TANZANIA HOME MINISTER HINTS ABOUT NATIONAL VIEWS

C O N F I D E N T I A L DAR ES SALAAM 000063 AF/E FOR JLIDDLE; INR/RAA: FEHRENRIECH E.O. 12958: DECL: OADR TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR TZ SUBJECT: TANZANIA HOME MINISTER HINTS ABOUT NATIONAL VIEWS ON ZANZIBAR 2010 ELECTIONS REF: (A) DAR ES SALAAM 54 (B) DAR ES SALAAM 16 (C) 08 DAR ES SALAAM 844 (D) 08 DAR ES SALAAM 740 (E) 08 DAR ES SALAAM 444 (F) 08 DAR ES SALAAM 98 Classified By: CDA Andre for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Minster of Home Affairs Lawrence Masha told CDA as part of a wide-ranging tour d'horizon that formal negotiations between CUF and CCM on Zanzibar ("Muafaka") was dead for now, mainly because of Karume's intransigence. A power-sharing government prior to the 2010 elections, with the task of running the elections, is now highly unlikely. However, Masha said CCM's national Central Committee (not CCM-Zanzibar) will try to pick a candidate who will campaign on the platform of a unity government, with a CUF Prime Minister under a CCM President. It is an open question whether CUF would go along with such a bargain if it thought it could win the election outright, or whether CUF thought CCM would make good on such a promise or even if CCM could agree on the offer. In any event, Masha was optimistic that his Ministry would preserve law and order on Zanzibar during the elections and, moreover, would prevent score settling regardless of the outcome. The UK and Belgian Ambassadors have joined Ambassador Green in calling for reconciliation (ref B). Fully funding our already-staffed American Presence position on Zanzibar is an imperative. END SUMMARY. MASHA: "THE 2010 ELECTION WILL BE CIVIL" -------------- ¶2. (C) On January 22, CDA and P/E Couns met with Minster of Home Affairs Lawrence Masha for a tour d'horizon, elements of which will appear in future reporting. Inter alia, at CDA's prompting, Masha revealed some hints about ruling party CCM's thinking on how the 2010 election might play out in Zanzibar. Masha also related senior national CCM leadership views on reconciliation with principal opposition party CUF. On the security situation for the 2010 Zanzibari elections, Masha predicted that Zanzibar would be "under control" from a peace and security perspective. He rejected the assertion that police affairs in the autonomous region were out of his hands, noting that over the last months there had been several transfers of police officers to the mainland and vice-versa. He stressed that police and security were Union matters. Masha also said that he maintains good relations with Zanzibar President Abeid Karume as a matter of courtesy and good practice, not from obligation. (COMMENT: We have noted tensions in the Zanzibar police force between mainland and island elements. We also have noted political interference by Zanzibar authorities in the management of police affairs-- a national, not regional, competency (ref D). END COMMENT.) ¶3. (C) On reconciliation, Masha said that formal negotiation with CUF ("Muafaka") was dead for now, mainly because of Karume's "historical sensitivities as son of the revolution." (COMMENT: Karume's father was the pre-imminent ideologue of the Zanzibar Revolution and became the archipelago's first president. CCM -- "Chama cha Mapinduzi" -- means "Revolutionary Party" in Kiswahili. END COMMENT.) However, Masha also hinted at divisions within CCM over reconciliation by recalling a two-front battle that President Kikwete had to fight in early 2008. According to Masha, if former Prime Minister Edward Lowassa hadn't been felled on the corruption issue, he could have outmaneuvered Karume whom Masha claims was not in favor of where the talks were going. (BACKGROUND NOTE: Veteran CCM politician Lowassa tendered his resignation in February 2008 over an emerging scandal involving kickbacks at the national power monopoly (TANESCO). His was the highest ranking resignation in Tanzania's history (ref F). At the same time, the years-long negotiations with CUF were winding up, but Karume remained dead set against any concessions to CUF. In the end, after an ad ref agreement among the parties, CCM said it had to bring the results to the Central Committee for approval. The Central Committee, of which Karume and some of his allies are members, maneuvered to postpone approval until after a popular referendum on the issue, causing CUF to cry foul and walk out. END NOTE.) ¶A. CCM CANDIDATE OFFERING POWER SHARING AS CAMPAIGN PROMISE? -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) Looking toward the future, Masha predicted that if CCM chooses the right candidate -- a decision to be made by "CCM-Tanzania," he asserted, not CCM-Zanzibar -- that candidate would start the election campaign by pledging a unity government, proposing a CUF Chief Minister under a CCM President. The question remained whether CUF would go along with such a deal if it thought it could win the election outright. Masha said that CUF was effectively personality-based behind CUF SYG Seif Sharif Ahmad, who could change parties if he wanted to and take his supporters along. He said there also were some "reasonable and moderate" CUF members, like Hamad Rashid (former national Deputy Finance Minister and current opposition leader in national Parliament). Masha added that party loyalty on both sides has faded since revolutionary days, noting that CCM/Zanzibar's poor record on governance and corruption was creating more CUF supporters, even from among CCM's base. ¶5. (C) Masha said that were CUF to win in 2010, the Ministry of Home Affairs would work with the new government in the same way "as any national ministry charged with peace and security everywhere," but he said his Ministry was especially primed to work well with Zanzibar authorities of all stripes. Moreover, Masha asserted that if CUF won, the Ministry of Home Affairs would prevent payback/retribution. ¶6. (C) Masha noted that on some issues, especially Zanzibar sovereignty, "all Zanzibaris had the same opinion," namely that Zanzibar was a country in free association with the mainland that could revert to its stand-alone status at anytime. Nonetheless, Masha also opined that if ever the mainland were to hold a referendum on Zanzibar's affiliation with the Union, "Zanzibar would be quickly cut loose" (though he was quick to add that such a referendum "will never happen"). COMMENT: ...BUT WILL CUF AND ZANZIBAR-CCM GO ALONG? -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) COMMENT: In his conversations with us, Masha is probably the most candid member of Kikwete's cabinet. A trusted member of Kikwete's inner circle, a member of CCM's Central Committee (where he is closely associated with former PM Lowassa),and an insider among the nation's security services, he also has insight and access to other camps as well. For example, one of Karume's daughters works at Masha's law firm. All that notwithstanding, because he is a consummate CCM politician, one wonders how much of a CCM filter guides his glib and breezy conversation. There is still a lot of CCM/mainland impatience with CCM/Zanzibar. Mutual distrust between CUF and CCM runs high. CUF remains of the view, publicly and privately, that it won all of the elections it has contested since 1995. It also believes it has never been stronger than it is at the present. CCM _{oo-rAQMWk.9]QQHQn.rties. Every multi-party election ever held in Zanzibar, including the pre-independence elections, have included significant violence; although some years have been worse than others. 2010 is unlikely to be an exception, although if the CCM candidate and the CUF candidate both announce in advance their intent to form a coalition government (as Masha told us it plans to do) then that will help. It is interesting to note that Masha is sanguine about a possible CUF victory in Zanzibar and claims that he even would deploy national security assets to preserve such a victory. ¶8. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: If what Masha says about Karume is true, a power sharing government prior to elections, with the task of running the elections, is now highly unlikely. Meanwhile, opposition faith in the Zanzibar electoral commission is as low as ever. Given CUF's feeling of betrayal after Mufaka I (in which the agreements were never implemented) and Muafaka II (in which CCM changed the nature of the agreement process),it might be a hard sell to convince CUF to buy into a second place finish and trust CCM to share power in advance of an election it thinks it can handily win. This is especially true if CUF believes international pressure could be brought to bear on the ruling Government for free and fair elections. In addition to Ambassador Green's valedictory speech on Zanzibar (ref B) making the case for reconciliation (which, incidentally, the Zanzibari Chief of Archives quietly has asked us for a copy to preserve among the islands' historical records),the outgoing UK Ambassador and the Belgian Ambassador have also made strong calls for power sharing, following the model of Ambassador Green. For the Department, fully funding our already-staffed American Presence position so we could have a full-time presence on Zanzibar is an imperative that positively would impact our ability to influence peaceful change in Zanzibar. ANDRE