BANGLADESH MUTINY AFTERMATH: TIME FOR USG

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DHAKA 000241 SIPDIS DEPT FOR SCA/PB, SCA/FO, CA/OCS, DS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/04/2019 TAGS: PGOV PINR PINS PREL PTER ASEC KDEM BG SUBJECT: BANGLADESH MUTINY AFTERMATH: TIME FOR USG ASSISTANCE IN CIV-MIL RELATIONS AND BORDER MANAGEMENT REF: A. DHAKA 222 ¶B. DHAKA 213 ¶C. DHAKA 210 ¶D. DHAKA 207 ¶E. DHAKA 204 ¶F. DHAKA 218 Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d) -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) One week after the bloody border guard mutiny, Bangladesh's immediate crisis appears to have passed, but the resulting political situation remains perilous. Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina herself warns of more attacks to undermine democracy. Three competing Government of Bangladesh investigations will likely exacerbate speculation over who masterminded the rebellion, further poisoning a political scene abuzz with competing conspiracy theories. Still, Hasina's leadership during the crisis received broad public support. Military subservience to civilian control remains tenuous but has prevailed, at least for now. Hasina and other senior officials have expressed profuse gratitude to the USG for providing early and strong support during the crisis. This creates an opportunity for us to pursue with increased vigor efforts to assist Bangladesh in strengthening border management and civilian-military relations, issues clearly atop Hasina's post-mutiny agenda. Such assistance not only advances USG priorities in Bangladesh but also is essential for regional stability. -------------- INITIAL CRISIS IS OVER ... -------------- ¶2. (SBU) A week after the February 25-26 mutiny of Bangladesh Rifles troops, the initial crisis appears over. The burial of more than 55 army officers killed in the uprising passed without incident despite great anger among many army officers that the Government was not aggressive enough in quelling the revolt. Hasina's dramatic appearance before hundreds of irate officers on March 1 appears to have eased at least some of the tension between the civilian government and military officers shocked by the brutality of the deaths of their colleagues. In its first days, the army-led Operation Rebel Hunt rounded up an alleged mutiny ringleader and other rebel suspects; there were no immediate reports of soldiers dispensing swift and violent justice as some had feared. -------------- ...BUT NOT OUT OF THE WOODS YET 
 -------------- ¶3. (SBU) After first eliciting calls for national unity from most political corners, the mutiny has since fueled partisan rancor that threatens to poison Bangladesh's fragile democracy. Members of the two major political parties -- Hasina's Awami League and the opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) led by Khaleda Zia -- have exchanged nasty unsubstantiated accusations of complicity in the mutiny. The BNP has accused Hasina of bungling the response to the mutiny, and Zia has joined some military officers in calling for the resignation of the Minister of Home Affairs, who led Government negotiations with mutineers. ¶4. (C) DHAKA remains abuzz with a surfeit of conspiracy theories. Among the purported mutiny masterminds most frequently named have been India, prominent BNP lawmaker S.Q. Chowdhury, and Islamist party Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh. Hasina claimed on March 3 that others were hatching more plots to topple Bangladesh's government. Although the Government of Bangladesh has not made public credible evidence implicating anyone other than the actual mutineers, Hasina's insistence on a broader conspiracy surely will color the deliberations of the three separate investigations into the rebellion. The eventual findings of those probes -- one by a government-appointed body, another by the military, and a third by the police Criminal Investigation Department -- could further fuel partisan rancor and still-simmering military anger. ¶5. (C) Watching developments carefully is India, which had DHAKA 00000241 002 OF 003 expected an improvement in its often contentious bilateral relationship with Bangladesh under an Awami League government. M. Subbarayudu, political counselor at the Indian High Commission in Dhaka, told us his country believed the mutiny would make it more difficult for the Awami League to take bold action to improve bilateral relations. A planned visit by the Indian Cabinet member with responsibility for the Indian states that border Bangladesh has been cancelled. Efforts to improve regional security cooperation and management of the lengthy Indian-Bangladesh border also are likely to be disrupted. -------------- HASINA SURVIVES MAJOR CRISIS -------------- ¶6. (C) For now, at least, Hasina appears to have weathered her first major crisis. Local media carried many editorials and opinion pieces applauding the government for successfully negotiating a peaceful end to the mutiny and avoiding a greater bloodbath. (Note: A senior official of the paramilitary Rapid Action Battalion told PolOff the rebels had threatened to fire mortars at nearby DHAKA University and a major market if the army attacked their position inside Bangladesh Rifles Headquarters in central Dhaka. End note.) Hasina exhibited personal bravery in meeting with hundreds of hostile military officers to explain her Government's actions. That March 1 meeting appeared to dampen immediate concerns anger at the mutiny in the army would quickly lead to a military coup. ¶7. (C) To assuage military anger, Hasina agreed to several demands, such as allowing the army to take a leading role in the hunt for missing Bangladesh Rifles mutineers. While Chief of Army Staff General Moeen Uddin Ahmed appeared to have consulted with Hasina and followed her orders during the two-day ordeal, the relationship between her government and the military remains complex. It may not be long before Hasina and the army or its officer corps could be at loggerheads again over justice for suspected rebels or other demands not yet met. These demands reportedly include a call to axe several senior government officials, including Home Affairs Minister Sahara Khatun, for their role in negotiating with the mutineers. (Note: An apparently genuine audiotape of Hasina agreeing to several of those demands is available on the Internet and could further exacerbate the situation. End note.) -------------- USG OPPORTUNITIES TO PURSUE IMPORTANT GOALS -------------- ¶8. (C) Bangladeshi officials from the Prime Minister on down expressed thanks for the strong and timely USG support during the crisis. Ambassador Moriarty spoke with Hasina just after the mutiny ended on 2/26, and Assistant Secretary Richard Boucher telephoned her on 2/28. The Government of Bangladesh thereafter placed great emphasis on its request to the USG for intelligence, forensic investigation and crime detection assistance to find out who was responsible for the mutiny. Providing such support in a timely fashion would further cement Government of Bangladesh gratitude. ¶9. (C) The mutiny is forcing the Government of Bangladesh to deal quickly with issues that have great implications for U.S. priorities to deny space to terrorists and promote democracy in Bangladesh. The USG already had identified improving security along Bangladesh's infamously porous borders as a top counterterrorism priority. The reconstitution of Bangladesh's border force in the aftermath of the mutiny provides an opportunity for the USG to accelerate efforts to help improve the system of border management. Ambassador Moriarty plans to raise the issue at an upcoming meeting with the Home Affairs Minister. A planned visit in April by the Pacific Command's Joint Interagency Task Force-West to determine appropriate USG border assistance could not come at a more opportune time. The mutiny also adds a sense of urgency to Post's proposal for Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism funding Track Two programs that would bring together Bangladeshi and Indian experts on regional security and border cooperation. Additionally, Pacific Command's April 2009 military law exchange with the Bangladesh military is the perfect opportunity to influence the legitimacy of the proposed DHAKA 00000241 003 OF 003 military tribunals that will try the alleged mutineers. ¶10. (C) Strengthening oversight of the military is the other issue surely at the top of Hasina's agenda after the mutiny highlighted deep dissatisfaction among officers with the civilian government. Post is working with the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies to develop programming to help Bangladesh strengthen civil-military relations. Post also is greatly interested in the Office of the Secretary of Defense's new Defense Institute Reform Initiative, a program to help countries create a professional ministry of defense and effective civil-military relations. We strongly advocate Bangladesh being named a focus country for this promising initiative. -------------- -------------- CONCLUSION: HELP BANGLADESH OVERCOME PERILOUS TIMES -------------- -------------- ¶11. (C) These are perilous times for Bangladesh, a predominantly Muslim country of about 150 million people whose stability is essential to effectively fighting terrorism in South Asia. Whether the mutiny itself was the handiwork of forces keen to destabilize Bangladesh remains to be seen; for now, there is no credible evidence to suggest the involvement of anyone other than deeply disgruntled Bangladesh Rifles troops. But the deep fissures between the Government and security forces highlighted by the mutiny are not likely to heal soon and could yet destabilize Bangladesh's fragile democracy. The USG should use all the tools in our kit to help Bangladesh create a better relationship between its civilian Government and military. Bangladesh experienced numerous coups during the first two decades of its 38-year existence; a return to that norm would have a disastrous impact on U.S. interests. Failure to act now could haunt U.S. policy in Bangladesh and the region for years to come. MORIARTY