Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09DJIBOUTI1423
2009-12-27 12:41:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Djibouti
Cable title:
DAS WYCOFF DISCUSSES REGIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES WITH
VZCZCXRO5859 RR RUEHROV RUEHTRO DE RUEHDJ #1423/01 3611241 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 271241Z DEC 09 FM AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1170 INFO IGAD COLLECTIVE SOMALIA COLLECTIVE RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE RHMFISS/CJTF HOA RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DJIBOUTI 001423
SIPDIS
STATE FOR AF, AF/E, AND AF/RSA
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA-WATCHER
AFRICOM AND CJTF-HOA FOR POLAD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2024/12/27
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PREF DJ SO ER YM
SUBJECT: DAS WYCOFF DISCUSSES REGIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES WITH
DJIBOUTI'S PRESIDENT GUELLEH
CLASSIFIED BY: James C. Swan, Ambassador, U.S. Department of State,
Executive Office; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DJIBOUTI 001423
SIPDIS
STATE FOR AF, AF/E, AND AF/RSA
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA-WATCHER
AFRICOM AND CJTF-HOA FOR POLAD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2024/12/27
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PREF DJ SO ER YM
SUBJECT: DAS WYCOFF DISCUSSES REGIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES WITH
DJIBOUTI'S PRESIDENT GUELLEH
CLASSIFIED BY: James C. Swan, Ambassador, U.S. Department of State,
Executive Office; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)
1. (C) SUMMARY. On the same day that DAS Wycoff had separate
meetings with Djibouti's Foreign Minister and Prime Minister
(septels),President Guelleh engaged in a 90-minute exposition of
the interlinking security challenges facing Djibouti. Chief
security concerns for Djibouti are Eritrea's continued military
occupation of Djiboutian territory at Ras Doumeira, as well as the
threat posed by al-Shabaab extremists in Somalia. In addition to
discussing developments in the Horn of Africa, Guelleh also
underscored his concern over deteriorating security conditions in
Yemen. He reported that Eritrea's Defense Minister had recently
traveled to Tehran in search of additional military and financial
support. He expressed reservations over Kenya's "Jubaland
Initiative" to train ethnic Ogadeni in support of TFG political
objectives in Lower Juba. Despite the wide array of regional
security challenges -- or perhaps because of them -- Guelleh
expressed his deep appreciation for Djibouti's strategic
partnership with the United States. END SUMMARY.
2. (U) On December 8, AF DAS Wycoff and Ambassador met with
President Ismail Omar Guelleh. Embassy Nairobi Counselor for
Somalia Affairs, AF/E senior desk officer for Somalia, and DCM
(note-taker) accompanied DAS Wycoff.
3. (C) President Guelleh expressed appreciation for Djibouti's
partnership with the United States, a relationship strengthened by
"optimism" and transparency. He noted popular support within
Djibouti for the U.S. military presence at Camp Lemonnier, citing
civil affairs projects (supporting schools and health clinics) in
rural areas as an excellent example of bilateral cooperation.
4. (C) President Guelleh noted the impact of regional instability
on Djibouti. Individuals fleeing conflict in neighboring Ethiopia,
Somalia, and Yemen could be found in Djibouti's modest hospitals,
all receiving treatment with costs covered by the GODJ. Beginning
in 1975, with the rise and subsequent fall of the Communist Dergue
regime in Ethiopia, thousands of refugees fled to Djibouti, with
many obtaining Djiboutian citizenship upon Djibouti's independence
in 1977. In the 1980s, numerous Afars found refuge in Djibouti.
More recently, for nearly the past two decades, the crisis in
Somalia had impacted Djibouti.
-------------- -
AL-SHABAAB REPRESENTS THREAT TO HORN OF AFRICA
-------------- -
5. (C) Unlike some European countries, the USG understood the
gravity of the situation in Somalia and the need for action in
response, Guelleh said. Speaking of the TFG's struggle against
al-Shabaab, Guelleh said that the TFG and Djibouti sought to
"eliminate a real cancer", which had to be stopped before it
wrought havoc among the large mixed populations of Muslims and
Christians in Ethiopia. Since the mid-1990s, extremist elements in
Somalia, including al-Ittihad al-Islamiya (AIAI),had repeatedly
sought to destabilize Ethiopia, but had been defeated - through
direct Ethiopian military intervention in 1997, in the case of
AIAI.
6. (C) Guelleh also reviewed deteriorating security conditions in
Yemen, noting Saudi concern over developments with its neighbor,
and attributing much of Yemen's current instability to the failure
to demobilize and reintegrate former combatants from south Yemen in
1994. Somali mercenaries had also fought in Yemen in support of
DJIBOUTI 00001423 002 OF 003
rebel groups, Guelleh said.
7. (C) DAS Wycoff noted the common interest of the USG in promoting
stability in the region and in Somalia. He reviewed regional
consultations on the margins of the recently concluded IGAD
ministerial, and highlighted U.S. support for regional actors
seeking to promote Somali stability, including support for Uganda
as well as for Djibouti's efforts to train TFG troops. Wycoff
highlighted bilateral cooperation with Djibouti, including the
anticipated arrival in January 2010 of an ACOTA team to discuss
possible Djibouti military contributions to multilateral
peacekeeping operations, including AMISOM.
8. (C) In response, President Guelleh noted the necessity of
establishing a security cordon in Mogadishu; TFG forces needed to
"clean up" Mogadishu and to rid it of al-Shabaab forces, who
rallied the bulk of their fighters to specific areas when needed.
Civilians bore the brunt of their attacks, whether perpetuated by
al-Shabaab or Hisbul Islam, and medical needs were urgent. A key
reason to train TFG forces was that AMISOM could not remain in
Somalia in perpetuity, Guelleh said, noting that TFG forces needed
to replace AMISOM forces in the country's interior.
9. (C) After a brief discussion of USG opposition to a reported
Kenyan plan to work with the TFG to train Somalis in Kenya for an
intervention in Juba, Guelleh again highlighted the interlinkages
among countries in the Horn, including Ethiopia, Somalia, and
Kenya. Kenya's Minister of Defense, like the terrorist Hassan
al-Turki, were both ethnic Ogadeni, Guelleh noted. While the TFG
and Kenyans wanted to play the Ogadeni card in support of the TFG,
if mishandled the operation could backfire and lead to further
unrest in Ogadeni regions of Ethiopian and northern Kenya.
--------------
ERITREA'S ISAIAS MUST BE REMOVED
--------------
10. (C) Noting Eritrea's continued occupation of Djiboutian
territory at Ras Doumeira, President Guelleh observed that
Eritrea's defense minister had led an Eritrean delegation two weeks
earlier to Tehran in search of weapons and financial support.
Citing Iranian support for the GSE, Guelleh said the Eritrean
regime continued to infiltrate Oromos and Afars from Eritrea into
Djibouti, in an attempt to destabilize Djibouti. The current
regime in Asmara needed to be removed, Guelleh said. DAS Wycoff
pushed back on this idea, responding that the USG priority was
regional stability and highlighting our significant efforts to
exert diplomatic pressure on Eritrea.
11. (C) Guelleh criticized France for opposing international
efforts to sanction Eritrea, noting that French officials sought
not to irritate Isaias, due to the presence of a French hostage
being held in Somalia. Guelleh noted that the recently concluded
December 7-8 33rd IGAD Council of Ministers had resulted in a
communique calling, inter alia, for sanctions against Eritrea, and
that Isaias only responded to pressure. Guelleh attributed Isaias'
intransigence to psychological problems, noting that an uncle of
Isaias, as governor in Wollo, Ethiopia, had been responsible for
repeated bloody repression of the population. Isaias had become
more and more dangerous; Djiboutian troops had not left the border
with Eritrea since mid-2008, Guelleh said. Wycoff noted that the
USG was working to pass a UNSC resolution that would put sanctions
DJIBOUTI 00001423 003 OF 003
on Eritrea both for its role in Somalia and for its conduct vis a
vis Djibouti.
12. (C) COMMENT. In this 90-minute meeting with DAS Wycoff,
President Guelleh offered a strategic tour d'horizon of the
numerous security challenges affecting Djibouti, and how Djibouti
therefore views regional cooperation as well as partnership with
the United States as key to preserving its stability and security.
Growing worries about instability in Yemen have now been added to
standard Djiboutian security concerns over Somalia and Eritrea. In
discussion of the deployment of Djiboutian forces to Somalia under
AMISOM, Guelleh neither reiterated nor retracted this commitment.
In a separate meeting, Djiboutian CHOD MG Fathi stated that
Djiboutian troops had already been identified to serve with AMISOM
but still lacked equipment (of which he promised to provide a
list). END COMMENT.
13. (U) DAS Wycoff cleared this message.
SWAN
SIPDIS
STATE FOR AF, AF/E, AND AF/RSA
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA-WATCHER
AFRICOM AND CJTF-HOA FOR POLAD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2024/12/27
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PREF DJ SO ER YM
SUBJECT: DAS WYCOFF DISCUSSES REGIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES WITH
DJIBOUTI'S PRESIDENT GUELLEH
CLASSIFIED BY: James C. Swan, Ambassador, U.S. Department of State,
Executive Office; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)
1. (C) SUMMARY. On the same day that DAS Wycoff had separate
meetings with Djibouti's Foreign Minister and Prime Minister
(septels),President Guelleh engaged in a 90-minute exposition of
the interlinking security challenges facing Djibouti. Chief
security concerns for Djibouti are Eritrea's continued military
occupation of Djiboutian territory at Ras Doumeira, as well as the
threat posed by al-Shabaab extremists in Somalia. In addition to
discussing developments in the Horn of Africa, Guelleh also
underscored his concern over deteriorating security conditions in
Yemen. He reported that Eritrea's Defense Minister had recently
traveled to Tehran in search of additional military and financial
support. He expressed reservations over Kenya's "Jubaland
Initiative" to train ethnic Ogadeni in support of TFG political
objectives in Lower Juba. Despite the wide array of regional
security challenges -- or perhaps because of them -- Guelleh
expressed his deep appreciation for Djibouti's strategic
partnership with the United States. END SUMMARY.
2. (U) On December 8, AF DAS Wycoff and Ambassador met with
President Ismail Omar Guelleh. Embassy Nairobi Counselor for
Somalia Affairs, AF/E senior desk officer for Somalia, and DCM
(note-taker) accompanied DAS Wycoff.
3. (C) President Guelleh expressed appreciation for Djibouti's
partnership with the United States, a relationship strengthened by
"optimism" and transparency. He noted popular support within
Djibouti for the U.S. military presence at Camp Lemonnier, citing
civil affairs projects (supporting schools and health clinics) in
rural areas as an excellent example of bilateral cooperation.
4. (C) President Guelleh noted the impact of regional instability
on Djibouti. Individuals fleeing conflict in neighboring Ethiopia,
Somalia, and Yemen could be found in Djibouti's modest hospitals,
all receiving treatment with costs covered by the GODJ. Beginning
in 1975, with the rise and subsequent fall of the Communist Dergue
regime in Ethiopia, thousands of refugees fled to Djibouti, with
many obtaining Djiboutian citizenship upon Djibouti's independence
in 1977. In the 1980s, numerous Afars found refuge in Djibouti.
More recently, for nearly the past two decades, the crisis in
Somalia had impacted Djibouti.
-------------- -
AL-SHABAAB REPRESENTS THREAT TO HORN OF AFRICA
-------------- -
5. (C) Unlike some European countries, the USG understood the
gravity of the situation in Somalia and the need for action in
response, Guelleh said. Speaking of the TFG's struggle against
al-Shabaab, Guelleh said that the TFG and Djibouti sought to
"eliminate a real cancer", which had to be stopped before it
wrought havoc among the large mixed populations of Muslims and
Christians in Ethiopia. Since the mid-1990s, extremist elements in
Somalia, including al-Ittihad al-Islamiya (AIAI),had repeatedly
sought to destabilize Ethiopia, but had been defeated - through
direct Ethiopian military intervention in 1997, in the case of
AIAI.
6. (C) Guelleh also reviewed deteriorating security conditions in
Yemen, noting Saudi concern over developments with its neighbor,
and attributing much of Yemen's current instability to the failure
to demobilize and reintegrate former combatants from south Yemen in
1994. Somali mercenaries had also fought in Yemen in support of
DJIBOUTI 00001423 002 OF 003
rebel groups, Guelleh said.
7. (C) DAS Wycoff noted the common interest of the USG in promoting
stability in the region and in Somalia. He reviewed regional
consultations on the margins of the recently concluded IGAD
ministerial, and highlighted U.S. support for regional actors
seeking to promote Somali stability, including support for Uganda
as well as for Djibouti's efforts to train TFG troops. Wycoff
highlighted bilateral cooperation with Djibouti, including the
anticipated arrival in January 2010 of an ACOTA team to discuss
possible Djibouti military contributions to multilateral
peacekeeping operations, including AMISOM.
8. (C) In response, President Guelleh noted the necessity of
establishing a security cordon in Mogadishu; TFG forces needed to
"clean up" Mogadishu and to rid it of al-Shabaab forces, who
rallied the bulk of their fighters to specific areas when needed.
Civilians bore the brunt of their attacks, whether perpetuated by
al-Shabaab or Hisbul Islam, and medical needs were urgent. A key
reason to train TFG forces was that AMISOM could not remain in
Somalia in perpetuity, Guelleh said, noting that TFG forces needed
to replace AMISOM forces in the country's interior.
9. (C) After a brief discussion of USG opposition to a reported
Kenyan plan to work with the TFG to train Somalis in Kenya for an
intervention in Juba, Guelleh again highlighted the interlinkages
among countries in the Horn, including Ethiopia, Somalia, and
Kenya. Kenya's Minister of Defense, like the terrorist Hassan
al-Turki, were both ethnic Ogadeni, Guelleh noted. While the TFG
and Kenyans wanted to play the Ogadeni card in support of the TFG,
if mishandled the operation could backfire and lead to further
unrest in Ogadeni regions of Ethiopian and northern Kenya.
--------------
ERITREA'S ISAIAS MUST BE REMOVED
--------------
10. (C) Noting Eritrea's continued occupation of Djiboutian
territory at Ras Doumeira, President Guelleh observed that
Eritrea's defense minister had led an Eritrean delegation two weeks
earlier to Tehran in search of weapons and financial support.
Citing Iranian support for the GSE, Guelleh said the Eritrean
regime continued to infiltrate Oromos and Afars from Eritrea into
Djibouti, in an attempt to destabilize Djibouti. The current
regime in Asmara needed to be removed, Guelleh said. DAS Wycoff
pushed back on this idea, responding that the USG priority was
regional stability and highlighting our significant efforts to
exert diplomatic pressure on Eritrea.
11. (C) Guelleh criticized France for opposing international
efforts to sanction Eritrea, noting that French officials sought
not to irritate Isaias, due to the presence of a French hostage
being held in Somalia. Guelleh noted that the recently concluded
December 7-8 33rd IGAD Council of Ministers had resulted in a
communique calling, inter alia, for sanctions against Eritrea, and
that Isaias only responded to pressure. Guelleh attributed Isaias'
intransigence to psychological problems, noting that an uncle of
Isaias, as governor in Wollo, Ethiopia, had been responsible for
repeated bloody repression of the population. Isaias had become
more and more dangerous; Djiboutian troops had not left the border
with Eritrea since mid-2008, Guelleh said. Wycoff noted that the
USG was working to pass a UNSC resolution that would put sanctions
DJIBOUTI 00001423 003 OF 003
on Eritrea both for its role in Somalia and for its conduct vis a
vis Djibouti.
12. (C) COMMENT. In this 90-minute meeting with DAS Wycoff,
President Guelleh offered a strategic tour d'horizon of the
numerous security challenges affecting Djibouti, and how Djibouti
therefore views regional cooperation as well as partnership with
the United States as key to preserving its stability and security.
Growing worries about instability in Yemen have now been added to
standard Djiboutian security concerns over Somalia and Eritrea. In
discussion of the deployment of Djiboutian forces to Somalia under
AMISOM, Guelleh neither reiterated nor retracted this commitment.
In a separate meeting, Djiboutian CHOD MG Fathi stated that
Djiboutian troops had already been identified to serve with AMISOM
but still lacked equipment (of which he promised to provide a
list). END COMMENT.
13. (U) DAS Wycoff cleared this message.
SWAN