DJIBOUTI/SOMALIA: TFG OFFICIALS REITERATE REQUEST TO THE USG FOR MILITARY EQUIPMENT

CONFIDENTIAL DJIBOUTI 1057 SENSITIVE Pass Line: STATE FOR AF, AF/E, AND AF/RSA LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA-WATCHER AFRICOM AND CJTF-HOA FOR POLAD E.O.:12958 TAGS: MASS MOPS KPKO PREL SO DJ UG FR SUBJECT: DJIBOUTI/SOMALIA: TFG OFFICIALS REITERATE REQUEST TO THE USG FOR MILITARY EQUIPMENT Ref: 09 STATE 83024 09 DJIBOUTI 1031 09 DJIBOUTI 1029 09 DJIBOUTI 991 09 DJIBOUTI 951 09 DJIBOUTI 881 09 NAIROBI 1641 ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Officials from Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG) hail recent senior USG engagement with the TFG, but highlight the need for military assistance: whether future instruction by U.S. trainers, or material support for nearly 500 TFG troops being trained by Djibouti (refs D-E). The Djiboutian military has requested USG assistance to return these TFG troops to Mogadishu, beginning in late September; that is also when the first tranche of TFG troops undergoing a separate 7-week “crash course” by the French military is due to conclude its training. In addition to training TFG troops, the Government of Djibouti seeks international assistance to train up to 200 TFG civilian police and gendarmes. Djibouti’s deputy chief of defense states that no official announcement has been made yet regarding deploying Djiboutian troops in support of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM),but acknowledges that discussions are underway. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) On August 12, CDA a.i. and Security Cooperation Officer (SCO) met with Somali Embassy DCM Abdourahman Mohamed Hirabe and TFG Colonel Mahdi Arif Ali. Noting that he had been in Nairobi during President Sheikh Sharif’s recent meeting with the Secretary, Hirabe expressed appreciation for USG engagement with, and support of, the TFG. -------------- WHY ISN’T THE USG TRAINING TFG FORCES? -------------- ¶3. (C) Citing the positive and well-publicized meeting between the Secretary and TFG President Sheikh Sharif in Nairobi, Hirabe questioned why the USG was not training TFG troops. The TFG was deeply interested in USG training, he said. Training involving U.S. trainers could occur in either Djibouti or Uganda, he added. ¶4. (C) Hirabe underscored the global menace posed by those seeking to topple the TFG. Hizb al-Islam leader Hassan Dahir Aweys had said on BBC Somali Service that he was interested not just in Somalia, but in the entire world, Hirabe noted. Similarly, Al-Shabaab pursued a long-term strategy, and attracted many international terrorists to its ranks, Hirabe said. Noting the increasing number of foreign fighters seeking to destabilize Somalia, Col. Mahdi observed that al-Shabaab and its supporters would not cease fighting until they had succeeded internationally: i.e., not only in Africa, but also in China, America, and elsewhere. Col. Mahdi asserted that shipments of sugar from Dubai to Bosasso were being used to finance al-Shabaab, due to increased controls on money exchange; proceeds allegedly financed al-Shabaab arms purchases and payments to recruit child soldiers, he said. -------------- -------------- DJIBOUTI SEEKS SUPPORT FOR LATE SEPTEMBER RETURN FLIGHTS -------------- -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Charge a.i. responded that the USG was informing the UN Somalia Sanctions Committee of plans to transport GODJ-trained TFG forces back to Mogadishu upon completion of training (ref A); exact modalities would be addressed with the GODJ. Additional requests should be addressed to the Embassy Nairobi Somalia Unit, which had the lead on TFG assistance. -------------- -------------- TFG TROOPS NEED UNIFORMS, EQUIPMENT, TENTS--AND SALARIES -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) While acknowledging public statements that the USG would increase weapon shipments to Uganda, Hirabe complained that U.S. support to AMISOM was “too slow.” Hirabe appealed for direct support to the TFG: French support was sought for TFG troops trained by the French, but Somalia sought USG support for TFG troops trained by the Djiboutians. Hirabe highlighted that GODJ-trained TFG troops still required uniforms and personal military gear (e.g, rucksacks, gear for sleeping, and mess kits),for use upon returning to Somalia. Salaries, as well as either a stipend during training, or a lump sum upon completion of training, would also encourage additional forces to rally to the TFG. “If they come back with nothing, what can they do?” As this was the first tranche of troops to be trained by Djibouti, it was especially important that they be well-equipped, so as to encourage other potential TFG recruits to join the TFG’s army, he said. In addition, the TFG needed tents to prepare camps in Mogadishu for their return; TFG instructors would be sent to assist in the camps. ¶7. (C) Col. Mahdi noted that the first tranche of Somali TFG recruits in Djibouti (totaling 463, including four who had been hospitalized in Djibouti for medical reasons, e.g., tuberculosis) had now reached the midpoint of their three-month training by the Djiboutian armed forces. The TFG was ready to send the second tranche (comprising up to 537 troops, to reach a total of 1,000) from Mogadishu to Djibouti at any time, Hirabe said. -------------- -------------- DEPUTY CHOD ACKNOWLEDGES DJIBOUTI MAY DEPLOY TO MOGADISHU -------------- -------------- ¶8. (C) NOTE. Djiboutian deputy CHOD Major General Hassan Ali Kamil informed SCO on August 18 that the GODJ seeks to begin returning GODJ-trained TFG forces to Mogadishu via four flights on September 19, 22, 24, and 26 (116 pax for the first 3 flights, and 115 for the last, for a total of 463 pax). MG Hassan said the GODJ still intended to train a second tranche of TFG recruits (to reach a total of 1,000). Hassan also acknowledged the possibility of Djiboutian Armed Forces deploying to Mogadishu in support of AMISOM, but said nothing official had been announced yet. END NOTE. -------------- FRENCH “CRASH COURSE” TRAINING UNDERWAY -------------- ¶9. (C) Hirabe and Mahdi confirmed that 151 Somali TFG troops (143 recruits and 8 officers) had begun a seven -week training program with the French military in Djibouti. Training was “going well,” and continuous training (day and night) enabled the abbreviated duration of this “crash course”. The French training was scheduled to conclude September 25-26. The 8 Somali officers had previous military experience, and included at least one colonel, lieutenant colonel, and major. Hirabe and Col. Mahdi said they had accompanied French Ambassador to Djibouti, Dominique Decherf, on an August 3 visit to the French training facility, near Arta. The French had rejected several trainees on suspicion of being under-age (below age 18),following physical inspection. ¶10. (C) The TFG had also sent 300 military recruits to Uganda for training, Hirabe said. The TFG had requested a three-month training (similar in duration to Djibouti’s) but Ugandan authorities wanted to conduct a six-month program. Ugandan training was valuable, “but we need the crash course,” Hirabe said. TFG troops trained in Uganda were ultimately sent to a single camp in Mogadishu, he added. -------------- GODJ MAY TRAIN TFG CIVILIAN POLICE -------------- ¶11. (C) Questioned about any plans to train TFG civilian police, Hirabe and Col. Mahdi said that training TFG military forces was a greater priority, given insecurity in Somalia. (NOTE. Col. Abdi Abdillahi, chief of Djibouti’s National Police, has informed RSO that President Guelleh has directed him to train 100-150 TFG civilian police in Djibouti. The GODJ is proposing a six-month course at its Nagad police academy, using police and university instructors, to cover subjects such as policing, criminal investigation, interviewing, and bomb detection. Col. Abdillahi requested USG assistance for police training, and welcomed U.S. trainers. According to MG Hassan, the GODJ intend to train up to 200 TFG civilian police and gendarmes. END NOTE.) ¶12. (C) COMMENT. Djibouti’s decision earlier this month to close its border to all single, Somali military- aged males, fearing that al-Shabaab elements could infiltrate Djibouti posing as refugees (ref C), illustrates that the struggle against al-Shabaab is one that Djibouti is deeply engaged in. Despite relatively little material support (to date) from the USG or other donors, the GODJ’s current training of TFG recruits, its interest in training an additional tranche of TFG fighters, its desire to train TFG police and gendarmes, and its plans to deploy Djiboutian troops to Somalia, all underscore the degree to which Djibouti has identified promoting stability in neighboring Somalia as fundamental to securing peace and security in the region. END COMMENT. Signature: WONG