modest overtures to the opposition parties that boycotted the last presidential elections could encourage their participation, and enhance the fairness and credibility of the process. ¶7. (C) Guelleh noted that several opposition parties were meeting this week in Brussels to coordinate their programs. He lamented the weakness and lack of national program or vision of the opposition groups that are outside the governing coalition (which includes the most prominent former rebel/opposition group, the "Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy," or FRUD). He reviewed Djibouti's history of tolerance and dialogue within its small population. While Foreign Minister Youssouf dismissed the notion that the government should reach out to try to create conditions for increased opposition participation (asking rhetorically "why would we help strengthen those who want to unseat us?") Guelleh was more receptive, noting that - whatever the reasons the opposition might opt to stay out of the contest - the government would pay a price in both domestic and international criticism. He acknowledged that it would be important for the government to take steps well before the election to address areas in which it is criticized by the opposition (e.g., media freedom). Guelleh did not specifically address the possibility that he would seek to amend the constitution and run for a third term; Youssouf DJIBOUTI 00000913 003 OF 003 volunteered that the President had made no decision in this regard. Comment -------------- ¶8. (C) Guelleh was relaxed and jovial throughout this wide-ranging but rather general conversation. Even while grappling with the significant development challenges of his small and poor country, Guelleh is focused on regional security issues: notably Somalia and Eritrea. Drawing on its meager financial and personnel resources, Djibouti continues to support the TFG materially (including through training of TFG recruits) and diplomatically (including mobilizing regional support for the TFG and pursuing sanctions against spoilers such as Eritrea). The GODJ seeks further USG support in these areas. Guelleh's openness to ideas for further democratic reforms reinforces our impression -- based on conversations with numerous other senior GODJ officials -- that there is an opportunity for a discreet U.S.-Djibouti dialogue on democracy/governance, grounded in our strong bilateral relationship and common interest in maintaining Djibouti as a pocket of peace and stability in this turbulent region. ¶9. (U) Minimize considered. SWAN