DJIBOUTI DECRIES STALEMATE IN BORDER DISPUTE WITH ERITREA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DJIBOUTI 000117

SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SBU DELIBERATIVE PROCESS
DEPARTMENT FOR AF AND AF/E
AFRICOM AND CJTF-HOA FOR POLAD
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA-WATCHER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019-01-15
TAGS: PINS PBTS PREL MOPS DJ ER UNSC
SUBJECT: DJIBOUTI DECRIES STALEMATE IN BORDER DISPUTE WITH ERITREA

REF: a) 08 DJIBOUTI 864, b) 08 DJIBOUTI 890

CLASSIFIED BY: Eric M. Wong, DCM, U.S. Department of State, U.S. Embassy, Djibouti; REASON: 1.4(B),(D)


1. (C) SUMMARY. As the five-week deadline referenced by UNSCR 1862
of January 14 approaches, senior Djiboutian officials--including
Foreign Minister Youssouf and Djibouti's Ambassador to the U.S. and
UN PermRep Olhaye-underscore the need for increased international
pressure on Eritrea. Facing a military statemate on the border
that may be costing Djibouti as much as $5 million monthly, and
lack of any Eritrean response to diplomatic overtures, including a
recent visit by a UN DPA director, Djibouti believes sanctions, or
financial measures targeting remittances collected by Asmara, may
be required to push Eritrea. Separately, ICRC confirms that
Djibouti has allowed international observers access to the 19
Eritrean POWs in GODJ custody, but that the Eritrean government
(GSE) has provided no response to the assertion that 19 Djiboutians
remain missing from June 2008 hostilities. END SUMMARY.




2. (C) In a February 11 meeting with Ambassador and DCM, Djiboutian
Ambassador to the U.S. and PermRep to the UN, Roble Olhaye,
underscored the need for imposing increased international
pressure--and possibly sanctions-on Eritrea. The border dispute
remained at a "stalemate," with Eritrea "solidifying its hold" on
Ras Doumeira, Olhaye said. A military response was not a viable
option; on the other hand, the GSE had rejected all mediation
efforts (rumors of a new Qatari initiative were simply "another
ploy" by Asmara to deflect international pressure). International
pressure had to increase in tandem with Eritrea's intransigence,
Olhaye said. While recognizing that sanctions would have little
effect on Eritrea's already isolated economy, Olhaye said they
would serve as an important sign that countries needed to fulfill
obligations as members of the international community.




3. (C) "This is a scenario where only one country is speaking," he
added, noting that Djibouti was fully engaging the international
community; IGAD, the Arab League, the African Union's Peace and
Security Council, and the UN Security Council, had all endorsed
Djibouti's position that this dispute should be resolved through
dialogue. Djibouti, the aggrieved party, should not be punished
again for Eritrea's delaying tactics, he said. Djibouti had
informed the ICRC of Eritreans held as POWs, and had provided
international observers with access to both POWs and defectors from
Eritrea; Djibouti had received "nothing" from Eritrea, however.



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ERITREA ENGAGED IN "SUBVERSIVE" ACTIVITIES

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4. (C) While the GODJ assessed that Eritrean troops at Ras Doumeira
were "not in a posture" of seeking to advance further into
Djibouti, Eritrea was currently engaged in "subversive" activities,
which required a military and intel-related response, Olhaye said.
Djibouti feared such subversive activities could increase, he
added, citing alleged training by Eritrea of military personnel who
sought to infiltrate Djibouti as civilians.




5. (C) Asked about Djiboutian Prime Minister Dileita's January 11
interview with "Jeune Afrique," in which the PM stated that
continuously deploying Djiboutian troops at the border with Eritrea
had cost more than $30 million over six months, Olhaye said the
GODJ sought to be able to exercise "a more flexible response"
militarily, over the next 2-3 months. If the Djiboutian military
had greater mobility, perhaps it could deploy fewer troops.

DJIBOUTI 00000117 002 OF 003



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UN POLITICAL DIRECTOR VISITS ASMARA

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6. (C) According to Olhaye, a UN official, Joao Honwana,
"stealthily" undertook a 4-day trip to Asmara in the previous week,
facilitated by Finnish special envoy for the Horn of Africa Pekka
Haavisto, and was currently preparing a report on meetings with the
GSE. (NOTE: Honwana is director of the Africa I
division--responsible for southern and eastern Africa--within the
UN Secretariat's Department of Political Affairs. END NOTE.)
Despite Eritrea's claims that it could hold bilateral talks any
time with Djibouti, the GSE was "not putting anything on the
table," Olhaye said, as Djibouti had sought such talks, to no
avail, since early 2008. Olhaye said Honwana would prepare the UN
Secretary-General's report to the UNSC, due six weeks after the
January 14 adoption of UNSCR 1862.




7. (C) FM Mahmoud Ali Youssouf echoed Olhaye's observations in a
February 12 meeting with Ambassador and DCM. Djibouti sought a way
to compel a rogue nation to fulfill its international obligations.
Rather than impose traditional sanctions, to include a travel ban
which would be ineffective against Eritrea, more targeted pressure
was needed. Youssouf specifically recommended targeting the
remittances the GSE collected from overseas Eritreans (2 per cent
of wages). Even freezing them for one month would have an impact,
he said.



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DJIBOUTI HOLDS 19 ERITREANS AS POWS

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8. (C) In a separate February 9 meeting with Ambassador, DCM, and
USAID representative, Christophe Luedi, head of the Nairobi-based
regional office of the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) reported that the GODJ had officially declared that it had
19 prisoners of war (POWs) from June 2008 hostilities with Eritrea.
The ICRC had been able to visit the POWs on three occasions, and
had facilitated cell phone calls to relatives in Eritrea and other
countries. Luedi hailed the GODJ for its adherence to
international humanitarian law in immediately informing the ICRC of
its taking POWs into custody. The POWs were segregated from
Eritrean deserters who had fled to Djibouti, who numbered
approximately 80 in mid-January.




9. (C) The Government of Djibouti had not responded to the ICRC's
written notification in November 2008, that a "detaining country"
was obligated to free and repatriate POWs, Luedi said. Some of the
19 POWs had stated their opposition to returning to Eritrea. If
the GODJ decided to repatriate POWs, the ICRC would then interview
POWs individually to determine who had a fear of refoulement.



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19 DJIBOUTIANS ARE MISSING IN ACTION

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10. (C) The ICRC, which had locally staffed offices in both
Djibouti and Asmara, had submitted the list of 19 POWs to the GSE,

DJIBOUTI 00000117 003 OF 003



as well as a list of 19 Djiboutian soldiers missing in action
(MIA). To date, Eritrea authorities had not provided any response
to either list, Luedi said. The 19 MIA included a senior
Djiboutian colonel whose wife had established an NGO for families
of the missing, he added.




11. (C) On whether Djibouti sought to exchange its 19 Eritrean POWs
for the 19 missing Djiboutians, Luedi noted that it was unclear
which--if any--of the 19 MIA were alive and/or in Eritrean custody.
GSE officials neither confirmed nor denied holding POWs.
Nevertheless, he said the ICRC "deducts" that the GSE is holding
POWs, citing reports from foreign diplomats in Asmara. The ICRC
could assist in any physical transfer of individuals between
Djibouti and Eritrea, Luedi said.




12. (C) COMMENT. On the diplomatic front, the GODJ is looking to
the UNSC to put pressure on Asmara through targeted financial
sanctions. Djibouti PermRep to the UN Olhaye will want to consult
closely with USUN in this effort. On the military front, the GODJ
is eager to reduce the burden of its troop presence on the border.
(At $5 million per month, the annualized cost would be equivalent
to approximately 8 per cent of GDP.) Providing the Djiboutian
military with additional means of promoting their mobility and
tactical intelligence collection along the border could help reduce
the number of troops Djibouti must deploy--currently one-third of
the entire Djiboutian armed forces. END COMMENT.
SWAN

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