TANZANIA HOME MINISTER HINTS ABOUT NATIONAL VIEWS

C O N F I D E N T I A L DAR ES SALAAM 000063


AF/E FOR JLIDDLE; INR/RAA: FEHRENRIECH

E.O. 12958: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR TZ
SUBJECT: TANZANIA HOME MINISTER HINTS ABOUT NATIONAL VIEWS
ON ZANZIBAR 2010 ELECTIONS

REF: (A) DAR ES SALAAM 54 (B) DAR ES SALAAM 16 (C) 08
DAR ES SALAAM 844 (D) 08 DAR ES SALAAM 740
(E) 08 DAR ES SALAAM 444 (F) 08 DAR ES
SALAAM 98


Classified By: CDA Andre for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Minster of Home Affairs Lawrence Masha told
CDA as part of a wide-ranging tour d'horizon that formal
negotiations between CUF and CCM on Zanzibar ("Muafaka") was
dead for now, mainly because of Karume's intransigence. A
power-sharing government prior to the 2010 elections, with
the task of running the elections, is now highly unlikely.
However, Masha said CCM's national Central Committee (not
CCM-Zanzibar) will try to pick a candidate who will campaign
on the platform of a unity government, with a CUF Prime
Minister under a CCM President. It is an open question
whether CUF would go along with such a bargain if it thought
it could win the election outright, or whether CUF thought
CCM would make good on such a promise or even if CCM could
agree on the offer. In any event, Masha was optimistic that
his Ministry would preserve law and order on Zanzibar during
the elections and, moreover, would prevent score settling
regardless of the outcome. The UK and Belgian Ambassadors
have joined Ambassador Green in calling for reconciliation
(ref B). Fully funding our already-staffed American Presence
position on Zanzibar is an imperative. END SUMMARY.

MASHA: "THE 2010 ELECTION WILL BE CIVIL"
--------------


2. (C) On January 22, CDA and P/E Couns met with Minster of
Home Affairs Lawrence Masha for a tour d'horizon, elements of
which will appear in future reporting. Inter alia, at CDA's
prompting, Masha revealed some hints about ruling party CCM's
thinking on how the 2010 election might play out in Zanzibar.
Masha also related senior national CCM leadership views on
reconciliation with principal opposition party CUF. On the
security situation for the 2010 Zanzibari elections, Masha
predicted that Zanzibar would be "under control" from a peace
and security perspective. He rejected the assertion that
police affairs in the autonomous region were out of his
hands, noting that over the last months there had been
several transfers of police officers to the mainland and
vice-versa. He stressed that police and security were Union
matters. Masha also said that he maintains good relations
with Zanzibar President Abeid Karume as a matter of courtesy
and good practice, not from obligation. (COMMENT: We have
noted tensions in the Zanzibar police force between mainland
and island elements. We also have noted political
interference by Zanzibar authorities in the management of
police affairs-- a national, not regional, competency (ref
D). END COMMENT.)


3. (C) On reconciliation, Masha said that formal negotiation
with CUF ("Muafaka") was dead for now, mainly because of
Karume's "historical sensitivities as son of the revolution."
(COMMENT: Karume's father was the pre-imminent ideologue of
the Zanzibar Revolution and became the archipelago's first
president. CCM -- "Chama cha Mapinduzi" -- means
"Revolutionary Party" in Kiswahili. END COMMENT.) However,
Masha also hinted at divisions within CCM over reconciliation
by recalling a two-front battle that President Kikwete had to
fight in early 2008. According to Masha, if former Prime
Minister Edward Lowassa hadn't been felled on the corruption
issue, he could have outmaneuvered Karume whom Masha claims
was not in favor of where the talks were going. (BACKGROUND
NOTE: Veteran CCM politician Lowassa tendered his resignation
in February 2008 over an emerging scandal involving kickbacks
at the national power monopoly (TANESCO). His was the
highest ranking resignation in Tanzania's history (ref F).
At the same time, the years-long negotiations with CUF were
winding up, but Karume remained dead set against any
concessions to CUF. In the end, after an ad ref agreement
among the parties, CCM said it had to bring the results to
the Central Committee for approval. The Central Committee,
of which Karume and some of his allies are members,
maneuvered to postpone approval until after a popular
referendum on the issue, causing CUF to cry foul and walk
out. END NOTE.)


A. CCM CANDIDATE OFFERING POWER SHARING AS CAMPAIGN PROMISE?
-------------- --------------


4. (C) Looking toward the future, Masha predicted that if
CCM chooses the right candidate -- a decision to be made by
"CCM-Tanzania," he asserted, not CCM-Zanzibar -- that
candidate would start the election campaign by pledging a
unity government, proposing a CUF Chief Minister under a CCM
President. The question remained whether CUF would go along
with such a deal if it thought it could win the election
outright. Masha said that CUF was effectively
personality-based behind CUF SYG Seif Sharif Ahmad, who could
change parties if he wanted to and take his supporters along.
He said there also were some "reasonable and moderate" CUF
members, like Hamad Rashid (former national Deputy Finance
Minister and current opposition leader in national
Parliament). Masha added that party loyalty on both sides has
faded since revolutionary days, noting that CCM/Zanzibar's
poor record on governance and corruption was creating more
CUF supporters, even from among CCM's base.


5. (C) Masha said that were CUF to win in 2010, the Ministry
of Home Affairs would work with the new government in the
same way "as any national ministry charged with peace and
security everywhere," but he said his Ministry was
especially primed to work well with Zanzibar authorities of
all stripes. Moreover, Masha asserted that if CUF won, the
Ministry of Home Affairs would prevent payback/retribution.


6. (C) Masha noted that on some issues, especially Zanzibar
sovereignty, "all Zanzibaris had the same opinion," namely
that Zanzibar was a country in free association with the
mainland that could revert to its stand-alone status at
anytime. Nonetheless, Masha also opined that if ever the
mainland were to hold a referendum on Zanzibar's affiliation
with the Union, "Zanzibar would be quickly cut loose" (though
he was quick to add that such a referendum "will never
happen").

COMMENT: ...BUT WILL CUF AND ZANZIBAR-CCM GO ALONG?
-------------- --------------


7. (C) COMMENT: In his conversations with us, Masha is
probably the most candid member of Kikwete's cabinet. A
trusted member of Kikwete's inner circle, a member of CCM's
Central Committee (where he is closely associated with former
PM Lowassa),and an insider among the nation's security
services, he also has insight and access to other camps as
well. For example, one of Karume's daughters works at
Masha's law firm. All that notwithstanding, because he is a
consummate CCM politician, one wonders how much of a CCM
filter guides his glib and breezy conversation. There is
still a lot of CCM/mainland impatience with CCM/Zanzibar.
Mutual distrust between CUF and CCM runs high. CUF remains
of the view, publicly and privately, that it won all of the
elections it has contested since 1995. It also believes it
has never been stronger than it is at the present. CCM
_{oo-rAQMWk.9]QQHQn.rties. Every multi-party election ever
held in Zanzibar, including the pre-independence elections,
have included significant violence; although some years have
been worse than others. 2010 is unlikely to be an exception,
although if the CCM candidate and the CUF candidate both
announce in advance their intent to form a coalition
government (as Masha told us it plans to do) then that will
help. It is interesting to note that Masha is sanguine about
a possible CUF victory in Zanzibar and claims that he even
would deploy national security assets to preserve such a
victory.


8. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: If what Masha says about Karume is
true, a power sharing government prior to elections, with the
task of running the elections, is now highly unlikely.
Meanwhile, opposition faith in the Zanzibar electoral
commission is as low as ever. Given CUF's feeling of
betrayal after Mufaka I (in which the agreements were never
implemented) and Muafaka II (in which CCM changed the nature
of the agreement process),it might be a hard sell to
convince CUF to buy into a second place finish and trust CCM
to share power in advance of an election it thinks it can
handily win. This is especially true if CUF believes
international pressure could be brought to bear on the ruling
Government for free and fair elections. In addition to
Ambassador Green's valedictory speech on Zanzibar (ref B)
making the case for reconciliation (which, incidentally, the
Zanzibari Chief of Archives quietly has asked us for a copy
to preserve among the islands' historical records),the
outgoing UK Ambassador and the Belgian Ambassador have also
made strong calls for power sharing, following the model of
Ambassador Green. For the Department, fully funding our
already-staffed American Presence position so we could have a
full-time presence on Zanzibar is an imperative that
positively would impact our ability to influence peaceful
change in Zanzibar.


ANDRE