GOB IMPLEMENTING CHITTAGONG HILL TRACT PEACE ACCORDS,

UNCLAS DHAKA 000825 SENSITIVE SIPDIS C O R R E C T E D COPY CAPTION STATE FOR SCA/INSB, SCA/RA AND DRL STATE FOR INR/OPS ACTING DIRECTOR MICHAEL P. OWNES STATE PASS TO USAID E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PINR MOPS PHUM PREL PGOV EAID BM BG SUBJECT: GOB IMPLEMENTING CHITTAGONG HILL TRACT PEACE ACCORDS, OPPOSITION PARTY HOWLS REF: A) Dhaka 763 B) Dhaka 476 (NOTAL) Summary -------------- ¶1. (SBU) Chittagong Hill Tracts Commission (CHTC) monitors credit PM Sheikh Hasina's personal commitment to peace in the Chittagong Hill Tracts with progress towards implementation of the 1997 Peace Accords between the Government of Bangladesh (GOB) and indigenous groups. In an August 18 donor briefing, Commission Co-Chair Lord Eric Avebury dismissed opposition Bangladesh National Party's (BNP) claims that Hasina's decision to withdraw military units from the Hill Tracts bordering India and Burma would foster insecurity. The CHTC Co-Chair said the planned withdrawal was largely "cosmetic" and would likely improve law and order in the Hill Tracts, where the military stood accused of numerous human rights abuses. Despite this progress, the Commission believes the GOB lacks a strategic framework and implementation timetable. The polarization of Bangladeshi politics on the issue could limit the window for progress to the 4 and 1/2 years remaining until the next national elections. Making Progress, Thanks to PM Hasina -------------- ¶2. (SBU) On August 18, members of the Chittagong Hill Tracts Commission briefed donors on their recent visits to the field and meetings with GOB officials, including Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. (Note: The CHTC is an international NGO established to monitor implementation of the 1997 Peace Accords signed between the GOB and indigenous groups in the Chittagong Hill Tracts that abut India and Burma (Ref. B).) Commission Co-Chair and Member of the UK House of Lords Eric Avebury said, whereas earlier governments had sought to suppress dissent in the Hill Tracts militarily, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina was committed to a "political solution." Avebury said the impact of Hasina's commitment was palpable in the Commission's recent field visit; brigade commanders who had previously expressed pessimism about reducing the military's role in the region now voiced optimism the civil administration and police could effectively govern the areas. In the six months since Hasina's Awami League took power, the GOB had moved to close down controversial commercial plantation agriculture on disputed land, set up a commission to resolve land disputes, and announce a withdrawal of military units from the Hill Tracts. Planned Troop Withdrawal Good for Security -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Avebury was dismissive of claims made by former PM Khaleda Zia and other opposition Bangladesh National Party (BNP) leaders that the GOB's decision to withdraw some military units from the Hill Tracts (Ref A) would invite insecurity in the region. Avebury said three Brigade Commanders told the Commission that the withdrawal would not lead to a rise in violence or disorder. According to Avebury and other commissioners, the planned withdrawal was largely "cosmetic," and would not reduce the military's ability to exert its power throughout the Hill Tracts, where only 35 of more than 300 military outposts would be closed. To the extent security was affected, it would be for the better, argued Avebury, since the military stood accused of numerous human rights abuses against the local population. GOB Needs a Roadmap, and Political Support -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Avebury was concerned, however, that the GOB did not possess a road map with verifiable timelines for implementation of the 1997 Accords, especially for resolving the tens of thousands of disputed land claims that arose out of previous GOB administrations' efforts to populate the Hill Tracts with ethnic Bengalis by offering land, often irregularly granted, to ethnic Bengali migrants. According to Avebury, Hasina told the Commission the GOB could finance implementation of the Accords, but she needed "moral and political support" to push ahead with implementation in the face of strong opposition. Asked what the donor community could do to help the Commission, Avebury suggested that foreign missions could impress on Hasina the need for a time-bound implementation plan while providing the moral and political support she requested. Comment: Praise-Worthy Political Solution -------------- ¶5. (SBU) The Awami League government deserves recognition for its work to implement the 1997 Chittagong Hill Tract Accords, which had stalled during the BNP and caretaker regimes (Ref B). The challenge for PM Hasina's government will be to ensure that civilian authorities, especially the police, maintain law and order in the wake of the military's withdrawal, providing security for settlers while respecting the rights of indigenous groups. Opponents of the Peace Accords, especially ethnic Bengali settlers, might instigate conflict; even the perception of weakened security would likely embolden critics of Hasina's "political solution." The United States should continue to exploit opportunities to voice support for the Peace Accords. Responding to a press question after his August 20 meeting with Foreign Minister Dipu Moni (septel),the Ambassador reiterated U.S. support for implementation of the 1997 Peace Accords. MORIARTY.