SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT TO TIMOR-LESTE BY MARFORPAC'S LT

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 DILI 000097 SENSITIVE SIPDIS FOR LT GEN STALDER FROM AMBASSADOR KLEMM E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: TT MARR ID MOPS OTRA SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT TO TIMOR-LESTE BY MARFORPAC'S LT GEN KEITH STALDER DILI 00000097 001.2 OF 004 Summary -------------- (SBU) The visit of U.S. Marine Forces Pacific Commander, Lieutenant General Stalder to Dili comes at a perfect time as we seek to encourage the Government of Timor-Leste's active leadership over the reform of its security sector. Lt Gen Stalder will be the second high ranking American military commander to visit Dili in 2009, underscoring the U.S. commitment to Timor-Leste's stability and to regional security. While still facing enormous challenges of poverty, there are hopeful signs of increasing stability with the country now in its 14th consecutive month without a serious incident of political violence or instability. The country's leadership appears increasingly aware that it must begin to act to hasten reform of the country's police and military to sustain this stability, an awareness prompted in significant part due to the September 2008 national security policy development workshop supported by PACOM. Lt Gen Stalder's meetings with the Timorese leadership will allow us to emphasize our continued commitment to support reform, especially the professionalization and responsible development of Timor-Leste's defense force; and to explore possible avenues of future engagement, in particular towards the development of Timor-Leste's maritime security capabilities. End summary. Economic and Social Setting -------------- (U) Timor-Leste is Asia's poorest country, with half of its population living on less than a dollar a day, 85% of its labor force engaged in subsistence agriculture, illiteracy running at well over 50%, and more than half the population stunted from malnutrition. Timor's poverty is correlated with enormous gaps in social infrastructure, distinguished by a poor national road network; inadequate telecommunications (less than 1% of households has a landline telephone); a single, increasingly congested seaport; an electricity grid that supplies power to only a third of the country's households and then only for short segments of the day; a health services infrastructure barely able to cope with one of the world's highest rates of maternal and child mortality; an education system in which less than a fifth of schoolchildren has a chair or desk, and more than half have no textbook; poor water and sanitation facilities (two-thirds of adults fetch water at least once a week); and a single functioning international airport that can handle planes no larger than a 737. Timor-Leste is not without resources, however. It has more than $4.2 billion in a sovereign wealth fund due to accruals from modest oil deposits, and zero international debt. It also benefits from the generosity of the international community, with the government forecasting receipts of more than $220 million from bilateral and multilateral donors in 2009. The IMF estimates the economy grew by a real 12.5% in 2008 due almost solely to increased government spending. Political Context -------------- (SBU) Since acquiring independence in 2002, Timor-Leste established a tragic pattern of periodic violence or instability, with large-scale disturbances occurring almost yearly. The most serious event occurred in 2006, when a security sector crisis led to the collapse of the central government, widespread property damage, and the displacement of 150,000 persons from their homes and into large and wretched camps around Dili. To restore order in 2006, an Australian-led International Stabilization Force (ISF) intervened and a renewed United Nations mandate established a large police presence. Both forces remain in Timor in considerable strength. They were unable to prevent, however, the most recent incident of political violence when, on February 11, 2008, the President was critically wounded and the Prime Minister also came under gunfire. (SBU) Major causes of Timor's instability include a highly contentious political elite; weak, politicized, poorly motivated or poorly directed security institutions; poor access to justice and a culture of impunity, especially among the elite; and the disillusionment and disempowerment that has accompanied Timor's DILI 00000097 002.2 OF 004 failure to raise its people out of grinding poverty. The government of Prime Minister Gusmao, installed in August 2007, set out to tackle the primary consequences of the 2006 crisis, and to some extent its causes, and recorded significant success in 2008. It largely closed the many internally displaced persons camps that were stubbornly scattered across Dili until just six months ago. The government also resolved remaining grievances held by the "petitioners," the soldiers that left the defense force in early 2006, and introduced a pension system for veterans, the elderly and the infirm (a daunting logistical challenge in a rugged country without a postal system or banking network). The prime minister designated 2009 as the year of infrastructure and rural development as a means of signaling his government's intent to speed economic growth and tackle the scourges of poverty and unemployment. In recognition of the signs of increasing stability in Timor, the Department of State lifted its travel advisory in September 2008 and the ISF reduced its troop levels by 150 in January 2009. Security Sector: Reform Needed -------------- (SBU) To transform themselves into protectors of the people and sources of stability, both Timor-Leste's national police (PNTL) and defense force (F-FDTL) require substantial reform. The poorly-led, unmotivated, under-resourced and ill-trained police force is also tainted by its historical antecedents with the Indonesian police force and a history through 2006 of severe politicization. Consequently, UNPOL retains full operational command of police responsibilities throughout Timor-Leste, although a phased process of resumption of Timorese control is to begin in April 2009. The military largely represents the rump of the armed resistance to the Indonesian occupation, one that is justly proud of its legacy as a guerrilla force in the mountains of Timor, but wholly lacking in command, discipline, training and logistics capabilities that feature in a modern, professional army. The roles and responsibilities of the PNTL and F-FDTL are ill-defined in law or regulation, and civilian command often has been wanting at best, contributing to their frequent mutual conflict. (SBU) Reassuringly, the need for reform is recognized across the Timorese leadership spectrum and the donor community, especially the UN and Timor-Leste's key democratic partners, has signaled strong readiness to assist reform. A significant positive development occurred after the February 11, 2008, assassination attempts when the army and the police were placed together under a joint command to bring the perpetrators to justice. They did so successfully and peacefully, restoring a good deal of trust and confidence between the two forces. Their performance was tarnished, however, by many cases of abuse of human rights and authority. Sadly, such incidents continue to occur on a regular basis. U.S. Support of Reform -------------- (SBU) Since mid-2007, the U.S. has substantially increased its engagement with the Timorese government towards reform of its military. Our core objective has been to enhance the ability of the government to provide stability and security for its citizens, for without stability there can be no realistic hope for sustained, long term economic and social development. To do so, we've focused on the goals of reforming and strengthening the country's security institutions; enhancing civilian command, including through the development of the country's legal infrastructure; and supporting the professionalization of the F-FDTL and PNTL. (SBU) Support from and engagement by the U.S. Pacific Command has been essential and generous. In the past eighteen months, PACFLT Commander Admiral Robert Willard, U.S. 7th Fleet Commander Vice Admiral John Bird, and your predecessor at MARFORPAC, Lt Gen John Goodman, have all visited Timor-Leste. The USNS Mercy completed a 15 day deployment here in July 2008 and the USS Lassen received a warm welcome in January 2009. A company from the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) spent a very productive two weeks in April 2008 interoperating with the ISF and supporting several community relations projects. A delegation led by the Defense Institute of International Legal DILI 00000097 003.2 OF 004 Studies conducted an analysis of the legal infrastructure supporting Timor's security sector in August 2008. A high-level PACFLT, USCG and MARFORPAC assessment team in November 2008 surveyed the prospects for future engagement. And with full PACOM support, the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies hosted a historic workshop in September 2008 to facilitate the drafting of Timor-Leste's first national security policy. This investment, which brought together seventeen Timorese leaders from government, parliament, military, police and civil society, has done more than any other in recent years to emphasize for those who participated and other Timorese leaders the strength and authenticity of the U.S. commitment to Timor's reform and development. (SBU) In February 2009, PACFLT deployed a team of Seabees to conduct a variety capacity-building tasks nationwide over an indefinite period of time. And with the upcoming, much anticipated visit of the 11th MEU due to occur in October, this only further underscores the American commitment to Timor-Leste. (SBU) F-FDTL has unfortunately been a source of national instability since independence in May 2002. In April 2006, about 40% of the force deserted, a few with weapons and most without, and precipitated the aforementioned national security sector crisis which culminated in F-FDTL and PNTL engaging in open warfare in the streets of Dili. This was followed by an 18-month long period in which Timor was subject to episodes of widespread gang violence, and disruptions associated with the military dissidents who were behind the events of February 11, ¶2009. MARFORPAC engagement of F-FDTL cannot come at a better time as it sets off on an attempt to nearly double its numbers as a result of this year's upcoming recruit training effort. For F-FDTL, this is a dramatic step forward that is not without significant risk since many of aspects of the training plan have yet to be developed, much less coordinated with the advisors of Australia and Portugal - F-FDTL's principal supporters. The bottom line is there may be room for MARFORPAC to assist with the recruitment and basic training of new F-FDTL recruits. Donor coordination -------------- (SBU) The coordination of military or police assistance to Timor-Leste is at best ad hoc, with the Timorese government unable or reluctant to provide leadership. Early in 2008 at our initiative, ambassadors to Dili from Australia, Japan, Portugal, New Zealand and the U.S. began to meet periodically to improve information sharing, especially regarding maritime security assistance, supplementing regular contact among local defense attachis. In effort in 2008 to include security sector reform as part of a government-led national priorities process with full donor participation failed largely due to lack of engagement by key Timor defense actors. During Admiral Willard's July 2008 visit, Secretary of State for Defense Pinto openly shared his concerns of having many generous partners ready with assistance to meet Timor's many needs, while knowing that the aid is often competitive, conflicting or incoherent. He openly confessed his inability to effectively coordinate and optimize foreign assistance. Donors with current maritime security programs in Timor, or those that have expressed interest in aiding Timor's maritime sector include Portugal, Australia, China, Japan, Indonesia, Canada, India, New Zealand, Britain, Germany, Korea and the United Nations. Secretary Pinto subsequently asked for U.S. support to convene a conference and help him enhance the coordination of assistance to Timor's maritime security sector. Embassy Dili continues to explore means of possible facilitation. Your Visit to Timor -------------- (SBU) Your visit to Dili comes at an ideal time. The Honolulu APCSS workshop spurred recognition among Timorese leaders of the necessity of moving forward on reform of the security sector. Not surprisingly, reform is a highly sensitive and political subject in Timor-Leste, and while there has been a general awareness that the police and military must be overhauled, particularly given their tragic contribution to the 2006 crisis, there has been scant action. The UN in particular has a long record of failure in initiating meaningful reform. Following DILI 00000097 004.2 OF 004 the September workshop the Prime Minister told me he will turn his attention to security sector reform early in 2009 - his attention and commitment will be critical to its success. In December 2008, the President hosted a seminar on the topic to prompt action, and his advisors subsequently consulted with me on options for the sequencing of reform and how the U.S. can assist. Your encouragement will ensure this momentum is maintained. (SBU) We hope to secure meetings for you with the President, the Prime Minister, and F-FDTL leadership. Each of these engagements will offer an opportunity to discuss the following themes. ¶A. The U.S., including PACOM and Marine Forces Pacific, is committed to assisting the government of Timor-Leste provide stability and contribute to regional security. ¶B. The U.S. is ready to explore how we might best support Timor-Leste's implementation of the results of the Honolulu workshop; how can the U.S. further support the development of a national security policy or law, and the reform of your security institutions? ¶C. The 11th MEU is eager to engage as broadly as possible with F-FDTL during its visit to Timor in October 2009. ¶D. We are always eager, however, to receive your suggestions on how the U.S. might best support the professionalization of F-FDTL. ¶E. MARFORPAC is grateful for Timor-Leste's warm welcome of the 31st MEU in April 2008. ¶F. We strongly recognize the importance of effective donor coordination. As we design our future engagement in Timor-Leste, the U.S. will follow your leadership and be as transparent as possible with your partners. The U.S. Embassy is exploring possible mechanisms to assist your goal of enhancing donor coordination. KLEMM