PARLIAMENT VOTES FOR BANGLADESH WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 DHAKA 000120 SIPDIS DEPT FOR SCA/PB, DRL, AND S/WCI DEPT PLEASE PASS PEACE CORPS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/04/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR PTER KDEM PHUM KAWC KISL BD SUBJECT: PARLIAMENT VOTES FOR BANGLADESH WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL Classified By: Ambassador James Moriarty, reasons 1.5 (b&d) SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) The new government must immediately take steps to try those suspected of committing war crimes during Bangladesh's 1971 war of independence, said a resolution the Awami League-dominated parliament passed unanimously January 29. Those pushing for the establishment of a war crimes tribunal are generally former pro-independence combatants and Awami League supporters, who claim the issue played a major role in the party's recent electoral victory. Some players go beyond a desire to punish war criminals and instead seek nothing less than eliminating Jamaat-e-Islami (JIB),the nation's largest Islamic party, from the political process. Representatives of Islamist parties who were pro-Pakistan in 1971 could face charges. A very sensitive issue which has been highly politicized for decades, the war crimes question could potentially divide the nation further along its already-deep Islamist-secular fault line. It might also drag in other regional and international players, including Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. End summary. THE GOVERNMENT: MOVING RIGHT AHEAD -------------- ¶2. (C) On January 29, the fifth day of parliament, the Awami League-dominated body unanimously approved a resolution calling upon the new government to take "immediate measures" to try those responsible for war crimes in 1971. The war crimes issue featured prominently during the recent election campaign, during which senior Awami League leaders --including Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina -- publicly stated their intention to revisit the issue if elected. Sheikh Hasina termed the issue "a national demand," noting Bangladesh would review the experience of other countries before deciding the precise form its own prosecution would take. Francesc Vendrell, chief of the UN Secretary General's high-level panel formed for the recent parliamentary elections, said during an early January visit that it would be up to the new government to take up the matter with the UN Secretary General and "make it clear what they want the UN to do." The UNDP resident representative and other foreign envoys later reiterated this view. (Note: To date, the government has not approached us on this issue * perhaps �0A;because of our well-known policy of maintaining contact with JIB. End note.) In a potentially inflammatory public statement, on January 31 the newly-appointed Home Minister Sahara Khatun told the media she had taken steps to prevent "war criminals" from fleeing Bangladesh. JUST WHAT HAPPENED IN 1971? -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Bangladesh's War of Independence began March 25, 1971 when Pakistan launched a bloody crackdown against Bangladeshi civilians and ended on December 16, 1971 when the Pakistani commanding general signed an instrument of surrender on behalf of some 93,000 Pakistani troops. Exactly what happened between those two dates -- in particular the number of dead -- is still the subject of controversy. Those advocating for war crimes trials allege that 3 million Bangladeshis died during the nine months of conflict. A Pakistani commission appointed to look into allegations of misconduct by Pakistani troops concluded in 1974 that 26,000 civilian deaths had occurred. Representatives of Jamaat-e-Islami (JIB),Bangladesh's largest Islamic party - whose senior leadership has long been reviled by many as 'collaborators' and 'war criminals' - claim that less than 100,000 Bangladeshis died and that a significant proportion of those were pro-Pakistani local 'collaborators.' ¶4. (C) As the new nation confronted the myriad challenges post-independence, there was little done to gather specific information about alleged atrocities. Indeed, it seems the whole process of dealing with alleged war criminals quickly became overshadowed by political squabbling over other issues and quietly ground to a halt. Many Bangladeshis today believe the GOB lost the moral high ground when it agreed to repatriate Pakistani POWs as part of the 1972 Simla Accord, which brought the Indo-Pakistani conflict to a close. ¶5. (SBU) The Awami League government enacted a Collaborators DHAKA 00000120 002 OF 004 Act in January 1972, followed by an International Crimes Tribunals Act in July 1973. The former targeted collaborators and the latter, members of "armed forces, defense or auxiliary forces" for commiting crimes against humanity, genocide and war crimes. Some 37,000 Bangladeshis were detained under these acts between 1972 and 1975. The Awami League government subsequently amnestied 26,000 held for relatively minor offenses. Some 11,000, linked to cases of murder, rape, arson or looting, remained in custody, and the courts handed down about 750 sentences in connection with these cases. After the 1975 assassination of Awami League president Mujibur Rahman, his successor, Ziaur Rahman, abrogated the Collaborators Act and amnestied all remaining prisoners. The International Crimes Tribunals Act of 1973 remains in force, and some have argued it should be the basis for future prosecutions. THE SECTOR COMMANDERS' VIEW -------------- ¶6. (SBU) A group of retired military officers who commanded the newly-formed Bangladeshi Army and the 'mukti bahini' (freedom fighters - an independent guerrilla force formed by Bangladeshis) during the 1971 conflict established in 2007 the Sector Commanders Forum (SCF - www.sectorcommandersforum.org). About half a dozen of the 1971 sector commanders are active and formed the SCF in response to what they termed "regrouping by collaborators" over the years. "Today, these collaborators have regrouped in Bangladesh as several ragtag religious fundamentalist parties, whose only agenda is to oppose any move made by the people towards becoming a modern, democratic and religiously tolerant nation," claims the SCF website. ¶7. (SBU) A number of former freedom fighters, including individuals who are now members of the SCF, had established the Liberation War Museum (www.liberationwarmuseum.net) in Dhaka in 1996. The primary purpose of the museum is to document the nine-month period of the war and commemorate those who fought and died in it. (Note: The exhibit on international reactions to the conflict includes the declassified text of the April 6, 1971 strongly-worded dissent cable sent by then-U.S. Consul General for Dhaka Archer Blood, criticizing the hands-off USG approach to the conflict. The USG has provided support to the museum in the past through the Ambassador's Fund for Cultural Preservation. End note.) An affiliated committee, the War Crimes Fact Finding Commission (which has overlapping membership with the SCF),focuses on finding and preserving documents that may be used in a war crimes trial process. ¶8. (C) The SCF argues that the 1971 war was fought to assert Bengali identity against Pakistani cultural and economic oppression. On the side of right are the secularist-nationalists who fought and died under this banner. On the side of wrong are those who supported Pakistani imperialism and were responsible for atrocities. The SCF claims that chief among the latter are senior leaders of Jamaat-e-Islami, although a museum trustee also accused representatives of other parties, including Salahuddin Quader Chowdhury, a Member of Parliament and senior member of the BNP. ¶9. (SBU) The SCF claims the conflict led to the death of three million Bengalis, the rape of more than 200,000 Bengali women, and the flight of 10 million refugees (who fled to India to escape the fighting). According to the SCF, local collaborators joined one or more of several entities which aided and abetted the Pakistani military in its campaign to subjugate the Bengali population: a paramilitary force known as Razakers; volunteer militias known as Al Badar and Al Shams; and Peace Committees, which served community outreach and other purposes for the Pakistani administration. ¶10. (C) During the caretaker government period (2007-2008), sector commanders did not highlight their strong ties with the Awami League. After the new government took office, however, these ties became more apparent. The sector commanders are led by A. L. Khandker, a retired Air Vice Marshal who served as Deputy Chief of Staff of the pro-independence forces in 1971. Khandker won a seat in parliament on the Awami League ticket and Sheikh Hasina named him to a cabinet position (Ministry of Planning). Khandker is but one of a large group of AL bigwigs certain to use their DHAKA 00000120 003 OF 004 new-found influence to pursue the war crimes issue. THE JAMAAT-E-ISLAMI VIEW -------------- ¶11. (SBU) The JIB does not deny it sided with Pakistan in the 1971 conflict. "We had our reasons," one senior JIB leader told Poloff, going on to explain that with the existence of "a big common enemy like India" it would have been better for the two sides of Pakistan, both Muslim, to have remained united. In a memoir written by a JIB member during his imprisonment from 1971 to 1973 on charges of collaboration, the author denied that there had been any attempt by West Pakistan to impose an alien culture on Bengalis. He argued East Pakistan had been insular and parochial, claiming the creation of Pakistan had led to industrialization, which threatened the interests of the Bengali elite who led the liberation effort. "Old customs and superstitions were gradually breaking up, people were beginning to understand the advantages of modern comforts; polished floors were being substituted for mud and sand; bamboo being replaced by cement, porcelain taking the place of brass (...) An air of cosmopolitanism filled the atmosphere. Bengalis (...) were being forced increasingly to come into contact with foreigners whose ways and judgments were so different (...) It was this that appeared to be a threat to the Bengali way of life. A reaction against it developed in the form of xenophobia which really was a mask for the feeling of inferiority which the Bengalis experienced in relation to outsiders." ¶12. (SBU) Many critics believe JIB followers still owe their primary allegiance to Islam (or to Pakistan) rather than to Bangladesh. Secular nationalists allege that JIB has never publicly apologized for its pro-Pakistan stance in 1971, a fact that continues to play against the JIB in the court of public opinion. Acknowledging only that mistakes might have been made, the head of JIB, Matiur Nizami, told reporters recently that "A political decision may be wrong and unrealistic, but we were not involved in any criminal offenses." When asked about the possibility of a formal apology for JIB's 1971 position, he said "If we feel it necessary that we need to speak again, come up with a clearer statement, we will give one." The party may also consider sidelining controversial senior leadership in upcoming internal party elections, according to anonymous party sources quoted by media January 31. A senior JIB representative told Poloff January 29 the party was "in two minds" at the moment -- still deciding whether to face the issue legally and politically once and for all, or whether to continue to resist its revival. ¶13. (SBU) While generally denying allegations of war crimes against its members, JIB also remains opposed to the idea of initiating war crimes trials at this late date. "Why now, after nearly 40 years?" said one senior JIB representative. Awami League was in power from 1996 to 2001 -- why did they not pursue the issue then? he asked. The whole thing is politically motivated and will only serve to divide the nation. Further, he added, thousands of Bengalis were killed by the mukti bahini as collaborators and thousands more of the dead were pro-Pakistan Bihari (Urdu-speaking settlers from West Pakistan) resident in Bangladesh. He opined that the investigation would reveal that no-one's hands were clean. ¶14. (SBU) JIB leaders also point out that only one member of JIB was among the 750 individuals convicted during the anti-collaborator sweeps in the early post-conflict period. All others were either not detained, not charged or received amnesty. If they were guilty, it surely would have been apparent then, JIB argues. JIB claims proposing war crimes trials insults the memories of both Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and Ziaur Rahman, who granted the general amnesties and believed Bangladeshis should forgive and forget. JIB leaders also point out that Mujibur Rahman granted clemency to 195 Pakistani soldiers charged with war crimes and permitted their repatriation immediately after the conflict. Surely that clemency should continue to set the standard for Bangladesh, they say. ONLY ISLAMIST PARTY SPEAKS FOR JIB -------------- ¶15. (SBU) JIB's major political ally, the BNP, has indicated DHAKA 00000120 004 OF 004 publicly it has no objection to the prosecution of war criminals, if done transparently and fairly. Only the small Islamist party, Islami Oikya Jote (IOJ) -- also a member of the BNP's four-party alliance -- has publicly supported JIB. Indicating the potential of this issue to divide the nation along religious/secular lines, an IOJ spokesman has asserted the innocence of JIB leadership in recent media interactions. HOW AND WHERE SHALL WE TRY THEM? -------------- ¶16. (SBU) Opinions vary as to how and where defendants should be tried. The SCF and its supporters favor setting up a tribunal under the authority of the existing International Crimes Tribunal Act (para 5 above) and stress the need for international participation (preferably the UN) to ensure transparency and depoliticize a deeply-politicized process. According to SCF chief A.K. Khandker: "If the United Nations is involved for this trial, the trial will carry credibility and once the United Nations is involved, no political party coming into power will be able to stop it." In meetings with UN officials, the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister have publicly sought support for the establishment of such a tribunal. ¶17. (SBU) At the more extreme end lies the Ekaturrer Ghatok Dalal Nirmul Committee (Committee to eliminate killers and collaborators),also known as the Nirmul Committee. This group was formed in the early 1990s. In 1992, the Nirmul Committee convicted alleged war criminals in a series of mock trials in Dhaka that resonated powerfully with many; the BNP-led government of the day charged with treason 25 of the intellectuals who organized the trials. Committee representatives reject the idea of direct international involvement in a Bangladeshi war crimes process, asserting this is a Bangladeshi matter that should be settled by Bangladeshis, under the International Crimes Tribunal Act. At the very most, the UN might send observers to monitor the trials, committee members said. JIB opposes allowing war crimes trials at all; if trials must be held, however, a senior JIB representative said, they should entail substantial international involvement. COMMENT -------------- ¶18. (C) As the Awami League tries to implement its &vision 20218 the party keeps getting dragged back into the 1970s and into issues such as war crimes, the trial of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman,s assassins, and the broader question of Bangladesh's "secular" nature. Some also go beyond a desire to punish war criminals and instead seek nothing less than eliminating JIB from the political process. JIB officials have publicly committed to playing a constructive role in the opposition in the coming years -- driving them underground or against the ropes as an institution in the name of war crimes could well be counterproductive for both the Awami League and the democratic process. ¶19. (C) The issue of war crimes has been highly politicized for decades in Bangladesh. It has the potential to divide the nation further along its already-deep Islamist-secular fault line, as well as drag in other regional and international players. JIB and others are likely to play the issue as anti-Islamic in Bangladesh and elsewhere, and at least one JIB representative has mentioned the possibility of JIB soliciting moral and other support from Saudi Arabia. Conversations with JIB representatives also indicate the party is likely to make an effort to ensure regional stake-holders such as Pakistan (the origin of a significant number of war crimes suspects) play a role as the process moves forward. MORIARTY