ZANZIBAR PARTY VIEWS GOING INTO MAGOGONI

C O N F I D E N T I A L DAR ES SALAAM 000238 AF/E:JLIDDLE, INR/RAA:FEHRENREICH; NSC FOR MGAVIN E.O. 12958: DECL: OADR TAGS: KDEM PGOV SOCI TZ SUBJECT: ZANZIBAR PARTY VIEWS GOING INTO MAGOGONI BY-ELECTION REF: (A) DAR ES SALAAM 237 (B) DAR ES SALAAM 75 (C) DAR ES SALAAM 54 (D) 08 DAR ES SALAAM 844 (E) 08 DAR ES SALAAM 444 Classified By: CDA Larry Andre for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY AND BACKGROUND: With the voter registration completed in the Zanzibari suburban district of Magogoni (ref A),the actual vote to fill a local legislative seat will occur May 23, 2009. However, for ruling party CCM and opposition CUF, the winner-take-all nature of local politics -- and the rigid neighborhood-level vote-counting that each party conducts -- means that, for them, registration of voters (which, for the parties, means recognizing who from each of the card-carrying factions will get to cast a ballot) is tantamount to the vote itself. Both parties are already claiming that the by-election is a litmus test for 2010: CUF is saying that the exercise shows an institutionalized inability of the Government of Zanzibar to run a free and fair election. In CUF's view, only an election run completely by the international community could be trusted on Zanzibar. CCM says the event shows a transparent, free and fair system that confirms CCM's popularity as well as reveals opposition party perfidy. From our perspective, the machinery of voter registration appears to be in order, however the continued cynicism of the parties and their inability to work with one another remains the main issue of concern. END SUMMARY AND BACKGROUND. CUF VIEWS -------------- ¶2. (C) CUF seems resigned to not winning the Magogoni House of Representatives seat that had been vacated due to the untimely death of its CCM incumbent. CUF shadow FM and party strategist Issa Jussa told visiting Washington analysts that the violence perpetrated against its field organizers (ref A) showed that CCM would go to any lengths to prevent a CUF win. Jussa also claimed that ZEC reported up the same chain of command ("Minister of Regional Administration and SMZ Units" Suleiman Nyanga) as did Tanzanian Intelligence Service (TIS) assets seconded to the Zanzibar Government. Jussa claimed that the long delays in implementing the registration process was because the security services were having a hard time duplicating the "ghost" voter rosters of the pre-automated 2000 and 2005 elections. Jussa hypothesized that an accurate, current voter list should be at least 20% more than any previous list, given the near universal participation of Zanzibaris in electoral politics and given the rising demographic of voters (currently more than half of all Zanzibaris are under 30.). However, Jussa also predicted that the CCM/TIS/ZEC produced lists would probably be smaller than the actual numbers of voters. He thought that the strategy for CCM -- especially in CUF stronghold Pemba-- would be to disenfranchise as many eligible voters as it could. The primary tactics to limit voters would be on insisting on the Zanzibar-issued i.d. cards, reliance on previously-issued voters cards (many handed out fraudulently during the last election to mainlanders, he claimed) and, finally, intimidation of legitimate voters sympathetic to CUF. ¶3. (C) Jussa,s biggest objection concerned the exclusive use of Zanzibar-issued i.d. cards, and rejecting the use of passports and birth certificates for voter i.d. purposes. He said that many people in rural areas, particularly on Pemba, had never bothered to get Zanzibar i.d. cards. The cards themselves only entered into force in mid-2006, and even now their utility was mainly for people seeking government services or benefits. Jussa said that those who did not own or lease land, who registered no cars, who had no phones or electricity also would be unlikely to pay to go into town to get a plastic card. Such people were common in the countryside and such people were more often than not CUF supporters, he said. Moreover, citizens could note get an id. card even if they wanted one, Jussa asserted, unless approved by a Sheha (the lowest level of administration official),which was problematic in CUF areas overseen by a CCM-appointed Sheha. Moreover, the man in charge of issuing Zanzibar i.d.s, Mohammed Yuma Mohammed, was a senior intelligence officer, Jussa asserted. That notwithstanding, Jussa insisted that rural people would pay to go into town to vote. That was a right Zanzibaris would insist on. Jussa claimed that CCM's insistence on Zanzibar-issued id. cards would disenfranchise as many as 15,000 voters. ¶4. (U) Press reports that Zanzibar CUF SYG Seif Hammadi is also complaining that CCM can expedite or delay i.d. issuance at will. Following the Magogoni exercise, Hammadi is advocating that ZEC allow people to register with papers showing that their i.d. application is still in process. CUF is also demanding that ZEC produce voter rolls for 2005 so the public can compare it with the new list being produced now. CUF expects to see a much different roster because CCM couldn't find and duplicate all the fraudulent voters between last time and now. However, on March 17 a local court ruled the request "irrelevant," and ZEC is not compelled to re-issue the list nor does it intend to. Specific complaints filed for the Magogoni registration concern events at one particular registration center where allegedly 30 Coast Guard personnel registered, even though Magogoni has no Coast Guard facility and is not even on the sea. CUF also is complaining that children under 18 have been registered in Magogoni after obtaining residence i.d.s. ¶5. (SBU) Looking ahead, Jussa said that CUF has been working with European Political NGO "Freedom Now Foundation (FNF)" which was funded by the European Parliamentary group "Liberal International." With FNF coaching and funding, CUF has completed a "Strategic Action Plan." FNF has been funding several CUF party activities and has held several workshops on how CUF might better organize itself for the election. Jussa said that one page from CCM's playbook that CUF has found useful is to assign one party member for every 20 houses in a given neighborhood (In Zanzibar the CCM standard is to have one party "watcher" per 10 households. However, Jussa admitted that CUF did not have the manpower to field that level of coverage). ¶6. (U) The main CUF talking point remains that ZEC and the CCM-led government of Zanzibar were incapable of holding free and fair elections. In particular, the system of ZEC's Executive Committee of three CCM members, consisting of three CUF members, three CCM members and three ZEC members was structurally flawed because all the ZEC members were CCM appointees. CUF complains that in practice it does not have a voice in the Committee. In CUF's view, the only way to avoid trouble for 2010 would be if the international community were to take the process over before 2010. In the meantime, CUF says it "plays along with the charade" and will announce its candidate for the Magagoni seat by May 3. CCM VIEWS -------------- ¶7. (U) During the run-up to registration, CCM politicians filled state-controlled media with hoary exhortations for ZEC to keep a watch on any would-be lawbreakers. Leaders expressed concern about intimidation and vandalism to CCM property, which it accused CUF of doing in past elections. CCM also claims that during the by-election registration, an individual attempted to torch a CCM office in the Magogoni neighborhood of Mwendepole. In regard to the machete attacks against CUF organizers (ref A),police are saying they are a criminal, not political matter. The CCM spin is that CUF was the violent party, not CCM. It was CUF that tried to block legitimate voters (citing the case of the teenage girl, ref A),is corrupt (see septel on breaking CUF financial scandal) and "undemocratic." In terms of the latter, CCMers say by trying to micro-manage voter registration, CUF is attempting to presage results before actual voting begins. ¶8. (U) For its part, CCM has already moved beyond registration, calling it a "success." CCM is already gaming on who it wants to win, with the various CCM factions vying to put its candidate into the empty seat (ref 844). At least ten local CCM politicians announced their intention to run for the vacant Magogoni seat. The Zanzibar CCM Executive Committee debated candidacies March 30 and made a recommendation to the Zanzibar CCM Supreme Council April 4. The Supreme Council will submit a shortlist of names to the National Executive Council, which in turn will winnow the list further before sending its choice(s) to the National Central Committee April 20, which would then agree on the candidate. In other words, even for a local Zanzibar government seat, one of 89, the mainland's political leadership will decide the outcome. At the Tanzania national level, Zanzibari membership is never more than one-third of CCM's National Executive Committee (Zanzibaris account for only three percent of Tanzania,s population). NEXT STEPS -------------- ¶9. (U) According to ZEC, candidates for the open Magogoni seat should be nominated by the parties by May 3. There would be a one-day buffer to allow for challenges on the legality of declared candidacies, and the campaign season would start May 5, lasting 17 days. Voting would be held on a single day, May 23. COMMENT -------------- 10 (C) For the present election period, CUF seems to have done a 180-degree turn on its previously held voter identification views. In 2000 and 2005 CUF complained that the issuance of passports and birth certificates were a CCM- and Union- controlled enterprise and that whereas such documents might be proof of identity, they were not proof of residence. CUF alleged that CCM used those documents to stuff the voter rolls with mainlanders. CUF has switched its argument, now saying that the Zanzibari-specific i.d.'s were a ploy to limit CUF voters. ¶11. (C) As related in ref A, CUF claims of TIS meddling in Zanzibari elections might not be so far-fetched. However, CUF varies its claims that the node between TIS and the CCM-controlled Zanzibari government is either "Minister of Regional Administration and SMZ Units" Suleiman Nyanga or "Minister of State in the Chief Minister's Office" Ali Juma Shamhuna. It could be that both claims are true. ZAO has met with both individuals and with staff from both offices. It could be that Nyanga's role is more operational and Shamhuna's is more strategic and political. Moreover, given each other's background and proximity to Zanzibar President Karume, it also could be that Nyanga's is more of a CCM party function, while Shamhuna's is to protect the President himself. Indeed, during former President Sulmein Amour's presidency and before, there was a position called "Minister of State in the President's Office and Office of the Chairman of the Revolutionary Council." Under Karume, that slot has been left vacant, Karume choosing to delegate the daily running of Zanzibar's government to "Chief Minister" Shamsi Vuai Nahodha, perhaps one of Karume's most trusted lieutenants. Under the current set-up, Shamhuna reports to Nahoda, thus insulating the President from some of the nastiness of partisan politics. ¶12. (C) Another interesting thing to observe during this by-election is more glimpses of internal Zanzibar-CCM factionalism. As explained in ref D, the CCM machine is by no means monolithic. There are major divisions, political enemies and an internal dynamic within CCM that is hard to follow for outside observers. Yet, there are moments when the fissures become visible. Now is one of those times, as CCMers jockey for power for when Karume vacates the throne in 2010. Currently each faction appears to be testing its muscle in the Central Committee to see if it can get a candidate into office. One early casualty has been former President Sulmien Amour's son, an erstwhile member of CCM strongman Bilal's camp (Bilal was former Chief Minister under Amour). Amour fils was most likely set up for failure by Bilal's people themselves to get rid of him well before 2010, lest he become an embarrassment. Amour fils is seen by the general public as a ne'er-do-well, street bully, possible criminal and a drug addict. The idea is that if someone can't seem to get elected in a CCM-controlled place like Magogoni, a district with less that 5,000 voters, then he might not be a viable member of the party inner circle, namesake or no namesake. ANDRE