SOMALIA: TFG CONFIRMS PLANS TO TRAIN TROOPS IN DJIBOUTI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DJIBOUTI 000837 SIPDIS STATE FOR AF/FO, AF/E, AF/RSA AND PM NAIROBI FOR SOMALIA UNIT LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA-WATCHER AFRICOM AND CJTF-HOA FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/06/25 TAGS: MOPS MASS PREL PINS PTER SO DJ UG SUBJECT: SOMALIA: TFG CONFIRMS PLANS TO TRAIN TROOPS IN DJIBOUTI REF: 09 DJIBOUTI 765; 09 DJIBOUTI 743; 09 DJIBOUTI 563 09 DJIBOUTI 555; 09 DJIBOUTI 525 DJIBOUTI 00000837 001.2 OF 003 CLASSIFIED BY: Eric Wong, DCM, U.S. Department of State, U.S. Embassy, Djibouti; REASON: 1.4(A),(B),(D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. A senior Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG) military officer meeting with Djibouti's Chief of Defense reports that the TFG now has 1,000 fighters assembled in Mogadishu ready to undergo training immediately in Djibouti, as soon as transport is arranged. These 1,000 are not troops currently engaged in combat, but rather new recruits who therefore require basic infantry training as well as supplies and equipment. Among other IGAD countries, only Uganda has accepted to train 600 additional TFG troops. TFG officials noted the prevalence of foreign fighters among the al-Shabaab--primarily from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Indonesia and Malaysia--and appealed for USG military and financial assistance to allow the TFG to defeat al-Shabaab forces. END SUMMARY. -------------- -- TFG READY NOW TO TRAIN 1,000 TROOPS IN DJIBOUTI -------------- -- ¶2. (C) Ambassador, DCM, and Security Cooperation Officer (SCO) chief met on June 25 with Somali TFG representatives Colonel Mahdi Arif Ali ("M.A.A.") and Abdirahman Mohamed Hirabe, DCM of Somalia's Embassy to Djibouti. Col. Mahdi, a Soviet-trained former pilot and artillery officer who first joined Somalia's army in the 1960s, stated that he was the senior of three officials (the other two are in Mogadishu) responsible for overseeing military training for the TFG. Mahdi said his primary Djiboutian interlocutors were Major General (MG) Fathi A. Houssein and MG Zakaria Cheikh Ibrahim, Djibouti's Chief of Defense (CHOD) and Deputy CHOD, respectively. ¶3. (C) Mahdi confirmed that the detailed list of 420 Somali fighters ready for training in Djibouti (provided June 24 by Djibouti's Republic Guard commander to Embassy, and subsequently forwarded to AF/E, AF/RSA and Embassy Nairobi Somalia Unit) had originated from him. In fact, Mahdi said, the TFG had a total of 1,000 Somali fighters assembled in Mogadishu who were now available for training in Djibouti. The 1,000 were not currently engaged in combat, but rather were new recruits, he said, and therefore were ready to be trained immediately. ¶4. (C) The 1,000 Somali recruits lacked any formal military training, and therefore required basic infantry skills, Mahdi said. The TFG also sought to provide 210 of the 1,000 with additional training in close-in protection support (i.e., as protective security details for key TFG officials). While basic training normally required 6 months, the TFG was willing to accept a 3-month "crash course" due to the urgent security situation in Somalia, Mahdi said. He clarified that the TFG preferred ideally to have all 1,000 troops trained in Djibouti at once in a single 3-month tranche, rather than have three separate 3-month tranches (as proposed by the GODJ),as the TFG could not afford to wait for 9 months. -------------- -------------- FRANCE AND UGANDA TO SUPPORT OTHER MILITARY TRAINING -------------- -------------- DJIBOUTI 00000837 002.2 OF 003 ¶5. (C) Col. Mahdi confirmed that in addition to the Somali fighters to be trained immediately by Djibouti, the TFG planned to train an additional 500-person battalion in Djibouti "in late September" with French assistance. Rwanda had already trained 300 troops, who had returned to Mogadishu but were insufficient to defend the TFG. As for other IGAD countries, Uganda had agreed to train 600 troops, who were "ready" to be sent to Uganda; Kenya was only providing capacity-building training for Somali civil servants; and Ethiopia had now ceased any training of TFG forces. ¶6. (C) According to Col. Mahdi, TFG military forces included 1,300 professional military from the former Somali army, but the remainder were clan-based militia. Noting that Somalia's formal military had been "destroyed," he underscored the TFG's lack of military equipment. Mahdi also appealed for better armaments for the TFG, as it would not be able to prevail against opposition al-Shabaab forces who currently had the same weaponry as the TFG. Despite recent pledges of financial support from the international community, such aid was not visible in Mogadishu, where al-Shabaab forces could pay youth USD 10/day. -------------- - FOREIGN FIGHTERS AIDING AL-SHABAAB AGAINST TFG -------------- - ¶7. (C) Mahdi appealed for military and financial assistance from the USG, expressing concern that Somalia could become a "base for terrorism." Those threatening the TFG were not "ordinary fighters" but terrorists fighting in Somalia on behalf of al-Shabaab. Many were foreign fighters, both "black and white", including an American: Abu Mansour "Al-Amriki." The largest contingent of such foreign fighters were "Asians" -- from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Malaysia. Others hailed from Australia, Europe, the United Kingdom, the United States, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia. Mahdi asserted that al-Shabaab members received financial support and training from al-Qaida, as well as some support from maritime piracy. Mahdi also said some Islamic Union (i.e., possibly Hizb-Islam) members received unspecified support from Eritrea. ¶8. (C) Questioned about press reports that military commander General Yusuf Dhumal had been seriously wounded and subsequently medevacced to Djibouti, Col. Mahdi and Hirabe confirmed that Dhumal had been wounded in the leg, but was being treated at an AMISOM hospital in Mogadishu and was "still working." Hirabe acknowledged that the TFG had medevacced 28 casualties to Djibouti's Peltier Hospital on June 23, 5 of whom suffered "very serious" wounds. Hirabe lamented that, increasingly, victims of violence in Somalia were from civil society, rather than combatants; he also expected that additional casualties would be medevacced to Djibouti in the future. ¶9. (C) COMMENT. Colonel Mahdi's observations indicate that the GODJ's recent requests for USG assistance (e.g., for transport and materiel) to help train Somali TFG forces are consistent with the TFG's urgent needs. Furthermore, Mahdi made clear that even if troops are trained in other countries in the region (e.g., 600 in Uganda),the TFG plans for Djibouti to play an instrumental role in training Somali security forces (up to 1,000 now, and another 500 with French assistance this fall). SCO will meet again with GODJ military contacts after Djiboutian National Day (June 27) to review a more detailed training plan. Based on both GODJ and now TFG information, however, we expect training in Djibouti to proceed shortly, giving new urgency to the GODJ request to the USG for assistance with transport, material, and arms/ammunition to support DJIBOUTI 00000837 003.2 OF 003 the training. END COMMENT. SWAN