JAPANESE TROOPS EN ROUTE TO DJIBOUTI TO COMBAT SOMALI PIRACY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 DJIBOUTI 000255 C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - ADDING SIPDIS CAPTION SIPDIS SENSITIVE STATE FOR AF/E, EAP/J, AND PM/PPA AFRICOM, PACOM, AND CJTF-HOA FOR POLAD LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA-WATCHER E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019-03-29 TAGS: PREL PHSA MARR MOPS EWWT JA DJ SO XA SUBJECT: JAPANESE TROOPS EN ROUTE TO DJIBOUTI TO COMBAT SOMALI PIRACY REF: DJIBOUTI 156 (NOTAL); 09 TOKYO 472 (NOTAL) DJIBOUTI 00000255 001.2 OF 004 CLASSIFIED BY: Eric Wong, DCM, U.S. Department of State, U.S. Embassy, Djibouti; REASON: 1.4(A),(B),(D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. In anticipation of signing a SOFA on April 3 with Djibouti's foreign minister, two Japanese destroyers, each with 200-man crews, are expected to arrive in Djibouti in the next ten days to conduct counter-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia. They will be joined in May by two Japanese P-3C maritime surveillance aircraft, and possibly by a C-130 transport plane. While sailors will remain berthed on their ships, Japan seeks to deploy another 100-200 troops to support these assets from the U.S. military base at Camp Lemonier. Despite ship armaments, the Japanese Self Defense Forces (JSDF) are to observe rules of engagement similar to Japanese police--firing only if fired upon--and plan to transport captured pirates to Japan for prosecution. Highlighting that 10 per cent of ships transiting the strategic Bab-al-Mandeb Strait (between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden) are carrying Japanese cargo or crews, the duration of Japan's historic naval deployment is "open-ended". END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) DCM and PAO (Japanese-speaker) met with Addis Ababa-based Japanese polchief Masaki Morimoto on March 24. Morimoto confirmed Japan's deployment of two destroyers to conduct counter-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia, as well as the likely deployment to Djibouti of two P-3C maritime surveillance aircraft (ref A)--and possibly a C-130 transport plane in the near future. He confirmed that both the ships and the aircraft would be based in Djibouti; Yemen and Oman remained alternate sites. -------------- -------------- TWO DESTROYERS TO CONDUCT COUNTER-PIRACY MISSIONS -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) According to Morimoto, two Japanese Self Defense Force (JSDF) destroyers--the JS Sazanami and the JS Samidare, each with a crew of nearly 200 sailors--had departed Kure (Hiroshima prefecture),Japan, on March 14 and were scheduled to arrive in the Gulf of Aden on approximately March 30, depending on tides. The ships would enter Djibouti for 2-3 days between April 5-8 (as the change of command ceremony for the EU's Operation Atalanta counter-piracy naval task force was scheduled for April 6). The two ships would engage in convoy escort missions over a six-month period, before being relieved by similar class ships. ¶4. (SBU) Japanese Ministry of Defense fact sheets provided by Morimoto (forwarded by Post to AF/RSA, EAP/J, and PM/PPA) note that the JS Sazanami (DD Takanami class) and JS Samidare (DD Murasame DJIBOUTI 00000255 002.2 OF 004 class) are each equipped with 12.7mm machine guns, 2 x 20mm close-in weapon systems, 2 triple torpedo tubes, a vertical launching system (VLS) with short-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) and anti-submarine rocket (ASROC) launchers, and a patrol helicopter. In addition, the JS Sazanami has a 127mm/54 rapid-fire gun; the JS Samidare has a 76mm/62 rapid-fire gun. Each ship has a maximum speed of 30 knots, carries a crew of approximately 200, and carries two "special mobile ships" (likely rigid-hulled inflatable boats). On each ship, 4 Japanese Coast Guard officials will be on aboard to execute "judicial police duties." -------------- -------------- RULES OF ENGAGEMENT: ONLY FIRE IF FIRED UPON FIRST -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) Morimoto said the navy would mirror rules of engagement (ROE) used by Japanese police: ships would not permitted to fire, unless fired upon first. Japan's Diet was currently debating whether ships could fire when suspected pirates came within 50 meters--the minimum distance by which "the naked eye" could determine whether a suspected pirate's intent was malicious or not. Morimoto complained that the death or injury of a Japanese sailor may be necessary to prompt the Diet to review ROE. -------------- JAPAN PLANS TO FLY SUSPECTED PIRATES TO JAPAN -------------- ¶6. (C) According to Morimoto, while Japan seeks prosecution agreements with Kenya and the UK, Japan currently plans to fly suspected pirates (if captured by Japanese forces) via a 20-seat Japanese Coast Guard jet from Djibouti to Japan for prosecution. Flights would transit Singapore, due to mandated crew rest. Initially detained at sea, the JSDF would transport suspected pirates to Djibouti by either helicopter or boat; then to Djibouti's airport by car, for onward transit to Japan. Given Japan's continued non-recognition of Somalia, Morimoto said it was unclear whether convicted pirates would ultimately be deported to Somalia. Morimoto acknowledged that numerous technical issues relating to prosecution remained unresolved, including the lack of Somali speakers in Japan. -------------- P-3C AIRCREWS TO BE HOUSED AT U.S. BASE DJIBOUTI 00000255 003.2 OF 004 -------------- ¶7. (C) Morimoto said that 2 JSDF P-3C aircraft would arrive in May 2009: one would be stationed at the U.S. military base, Camp Lemonier; the other at the civilian air terminal at Djibouti's Ambouli international airport. A third P-3C may arrive in 2010. Morimoto added that Japan may also deploy one C-130 transport plane at the civilian air terminal. ¶8. (C) While the 400 sailors would live aboard ship, another 100-200 Japanese troops--"depending on how much we can outsource"--would be housed at Camp Lemonier. Providing security, technical assistance, and routine maintenance for the Japanese assets stationed in Djibouti, the Japanese troops at Camp Lemonier would be a joint force under the command of a Japanese navy captain, and would observe the Camp's liberty restrictions (e.g., midnight curfew). For medical contingencies, Japan was discussing using the French military hospital (Bouffard) with France, although 1-2 Japanese military doctors might be seconded to Camp Lemonier's on-base Emergency Medical Facility (EMF). ¶9. (C) Underscoring the historical significance of this first-ever post-war deployment abroad of the Japanese air force, Morimoto said Djibouti's foreign minister was expected to participate in an April 3 ceremony in Tokyo, to sign a status of forces agreement (SOFA) between Djibouti and Japan. -------------- - DIET LIKELY TO ADOPT LEGISLATION IN LATE APRIL -------------- - ¶10. (C) Currently, Japanese forces being deployed could protect only Japanese interests, Morimoto said: Japanese-flagged vessels, or foreign vessels carrying either Japanese cargo or even a single Japanese crew member. Under this definition, some 10 per cent of the 2,000 ships transiting the Bab-al-Mandeb Strait annually were "Japanese interests," Morimoto noted. ¶11. (C) Morimoto anticipated legislation authorizing Japanese participation in an expanded counter-piracy mission to be adopted before Japanese "Golden Week" holidays in early May. PM Aso would likely wait until after the legislation's adoption, he said, to dissolve parliament and call for elections. Currently, opposition party members in the Upper House of the Diet were seeking to amend a bill, so that only Japan's Coast Guard (using Japanese military naval assets)--but not Japan's navy--would be authorized to take DJIBOUTI 00000255 004.2 OF 004 part in the counter-piracy mission. -------------- JAPANESE DEPLOYMENT "OPEN-ENDED" IN DURATION -------------- ¶12. (C) Asked how long Japan planned to deploy naval assets off the coast of Somalia, Morimoto said the deployment was "open-ended" with "no limitations"; some Japanese military planners had discussed Japanese forces being deployed (on a rotational basis) for as long as 10 years, he said. ¶13. (C) Despite this, Japan had no immediate plans to establish a permanent diplomatic mission in Djibouti, Morimoto said. Instead, Japan would continue staffing temporary "liaison offices" out of hotel rooms in Djibouti, manned by 1 foreign ministry official and 3 defense ministry officials on two-week TDYs. Morimoto expressed confidence in Japan's honorary consul in Djibouti, Djiboutian businessman Mourad Farah. (NOTE: Mourad's brother, Rachad Farah, is arguably one of Djibouti's most prominent diplomats: he was Djibouti's ambassador to Japan for 16 years, has a Japanese wife, and currently serves as Djibouti's ambassador to France. END NOTE.) ¶14. (C) COMMENT. Significantly, Morimoto refrained from any discussion of possible compensation by Japan for its anticipated use of U.S. military facilities in Djibouti, noting that "technical" details remained to be worked out by U.S. and Japanese military planners. Japan's planned deployment highlights that a growing number of East Asian military forces (e.g., Korea, Singapore) are planning to come to Djibouti, where EU and other coalition forces are already conducting counter-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia. Japanese Embassy officials are acutely aware of the sensitivity of this historic deployment, going so far as to cancel any plans for an on-board ship reception upon arrival in Djibouti, so as to avoid media coverage of JSDF "drinking champagne" instead of combating piracy. END COMMENT. SWAN