ZANZIBAR: OPPOSITION CUF THINKING IN A POST-RECONCILIATION

UNCLAS DAR ES SALAAM 000123 SENSITIVE SIPDIS FOR AF/E JLIDDLE, INR/RAA FEHRENREICH E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: EAID PGOV PREL TZ SUBJECT: ZANZIBAR: OPPOSITION CUF THINKING IN A POST-RECONCILIATION WORLD REFS: (A) Dar es Salaam 75 (B) Dar es Salaam 09 and previous ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Once supportive of President Kikwete because of his stated desire for reconciliation, opposition party Civic United Front (CUF) is now disappointed that he failed to fulfill his commitment to Zanzibar. CUF has concluded that the upcoming 2010 elections in Zanzibar will not be different from the previous, failed ones. CUF Foreign Affairs Advisor Ismail Jusa[f1] claimed he and Zanzibar SYG Seif Hamad are the only moderates left in a party that is growing frustrated with ruling party CCM perceived duplicity. Jusa said he was sympathetic to solving the ongoing CUF and CCM stalemate in the near term through some kind of power sharing deal. The trick to make that happen was to create some kind of mechanism to make government officials assume a neutral role. For now, CUF focus will be on the upcoming by-election in Magogoni, expected in May. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (U) In early February, the Zanzibar Affairs Office and Washington analysts met with Ismail Jusa, CUF Foreign Affairs Advisor at the USG Zanzibar residence "Pettersen House." Jusa, a U.S. International Visitor Program alumnus, began by saying that at the outset of the current national administration, "CUF had great confidence in Kikwete, especially when he admitted polarization on Zanzibar and promised that he would work towards finding the solution." (COMMENT: President Kikwete promised to resolve the CUF-CCM conflict when he delivered his maiden speech at the Union Parliament in December 2005. END COMMENT). ¶3. (SBU) Jusa said that recently Kikwete has changed his tune. Jusa cited speeches Kikwete made in January 2009 while on Pemba -- not just on Revolution Day when he gave short shrift to the subject of reconciliation -- but especially during CCM rallies around the island in the days afterward. In speeches at those rallies, Jusa claimed that Kikwete deliberately used inflammatory rhetoric that "recalled the hardline era." According to Jusa, when Kikwete said lines like "the revolution must be upheld," he was echoing the battle cry of those revolutionaries who carried out violent punitive actions on Pemba like rape and murder in retaliation for the Pemban Party's support of the first Independent Sultanate government of Zanzibar. When Kikwete said lines like "I can't even imagine a CUF government in 2010 - nor in 2015 for that matter," he was echoing President Karume's first international press conference in 1964, well known to Zanzibaris, when he called for a "50-year Revolution." ¶4. (SBU) Jusa expressed disappointment that Kikwete had failed to fulfill his commitment to Zanzibar. He concluded that the upcoming 2010 elections in Zanzibar would not be different from the previous ones (i.e. violent, oppressive and not credible). Jusa claimed that the present delay in voter registration (septel) was because CCM couldn't duplicate the numbers it had invented in 2005, so it was having a hard time getting started. The population was more numerous across the whole archipelago, so it would embarrass CCM if it couldn't even muster the same numbers it fudged five years earlier. ¶5. (SBU) Commenting on reconciliation between CCM and CUF, Jusa admitted there were hardliners within CUF who wanted to take a radical approach in dealing with CCM. Jusa said the "only real moderates" left in CUF were himself and SYG Seif Hamad. With a series of lost elections behind them-and failure of the Muafaka (reconciliation) talks, twice - he said the two of them were on the last shreds of credibility. "There are different people in CUF who have different views on the directions that CUF should take," he said. Jusa mentioned Juma Duni, the CUF Deputy Secretary General, as non-compromising and one who would have CUF take a more radical approach. He said one ascendant view within CUF was to opt out of the political system altogether since it was "illegitimate." Another, majority view, was that CCM was irredeemable. Therefore, CUF's interlocutor should not be the government but the international community instead. There needed to be an international commission of some sort that would guarantee a CUF victory after a free and fair election. After attaining power, CUF would "clean house." ¶6. (SBU) Jusa said he supported the views of Ambassador Green in his valedictory speech of early January (ref B). Jusa said he was sympathetic to the idea of solving the ongoing CUF and CCM stalemate in the near term through some kind of power sharing deal. The trick to make that happen was to create some kind of mechanism to make government forces assume a neutral role. Without that as a starting point, CCM couldn't be trusted to uphold its end of the bargain. ¶7. (SBU) On the Union, Jusa said a "three-government-system would be the best way to govern Tanzania" (i.e. a Government of Tanganyika, of Zanzibar, and a Union Government of Tanzania to deal with shared interests). He said the status quo was that "Tanganyika" also claimed to be Tanzania. He pointed fingers at mainlanders whom he said "were working towards dividing Zanzibar to be able to get away with everything they want." ¶8. (SBU) For now, CUF focus will be on the upcoming by-election in Magogoni, expected in May. Jusa doubted it would be free and fair. He said "there were rumors about planting illegal voters to be brought from mainland Tanzania and the nearby areas." To build up the confidence of the electorate, he wanted the U.S. government to play a leading role in managing the Magogoni bi-election and beyond. He rejected the idea that the Zanzibar Electoral Commission was impartial. COMMENT: ¶9. (SBU) Jusa, like most Zanzibari political observers, takes U.S. participation in an international election observer mission as a given. We have served that role - and more-in 2000 and 2005. We continue to have expectations that we will have a sufficient budget for a 2010 [f2]observation effort. In the meantime, we will continue to encourage CUF to work within the system and to keep trying to engage with CCM. Andre [f1]Isn't he Ismail Jussa? [f2]Suggest clearing with USAID, since I think it would ordinarily be their funds.