ZANZIBAR: AMBASSADOR LENHARDT LUNCHES WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 DAR ES SALAAM 000901

SIPDIS

AF/E FOR TREADWELL; INR/RAA: FEHRENREICH; NSC FOR GAVIN

E.O. 12958: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR TZ
SUBJECT: ZANZIBAR: AMBASSADOR LENHARDT LUNCHES WITH
PRESIDENTIAL HOPEFUL MOHAMED ABOUD

REF: A. DAR ES SALAAM 870

B. DAR ES SALAAM 779

C. DAR ES SALAAM 756

D. DAR ES SALAAM 749

E. DAR ES SALAAM 63

F. 2008 DAR ES SALAAM 844

G. AND 2008 DAR ES SALAAM 444

Classified By: Ambassador Alfonso Lenhardt for reasons 1.4 (b/d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: On December 19 Ambassador Lenhardt invited to
the Residence for lunch Mohamed Aboud, a jocular and
charismatic Zanzibari politician of the ruling "Revolutionary
Party" (known by its Kiswahili acronym, "CCM - Chama cha
Mapinduzi"). Aboud is among the top contenders to replace
President Karume after the 2010 General Elections (Karume is
limited to two terms by the Zanzibari Constitution). Aboud
has been one of the architects of the present reconciliation
process in Zanzibar, which he detailed for us. The idea is
to amend the Constitution so that a unity government can be
formed based on the percentage of representation gained from
the General Election. Aboud is pro-America, pro-Union and
pragmatic about Zanzibar nationalism. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) A native of the island of Pemba, hotbed of dissension
and an opposition Civic United Front (CUF) stronghold, Aboud
believes he is the one who could reconcile differences
between the islands of the archipelago, between the two
parties, and between Zanzibar and the mainland. Aboud wants
to move away from Zanzibar's residual "revolutionary,"
socialist rhetoric and institutions that, he says, only serve
to isolate Zanzibar.


3. (C) Ambassador Lenhardt agreed with Aboud that the key
traits for a leader are honesty and fairness. Success comes
from a leader who leads from the front, the Ambassador
counseled. Frankness between friends also should remain a
hallmark of the U.S.-Zanzibar relationship, the two agreed.
While much of Aboud's fortunes rest on the success of a
political deal between CCM and CUF (which he helped put
together),he asserted there is no direct linkage between
interparty reconciliation and his chance of becoming CCM's
candidate for President in 2010. Aboud said the battle to
succeed Karume will take place in CCM's National Executive
Council (NEC),where Aboud said he has been a member since
long before Karume or Kikwete's respective presidencies.

RECONCILIATION: AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION FOR A UNITY
GOVERNMENT
-------------- ---


4. (SBU) According to Aboud, the next step in reconciliation
is to have the CCM government table in Zanzibar's House of
Representatives a constitutional amendment that would allow
power sharing based on the percentage of votes achieved by
all participants in a General Election. This would need to
be done prior to the next elections expected in October 2010.



5. (C) The key to the reconciliation plan, in Aboud's view,
was that it was all-inclusive. At the beginning of
multipartyism there were only two viable parties. In
Zanzibar that remains the case to some extent, however one of
the problems with the "Muafaka" peace process is it left out
all those but CUF and CCM. Other, smaller parties were
growing in influence. They would likely never get enough
power to rule but could play the role of spoilers. Having
a "past the post" system would tacitly be all-inclusive, but
in practice keep both parties in power and thus make it
easier to manage compromises. The other thing about a
constitutional amendment mandating a unity government is that
it would lock in power-sharing beyond specific
administrations and take some of the political heat off the
Chief Executive in implementation. Aboud said that even if he
himself were to be elected President in 2010, absent a

DAR ES SAL 00000901 002 OF 004


constitutional amendment now it would be difficult if not
impossible to bring in CUF members post-election over the
heads of party activists who would have helped guarantee the
CCM win.


6. (C) Aboud described how the process would likely work.
Minister of "Constitutional Affairs and Good Governance,"
Ramadhan Abdulla Shaaban, would draft legislation to amend
the constitution to mandate proportional power-sharing (Note:
Shaaban is one of three ministers who report directly to the
President rather than the Chief Minister. End Note.). The
draft would be presented and agreed upon by the Revolutionary
Council (a quasi-NSC-like organ made up of the cabinet,
Speaker of the House and other notables). Once agreed on by
the Revolutionary Council, the draft would be submitted to
Parliament for action. There are only two sessions of
Parliament scheduled in Zanzibar before the General Election,
and the final session will be seized with budgetary matters.
Therefore, the unity government constitutional amendment
should be gaveled in at the next session, to begin late
January or early February.

POLITICAL HURDLES AHEAD
--------------


7. (C) Aboud said the legislative strategy for a unity
government in the lead-up to October 2010 was workable, but
"workable" and "possible" were different in Zanzibar. An
early obstacle would be the desire of Seif Sharif and other
CUF leadership to get into Zanzibar's government now, "at any
cost," through some kind of packaged "unity government." As
a CCM-insider, Aboud claimed no special insight into the
inner workings of CUF. However, from what he said he
understood, Seif Sharif wanted into the government now in
order to be able to control, or at least influence, the
workings of the Zanzibar Electoral Commission and the
Zanzibar ID card process (NOTE: CUF supports having a special
Zanzibar-only identification and "citizenship" process that
differs from mainland Tanzania, but complains that the
issuance process favors CCM in a partisan way. END NOTE).


8. (C) Other CUF members (probably the elected members)
complained that they needed to show their supporters some
kind of concession from CCM and the Karume government now.
The party had three times forged power-sharing agreements
with CCM only to have them ignored after each election. A
fourth failure could be fatal for CUF, Aboud said.


9. (C) On the CCM side there are numerous hard-liners who
reject a unity or coalition government out of principle,
under any circumstance. Many still held the Communist view
of politics that an institutional monopoly of power was
needed to make "revolutionary changes among the masses."
Another dilemma for the pragmatists of the party is that that
any CUF member who would enter government now would do so at
the cost of CCM incumbents, most of whom gained their seats
from party affiliation. There would be mutiny in the ranks if
party militants were to be cut loose in favor of the
opposition.


10. (C) Karume himself was another impediment. Aboud said he
pays lip service to the "Plan" during closed door meetings,
but has been reluctant to take any decisive action. He said
Karume was of the view that he was President until October
2010, no matter what. The "reconciliation handshake" with
Seif Sharif was his "historic contribution," and whatever
followed was the problem of others.


11. (C) Aboud hoped a deal could be reached where CCM
hard-liners could take credit for preventing a unity
government under Karume while at the same time a
constitutional mechanism would have automatic effect for the
next administration. Since most of Karume's cabinet would be
replaced even under another CCM mandate, the people in power
now would have less to lose. Also, a constitutional

DAR ES SAL 00000901 003 OF 004


amendment would survive past the current lame-duck
government. For CUF the trick would be to convince them that
a "bird in the hand is not worth two in the bush," that any
stint in government now would last only as long as Karume was
in power (i.e., until October 2010). A constitutional
amendment, however, would ensure CUF power-sharing by law.
Political campaigning would remain important, since both
parties would have to earn their proportion of government.


12. (C) Aboud concluded that at the present time, the plan
had a chance of success or failure in equal measure. If the
U.S. wanted to be helpful, it should continue what it was
doing: highlighting the need for reconciliation and
linking it with development. Laud leaders for any move
toward progress, including if only baby steps, and advocate
support for the reconciliation process in private, when
asked, or when hearing each respective side air its
complaints.

ON ZANZIBARI NATIONALISM
--------------


13. (C) Aboud said that sometimes Zanzibari nationalism stood
in the way of common sense. At its worse, blind jingoism
sometimes hurt the archipelago. For example, the recent
dust-up between Zanzibar and the mainland as to who would
control any oil found in the Pemba Channel could have been
handled better. Zanzibar's insistence that it had exclusive
competency over exploration and exploitation of any gas or
oil fields was absurd, since there was no one in Zanzibar who
had expertise in these matters. Moreover, Zanzibar was not
solvent enough to launch any kind of exploration on its own.
Therefore, through nationalism, Zanzibar had just cut out its
most eager finance partner - the Union Government.
Meanwhile, Kenya was not sitting still. It was moving ahead
with a package funding deal and any successful drilling it
might eventually conduct could be from the same pockets of
oil.


14. (C) Similarly, during the Zanzibar Presidency of Salmin
Amour (1990-2000),there was a move to homogenize taxation in
Tanzania: all taxes would have been collected union-wide and
Zanzibar (only 3.5 percent of Tanzania's population)
would have received roughly 10 percent of revenue. For
nationalistic reasons, Zanzibar did not want to cede tax
collection authority. The net result is that now, at a time
when the East African Community is homogenizing duties,
Zanzibar is going in the opposite direction. Indeed,
according to Aboud , Zanzibar's unilateral tax regime needed
to be overhauled. "No modern nation earns its primary
revenue from import/export duties." For similar reasons,
Zanzibar had no business in monopolizing the clove trade.
Wealth creation should be the government's focus.


15. (C) In summary, Aboud said pragmatism should rule the
day, not blind ideology. What was good for the region and
for the Union was usually good for Zanzibar. it was not a
zero-sum game. He even commented on the "absurdity" of the
official name for "Zanzibar" - the "Revolutionary
Government." He said that during the real revolution,
Zanzibar was just called "Zanzibar." The "Revolutionary"
business was something created by the country's second
President, Aboud Mohamed Jumbe, in the 1970's after Abeid
Karume's assassination. Ambassador Lenhardt agreed, saying
excess baggage of the past just weighs a country down. Aboud
suggested it also served to alienate potential friends.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT REFORM
--------------


16. (C) Another reform might be in the realm of Local
Government. Aboud noted that shehas, politically appointed
leaders at the village level, did not exist on the mainland,
where local leaders were elected. "Shehas" were a colonial
legacy left over from the Sultan, he said. To make them

DAR ES SAL 00000901 004 OF 004


accountable to their constituents it would take only an
administrative action by the President. It could be done
quickly and would not need a Constitutional amendment.
Meanwhile, Regional and District Commissioners were, in
Aboud's view, necessary to keep as appointed positions since
they existed to ensure national polices were implemented in
the region.

COMMENT
--------------


17. (C) Aboud clearly wants to be President. He sees himself
as the compromise candidate between the Kikwete Union
Government and the Karume government's faction. Aboud was
certain that the next President of Zanzibar would be from
CCM, not CUF. He also was of the view that any President in
2010 would have to be a Kikwete loyalist.
LENHARDT