DJIBOUTI DECRIES STALEMATE IN BORDER DISPUTE WITH ERITREA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DJIBOUTI 000117 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SBU DELIBERATIVE PROCESS DEPARTMENT FOR AF AND AF/E AFRICOM AND CJTF-HOA FOR POLAD LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA-WATCHER E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019-01-15 TAGS: PINS PBTS PREL MOPS DJ ER UNSC SUBJECT: DJIBOUTI DECRIES STALEMATE IN BORDER DISPUTE WITH ERITREA REF: a) 08 DJIBOUTI 864, b) 08 DJIBOUTI 890 CLASSIFIED BY: Eric M. Wong, DCM, U.S. Department of State, U.S. Embassy, Djibouti; REASON: 1.4(B),(D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. As the five-week deadline referenced by UNSCR 1862 of January 14 approaches, senior Djiboutian officials--including Foreign Minister Youssouf and Djibouti's Ambassador to the U.S. and UN PermRep Olhaye-underscore the need for increased international pressure on Eritrea. Facing a military statemate on the border that may be costing Djibouti as much as $5 million monthly, and lack of any Eritrean response to diplomatic overtures, including a recent visit by a UN DPA director, Djibouti believes sanctions, or financial measures targeting remittances collected by Asmara, may be required to push Eritrea. Separately, ICRC confirms that Djibouti has allowed international observers access to the 19 Eritrean POWs in GODJ custody, but that the Eritrean government (GSE) has provided no response to the assertion that 19 Djiboutians remain missing from June 2008 hostilities. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) In a February 11 meeting with Ambassador and DCM, Djiboutian Ambassador to the U.S. and PermRep to the UN, Roble Olhaye, underscored the need for imposing increased international pressure--and possibly sanctions-on Eritrea. The border dispute remained at a "stalemate," with Eritrea "solidifying its hold" on Ras Doumeira, Olhaye said. A military response was not a viable option; on the other hand, the GSE had rejected all mediation efforts (rumors of a new Qatari initiative were simply "another ploy" by Asmara to deflect international pressure). International pressure had to increase in tandem with Eritrea's intransigence, Olhaye said. While recognizing that sanctions would have little effect on Eritrea's already isolated economy, Olhaye said they would serve as an important sign that countries needed to fulfill obligations as members of the international community. ¶3. (C) "This is a scenario where only one country is speaking," he added, noting that Djibouti was fully engaging the international community; IGAD, the Arab League, the African Union's Peace and Security Council, and the UN Security Council, had all endorsed Djibouti's position that this dispute should be resolved through dialogue. Djibouti, the aggrieved party, should not be punished again for Eritrea's delaying tactics, he said. Djibouti had informed the ICRC of Eritreans held as POWs, and had provided international observers with access to both POWs and defectors from Eritrea; Djibouti had received "nothing" from Eritrea, however. -------------- ERITREA ENGAGED IN "SUBVERSIVE" ACTIVITIES -------------- ¶4. (C) While the GODJ assessed that Eritrean troops at Ras Doumeira were "not in a posture" of seeking to advance further into Djibouti, Eritrea was currently engaged in "subversive" activities, which required a military and intel-related response, Olhaye said. Djibouti feared such subversive activities could increase, he added, citing alleged training by Eritrea of military personnel who sought to infiltrate Djibouti as civilians. ¶5. (C) Asked about Djiboutian Prime Minister Dileita's January 11 interview with "Jeune Afrique," in which the PM stated that continuously deploying Djiboutian troops at the border with Eritrea had cost more than $30 million over six months, Olhaye said the GODJ sought to be able to exercise "a more flexible response" militarily, over the next 2-3 months. If the Djiboutian military had greater mobility, perhaps it could deploy fewer troops. DJIBOUTI 00000117 002 OF 003 -------------- UN POLITICAL DIRECTOR VISITS ASMARA -------------- ¶6. (C) According to Olhaye, a UN official, Joao Honwana, "stealthily" undertook a 4-day trip to Asmara in the previous week, facilitated by Finnish special envoy for the Horn of Africa Pekka Haavisto, and was currently preparing a report on meetings with the GSE. (NOTE: Honwana is director of the Africa I division--responsible for southern and eastern Africa--within the UN Secretariat's Department of Political Affairs. END NOTE.) Despite Eritrea's claims that it could hold bilateral talks any time with Djibouti, the GSE was "not putting anything on the table," Olhaye said, as Djibouti had sought such talks, to no avail, since early 2008. Olhaye said Honwana would prepare the UN Secretary-General's report to the UNSC, due six weeks after the January 14 adoption of UNSCR 1862. ¶7. (C) FM Mahmoud Ali Youssouf echoed Olhaye's observations in a February 12 meeting with Ambassador and DCM. Djibouti sought a way to compel a rogue nation to fulfill its international obligations. Rather than impose traditional sanctions, to include a travel ban which would be ineffective against Eritrea, more targeted pressure was needed. Youssouf specifically recommended targeting the remittances the GSE collected from overseas Eritreans (2 per cent of wages). Even freezing them for one month would have an impact, he said. -------------- DJIBOUTI HOLDS 19 ERITREANS AS POWS -------------- ¶8. (C) In a separate February 9 meeting with Ambassador, DCM, and USAID representative, Christophe Luedi, head of the Nairobi-based regional office of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) reported that the GODJ had officially declared that it had 19 prisoners of war (POWs) from June 2008 hostilities with Eritrea. The ICRC had been able to visit the POWs on three occasions, and had facilitated cell phone calls to relatives in Eritrea and other countries. Luedi hailed the GODJ for its adherence to international humanitarian law in immediately informing the ICRC of its taking POWs into custody. The POWs were segregated from Eritrean deserters who had fled to Djibouti, who numbered approximately 80 in mid-January. ¶9. (C) The Government of Djibouti had not responded to the ICRC's written notification in November 2008, that a "detaining country" was obligated to free and repatriate POWs, Luedi said. Some of the 19 POWs had stated their opposition to returning to Eritrea. If the GODJ decided to repatriate POWs, the ICRC would then interview POWs individually to determine who had a fear of refoulement. -------------- 19 DJIBOUTIANS ARE MISSING IN ACTION -------------- ¶10. (C) The ICRC, which had locally staffed offices in both Djibouti and Asmara, had submitted the list of 19 POWs to the GSE, DJIBOUTI 00000117 003 OF 003 as well as a list of 19 Djiboutian soldiers missing in action (MIA). To date, Eritrea authorities had not provided any response to either list, Luedi said. The 19 MIA included a senior Djiboutian colonel whose wife had established an NGO for families of the missing, he added. ¶11. (C) On whether Djibouti sought to exchange its 19 Eritrean POWs for the 19 missing Djiboutians, Luedi noted that it was unclear which--if any--of the 19 MIA were alive and/or in Eritrean custody. GSE officials neither confirmed nor denied holding POWs. Nevertheless, he said the ICRC "deducts" that the GSE is holding POWs, citing reports from foreign diplomats in Asmara. The ICRC could assist in any physical transfer of individuals between Djibouti and Eritrea, Luedi said. ¶12. (C) COMMENT. On the diplomatic front, the GODJ is looking to the UNSC to put pressure on Asmara through targeted financial sanctions. Djibouti PermRep to the UN Olhaye will want to consult closely with USUN in this effort. On the military front, the GODJ is eager to reduce the burden of its troop presence on the border. (At $5 million per month, the annualized cost would be equivalent to approximately 8 per cent of GDP.) Providing the Djiboutian military with additional means of promoting their mobility and tactical intelligence collection along the border could help reduce the number of troops Djibouti must deploy--currently one-third of the entire Djiboutian armed forces. END COMMENT. 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