NADR-FUNDED PROPOSAL TO SUPPORT THE REGIONAL STRATEGIC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 DJIBOUTI 000010 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR S/CT MARC NORMAN AND AF/E NAIROBI FOR POLOFF S.MADSEN CJTF-HOA FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PTER PINS ASEC DJ SO SUBJECT: NADR-FUNDED PROPOSAL TO SUPPORT THE REGIONAL STRATEGIC INITIATIVE REF: 08 STATE 128554 (NOTAL) ¶1. SUMMARY. Per guidance in reftel, Embassy Djibouti submits the following proposal for $500,000 to establish a "Djibouti-Somalia Counter-Terrorism Border Post" (DSCBP) at Loyada, along the currently porous border between Djibouti and Somalia. Implementation of this proposal would enable the USG to provide TIP/PISCES and additional surveillance capability to the Government of Djibouti that would the GODJ to improve entry control and identify/capture terrorists traveling from neighboring Somalia. The DSCBP will not only help ensure the continued safety and stability of Djibouti--a key Muslim partner in the GWOT--but also strengthen vitally needed force protection for more than 2,500 U.S. military personnel stationed in Djibouti at the only U.S. military base in sub-Saharan Africa. END SUMMARY. -------------- PROPOSAL DETAILS -------------- ¶2. This proposal has been reviewed by, and has the concurrence of, East Africa Coordinator for the Regional Strategic Initiative (RSI) Samuel Madsen. ¶A. Project Name: Djibouti-Somalia Counter-Terrorism Border Post (DSCBP) ¶B. Implementing agency: U.S. Department of State, American Embassy Djibouti, Regional Security Office (RSO) -------------- - DJIBOUTI-SOMALIA COUNTER-TERRORISM BORDER POST -------------- - ¶3. The Djibouti-Somalia Counter-Terrorism Border Post (DSCBP) is designed to help secure the porous southern border in Djibouti adjacent to Somalia/Somaliland by establishing a border post and related TIP/PISCES and additional surveillance capability to improve entry control and identify/capture terrorists. The DSCBP will not only help ensure the continued safety and stability of Djibouti--a key Muslim partner in the GWOT, but also strengthen vitally needed force protection for more than 2,500 U.S. military personnel stationed in Djibouti at the only U.S. military base in sub-Saharan Africa. ¶4. Simultaneous bombings by suspected Somali terrorists on October 29, 2008--of the Somaliland presidential palace, UN offices, and Ethiopian diplomatic facilities in neighboring Hargeisa; and of several key targets in Puntland--highlight the active terrorist threat that exists in the region, one that includes elements of al-Shabaab, al-Ittihad al-Islamiya (AIAI),and al-Qaida East Africa. The resignation in December 2008 of President Yusuf as head of Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG),coupled with the anticipated withdrawal in early 2009 of Ethiopian military forces from Somalia, also underscore the continued fragility of the Somali security situation and the urgent need to assist the Government of Djibouti with the means to secure its borders against terrorist threats. ¶5. The Djibouti-Somalia Counter-Terrorism Border Post will aid in securing the border by supporting the Government of Djibouti (GoDJ) to establish a functioning border post between Djibouti and Somalia/Somaliland. This post will be established at Loyada (the only official border crossing point between Djibouti and Somalia), and will serve as immigration border checkpoint for Djiboutian police and immigration officers to properly identify, screen and detain persons as necessary. Other USG agencies are committed to providing TIP/PISCES connectivity to this post, as well as experienced USG mentors to ensure sustainment of these critical CT measures. ¶6. Objective: The Djibouti-Somalia Counter-Terrorism Border Post seeks to address a critical counter-terrorism requirement stemming from Djibouti's proximity to Somalia/Somaliland. Although Djibouti borders the comparatively peaceful self-declared independent Republic of Somaliland, both Somaliland and Djibouti have seen an influx of refugees and undocumented migrants from war-torn and unstable southern Somalia. Djibouti has effective entry control measures in place at its international airport, but not at its land borders, of which Loyada is the most critical. DJIBOUTI 00000010 002 OF 003 ¶7. Djibouti is particularly attractive as a terrorist target since it is host to the only U.S. military base in Africa, Camp Lemonier, which serves as the headquarters to over 2,500 U.S. and coalition troops serving with the Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA),who are conducting operations in 13 African countries. Efforts to promote Djibouti's border security will not only help strengthen force protection for U.S. and allied troops but also assist U.S. counterterrorism efforts throughout the Horn of Africa. Other USG installations based in Djibouti include an important naval refueling center; a VOA broadcasting facility that transmits to much of the Arabian peninsula and East Africa; and a USAID pre-positioning warehouse for up to 30,000 metric tons of humanitarian food assistance. In addition to U.S. targets, Djibouti also hosts some 3,500 French forces. ¶8. The Djiboutian government is itself a target for serving as the venue for Somali reconciliation talks that are actively opposed by extremist terrorist elements. The Somalia-based terrorist group al Shabaab has now vowed to launch attacks outside of Somalia. Recent threat reporting in other channels underscores that Djibouti is genuinely at risk. ¶9. In line with Mission Strategic Plans, the Office of Regional Affairs has committed to installing a Terrorist Interdiction Program/ Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System (TIP/PISCES) at the Loyada border upon establishment of the immigration and police post. As Djibouti is increasingly a regional hub for travel, financial transactions, and port services, assisting the GODJ to tighten border controls against possible terrorists and other malafide travelers will promote security and stability not only in Djibouti, but throughout the entire region. ¶10. The host government is a close partner of the United States on a range of security and counter-terrorism issues, and has expressed strong endorsement of additional programs to enhance border security. -------------- PROJECT DETAILS -------------- ¶11. The objective of this program is to provide the Government of Djibouti with a fully functioning and effective immigration/border post, equipped with complete office automation, photo identification system, surveillance vehicles, and an expanded screening facility to house undocumented migrants and possible terrorists attempting to cross Djibouti's borders. Additional surveillance vehicles and night vision equipment will permit the GODJ authorities to improve monitoring of remote locations along the border, where illicit travelers often cross. The border post will be linked to TIP/PISCES. The Government of Djibouti has already demonstrated its ability to use such equipment and similar measures effectively at Djibouti International Airport. This project would extend this capability to the most important and most vulnerable land border crossing - that with Somalia/Somaliland. ¶12. This border post facility will allow the GoDJ to: --Identify and register travelers (including immigrants, IDPs, and refugees) legally crossing the border from Somalia. --Patrol the border and interdict malafide travelers illegally crossing the border. --Provide a base of operations for Djiboutian police and immigration forces along the border to deter, identify, detain and deport malafide travelers and capture terrorists. --Deploy TIP/PISCES capability at Djibouti's most vulnerable land border crossing. ¶13. Timeline: To achieve the objectives, the border post would be built over a 6- to 9-month schedule. Because of limited expertise in country, a technical advisor will be contracted in-country to provide oversight and monitoring and evaluation of the project until completion of the border post facility. ¶14. Coordinating Office: Regional Security Officer will serve as the Post Coordinator and work in conjunction with Refugee Officer, Office of Regional Affairs, Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS),and the Department of Defense (U.S. Africa Command and CJTF-HOA),who will work together in development of this initiative. Border security has broad implications for all the agencies and subordinate sections involved. State, NCIS, and DOD are primarily interested in the security and counterterrorism implications of the DJIBOUTI 00000010 003 OF 003 open border. ¶15. Implementation and Evaluation: The Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) will oversee coordination to ensure all program requirements are met. State will be the lead agency for implementation, with interagency assistance. State possesses the manpower, contracting expertise, and coordinating authority to ensure the success of the program. Interagency efforts will be coordinated through existing structures at the Embassy, supervised by the DCM. ¶16. The technical advisor, working in collaboration with the host government, will apprise coordinator with impediments of progress. The coordinator, technical advisor, and relevant interagency partners will meet to discuss course corrections and present them to the host government with concurrence. The technical advisor will work with the host government in implementing and modifying plans. ¶17. Cost Allocation (estimated): $250K Construction of new Immigration Post (Physical structure for immigration post) $50K Office automation for Immigration Post (Computers, copy machines, fax phones, cameras, etc.) $100K Surveillance Vehicles (Three 4X4 patrol vehicles with night vision equipment) $50K Technical Advisor (Technical advisor to oversee implementation) $50K Training (Training on equipment and law enforcement procedures) Total: $500,000 ¶18. Embassy Point of Contact: Ellen Tannor, Regional Security Officer (RSO),email: TannorE@state.gov, phone: (253) 35-5734 or (253) 820672. SWAN