THE DOWNSIZING OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY FORCES IN

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 DILI 000338 SENSITIVE SIPDIS FOR STATE - EAP/MTS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL PGOV PMIL KPKO TT SUBJECT: THE DOWNSIZING OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY FORCES IN TIMOR-LESTE REF: A) BLOOMQUIST/ HENICK E-MAILS; B) DILI 267 DILI 00000338 001.2 OF 006 -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (SBU) The Timorese government seeks a significant reduction in the presence of international security forces over the course of 2010. Citing the improved security situation here, Australian and New Zealand troops deployed in Timor-Leste plan to drop from a combined 800 soldiers today to 450 by May 2010. Reducing the United Nations peacekeeping operation may prove more challenging, however, as the UN has tied the handover of policing responsibilities to Timorese police meeting minimal capability standards. President Ramos-Horta publicly has called for the full handover of police responsibilities to occur in Dili by June 2010 and nationwide by end-2010. Mixed UN police performance, a Timorese desire to recover sovereignty, a craving to reduce the chafing UN presence especially in Dili, and renewed confidence in the Timorese police are factors driving the new timeline. The Timorese police remain institutionally weak, however, poorly resourced, still deeply scarred by its 2006 collapse, and inadequately trained. Nevertheless, we recommend that the renewal of the UN mandate for Timor-Leste in February 2010 confirm the handover of police responsibilities to the Timorese by end-2010, and the beginning soon of a visible, deliberate downsizing of peacekeeping operations. Ideally, the UN should sponsor an independent assessment of remaining gaps in Timorese policing capabilities that can provide a baseline for future bilateral assistance. As the UN PKO withdraws, the U.S. should step up its assistance to the professionalization of the Timorese police in conjunction with our allies Australia, Portugal and Japan. End summary. ¶2. (SBU) In two speeches delivered in Dili in November and December 2009, President Ramos-Horta outlined Timorese intentions for a deliberate but prompt reduction in the international security forces deployed in Timor-Leste. Ramos-Horta's timetable - worked out in consultation with the Prime Minister and the civilian and uniformed commanders of the country's security forces, and ratified in early-December 2009 by the constitutionally mandated Superior Council on Defense and Security (an advisory body comprised of civilian authorities, the national parliament, military and police representatives, and other stakeholders) - envisions a full transfer of police operational responsibilities back to the Timorese by end-2010 and a concomitant lower presence of Australian and New Zealand troops. The timetable is in rough accordance with the key international actors, the UN and the Australian led International Stabilization Force (ISF). Both cite recent Timorese stability and the increasing ability of Timorese institutions to maintain security as key factors enabling a drawdown. Nonetheless, the potential for friction or disagreement regarding the size and mission of future international forces in Timor-Leste exists, especially regarding the UN peacekeeping operations (PKO) within the UN Mission to Timor-Leste (UNMIT). The UN consistently has tied a handover to the Timorese meeting certain qualitative performance criteria, and has not begun to discuss downsizing, at least not openly and not in 2010. -------------- International Stabilization Force -------------- ¶3. (SBU) The ISF currently numbers roughly 800 soldiers, comprised of 650 Australian troops and 150 from New Zealand. Always commanded by an Australian, the ISF arrived in Timor-Leste in late-May 2006 at the peak of the violence associated with the 2006 crisis with an initial contingent of some 3000. By February 2010, the Australian component will shrink to 400 and by May 2010, the New Zealand force will slip DILI 00000338 002.2 OF 006 to 50, leaving total ISF troop strength at 450 by mid-2010. In coordination with the government of Timor-Leste (GoTL),the ISF will close a forward operating base in Baucau, focus operations in Dili and Gleno, and reduce armed security patrols to a minimum, especially in the capital. The ISF's core mission will continue to be to work with the Timorese military (F-FDTL), engage with local communities throughout Timor-Leste, and monitor the security environment. Australian diplomatic contacts acknowledge that as long as Timor-Leste remains stable, the ISF will assess its force strength continuously with an eye towards further reductions in manpower. -------------- UNPOL -------------- ¶4. (SBU) The UN PKO is made up of some 1500 personnel, predominantly police representing more than forty nations, and known locally as UNPOL. Its largest contingents hail from Portugal, Malaysia, the Philippines, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Australia. UNPOL is headquartered in Dili, concentrated in formed police units in several parts of the country and is permanently stationed in each of the country's thirteen district capitals (an early goal to have UNPOL stationed in all 65 sub-districts was never realized). Since its inception, the peacekeeping mandate has had two primary goals: A) establish peace and stability through operational command of all police forces in Timor-Leste and B),reconstitute the Timorese national police (PNTL) through training, mentoring and a process of certification. The size of UNPOL has remained constant since the beginning of the UN mandate in 2006, although its role has shifted over time in response to changing conditions in Timor-Leste, fluctuations in the relationship with the Timorese authorities, and realization of its own limitations. ¶5. (SBU) UNPOL's task of ending the widespread violence and property destruction that wracked Timor-Leste through much of the latter half of 2006 was accomplished by end-2007. Today, the country is peaceful and crime rates are low. The consensus view on UNPOL's second objective - training, mentoring and recertifying the PNTL - is largely one of failure. Mentoring and training programs had little positive effect due to the absence of a unified UN training/mentoring doctrine, a lack of qualified trainers/mentors within UNPOL and, after the initial bad experience of working with weak UNPOL instructors, Timorese disengagement. On the certification process, whereby individual PNTL officers would be reviewed for past criminal behavior and performance during the 2006 crisis, the GOTL and UNMIT never came to agreement on a unified process and have effectively operated parallel systems. A program of co-location to encourage joint UNPOL/PNTL operations was not uniformly implemented. Visiting police stations around the country, one can easily find PNTL officers working out of dilapidated structures without power, desks or latrines, in eyesight of their UNPOL colleagues working in clean, well-lit and fully resourced offices. Several internal UN reviews of the UNPOL-PNTL relationship, including a major assessment conducted in March 2008 by the head of the UN's police operations, have suggested reforms. Implementation has been spotty, however. UNPOL leadership at times has been weak, effective joint operations remain irregular, and the Timorese in frustration have turned to bilateral partners for their training needs. -------------- How long the UN PKO Mission? -------------- ¶6. (SBU) In September 2007, the GoTL asked the UN for an extension of its PKO mandate through 2012 when the next round of DILI 00000338 003.2 OF 006 presidential and national parliament elections are expected. Even then, the Timorese embrace of UNPOL was less then wholehearted. In October 2007, the president of the national parliament told the Ambassador that it was time for UNPOL to scale down and give policing back to the PNTL. UNPOL's heavy presence in Dili has chafed, as has the loss of sovereignty, the occasional poor caliber of UNPOL officers, its indifferent integration with PNTL forces, its lavish stock of equipment and vehicles, and the occasional well-publicized maltreatment of Timorese. In recognition of Timor-Leste's increasing stability, in May 2009 UNPOL finally initiated a process whereby operational policing responsibilities were returned to PNTL commanders on a district or unit basis. Command in four districts and several units (such as the maritime police) have been turned over to the PNTL so far. ¶7. (SBU) The focus now is on when the handover will be completed, and the future role and scale of UNPOL. President Ramos-Horta asked that the ongoing handover process be completed by the end of 2010, with the PNTL reassuming policing responsibilities in the critical Dili capital district by June ¶2010. He urged that the four formed police units (FPUs) be reduced to two and deployed outside of Dili, but later acceded to the UN's request that the FPUs be reduced only to three, with one having responsibility for the security of UN staff concentrated in Dili. While Ramos-Horta deferred to the UN decisions regarding the future, post-handover size of UNPOL, he made clear the Timorese expectation that UNPOL will downsize. Regarding the post-handover role of UNPOL, Ramos-Horta insisted that it be subordinate and supportive; i.e., to provide guidance and support in administration and management and to continue monitoring and training. Throughout the country, UNPOL would cease carrying out mobile patrols "or intervene except when necessary." -------------- The Handover Process So Far -------------- ¶8. (SBU) In the four districts in which the PNTL have resumed command, the process of transferring authority and having UNPOL assume a "monitoring" role has not been friction-free. In Lautem, which in May 2009 became the first handover district, there was considerable confusion among both the remaining UNPOL officers and the PNTL regarding their respective roles. UNPOL commanders provided little doctrinal or procedural clarity and UNPOL behavior suggested to the Timorese that the former believed themselves to be still in charge. The Lautem PNTL Chief told the Ambassador that the situation was resolved satisfactorily only in October 2009, following a visit by the PNTL commander. ¶9. (SBU) Decisions on which districts or units to hand over have been jointly reached by UNMIT and Timorese commanders based on assessments of local PNTL operational capabilities, including the completion rates of the certification process for district or unit officers. The process at times has required very senior-level negotiations. In one instance, UNMIT threatened to block a handover unless the prime minister acted to remove uncertified district commanders. Although the Timorese at times asked that the process be time-bound, UNMIT maintained that the process be solely criteria-based. The significance of Ramos-Horta's December 9 declaration was UNMIT's apparent acceptance that the handover process would now also be driven by a timetable and completed no later than end-2010. -------------- Timorese Police Far From Ideal -------------- DILI 00000338 004.2 OF 006 ¶10. (SBU) The PNTL remains a weak institution, poorly resourced, inadequately trained, badly administered, with many of its officers without access to basic transportation, investigations, enforcement and communications equipment. Since 2006, however, when its command collapsed in the face of that year's crisis, there have been some improvements. In a late-2008 national poll, 80% of respondents stated the PNTL was doing a good or very good job. By means of a series of legal and regulatory changes the government is reforming the PNTL's command and personnel structure, tightening its disciplinary codes, and clarifying its training and operational doctrines. The prime minster recently dismissed seven officers, a commission reviewing 259 still uncertified officers (8% of the total force) will complete its work in mid-2010 (and is expected to require more dismissals),and a long awaited performance-based promotion system will be enacted in January ¶2010. That said, while the new PNTL chief introduced a needed strengthening of the chain of command, he also faces criticism for rewarding loyalists and prioritizing the development of glitzy tactical units at the expense of community policing. A visit to any sub-district PNTL station remains an astonishingly discouraging event. It routinely ends with a beleaguered commander noting the absence, and requesting help with the provision, of basic skills training, communications equipment, generators, transportation, weapons lockers and even handcuffs. ¶11. (SBU) Nevertheless, Ramos-Horta's logic in calling for a completion of the handover process in 2010 is compelling. To begin, the PNTL relationship with UNPOL is significantly one of dependence, for logistics, infrastructure, equipment, maintenance and transportation. An effective downsizing of UNPOL will help break this dependency, and Ramos-Horta urged the GOTL to meet by end-2011 all basic PNTL infrastructure and logistic requirements. He further told the ambassador that the PNTL must develop the confidence that it can police Timor-Leste on its own well before the next round of national elections in 2012, and can only do so by building up a record of success through experience. Mindful of the history of PNTL failure when the international presence has been relaxed, most notably in 2006 but also in 2002, Ramos-Horta said the presence of UNPOL as monitors through 2012 will provide adequate insurance in the case of another PNTL relapse. -------------- Next Steps -------------- ¶12. (SBU) Two milestones loom. The first will be a UN technical assessment mission, to be led by Ian Martin (a UN veteran in Timor-Leste),that will survey all UN operations but especially those of UNPOL in mid-January 2010. The second will be the upcoming UN Security Council review of the UN's mandate in Timor-Leste, currently due for renewal in February 2010. We see some danger that either UNMIT or UN headquarters will take an overly restrictive approach to the handover process and UNPOL downsizing, and unnecessarily maintain the UNPOL presence at current levels. We recommend UN support of completing the process of returning full policing responsibility to the PNTL by end-2010, the development of a well-defined, narrow, supportive monitoring program for UNPOL, and the beginning in 2010 of a visible, deliberate downsizing of UNPOL. ¶13. (SBU) The role of Timor-Leste's bilateral partners, including the U.S., in the professionalization of its police force and military is viewed by Timorese actors as becoming ever more important. For the PNTL, both Portugal and Australia have significant training programs in basic skills, and the U.S. has contributed in alignment with Australia investigative skills training (implemented by NCIS) and the installation of a computer-based training facility at PNTL's training center. The DILI 00000338 005.2 OF 006 FBI/JTIAF-W is developing an extended criminal intelligence training program. Timorese leaders do not expect or want bilateral partners to replace the full array of assistance provided by UNPOL since 2006, but correctly see key PNTL capability gaps and believe they can only be remedied with support from skilled, reliable bilateral partners. An area where the UN may still play a useful role would be to sponsor an independent assessment of PNTL needs. The Timorese requested such an analysis in 2008, but UNMIT dodged it. A comprehensive assessment and prioritization of PNTL needs would provide a critical reference for both the GOTL and bilateral partners. ¶14. (SBU) Pending the completion of such an assessment by the UN or by the USG, Mission Dili has identified the following key areas for potential U.S. programs. Development of Timor-Leste's Legal Framework for the Security Sector: The clash between members of the Timorese armed forces (F-FDTL) and between the F-FDTL and the PNTL during the 2006 crisis demonstrated the urgent need to clearly articulate a national security policy and to delineate the roles and responsibilities of the Timorese security forces. The U.S. has been playing a major supportive role in the ongoing effort to finalize a national security policy through facilitation and coordination conducted by the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies. Although the draft national security policy is expected to be approved sometime early next year, continued support may be required to help bring this process to a successful conclusion. In addition, the U.S. Pacific Command has explored the provision of legal advisors, which would be warmly welcomed by Timorese Commanders. Professionalization of the F-FDTL: The F-FDTL is in the process of tripling its size over the course of just a few years and has declared its intention to focus future activities on disaster management, engineering projects, and international peacekeeping - all areas in which it has little expertise. Mission Dili's Office of Defense Cooperation has been using IMET funds and U.S. Pacific Command programs to support the professionalization of the F-FDTL through training programs and bilateral engagement. A recent major U.S. Marines exercise in Timor-Leste that included extended joint training with the F-FDTL was highly praised by Timorese commanders for providing their soldiers an opportunity to engage with and learn from U.S. troops. Making such exercises a regular feature of U.S. engagement would have a strongly positive effect on F-FDTL development. In addition, the U.S. Pacific Command supported the permanent deployment of a detachment of U.S. Navy Seabees to conduct humanitarian engineering projects and to work with the F-FDTL engineers to build their capacity. Continued support in these areas will be critical for the next several years. Maritime security: The GOTL has yet to develop an integrated policy and institutional arrangements to manage its maritime security and the failure to do so is a major obstacle to addressing the country's vulnerabilities to terrorism, narcotics and human smuggling, and illegal fishing. Additional vulnerabilities in this area include port security and the low capacity of the maritime police and military units. The Secretary of State for Security has asked for U.S. navigational skills training, from the most basic thorough intermediate search and rescue and maritime police tactics, for the Timorese maritime police. The U.S. Pacific Command, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the National Criminal Investigative Service have all begun to offer assistance programs to address these problems, including training on port security and basic navigational skills, and the possible assignment of a legal advisor to assist with the development of a national maritime security policy. Additional support will be required in these and related areas in the coming few years. Logistical support for the PNTL: As noted above, the PNTL lacks basic logistical capabilities, particularly in the districts DILI 00000338 006.2 OF 006 outside of Dili. At the same time, the GOTL is committed to investing some of its own funds towards redressing these deficiencies. What is lacking, however, is technical expertise on procurement, storage, and, particularly, maintenance of equipment and supplies. All too often, we have observed that Timorese purchase unneeded equipment or fail to maintain such equipment in working order. Per ref A, we have already requested INL support in providing limited technical assistance in this area. Depending on future assessments and needs, however, additional support may be necessary. Professionalization of the PNTL: As described above, the PNTL remains an unprofessional force lacking in capacity in a range of critical areas. A comprehensive assessment of the deficiencies and the ongoing bilateral training programs is needed to determine where and how the U.S. can contribute to its professionalization. Pending such an assessment, however, immediate needs include basic training in the areas of border management and close protection. Deficiencies in both of these areas have left Timor-Leste vulnerable to external terrorism threats, as well as international crime and drug and human trafficking. Per ref B, we have requested assistance from S/CT and Diplomatic Security's Anti-Terrorism Assistance program to conduct an assessment and offer in-country border management and close protection training. As we continue to develop a better understanding of the needs and deficiencies of the PNTL, we anticipate the need for additional U.S. training and support. We hope to apply for 1207 funds during the coming year to address the immediate needs presented by the anticipated drawdown of the ISF and UNPOL over the next few years. KLEMM