FBI HELPS BANGLADESH GOVERNMENT REALIZE NEED FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 DHAKA 000284 SIPDIS DEPT FOR SCA/INS, SCA/PB AND SCA/FO E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/21/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR PHUM MARR KDEM BG SUBJECT: FBI HELPS BANGLADESH GOVERNMENT REALIZE NEED FOR MORE TIME AND RESOURCES TO COMPLETE BDR MUTINY INVESTIGATION REF: DHAKA 280 AND PREVIOUS Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) Summary ======= ¶1. (C) The FBI has concluded the initial phase of its support to the local police investigation into the February 25 ) 26 Bangladesh Rifles Mutiny. This support focused ON the importance of setting up a functioning command post and prioritizing the need to interview witnesses. The GOB has begun to realize that a proper investigation will take months and will require additional resources. At the same time, the GOB realizes it must ensure a transparent investigation while managing public expectations and responding to criticism from the political opposition. While the investigation continues, there has not yet been any hard evidence of outside involvement. The timely and effective response by the FBI has provided much needed support to the government and resulted in much goodwill towards the United States. Ambassador Highlights USG Support ================================= ¶2. (C) The Ambassador met March 22 with Foreign Minister Dr. Dipu Moni, Commerce Minister LTC (ret) Faruq Khan, Prime Minister's Advisor MG (ret) Tarique Ahmed Siddique, and the Director General of the Special Security Force Brigadier Zainul Abedin to provide an update ON FBI assistance with the investigation into the February 25 ) 26 Bangladesh Rifles Mutiny. A/LEGAT and Pol/Econ Counselor (notetaker) participated in the meeting, which was held at the Prime Minister's Office. ¶3. (C) The Ambassador noted that the USG had responded quickly to Bangladesh's request for assistance with the investigation. An FBI advance team had arrived ON March 8, just one week after the Prime Minister had first raised the possibility of USG investigative assistance. A six member FBI team had returned ON March 17 to begin the first phase of working with the Bangladesh Police Criminal Investigative Division (CID). The Ambassador explained the USG understood the mutiny had been a traumatic event for Bangladesh and wanted to provide all possible assistance at this critical time. The Ambassador underscored USG support for Bangladesh's transition to democracy. FBI Assistance in Organizing Investigation ========================================== ¶4. (C) The A/LEGAT outlined the assistance provided by the FBI during this initial phase of the investigation. The FBI team had provided support in the areas of: command post management; major case investigation; interview and interrogation methods; computer forensics; and evidence collection. The FBI team had also assisted the CID in imaging four computers seized from the BDR compound. With FBI assistance, CID had established a fully functional command post, which was critical to the success of this complex investigation. The A/LEGAT expressed confidence that the CID investigators now had the requisite competency, equipment, and motivation to conduct the investigation. He commented that the investigators clearly felt tremendous pressure to show results. ¶5. (C) The A/LEGAT noted there was a need to improve Bangladeshi interagency coordination in the investigation. For example, the CID had not yet received from the BDR or Army a list of the 2,583 persons present at the Durbar Hall when the mutiny broke out. It was essential that the Army, BDR, Rapid Action Battalion and Directorate General of Forces Intelligence each provide liaison officers to work in the CID command post. It would also be useful to involve prosecutors at this stage so that they could begin to work with the investigators to prepare for the eventual trials. The A/LEGAT recommended that the GOB appoint a lead prosecutor at this time. He also underscored the importance of transparency in the investigation. DHAKA 00000284 002 OF 004 Need for Additional Resources ============================= ¶6. (C) The A/LEGAT observed that investigators had only completed a small percentage of the thousands of interviews that would be required. He characterized this as a complex investigation that would require "months" to complete. Simply conducting the interviews would be a Herculean task, and the FBI recommended that CID at least double the number of interview teams. While the first phase of the FBI deployment was ending, USG officials would remain in contact with Bangladeshi counterparts and planned to return at an appropriate future date to check ON the progress of the investigation. At this critical time, the FBI "stood shoulder to shoulder" with its Bangladeshi counterparts. ¶7. (C) Commerce Minister Khan, in charge of coordinating the ongoing GOB investigation and inquiries, said that at the last GOB coordination meeting there had been discussion of appointing prosecutors. One option ON the table was to name three prosecutors who could begin to work with the investigators to develop an understanding of the case. The GOB had not yet decided, however, whether the case would be tried in the civilian or military justice system. The Minister acknowledged the need for closer coordination among GOB agencies. Pressure to Show Results ======================== ¶8. (C) The Commerce Minister acknowledged that the investigation would take time but said the GOB was under pressure to produce results quickly. The Minister had tried to counter this pressure, noting in public that "justice hurried was justice buried." The Foreign Minister (herself an attorney) suggested the need to provide the public with an estimated time frame for completing the investigation. Given the magnitude of the incident, she agreed the case could not be solved in a short time. The Foreign Minister emphasized that the GOB did not want to see a miscarriage of justice and was committed to ensuring due process. The Ministers discussed the need for an active media strategy to strike a balance between the desire for "news" and the need to keep expectations in check. They agreed that it had been a mistake to announce in the initial days after the mutiny that the GOB inquiry commission would produce a report in seven days. At that time, nobody had known the magnitude of what had happened. The GOB now faced a dilemma, since further delays in producing a report could lead to charges that the GOB was trying to suppress information. ¶9. (C) The Ambassador noted positive developments in recent days, with the Police CID now telling the media that the investigation would take longer. All agreed that at first the GOB had not realized the magnitude of the task before it. The Commerce Minister said there was a need to balance the "political with the professional" aspects of the investigation. He feared that the resumption of Parliament on March 29 would bring with it pressure from the opposition to announce the results of the investigation. The Ambassador advised the Minister to inform the public about the steps the GOB had taken to increase the number of investigators to speed up the work. ¶10. (C) The Ambassador noted that we had seen progress in the investigation and wanted to make sure it remained ON track. For this reason, the FBI would return in a few weeks to check ON the progress. The A/LEGAT emphasized this case would hinge ON witness testimony, not physical evidence. The Ambassador acknowledged that USG agencies had recognized the need to work closer together after 9/11. In addition, he noted, we had seen the same in India after the Mumbai attack. Bangladesh needed to FOLLOW suit. In a candid admission, Siddique said he had recently called together the Directors General of Forces Intelligence and National Security Intelligence to emphasize the need for closer cooperation. The two had admitted that they spent 50 percent of their time spying ON each other and agreed this had to stop. DHAKA 00000284 003 OF 004 Human Rights Concerns ===================== ¶11. (C) Pol/Econ Counselor expressed concern about five suspicious deaths of BDR personnel in custody since the mutiny. The GOB officials agreed that these needed to be investigated since they could jeopardize the investigation. The Commerce Minister said he had raised this issue directly with the DG BDR. The DG had speculated some of the deaths were the result of suicides or homicides committed by other BDR personnel to prevent colleagues from testifying. Regardless, all agreed it was important that the GOB conduct post-mortem examinations in these cases. No Sign of Outside Involvement ============================== ¶12. (C) The Commerce Minister asked about the possibility of involvement by terrorist groups. The A/LEGAT noted that based ON the information we had seen thus far, the incident appeared to be a "home grown" crime. One working theory was that a small group of perpetrators were responsible for the incident, which reached a flash point and then expanded. There were examples of similar crimes in the U.S. and other countries--for example, the LA riot after the beating of Rodney King appeared to fit this profile. The Commerce Minister noted that the mutineers had sought out one BDR officer, Col Gulzar, who had recently transferred from the RAB where he had worked ON a number of high profile terrorist cases. Gulzar was killed and his body mutilated, suggesting to the Minister that the killers could have had another motive. The Minister also questioned why the mutineers had not simply focused their anger at the BDR DG and Deputy, who bore primary responsibility for the failure to meet their demands for improved conditions. ¶13. (C) The A/LEGAT explained that logic did not always suffice as an explanation for criminal activity. We were confident that a proper investigation would reveal the facts. There was undoubtedly a high degree of emotion in the crime, but this did not mean there was outside involvement. The Minister also asked why BDR personnel had fled the scene if they were not guilty. A/LEGAT explained that this was not an uncommon occurrence, particularly given reports that mutineers were spreading rumors of retaliation by army officers. Political Headaches =================== ¶14. (C) The Commerce Minister complained the government and opposition had not stood together during the crisis. While the GOB could have reached out to the opposition, he said subsequent comments by the Leader of the Opposition had been irresponsible. The Ambassador observed that there had been too much finger pointing almost from the start. All should agree to withhold comments until the investigation was completed. The Commerce Minister expressed appreciation for the assistance from the FBI and New Scotland Yard, saying this showed the GOB was being open. In the past there had never been a proper investigation of major crimes in Bangladesh. Next Steps ========== ¶15. (C) The Ambassador and Ministers agreed that the Embassy would issue a press statement highlighting the successful completion of this first phase of assistance. The Commerce Minister said the CID had arrested over 300 people so far and noted the GOB would consider holding the trials in stages if necessary. The Foreign Minister explained the decision to hold the trials in civilian or military courts would depend on the involvement of non-BDR personnel as perpetrators. The Commerce Minister said some BDR personnel had confessed their involvement. He added the investigation was currently focused ON Dhaka but would move ON to incidents at BDR installations outside the capital. The DG BDR was visiting DHAKA 00000284 004 OF 004 troops and gaining confidence of its members. Still, the Commerce Minister worried there were over 1,500 deserters still at large, many of whom had weapons (handguns and grenades) looted from the BDR arsenal. Comment; And a Vote of Thanks ============================= ¶16. (C) The timely provision of assistance by the FBI has been invaluable as Bangladesh grapples with one of the most complex criminal investigations in the country's history. Our engagement has helped GOB policy makers and investigators understand the need to devote sufficient resources to this task and to organize the effort to ensure results. This assistance has increased the odds that the investigation will uncover the truth and provide the basis for both justice and healing after the mutiny. The GOB needs to communicate this clearly to the public and the military. Handled properly, this investigation can help break down barriers between Bangladeshi law enforcement and intelligence agencies and further solidify the relationship between GOB and USG law enforcement agencies. We greatly appreciate the support from the FBI, in particular the Legatt Office in New Delhi, for coming to Bangladesh's aid at this critical period. MORIARTY