Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09DARESSALAAM793
2009-11-19 13:59:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Dar Es Salaam
Cable title:  

ZANZIBAR: POLITICAL RECONCILIATION NOT YET

Tags:  PINS PINR KDEM PGOV PHUM TZ 
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P 191359Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9046
INFO SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA 
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 
AMEMBASSY KIGALI 
AMEMBASSY LONDON 
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 
AMEMBASSY OSLO 
AMEMBASSY PARIS 
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 
CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
CIA WASHINGTON DC
CJTF HOA//J3
NSC WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L DAR ES SALAAM 000793 


DEPARTMENT FOR AF/E JTREADWELL; INR/RAA: FEHRENREICH; NSC
FOR MGAVIN

E.O. 12958: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PINS PINR KDEM PGOV PHUM TZ
SUBJECT: ZANZIBAR: POLITICAL RECONCILIATION NOT YET

REFLECTED ON THE GROUND

REF: (A) DAR ES SALAAM 779 (B) DAR ES SALAAM 768
(C) DAR ES SALAAM 765 (E) DAR ES SALAAM 756 AND PREVIOUS


Classified By: Ambassador Alfonso Lenhardt for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L DAR ES SALAAM 000793 DEPARTMENT FOR AF/E JTREADWELL; INR/RAA: FEHRENREICH; NSC FOR MGAVIN E.O. 12958: DECL: OADR TAGS: PINS PINR KDEM PGOV PHUM TZ SUBJECT: ZANZIBAR: POLITICAL RECONCILIATION NOT YET REFLECTED ON THE GROUND REF: (A) DAR ES SALAAM 779 (B) DAR ES SALAAM 768 (C) DAR ES SALAAM 765 (E) DAR ES SALAAM 756 AND PREVIOUS Classified By: Ambassador Alfonso Lenhardt for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: On November 17, AF/E Deputy Director and Zanzibar Affairs Officer (ZAO) visited Pemba, the contentious second island of the Zanzibar archipelago and stronghold of opposition party Civic United Front (CUF). Since the handshake between Zanzibar ruling party CCM leader President Karume and CUF SYG Seif Sharif Hamad (Refs A and C),there appears little changed on the ground in Pemba. The CUF boycott of voter registration continues; CCM appears to be stacking the voter list with underage kids and security personnel, and local leaders from both sides complain of a lack of mutual respect. Low-level, tit-for-tat violence seems to be continuing in Pemba. November 18 Ambassadorial consultations among the "Friends of 2010" group of key donor partners revealed there may be problems ahead if the two leaders remain aloof from the political process leading up to the October 2010 General elections. Ambassador Lenhardt is scheduled for a first meeting with Karume December 2, after which the Ambassador will make a trip around the archipelago-- including to Pemba hotspots. We will push for concrete measures of reconciliation. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) Over the two weeks since the November 5 historic "handshake" between opposition Civic United Front (CUF) leader and ruling CCM party President Karume, local and national media have been full of heretofore impossible images of the former arch enemies sharing the stage together. However, a November 17 Zanzibar visit by AF/E Deputy Dir. and Zanzibar Affairs Officer (ZAO) to the contentious second island of Pemba showed the bonhomie between the two party leaders to be nowhere evident among their respective Pemban followers. Representatives of the Zanzibar Legal Services Center NGO and U.S.-sponsored Tanzanian election monitors REDET both detailed "business as usual" malfeasance in the voter registration process. In the town of Pujini, tough-looking CUF supporters stood at the edge of the registration center and took note of those breaking the CUF boycott, while tough-looking CCM supporters escorted youthful registrants (COMMENT: Zanzi
bar Affairs Specialist (ZAS) personally spoke with would-be voters who admitted they were underage). ¶3. (C) Also in Pujini, a contested area where some of the local inhabitants display a picture of Omani ruler Sultan Qaboos rather than President Karume in their shops, AF/E DepDir and ZAO saw Zanzibar militia trucks full of civilians coming from registration areas. They also observed a makeshift militia camp, normally with six or seven people resident, now brimming with about 50 or 60 people, dressed in clothes more urbane than the traditional Islamic garb worn by the townspeople outside the camp wire, suggesting that those in the camp were from out of town. A Zanzibar Election Official (ZEC) confirmed to ZAS November 18 that ZEC will register otherwise eligible Zanzibari militia members in districts where they were "assigned" at the written request of militia commanders. (COMMENT: In precincts around Pemba capital ChakeChake where neighborhoods are mixed with both CCM and CUF supporters, an influx of several dozen CCM-supporting soldiers could make an electoral difference.) ¶4. (C) AF/E DepDir and ZAO also met with CUF minority whips for both the Tanzania National Parliament and the Zanzibari House of Representatives in the Wete, Pemba, home of CUF Parliamentarian Khalifa Suleiman Khalifa. CUF House member Saidi complained that, post-"handshake," in the closing sessions of the House, CCM colleagues ridiculed and teased CUF colleagues rather than welcomed the reconciliation gesture of their leader. Khalifa complained that in his District there was no indication that local government prejudice shown CUF supporters had dissipated. In fact, he detailed an incident wherein an elderly constituent was stricken from the retirement payment roles by a Sheha because she refused to register to vote. Khalifa said the CUF registration boycott would continue until CUF was satisfied that all those qualified for a Zanzibar I.D. (required to register to vote) got their I.D. and all those qualified to vote were registered. So far, that has not been the case, he said. Meanwhile, officers in the Regional Commissioner's office noted dryly that CUF representatives have not been helpful in program implementation. ¶5. (C) Khalifa said the international community should be guarded in its praise of the apparent reconciliation until there were concrete changes on the ground. He suggested signs of good faith in the near term would be for ZEC to publicly post the voters list. Khalifa also thought it would be a good idea for a town meeting in Pemba between CUF members and local CCM officials to be chaired by senior CCM leaders at which the senior leaders could publicly declare their support for reconciliation and offer specific instructions to their subordinates on practical matters that would facilitate integration between the two sides. Presently, Khalifa complained, the situation was worse than before: if CUF concessions were to be met with CCM abuses, the people would take up their demands outside party structures. LOW LEVEL VIOLENCE CONTINUES IN PEMBA -------------- ¶6. (C) With the passing of time, it appears that a pattern of tit-for-tat retaliations continues. This might have a life beyond the political divide, as particular neighborhoods or particular townspeople seek vengeance for perceived violent wrongdoing perpetrated against them. For example, in the town of Ole where violent demonstrations resulted in a "time-out" of the voter registration process in July, it would appear that local CCM supporters retaliated by targeting at least three CUF organizers by breaking into their houses and beating them in the pre dawn hours. Some weeks later, someone set off bombs in the homes of two CCM leaders believed to be implicated in the beatings. Later in August, someone set fire to a large, collective agricultural field and killed several farm animals in the hometown of CUF founder Seif Sharif, perhaps in retaliation to the house bombings. More recently, DepDir and ZAO saw the burned home of an Ole town Sheha-- torched after the supposed reconciliation handshake-- perhaps in retaliation for the field burning. "FRIENDS" GROUP REMAINS ACTIVE -------------- ¶7. (SBU) During November 18 Ambassadorial consultations among the "Friends of 2010" group of key donor partners, attended by Ambassador Lenhardt, the Swedish Ambassador, as EU President, said EU Troika Ambassadors had just completed a visit to Zanzibar during which they met with President Karume, Chief Minister Nahodha and CUF and CCM leaders. The week prior, political officers from Belgium, France, Finland, Netherlands, Sweden and the UK visited Pemba. A UK spokesman for the group detailed familiar observations relating to I.D. card issuance and voter registration being conducted on a partisan basis. ¶8. (SBU) The group also heard reports of an augmentation of local militia forces and the Zanzibar electoral Commission's (ZEC) stated intent to register many of them. Moreover, the Europeans said ZEC Director Khamis Ali told them he planned to start the second round of registrations a week after conclusion of the first round, i.e. in late February. ¶9. (SBU) On November 11 the Norwegian Ambassador met with Karume, and the Norwegian polcouns circulated to the "Friends" a draft set of talking points (e-mailed to AF/E) that tried to encapsulate shared goals and values for the "Friends." A new element was a call for the voter register to be made public. A UNDP representative at the "Friends" meeting claimed that ZEC will display a provisional list by "the week of November 16" in the first District to complete the first round of Voter I.D.-- Micheweni. However, on November 19 ZAS, in Pemba, could not confirm this. AMBASSADOR LENHARDT TO SEE KARUME DECEMBER 2 -------------- ¶10. (SBU) We are awaiting written confirmation of an ad ref acceptance by Zanzibar's "State House" for Ambassador Lenhardt's first call on President Karume December 2. The Ambassador's visit to Zanzibar will be among his first calls outside the capital after serving his credentials to President Kikwete November 12. The Ambassador will inspect key areas of American engagement in Zanzibar and will make a point of visiting Pemba hotspots. COMMENT: -------------- ¶11. (C) In terms of the substance of a power-sharing deal, Khalifa (who once claimed to ZAO that he was a possible back-channel conduit to President Kikwete (ref E)) told ZAO that mainstream politicians of both stripes were caught by surprise by the timing of the Karume/Seif Sharif reconciliation move. It seems the brokers for the deal are a small faction of CUF founders who were former members of CCM and, on the CCM side, were former leaders of the Zanzibar Revolution. Be that as it may, now that the CUF SYG has cast the die, according to Khalifa, the only move left for CUF cadre was to consolidate party support for its senior leadership-- even without details of a reconciliation deal-- "for the sake of Zanzibar and the peace process." The cost of failure would be resignation of senior leadership (and, Khalifa implied, possible dissolution of the party). If CUF is indeed embroiled in an "all or nothing" gambit and CCM does not offer any reciprocity-- or at the very least does not reign in its members who continue with scorched earth politics against CUF-- CUF will likely pull back and the reconciliation plan will be stillborn. ¶12. (C) Worrisome is ZEC's reported plan to start the second (and final) round of voter registration immediately after the first, whether or not there is any political deal (or at least change in I.D. card issuance procedures so that all eligible Zanzibari's can register to vote) The CUF registration boycott has been a tactic by which the party has been attempting to discredit the registration process and thereby the legitimacy of the election. Since only those who would otherwise vote for CUF are participating in the boycott, if brought to its natural conclusion, any CUF boycott would guarantee a CUF defeat. The boycott, however, has been predicated on the notion that there would be some kind of political breakthrough and CUF members would have a last-minute chance to register during a second round of voter screening once a level playing field had been created. While the political effectiveness of the boycott remains doubtful, it at least was helpful in tamping down the violence. Those denied participation in northern Pemba at the outset of the process stopped their unrest once other towns joined them "in solidarity" under the notion that "no one would register until all eligible could register." ¶13. (C) Should a second voter registration round begin without any changes to the process-- or to island politics more broadly-- then panic, confusion and anger could rise up, fomenting violence. A discredited CUF party would be less likely to be a positive brake. In the past, Seif Sharif usually has been effective in getting his base in line. Karume much less so. For reconciliation to work, both leaders (but especially Karume) need to build up support for reconciliation at the grass roots, quickly. LENHARDT

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