Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09DHAKA241
2009-03-05 10:41:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Dhaka
Cable title:  

BANGLADESH MUTINY AFTERMATH: TIME FOR USG

Tags:  PGOV PINR PINS PREL PTER ASEC KDEM BG 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DHAKA 000241 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/PB, SCA/FO, CA/OCS, DS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/04/2019
TAGS: PGOV PINR PINS PREL PTER ASEC KDEM BG
SUBJECT: BANGLADESH MUTINY AFTERMATH: TIME FOR USG
ASSISTANCE IN CIV-MIL RELATIONS AND BORDER MANAGEMENT

REF: A. DHAKA 222

B. DHAKA 213

C. DHAKA 210

D. DHAKA 207

E. DHAKA 204

F. DHAKA 218

Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)

------
SUMMARY
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DHAKA 000241

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/PB, SCA/FO, CA/OCS, DS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/04/2019
TAGS: PGOV PINR PINS PREL PTER ASEC KDEM BG
SUBJECT: BANGLADESH MUTINY AFTERMATH: TIME FOR USG
ASSISTANCE IN CIV-MIL RELATIONS AND BORDER MANAGEMENT

REF: A. DHAKA 222

B. DHAKA 213

C. DHAKA 210

D. DHAKA 207

E. DHAKA 204

F. DHAKA 218

Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) One week after the bloody border guard mutiny,
Bangladesh's immediate crisis appears to have passed, but the
resulting political situation remains perilous. Prime
Minister Sheikh Hasina herself warns of more attacks to
undermine democracy. Three competing Government of Bangladesh
investigations will likely exacerbate speculation over who
masterminded the rebellion, further poisoning a political
scene abuzz with competing conspiracy theories. Still,
Hasina's leadership during the crisis received broad public
support. Military subservience to civilian control remains
tenuous but has prevailed, at least for now. Hasina and other
senior officials have expressed profuse gratitude to the USG
for providing early and strong support during the crisis.
This creates an opportunity for us to pursue with increased
vigor efforts to assist Bangladesh in strengthening border
management and civilian-military relations, issues clearly
atop Hasina's post-mutiny agenda. Such assistance not only
advances USG priorities in Bangladesh but also is essential
for regional stability.

--------------
INITIAL CRISIS IS OVER ...
--------------


2. (SBU) A week after the February 25-26 mutiny of Bangladesh
Rifles troops, the initial crisis appears over. The burial of
more than 55 army officers killed in the uprising passed
without incident despite great anger among many army officers
that the Government was not aggressive enough in quelling the
revolt. Hasina's dramatic appearance before hundreds of irate
officers on March 1 appears to have eased at least some of
the tension between the civilian government and military

officers shocked by the brutality of the deaths of their
colleagues. In its first days, the army-led Operation Rebel
Hunt rounded up an alleged mutiny ringleader and other rebel
suspects; there were no immediate reports of soldiers
dispensing swift and violent justice as some had feared.

--------------
...BUT NOT OUT OF THE WOODS YET
--------------


3. (SBU) After first eliciting calls for national unity from
most political corners, the mutiny has since fueled partisan
rancor that threatens to poison Bangladesh's fragile
democracy. Members of the two major political parties --
Hasina's Awami League and the opposition Bangladesh
Nationalist Party (BNP) led by Khaleda Zia -- have exchanged
nasty unsubstantiated accusations of complicity in the
mutiny. The BNP has accused Hasina of bungling the response
to the mutiny, and Zia has joined some military officers in
calling for the resignation of the Minister of Home Affairs,
who led Government negotiations with mutineers.


4. (C) Dhaka remains abuzz with a surfeit of conspiracy
theories. Among the purported mutiny masterminds most
frequently named have been India, prominent BNP lawmaker S.Q.
Chowdhury, and Islamist party Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh.
Hasina claimed on March 3 that others were hatching more
plots to topple Bangladesh's government. Although the
Government of Bangladesh has not made public credible
evidence implicating anyone other than the actual mutineers,
Hasina's insistence on a broader conspiracy surely will color
the deliberations of the three separate investigations into
the rebellion. The eventual findings of those probes -- one
by a government-appointed body, another by the military, and
a third by the police Criminal Investigation Department --
could further fuel partisan rancor and still-simmering
military anger.


5. (C) Watching developments carefully is India, which had

DHAKA 00000241 002 OF 003


expected an improvement in its often contentious bilateral
relationship with Bangladesh under an Awami League
government. M. Subbarayudu, political counselor at the Indian
High Commission in Dhaka, told us his country believed the
mutiny would make it more difficult for the Awami League to
take bold action to improve bilateral relations. A planned
visit by the Indian Cabinet member with responsibility for
the Indian states that border Bangladesh has been cancelled.
Efforts to improve regional security cooperation and
management of the lengthy Indian-Bangladesh border also are
likely to be disrupted.

--------------
HASINA SURVIVES MAJOR CRISIS
--------------


6. (C) For now, at least, Hasina appears to have weathered
her first major crisis. Local media carried many editorials
and opinion pieces applauding the government for successfully
negotiating a peaceful end to the mutiny and avoiding a
greater bloodbath. (Note: A senior official of the
paramilitary Rapid Action Battalion told PolOff the rebels
had threatened to fire mortars at nearby Dhaka University and
a major market if the army attacked their position inside
Bangladesh Rifles Headquarters in central Dhaka. End note.)
Hasina exhibited personal bravery in meeting with hundreds of
hostile military officers to explain her Government's
actions. That March 1 meeting appeared to dampen immediate
concerns anger at the mutiny in the army would quickly lead
to a military coup.


7. (C) To assuage military anger, Hasina agreed to several
demands, such as allowing the army to take a leading role in
the hunt for missing Bangladesh Rifles mutineers. While Chief
of Army Staff General Moeen Uddin Ahmed appeared to have
consulted with Hasina and followed her orders during the
two-day ordeal, the relationship between her government and
the military remains complex. It may not be long before
Hasina and the army or its officer corps could be at
loggerheads again over justice for suspected rebels or other
demands not yet met. These demands reportedly include a call
to axe several senior government officials, including Home
Affairs Minister Sahara Khatun, for their role in negotiating
with the mutineers. (Note: An apparently genuine audiotape of
Hasina agreeing to several of those demands is available on
the Internet and could further exacerbate the situation. End
note.)

--------------
USG OPPORTUNITIES TO PURSUE IMPORTANT GOALS
--------------


8. (C) Bangladeshi officials from the Prime Minister on down
expressed thanks for the strong and timely USG support during
the crisis. Ambassador Moriarty spoke with Hasina just after
the mutiny ended on 2/26, and Assistant Secretary Richard
Boucher telephoned her on 2/28. The Government of Bangladesh
thereafter placed great emphasis on its request to the USG
for intelligence, forensic investigation and crime detection
assistance to find out who was responsible for the mutiny.
Providing such support in a timely fashion would further
cement Government of Bangladesh gratitude.


9. (C) The mutiny is forcing the Government of Bangladesh to
deal quickly with issues that have great implications for
U.S. priorities to deny space to terrorists and promote
democracy in Bangladesh. The USG already had identified
improving security along Bangladesh's infamously porous
borders as a top counterterrorism priority. The
reconstitution of Bangladesh's border force in the aftermath
of the mutiny provides an opportunity for the USG to
accelerate efforts to help improve the system of border
management. Ambassador Moriarty plans to raise the issue at
an upcoming meeting with the Home Affairs Minister. A planned
visit in April by the Pacific Command's Joint Interagency
Task Force-West to determine appropriate USG border
assistance could not come at a more opportune time. The
mutiny also adds a sense of urgency to Post's proposal for
Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism funding Track
Two programs that would bring together Bangladeshi and Indian
experts on regional security and border cooperation.
Additionally, Pacific Command's April 2009 military law
exchange with the Bangladesh military is the perfect
opportunity to influence the legitimacy of the proposed

DHAKA 00000241 003 OF 003


military tribunals that will try the alleged mutineers.


10. (C) Strengthening oversight of the military is the other
issue surely at the top of Hasina's agenda after the mutiny
highlighted deep dissatisfaction among officers with the
civilian government. Post is working with the Asia-Pacific
Center for Security Studies to develop programming to help
Bangladesh strengthen civil-military relations. Post also is
greatly interested in the Office of the Secretary of
Defense's new Defense Institute Reform Initiative, a program
to help countries create a professional ministry of defense
and effective civil-military relations. We strongly advocate
Bangladesh being named a focus country for this promising
initiative.

-------------- --------------
CONCLUSION: HELP BANGLADESH OVERCOME PERILOUS TIMES
-------------- --------------


11. (C) These are perilous times for Bangladesh, a
predominantly Muslim country of about 150 million people
whose stability is essential to effectively fighting
terrorism in South Asia. Whether the mutiny itself was the
handiwork of forces keen to destabilize Bangladesh remains to
be seen; for now, there is no credible evidence to suggest
the involvement of anyone other than deeply disgruntled
Bangladesh Rifles troops. But the deep fissures between the
Government and security forces highlighted by the mutiny are
not likely to heal soon and could yet destabilize
Bangladesh's fragile democracy. The USG should use all the
tools in our kit to help Bangladesh create a better
relationship between its civilian Government and military.
Bangladesh experienced numerous coups during the first two
decades of its 38-year existence; a return to that norm would
have a disastrous impact on U.S. interests. Failure to act
now could haunt U.S. policy in Bangladesh and the region for
years to come.

MORIARTY