ZANZIBAR 2010 ELECTION REGISTRATION BEGINS WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 DAR ES SALAAM 000486 SIPDIS AF/E JLIDDLE; INR/RAA FEHRENREICH; NSC FOR MGAVIN E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/24/2019 TAGS: KDEM PGOV PHUM SOCI TZ SUBJECT: ZANZIBAR 2010 ELECTION REGISTRATION BEGINS WITH INTIMIDATION AND IRREGULARITIES REF: A. (A) DAR ES SALAAM 385 ¶B. (B) DAR ES SALAAM 381 ¶C. (C) DAR ES SALAAM 340 ¶D. (D) DAR ES SALAAM 237 AND PREVIOUS DAR ES SAL 00000486 001.2 OF 007 Classified By: Classified By: CDA Larry Andre for reasons 1.4 (b) and ( d). NOTE POLICY CONSIDERATION IN FINAL PARAGRAPH FOR STATE AF & MCC. ¶1. (C) SUMMARY & INTRODUCTION: On July 6, the Zanzibar Election Commission (ZEC) started voter registration for the October 2010 General Election on the island of Pemba, stronghold of opposition party Civic United Front (CUF). Between July 16-18 Zanzibar Affairs Officer (ZAO) and Specialist (ZAS) witnessed intimidation and irregularities that may have resulted in the disenfranchisement of thousands. Violence has accompanied every multiparty election ever held in Zanzibar, including during the late British period. Pemba usually has borne the brunt of it. However, locals now are saying that 2010 may be "worse than ever," although there have been no violent incidents so far. There appears to be no move toward reconciliation between CUF and ruling CCM ("Chama cha Mapinduzi," Kiswahili for "Revolutionary Party"). If anything, positions on both sides are hardening. Like during the recent by-election in Magogoni (refs. B and C),in Zanzibar voter registration is tantamount to the vote itself. The U.S. and Norway (Zanzibar's second largest donor) are in the field and will continue to closely monitor events. Soon we hope to fund and field a larger observation presence. We also continue to call for reconciliation and power-sharing between the parties. Zanzibar reconciliation was a campaign position of Union President Kikwete, but he has been publicly silent on the issue of late. ¶2. (C) At some point, the USG, possibly in concert with other major donors, may publicly warn the Zanzibar government of the consequences in terms of development funding should they opt for a violent and rigged election. We will also need to determine a policy in advance as to the implications under our aid legislation (particularly MCC). The Union Government (Tanzanian mainland, i.e. 97 percent of the population) has little authority over how the government in largely �00A;autonomous Zanzibar conducts their election. In the event that mainland elections organized under the National Election Commission are deemed free and fair (as previous mainland contests have been) and Zanzibar elections organized under the completely separate Zanzibar Election Commission are deemed flawed (as all such have been in the past) are USG assistance programs for all of Tanzania threatened, or only those in Zanzibar? END SUMMARY & INTRODUCTION. ¶3. (U) On July 6, the Zanzibar Election Commission (ZEC) started voter registration for the October 2010 General Election (to be held simultaneously with national elections on the Tanzanian mainland organized by the National Election Commission). ZEC chose to begin the registration process in opposition party Civic United Front (CUF)'s heartland of Pemba Island and started with the most virulent anti-government district in Zanzibar-- Micheweni-- site of significant past political violence, especially in early 2000 (see para. 13 DAR ES SAL 00000486 002.2 OF 007 below). The first round of voter registration will last from now through December 7. ZEC will soon begin screening voters on the main island of Unguja, concurrently with the ongoing Pemba registration. ZEC plans to conduct two rounds of registration in each constituency, returning to Micheweni in early 2010 and continuing in the same order of districts until the second round is completed. ¶4. (C) July 16-18, Zanzibar Affairs Officer (ZAO) and Zanzibar Affairs Specialist (ZAS) visited all three constituencies of Micheweni District: Konde, where the first tranche of registration was completed; Mgogoni, where registrations were underway; and to Micheweni Central to see preparations for the ensuing round of voter registry. We traveled across large swaths of Pemba and spoke with both of Pemba's Regional Commissioners. We met three of the four District Commissioners and, separately, visited with their respective identification card clerks. We saw the Director of Zanzibar I.D. Cards for all of Pemba. We also called on the Wete District Police Commander and chatted with about a dozen local leaders (called "shehas") and imams and interacted with scores of citizens, including a group of about 200 in a makeshift town meeting set up for us by a sympathetic chieftain beneath the shade of a large mango tree. ¶5. (C) Just prior to departing for Pemba on July 15, ZAO and ZAS were demarched by a group of eight CUF parliamentarians from the Zanzibar House of Representatives, led by CUF minority whip Abubaker Hamis Hamadi. Commenting on the just- completed first round registrations in Konde, CUF complained about "massive rejection" of thousands of would-be voters, not only new registrants but also people who previously voted. CUF spoke of widespread intimidation and reiterated points along familiar lines that absent any change of behavior from the ruling CCM party, there would start to be a dissolution of CUF into factions along with widespread violence. Some of CUF's claims seemed either self-serving or exaggerated. However, while in Pemba July 16-18 we witnessed intimidation and irregularities that tracked with many of CUF's complaints and that may have resulted in the disenfranchisement of thousands. Creating Non-voters by Withholding Zanzibar I.D.s -------------- -------------- ¶6. (U) Earlier this year a Deputy Minister in Zanzibar's "Ministry of Home Affairs" issued a dicta that the newly revamped Zanzibar i.d. card would be the sole criteria to determine eligibility to vote in Zanzibar elections. Passports, birth certificates and even previously-issued ZEC voters' cards would not substitute for a Zanzibar i.d in order to vote in 2010. Although the cards first were introduced in 2005, and all Zanzibaris over 18 are supposed to have one, Zanzibar i.d. card issuance and usage is not universal-- particularly in rural areas and particularly in Pemba, places that also tend to favor CUF over CCM. (COMMENT: National i.d. cards, long promised (legislation dates back to 1986),may not be issued before the 2010 elections. Union Home Minister Lawrence Masha has suggested constitutional issues may need to be addressed as regards Zanzibar "citizenship." END COMMENT) ¶7. (SBU) Septel will detail the broader issue of i.d. cards and how Zanzibar seems to be using card issuance as a tool DAR ES SAL 00000486 003.2 OF 007 for reward and punishment. Suffice it to say, obtaining a Zanzibari i.d. card can become Kafka-esque to the point of impossibility... or not, depending on one's political orientation. We spoke to dozens and dozens of outraged Pembans of all ages who were not able to be certified as Zanzibaris even though they might have never left the island of their birth (in addition to 18 year-olds, the elderly seem to be particularly victimized as many born before the 1964 revolution/uprising have no birth certificates). "What does that make us then, Congolese?" spat a young man denied registration. "If I am not a Zanzibari," he continued, "am I at least a Tanzanian?" (COMMENT: Without a ZEC voter card, in Zanzibar, the youth would not be able to vote for Union President either. END COMMENT) ¶8. (C) Meanwhile, at the Micheweni I.D. center at District headquarters, on a Friday evening just after what would normally be close of business (the following Monday was to be the first day of voter registration in that district),we saw scores of young people who evidently had been bused to the center, many still wearing their secondary school uniforms (suggesting that they may have been underage),awaiting card issue. In contrast, the Regional Commissioner's Office in Wete-- during office hours -- seemed devoid of personnel of any kind (including the Regional Commissioner and his Deputy, with whom we had an appointment). The Imam of the Micheweni mosque (with whom we enjoy a close relationship since we restored his 16th Century building under the Ambassador's Fund For Historic Preservation) lamented that one of his own sons was denied a voters' card even though he had been eligible to vote in 2005. Meanwhile, he said that one of his granddaughters-- who was well underage-- apparently will be voting in 2010 (her father is a ruling CCM party member). Irregularities at the Voter Centers -------------- ¶9. (C) Whereas the constitutionality of the Zanzibar i.d. might be challenged, and its universality is far from being ubiquitous, ZEC is insisting on its usage with the utmost vigor. For example, ZEC has been denying even those who have applied and were accepted for an i.d. but were waiting for issuance of a card (the receipt for which has the same bar code that would appear on the card and can be scanned by any authority, including by ZEC at the voter registration centers). Norwegian government-sponsored observers whom we met in the field estimate that at least two thousand new voters were turned away during registration in Konde. ZEC admits to registering fewer than 400 new voters (although ZEC's numbers have changed with each official communique, another point of contention). ¶10. (C) Also new this time around is the time given to register. In 2005 ZEC allowed 27 days for voters to register in each constituency. Currently, in each constituency the time allotted for new voters is only two days (followed by two days for i.d. renewals and one day for lost cards-- assuming all have Zanzibar i.d.s, of course). When questioned why the largest and most controversial part of registration should be front loaded into a short period of time, ZEC officials say that now was only a first screening and they will return again. However, others point out that ZEC had earlier said it was going to make three passes around the constituencies but because of the recent by-elections and funding issues there was only time now for two passes. Many Pembans are skeptical that there will even be a second pass. Indeed, in an earlier conversation with ZEC Director Salim Kassim Ali on the delays in registration, Kassim Ali huffed that ZEC was not obligated by electoral law to any number of screenings or even to how many days it had to act. These same arguments could be DAR ES SAL 00000486 004.2 OF 007 deployed should ZEC/CCM decide they had enough voters to suit their needs without a second round of voter identification. ¶11. (C) At the registration centers themselves, ZAO and ZAS saw several individuals at each location who had ZEC-issued observer badges that were marked with no name (just "CCM" written in by hand),that had only a photograph taped (not laminated) on the card, or that were entirely blank. These individuals with such "bootleg" badges could pass freely in and out of the voter registration areas at will. ¶12. (C) Many registration centers were lacking so-called "2kk forms." These forms, required by law, are to officially inform unqualified applicants the grounds for which they were refused. What seemed to be happening was that in the first instance would-be applicants were turned away by security forces if they came near the registration center without a Zanzibar i.d. In other instances, an individual without an i.d. would go into the center, have his name written down by a ZEC or CCM official, but then he or she would be sent away without being interviewed. For that reason, it is hard to determine the exact number of people actually refused registration. Also, without a 2kk form, it would be impossible for an individual (or a political party) to make a formal challenge since a turned-away applicant without a refusal form officially never applied so was never officially refused. To what purpose the lists of people unofficially turned away will be used by ZEC or CCM also is unclear. Local observer Haji Mohammed Haji (strictly protect) of the International Law and Policy Group NGO told us that in the first two days of registration in Konde, he counted 1414 refused and 357 accepted, but only seven 2kk forms were issued. ¶13. (SBU) Following the Magogoni by-elections during which some European observers were criticized for "interfering with the voting process," ZEC instituted a controversial "five- minute rule" for observers (ref. C). At some locations in Pemba, ZEC officials actually used stop watches to time observers' presence inside a center, regardless whether there were any voters present or not. At the instant five minutes had elapsed, a ZEC official would cut off any conversation and shoo the observer away. We also experienced a few instances wherein the ZEC official of a given center would first quiz observers including ZAO and ZAS) about whom they intended to speak to and, in one case, what questions would be asked. In another center ZAS was asked to leave the center for "arguing with the staff" when he had just approached a group of local observers with a customary Swahili greeting. Intimidation -------------- ¶14. (C) Such has been the violence around Micheweni in the recent past, intimidation and rebellion can take subtle norms. The first ever death in multi-party Zanzibar occurred in 1995 in Micheweni when a youth put up a CUF flag (then a novelty) in the square by Micheweni's main mosque. Security forces and CCM thugs chased him down and shot him at his door step. Currently a large CCM banner hangs on the spot. In the aftermath of the 2000 elections, in January 2001 several hundred protesters, including women and children, marched up the main highway toward the Micheweni District Office. Told to halt, they were eventually fired on by troops, killing 27 by official count. Others claim there were significantly more casualties. CUF supporters say several hundred died, including those who succumbed to their wounds and those who were hunted down in the days that followed, including some who DAR ES SAL 00000486 005.2 OF 007 drowned in an overloaded dhow while trying to escape to the mainland. Allegations are that the boat was deliberately capsized by the prop wash of a pursuing helicopter. (ZAO obtained a gruesome home movie of the "District Office Massacre" and will forward dvds to INR, DRL and AF/E.) On the same notorious spot where the District Office shooting incident took place eight years ago, the special riot squad chose to set up its base during the present registration period. As recently as 2005, in the small Pemba town of Piki and in the larger, mostly mixed race Arab areas of Wete and ChakeChake (and even in the center of Stonetown on the mainland) rapes and house invasions occurred, perpetrated by "janjaweed," the local name for Zanzibari security forces and party thugs. Since then, around some of those places in selected shops (especially the ones looted) there hang pictures of Omani ruler Sultan Qaboos instead of Karume. Meanwhile, several youths, including one whose sister was raped by security forces in the street in front of his house, complained to us that in the last few days some police have been saying "don't make trouble-- remember 2005." ¶15. (C) At all the centers we visited we saw plenty of uniformed and armed individuals in plain clothes. Norwegian observers told us that in the first two days at Konde, when hundreds of applicants began swarming registration centers, police moved in with loud speakers saying that any of those without i.d.s who stayed around the center would be arrested. ¶16. (C) At two of the centers we visited, blank-badged men went to every individual with whom we spoke and asked for their i.d. and questioned them about our conversation. Even ZAO and ZAS were harassed by such men at one place (Finya). Evidently, communication about this spread, and, by the end of the day, it was difficult to get people to speak to us around the registration centers. ¶17. (C) As we had seen in Magogoni, one CCM/security force tactic is to set-up a possible security-related incident and use it as a springboard to launch aggressive security operations (ref. D). In Magogoni there was an exaggerated, perhaps staged, incident involving a local official and CUF youths that turned into justification for machete attacks on a number of CUF activists. In Kinyasini and Mgogoni on Pemba, an alleged fire at a local sheha's farm was used to justify heavy patrolling by forces through people's yards and trampling over their farm plots, especially in the pre-dawn hours. One elderly man told us he felt like he was living in "a war zone" because of the armed presence. ¶18. (C) The manipulation of children in the election process (see para. 7 above) is another kind of intimidation. Because in Zanzibar there is no civil service, school administrators and even teachers also can be political appointees. Those students we saw at the i.d. center and at some ZEC voters' centers (in Pemba as well as during reftel Magogoni by- elections in Unguja) were presumably recruited and organized by the very same people who also would proctor exams and offer placement in college, training courses and the like, post- graduation. Perhaps as an indication of how important the i.d. card business is to the ruling CCM government, the only fully- geared riot team we saw was stationed not near any active registration center but near the Micheweni District Office where last minute i.d.s were being issued to school kids. The SWAT team had its red flag flying (a show of warning to passers-by that it was engaged in a "high risk situation") and was checking every person in the area. (COMMENT: In the height of cynicism, they were operating not a hundred meters, and within eyesight, of a quarry operation notorious for DAR ES SAL 00000486 006.2 OF 007 using child labor, where at that moment kids as young-looking as eight or ten were making gravel with little hammers. END COMMENT) ¶19. (SBU) Finally, the CCM government has not been above using disinformation in the state-controlled press. For example, on July 14 the state-run paper "Zanzibar Leo" ran a front page story allegedly quoting in a headline CUF House of representatives leader Konde Suleiman Hamed Hamis stating his satisfaction with how well the registration was going. ZAS later spoke with Hamis, and he said he sent a three page letter to the paper demanding a retraction, but none was forthcoming. The same paper ran a July 8 editorial complaining that the opposition was trying to "use the constitution to distort reality." COMMENT AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS ¶20. (C) It seems evident to us that the ruling CCM Party is bent on fixing another electoral win using its absolute majority in Parliament, the machinery of bureaucracy, questionable voter practices and outright intimidation. Exemplifying the winner-take-all mentality that continues to fuel the impasse, CCM controls all aspects of the electoral process. For example, the ZEC board of Commissioners is made up of the ZEC secretariat and "equal representation of the parties." However, since ZEC officials are all appointed by the CCM-controlled government, the sole opposition party, CUF, is routinely outvoted two-to-one on all ZEC procedural questions. At the same time, CCM's absolute majority in Zanzibar's House of Representatives is used to not only control ZEC itself but, since the constitution gives the House of Representatives power over deciding electoral laws, CCM can unilaterally impose changes to the rules of the game, like introducing the new i.d. requirement. CUF Speaker Hamis Hamadi said in all the years he has served in Parliament, since the beginning of multi-partyism in 1995, CUF had never been permitted by the House Speaker to table any motions from the floor. ¶21. (C) On the ground, it seems that CCM intends to win in 2010 by breaking apart CUF's voter stronghold in Pemba.CCM intends to do this by denying thousands of Tanzanians living on that island not only their right to vote but their rights of "citizenship" in the archipelago writ large. Denying an i.d. card is not just denying the right to vote, it also can be used to deny employment, land transference, driving privileges ,etc. Should there ever be mass round-ups like in the past, not having an i.d. could be prima facie grounds for arrest or even for expulsion from the archipelago. ¶22. (C) In terms of local reaction to these new pressures,we are hearing different things. Some say that if anyone tried to go after their women or invade their home, they would fight (COMMENT: But whispers of so-called CUF "Blue Guard" training camps on Pemba are not credible. The island is too small and populated and too full of government security personnel for such things to be clandestine, whereas training camps of CCM/Zanzibar's "janjaweed" ARE readily visible in Zanzibar, and irregular forces can be seen sharing army trucks with TPDF. END COMMENT) For as many Pembans that say they will fight, others say they will leave to mainland Tanzania, Kenya or even the UK or Oman before elections begin. Some older people say that Pemba should secede from Zanzibar and come under protection of the Union, like Mafia Island which has a similar culture and history as Zanzibar, but which makes no pretense of "nationhood" and is merely another province of Tanzania. One old man even wistfully recalled the days of the DAR ES SAL 00000486 007.2 OF 007 UK Protectorate and hoped for a similar "Tanzanian Protectorate" to "save Pemba from Zanzibar." One thing virtually all Pembans share, though, is complete pessimism that anything other than fraud, followed by repression, will come from the 2010 vote. ¶23. (U) There appears to be no move toward reconciliation between CUF and ruling CCM. If anything, positions are hardening. Like during the recent by-election in Magogoni, in Zanzibar voter registration is tantamount to the vote itself. Therefore, events are moving quickly, and the 2010 elections may be all but sewn up by December of 2009, before most international observers arrive to watch a UN-supported confirmatory election of select people chosen by the ruling party. In the meantime, the U.S. and observers from Norway are in the field now and will continue to closely monitor events. Soon we hope to fund and field a larger observation presence. We also continue to call for reconciliation and power-sharing between the parties. ¶24. (C) At some point soon the USG, possibly in concert with other major donors, should publicly warn the Zanzibar government of the consequences in terms of development funding should they opt for a violent and rigged election. We will also need to determine a policy in advance as to the implications under our aid legislation (particularly MCC). The Union Government (Tanzanian mainland, i.e. 97 percent of the population) has little authority over how the government of largely autonomous Zanzibar conducts their election. In the event that mainland elections organized under the National Election Commission are deemed free and fair (as previous mainland contests have been) and Zanzibar elections organized under the completely separate Zanzibar Election Commission are deemed flawed (as all such have been in the past) are USG assistance programs for all of Tanzania threatened, or only those in Zanzibar? Our $698 million MCC compact with Tanzania is the largest in the world. At $63 million USD, a proposed power cable connecting Zanzibar's main island of Unguja to the mainland is among the biggest U.S. funded infrastructure projects in Tanzania. ANDRE