ZANZIBAR: MOVE TOWARD COALITION GOVERNMENT?

S E C R E T DAR ES SALAAM 000779 DEPARTMENT FOR AF/E: JTREADWELL; INR/RAA: FEHRENREICH; NSC FOR MGAVIN E.O. 12958: DECL: OADR TAGS: KDEM PGOV PHUM TZ SUBJECT: ZANZIBAR: MOVE TOWARD COALITION GOVERNMENT? REF: A. (A) DAR ES SALAAM 768 (NOTAL) (B) DAR ES SALAAM 765 ¶B. (C) DAR ES SALAAM 756 AND PREVIOUS Classified By: DCM Larry Andre for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S) SUMMARY: During Ambassador Lenhardt's credentials call on President Kikwete November 12, Kikwete confirmed that opposition Civic United Front (CUF) leader Seif Sharif Hamad has agreed in principal to serve as Chief Minister in a CCM-led government-of-national-unity in Zanzibar. However, the details and modalities for such an arrangement are still in play, and the deal remains fragile. Failure in reconciliation will undoubtedly lead to violence. Since the November 5 Karume-Seif meeting, mainstream leaders in both parties have been busy working the crowd to shore up support. The idea is to have a package ready for adoption by Zanzibar's House of Representatives when it meets again in January 2010. For Seif Sharif, this might be the last, best hope to wield at least some degree of power before he retires from the field. For Karume, it might be that he is building guarantees that some of his key loyalist maintain posts in any follow-on coalition government. In that way, the extensive land and business acquisitions of Karume and his family would be protected, if not his political legacy. We should continue to support Kikwete and his efforts to foster reconciliation in Zanzibar. However, any "unity government" in Zanzibar also must mean more Pembans in leadership positions, regardless of CCM or CUF affiliation. Currently there are none even though Pemba makes up 40% of Zanzibar. END SUMMARY. THE DEAL -------------- ¶2. (S) During Ambassador Lenhardt's credentials call on President Kikwete November 12 (36 hours after the Ambassador's arrival),Kikwete confirmed the essence of the deal afoot: opposition Civic United Front (CUF) leader Seif Sharif Hamad has agreed to serve as Chief Minister in a CCM-led government-of-national-unity. Earlier, on November 11, Salim Rashid (former Secretary of Zanzibar's Revolutionary Council during Zanzibar's independence and eventual merger into Tanzania)-- an influential elder who evidently is among the go-betweens for reconciliation (ref C)-- also told Zanzibar Affairs Specialist that Seif's acceptance of a Chief Minister's slot was the fulcrum of the deal. Ongoing now was wrangling over what Ministerial portfolios would go to which party (and to whom). This was being hurried along, so that a package deal could be presented before the Zanzibar House of Representatives at the opening of the next session, expected in early January. Salim Rashid passed us this information in strictest confidence because details and modalities for such an arrangement are still in play, and the deal remains fragile. BUILDING SUPPORT SINCE THE HANDSHAKE -------------- ¶3. (U) Following the November 5 meeting between Zanzibar President Amani Abeid Karume and Civic United Front (CUF) Secretary-General Seif Sharif Hamad (ref B),Seif Sharif held rallies on the main island of Unguja and on the second island of Pemba, to mixed results. A CUF rally in Zanzibari capital Stonetown November 6 was the largest-attended partisan political gathering in memory for most observers. Dispensing with the normal build-up of speeches and fanfare, Seif Sharif was the first to come on stage. He gave an historical summary of recent political events and concluded by informing of his decision to officially and formally recognize the Karume government (which he said CUF had de-facto recognized anyway by nature of CUF's participation in Zanzibar's parliament.) While most observers remained grimly silent, emotional pockets of the audience shouted hoots and catcalls. Amidst growing anger in the crowd, Seif Sharif left the stage abruptly. Even CUF President Lipumba was unable to take control of the crowd, and the rally ended quickly, if not quietly. A rally in Pemba two days later occurred without incident, however. ¶4. (C) Deputy Minister for East Africa Mohammed Aboud, (whom President Jakaya Kikwete had dispatched as his point man to put together the reconciliation deal-- ref C) told Zanzibar Affairs Officer (ZAO) that he was surprised at the timing of the Seif-Karume meeting, if not its substance. Perhaps trying to maneuver ahead of his party to avoid being marginalized, Seif Sharif might have jumped the gun on his meeting, Aboud speculated. Aboud said that it was expected that Seif Sharif would have done the political spadework with his own party before cutting a deal with Karume. Likewkse, LbkgRO8oQe ready to move forward. ¶5. (SBU) Since the Karume-Seif meeting, mainstream leadership of both parties have been busy working the crowd to shore up support. Rather than massive rallies, CUF has moved to working focus groups-- the Women's League, CUF Youth, "Zanzibaris Living Abroad Coalition" etc. Key CUF leaders, some of whom might still have a hard time with compromise with CCM are at least coming forward to urge followers to support the party leadership. A coalition agreement with CCM threatens the interests of some CUF members who have a personal, bitter hatred of CCM relating to personal experiences some have (especially in Pemba) of imprisonment, exile and even targeted murder and rape by government agents. ¶6. (SBU) On the CCM side, President Kikwete issued a statement November 11, calling the recent meeting "a major step in the right direction." Kikwete also urged Tanzanians to ignore skeptics and naysayers He called on all Tanzanians and the international community to encourage the two leaders "in order to step-up efforts in bringing about the desired outcome." Kikwete called reconciliation in Zanzibar a national, Tanzanian goal, "one of unity and solidarity... (where) no one had fear of any political retribution." However, for some Zanzibari CCMers, a coalition deal would impinge on the pervasive system of political patronage in the isles. Depending on how portfolios would be parsed, large numbers of CCM party loyalists would be unemployed if CUF and CCM cats and dogs were to share the same food bowl. ¶7. (SBU) The Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar (SMZ) also issued a statement November 11 congratulating Seif Hamad personally and praising Karume for hosting the talks. The communiqu said the meeting was proof of thawing relations between the parties and represented a new chapter in Zanzibar's history. The SMZ said it would to do whatever it could to "facilitate the enhancement of development of peace, unity, solidarity and to remove all elements or factors dividing our people." The communiqu ended with an impassioned plea for all Zanzibaris to support both Karume and Seif Sharif. Nonetheless, what the statement did not make explicit was just what it was the two leaders were working on that was worthy of public support. Since the deal still is not publicly known, the SMZ communiqu elicited cynicism at worst or apathy at best among the general populous. For the political class at least, it was seen as proof of Karume's commitment to a change in the status quo, and was welcomed. COMMENT: WHAT'S GOING ON? -------------- ¶8. (C) It is unclear whether a new "unity government," if agreed on, would take place immediately upon adoption by the House or whether the "unity government" would go into effect following the October 2010 General Elections. Either scenario raises questions and complications. For example, if Seif Sharif were to become Chief Minister in early 2010, what would happen to current Chief Minister Shamsi Nahodha (a member of CCM's Central Committee) and his staff? One issue that we have been working with Nahodha on is in trying to bring Zanzibar's port up to U.S. security standards. An impediment to that effort has been current Port Captain Mohamed Jumbe (son of the second President of Zanzibar and a close Karume crony). Could Seif Sharif really be expected to rein-in Jumbe or any other Karume or CCM stalwart? If not, then Seif Sharif and his party would be co-opteds rather than partners. Conversely, if a "unity government" were to be formed only after 2010, under whose banner would Seif Sharif campaign in the lead-up to the election? Would CUF even run a separate presidential campaign? For Seif Sharif at least, this might be the last, best hope for him to wield at least some degree of power before he retires from the field. Even though he already held the post of Zanzibar Chief Minister almost 20 years ago, perhaps he feels that CUF would splinter amidst violence should it-- for the fourth time-- go toe-to-toe with CCM and lose again through fraud. ¶9. (C) The main question, however, is: what is Karume's role in all this? Few believe that he is willing to sign away the legacy of his father, who was Zanzibar's first President and leader of the anti-Sultanate, Anti-Arab revolution. Karume remains firmly in power. Most of his party are confident that they will remain in power one way or another after 2010. On the other hand, Karume may be motivated (and reined-in) by pragmatic national and domestic considerations stemming from his lame-duck status. At the national level, it might be that Karume has (or is seeking) from Kikwete guarantees to insulate the Karume clan from criminal charges for corruption once Karume is out of office after 2010. As a private citizen, Karume will not want to be an enemy of President Kikwete at the moment when Kikwete will be starting his last term of office-- with a newly hand-picked President in Zanzibar and a willingness to spend political capital to settle scores and consolidate his power. ¶10. (C) Domestically, in Zanzibar, it might be that Karume is seeking guarantees for some of his key loyalists to maintain posts in any follow-on coalition government. Karume himself, upon taking power in 2000, was Zanzibar's worst practitioner of winner-take-all politics, having replaced every Minister and scores of other positions with his own people. Therefore, simultaneous to negotiations with CUF, in talks within the CCM party, Karume is likely seeking to keep some of his confederates and perhaps some portfolios under control after his departure in 2010. Probably key for him is retention of his brother-in-law, Mansour Yusuph Himid (sometimes called the "Minster of Everything" for his combined portfolio of "Water, Works, Energy, and Lands") In that way, Karume's financial legacy would be protected, if not his political one. ¶11. (SBU) For our part, we should continue to support Kikwete and his efforts to foster reconciliation in Zanzibar. While the clich about the unpalatability of watching laws and sausage being made likely holds true in this case, a Zanzibari solution to a Zanzibari problem will undoubtedly be longer lasting than any solution imposed from without. So long as Zanzibari nationalism does not threaten to destabilize Tanzania or the region, we should offer our good offices whenever possible to seeing this impetus develop positively. A successful outcome might also have the corollary of strengthening Zanzibar's legislative branch, thus adding another element of good governance to the archipelago. Nonetheless, a CUF-CCM political settlement is only one part of a broader solution. Any "unity government" in Zanzibar also must mean more Pembans in leadership positions, regardless of CCM or CUF affiliation. Currently there are no Pembans in power even though Pemba makes up 40% of Zanzibar. There has never been a Pemban President. Symptomatic of this dynamic were press reports November 11 that yet another house of a local leader (called "sheha") was torched in the troubled Pemban town of Ole. Failure in reconciliation will undoubtedly lead to more violence. LENHARDT