TIMOR-LESTE: LOCAL COUNTER-TERRORISM ACTION GROUP MEETS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DILI 000276 SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT FOR S/CT, DS, EAP/MTS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL ASEC ID TT SUBJECT: TIMOR-LESTE: LOCAL COUNTER-TERRORISM ACTION GROUP MEETS ¶1. (SBU) Summary: Representatives of the Counter-Terrorism Action Group (CTAG) countries, a G8 initiative intended to support the U.N. Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee, met for the first time in Timor-Leste on October 2. The group concluded that while the current risk of a terrorist attack in Timor-Leste remains low, vulnerability is high and the GOTL is increasingly concerned about the potential. The most likely threat would be external in origin and would seek to take advantage of Timor-Leste's porous borders and limited law enforcement capacity. The most likely targets would be the United Nations or foreign embassies. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) The Australian Ambassador convened the first-ever Counter-Terrorism Action Group (CTAG) meeting in Timor-Leste on October 2 on behalf of Italy, the current CTAG Chair (Note: Italy does not have diplomatic representation in Timor-Leste). The attendees included the U.S. (represented by the DCM),Japan, the European Commission, New Zealand, Spain, and the United Nations. Participants shared observations on the current terrorism threats and vulnerabilities in Timor-Leste, described ongoing and planned visits and programs in the area of counter-terrorism, and resolved to meet regularly and to update one another in an effort to coordinate counter-terrorism donor activities. ¶3. (SBU) The consensus view was that while the terrorism threat in Timor-Leste remains low, Timor-Leste's vulnerability to such threats is quite high. In terms of indigenous threats, the Australian Ambassador noted that the small local Muslim community in Timor-Leste is quite moderate in their views and very well integrated into society. The Japanese representative agreed, noting that he has met with both local imams, but cautioned that both are from Indonesia (one from East Java and the other from South Sulawesi) and regularly send Timorese students back to their home provinces for training, indicating continuing ties to groups of an unknown nature. The overwhelming majority of the Timorese population is Roman Catholic, however, and has no history of terrorist activities or links with external terrorist groups. ¶4. (SBU) The CTAG participants noted that senior Timorese officials have identified international terrorism as a growing concern. The DCM noted that over the last few weeks the Prime Minister, Secretary of State for Security, Director of National Intelligence, and others had raised this issue with us and requested counter-terrorism assistance. On September 25, for example, Prime Minister Gusmao made a public statement shortly after the killing of Noordin Top warning that terror can strike any country and exhorting the Timorese military and police to work to detect and prevent any foreign threats to Timor-Leste. ¶5. (SBU) Like the GOTL, the CTAG participants agreed that the most likely terrorist threat would come from outside of Timor-Leste, probably from neighboring Indonesia. Osama Bin Laden, other Al Qaeda representatives, one of the Bali bombing suspects, and Noordin Top himself have all publicly referred to the international intervention in Timor-Leste, calling it a "crusader-Zionist war against Muslims," and have threatened "retaliation" for "anti-Muslim" violence in Timor-Leste. Timor-Leste's vulnerability to international terrorism is high due to its limited local policing capacity. Monitoring of the "porous" land and maritime borders is extremely lax and even the sole international airport in Dili has limited capacity to intercept illegal aliens or criminal elements. The group agreed that the United Nations and foreign embassies, despite their relatively high security posture, were the most likely terrorist targets. ¶6. (SBU) The CTAG participants identified a few issues worthy of future monitoring and discussion. First, there is little awareness of increasing legal and illegal migration of Indonesians into Timor-Leste, a community that can operate rather freely here but may be more susceptible to terrorist infiltration. A significant infusion of extremist Indonesian Muslims, for example, could potentially alter the moderate character of the small, long-resident, indigenous Muslim community. Second, while much of the international development DILI 00000276 002 OF 002 assistance is focused on strengthening the Timorese law enforcement capabilities, less attention has been paid to Timorese intelligence capabilities. Timor-Leste appears to have some capacity to monitor domestic threats, but little ability to monitor international threats. Third, the group agreed that it would be worthwhile to compare notes at the next meeting on current terrorism threats and ongoing and planned counter-terrorism efforts in next-door Indonesian West Timor. HENICK