DAS WYCOFF DISCUSSES SOMALIA AND ERITREA WITH DJIBOUTIAN FOREIGN MINISTER

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 DJIBOUTI 001425



SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF, AF/E, AND AF/RSA

LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA-WATCHER

AFRICOM AND CJTF-HOA FOR POLAD



E.O. 12958: DECL: 2034/12/27

TAGS: MOPS, MASS, PREL, PGOV, PHSA, PTER, DJ, SO, ER, AG

SUBJECT: DAS WYCOFF DISCUSSES SOMALIA AND ERITREA WITH DJIBOUTIAN

FOREIGN MINISTER



REF: 09 NAIROBI 2444; IIR 6 830 0100 09; 09 DJIBOUTI 1031



CLASSIFIED BY: James C. Swan, Ambassador, U.S. Department of State,

Executive Office; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)



1. (S) SUMMARY. Meeting with visiting AF DAS Wycoff following the

conclusion of the December 7-8 IGAD ministerial on Somali and

Sudan, Foreign Minister Youssouf concurred that both security and

political measures were necessary to restore stability to Somalia.

While declaring that Djibouti was facilitating a shipment of

Algerian arms to the TFG to bolster is security capacity, FM

Youssouf highlighted that President Guelleh had underscored in

private to the TFG FM and Deputy PM that the TFG needed to deliver

basic services in order to build its credibility among Somalia's

populace. Noting Somali President Sheikh Sharif's "weakness" in

public diplomacy, FM Youssouf discussed Djibouti's efforts to

support Somalia's intellectuals, including paying salaries to

authors from the Somali diaspora. Youssouf said the GODJ did not

believe the TFG should foreclose the possibility of dialogue with

Hassan Dahir Aweys, whose leadership within Hizbul Islam was being

questioned; however, dialogue with al-Shabaab's terrorist

leadership was "out of the question." END SUMMARY.







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PIRACY AND TERRORISM: SYMPTOMS OF SOMALIA'S CRISIS



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2. (C) On December 9, visiting AF Deputy Assistant Secretary

Wycoff, accompanied by Ambassador and DCM, met with Foreign

Minister Mahmoud Ali Youssouf. Referring to IGAD's just-concluded

December 7-8 33rd Council of Ministers meeting on Somalia and

Sudan, hosted by Djibouti, FM Youssouf began by noting that the

"intricate problems" of the Horn of Africa made it difficult to

obtain meaningful consensus. The 20-year-old conflict in

neighboring Somalia lacked any "real rationale," Youssouf said.

There was no justification for the December 3 suicide bombing in

Mogadishu (ref A),which he attributed to an ethnic Somali Danish

national who had been in Mogadishu for only one month, but had been

"brainwashed by al-Qaida elements."







3. (C) In response to DAS Wycoff's overview of USG policy on

Somalia, FM Youssouf stated that terrorism and maritime piracy were

symptoms of a crisis in Somalia, which could not be tackled by

"strong measures" alone. Political measures, such as the Djibouti

Peace Process (DPP),were also needed. Both on-shore and off-shore

measures were required to combat piracy, including training for

Somalia's coast guard, and engaging with Somaliland and Puntland to

ensure that neither benefitted directly or indirectly from piracy.

Djibouti was facilitating the delivery of speedboats for Puntland,

following visits by President Faroole and Puntland's interior

minister. Djibouti was also working with the International

Maritime Organization (IMO) to serve as a regional center for

counter-piracy, Youssouf said. Wycoff noted that the USG continued

to support the DPP and advocated improved effort by the TFG to

expand its political base of support through a reconciliation and

outreach process.







4. (C) Youssouf said that according to Kenyan FM Wetangula, some

176 pirate attacks on commercial vessels (off the coast of Somalia)

had generated $120 million in ransom, thus making piracy "a

profitable business"--not just for Somalis but others, including,

reportedly, a UK bookkeeper in Nairobi.







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DJIBOUTI 00001425 002 OF 004





PUSHING THE TFG TO PROVIDE SERVICES AND SECURITY



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5. (C) The multiple components to the Somalia crisis required

multiple, concurrent lines of effort, Youssouf said. The GODJ was

privately pressuring the TFG to be more dynamic and proactive, and

to deliver basic services -- such as security and water - in order

to build credibility among Somalia's population. FM Youssouf said

that the previous day (December 8),President Guelleh had told TFG

FM Ali Ahmed Jama Jangeli, and TFG Deputy PM and Minister of

Finance Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden, that winning sustainable support

from the populace, not the international community, was key.

During the IGAD Ministerial, Uganda's deputy foreign minister had

told the TFG that it needed to focus on fostering patriotism, not

seeking helicopters, noting that Ugandan guerillas had fought in

the bush for eight years without a salary. Meanwhile, popular

support for al-Shabaab continued to erode. Youssouf asserted that

al-Shabaab had falsely denied responsibility for the December 3

suicide bombing, because it feared that student casualties would

lead to a popular backlash against it.







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PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: A WEAKNESS OF THE TFG



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6. (C) DAS Wycoff reviewed USG support for Somalia and the TFG,

including the provision of technical support to bolster the TFG's

public diplomacy efforts, including assistance to Radio Mogadishu.

Noting that Somali culture was predominantly oral, and that

illiteracy was high among armed Somali youths, FM Youssouf agreed

that radio messaging was key. Public diplomacy was a weakness of

President Sharif, Youssouf said. Djibouti sought to develop

Somalia's intellectuals, Youssouf said, noting that Somalia's PEN

Club was headquartered in Djibouti. Djibouti's President Guelleh

had assisted authors from Somalia's diaspora, even paying them to

produce publications and radio programming.







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MILITARY SUPPORT FROM ALGERIA



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7. (C) In his meeting with the TFG FM, Guelleh had also underscored

the strategic necessity of the TFG holding areas liberated from

al-Shabaab. As the TFG was incapable of sustaining a conventional

war with the requisite supply and logistics chain, the TFG needed

to wage a guerilla war against al-Shabaab, as al-Shabaab itself was

doing, Youssouf said.







8. (S) FM Youssouf stated that Algeria was providing 30 tons of

arms to the TFG; the shipment was currently in Dire Dawa

(Ethiopia),and would arrive in Djibouti December 9 or 10. The TFG

had previously considered delivery by road, but was concerned about

theft. Wycoff urged that care be taken in handing over the arms to

avoid their being misappropriated, noting that the USG worked

through AMISOM to try to ensure best use was made of any lethal

equipment provided. Noting that Djibouti had previously shipped

weapons to the TFG in April and June (ref B),FM Youssouf stated

that Djibouti would ship the Algerian arms on to the TFG only to

specific locations when specified by President Sharif.



DJIBOUTI 00001425 003 OF 004





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TFG CAN WORK WITH ASWJ AND PUNTLAND, BUT NOT AL-SHABAAB



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9. (C) DAS Wycoff reviewed the USG approach to the TFG. The U.S.

would continue support of Djibouti's effort to train additional TFG

troops, but the USG, EU, and other partners must do more to

coordinate efforts. While partners had been focused on the

security sector, a military solution alone was insufficient; ways

had to be found to build on the DPP to promote political solutions.

However, the USG opposed any effort to undercut or replace the

Djibouti Peace Process. DAS Wycoff highlighted USG opposition to

Eritrea's efforts in this area, as well as to Eritrea's

intransigence regarding its border dispute with Djibouti. It was

important to impose sanctions on Eritrea as a regional spoiler, in

order to effect change in the GSE's policies. Ahlu Sunna Wal

Jama'a (ASWJ) appeared to be a potent force, but needed to work

within the Djibouti Process and to partner with the TFG against

common enemies.







10. (C) FM Youssouf said he was pleased to observe that the USG and

GODJ shared the same assessment and goals regarding Somalia. He

hailed the strong partnership between Djibouti and the United

States, noting that the Djibouti benefitted from the U.S. military

presence at Camp Lemonier; it was not a "one-way" relationship.







11. (C) FM Youssouf concurred that the TFG would generate political

gains by taking in the ASWJ. The TFG had signed an agreement with

the ASWJ, he said; President Sheikh Sharif had even proposed that

ASWJ join Somalia's government. However, this was stymied by

ASWJ's demand that thousands of ASWJ militia be absorbed

immediately into Somalia's national security forces -- a demand

that could not be met, as President Sharif could not commit to pay

them all salaries.







12. (C) Noting that some Arab states had called for negotiations

with Hassan Dahir Aweys, FM Youssouf commented that while Eritrea

backed Aweys, his leadership was being contested within Hisbul

Islam. Nevertheless, the GODJ had advised TFG President Sharif

"not to close that door." On the other hand, Youssouf rejected the

possibility of political discussions with al-Shabaab's current

leadership. Following the death of Saleh Nabhan, Harun Fazul (from

Comoros) had assumed responsibility as the "operational mastermind"

for terrorist attacks and was now spending more time in Somalia,

Youssouf said. Dialogue with al-Shabaab was thus "out of the

question."







13. (C) As for Puntland and Somaliland, Youssouf said one could

envision a future political framework for Puntland (e.g., a federal

system). However, he cautioned against the TFG rushing into a

"volatile situation" in Somaliland. Due to recent electoral

issues, Somaliland authorities had not only lost credibility, but

also threatened Somaliland's tranquility.







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SUB-CLAN DYNAMICS WITHIN THE HAWIYE



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DJIBOUTI 00001425 004 OF 004





14. (C) Questioned about internal dynamics of the Hawiye clan, FM

Youssouf observed that whereas in the past the Hawiye had engaged

in a power struggle with other major Somali clans (like Abdullahi

Yusuf's Darod),following their ouster from Mogadishu after Siad

Barre's regime, there was now conflict within the Hawiye clan

itself. The major factions within the Hawiye comprised three

groups:



-- Hawiye from the most "anarchic" rural areas, who had never

before lived in urban areas, but who looted cities, had a "kill or

be killed" philosophy, and who now controlled Mogadishu;



-- the business community, who controlled the ports and Somalia's

fishing fleet, and who fought against the warlords, with their own

militia and bodyquards; and



-- farmers on previously state-controlled farms, who had continued

for several years to export bananas internationally.



Generally, Hawiye/Abgal hailed from Mogadishu, while

Hawiye/Habr-Gedir came from Mogadishu's outskirts.







15. (C) These three groups, Youssouf continued, maintained a rough

equilibrium for many years. U.S. intervention in 2006, during

which the USG armed and equipped some warlords, interfered with the

"semblance of harmony" that previously existed among these three

groups. The Islamic Courts Union took advantage of the ensuing

chaos in Mogadishu, which then led to Ethiopia's intervention.







16. (C) The "backbone" of Somali behavior and conflict remained

clan-based, Youssouf said, as illustrated by the in-fighting among

Somali subclans within the Hawiye. Youssouf noted that the

Djiboutian military's training earlier this year of TFG recruits

(ref C),aimed at fostering unit cohesion and Somali nationalism,

as Djiboutian authorities recognized that, at the beginning,

recruits formed cliques on the basis of sub-clans, and even feared

attacks from members of the same clan if they were from different

sub-clans.







17. (C) Questioned about possible international mediation support

for internal Somali dialogue, such as the use of African mediators

or negotiation support teams, FM Youssouf said they could assist,

but cautioned that internal reconciliation could not be effected by

external actors. Rather, such reconciliation depended first on

identifying grievances, which was a task only Somalis themselves

could lead. Genuine reconciliation would occur only when a Somali

layman chose peace rather than conflict, a process independent of

outside experts.







18. (C) COMMENT. An ethnic Afar within the majority ethnic Somali

Djiboutian government, Foreign Minister Youssouf often is more

outspoken than other Djiboutian senior principals in his criticism

of Somali clan dynamics. Nevertheless, FM Youssouf's observations

demonstrate the wide range of support that Djibouti is providing to

the TFG in neighboring Somalia: running the gamut of paying

salaries to intellectuals from the Somali diaspora, counseling the

TFG on the delivery of basic services, to training TFG troops, and

even facilitating the shipment of arms. All these activities

underscore that promoting stability in Somalia is a key national

security objective for Djibouti, as it is for the USG. END

COMMENT.







19. (U) DAS Wycoff cleared this message.

SWAN