SYRIAN FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN SEES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 000088

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA, NEA/IPA
NSC FOR SHAPIRO
LONDON FOR TSOU, PARIS FOR WALLER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/26/2018
TAGS: PGOV KPAL PTER SY IS LE
SUBJECT: SYRIAN FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN SEES
NO CHANCE FOR PEACE WITH ISRAEL WITHOUT U.S. INVOLVEMENT

Classified By: CDA Maura Connelly, American Embassy Damascus, Reasons 1
.4 b and d.


1. (C) Summary: Suleyman Hadad, Chairman of the Syrian
People's Assembly Foreign Affairs Committee, told us January
26 that Syrians were eager to restore good relations with the
U.S. Suleyman rolled out familiar Ba'ath Party talking points
on Israel's "rejection of peace" and the need for armed
resistance. But he also went beyond standard propaganda in
his analysis on Syria's complicated relations with Iran,
Hizballah, and Hamas. Hadad pressed for the return of an
American ambassador to Damascus and urged the Embassy to be
active in cultivating ties. He confided the SARG wanted to
help the embassy resume normal operations and predicted we
would be seeing positive signs soon. End Summary.


2. (C) In a January 26 courtesy call on Hadad, Charge and
Pol/Econ Chief visited the Syrian People's Assembly for the
first time in their tours here. Charge had met Hadad at a UK
Embassy reception three weeks earlier, and at Hadad's
invitation, we submitted a dipnote to the MFA requesting an
appointment last week. MFA Protocol notified us January 25
that the appointment had been approved. After 20 minutes of
pleasantries, Hadad willingly engaged in a frank exchange on
the Gaza crisis, U.S.-Syrian relations, returning to the
Golan track, Iran, and Hamas.

--------------
Syria Ready for U.S. Engagement
--------------


3. (C) Hadad, a former diplomat who served as Syria's
Ambassador to Germany and then as Vice Minister of Foreign
Affairs before retiring in 2003, greeted us enthusiastically.
He said he had met the previous day with FM Moullim, who had
expressed support for the Charge's call on the Syrian
parliament. Hadad stressed that Syrians liked Americans in
general; the past eight years represented an anomaly due to
the previous administration's "misguided" policies. Hadad
reported he had heard President Obama's inauguration address
and believed the U.S. was now "on the right track." Obama
had sent important, positive signals to the Arab world in his
January 25 al-Arabiya interview. Hadad referenced President
Asad's positive remarks aired the same day announcing Syria's
desire to engage the U.S. (Comment: Bashar's language was
slightly more confrontational about the possibility of
peace.) Damascus was keen to re-establish better relations
with the U.S., Hadad emphasized, because we have common
interests in cooperating. Syria looked forward to having an
American ambassador return to Damascus, he added.


4. (C) Charge replied no decision had been made on returning
an ambassador but the matter was under review. She noted we
had reported Bashar's contention that "Peace without Syria
would be impossible." Hadad said President Asad had spoken
the truth. He maintained Syria had expressed its interest in
peace with Israel for decades, while Israel had ignored at
least a dozen UN Security Council resolutions and continued
to occupy Arab land. Israel's military operations in Gaza
were only the most recent example of Israel's disregard for
human life in the name of national defense. "Over a thousand
Palestinians, mostly civilians died in Gaza. How many
Israelis died as a result of Hamas rocket attacks?" Hadad
asked, saying that the rocket attacks were Hamas's expression
of dissatisfaction with Israeli "strangulation" of the Gaza
population.

--------------
Syrian Relations with Hamas
--------------


5. (C) Responding to Charge's questions about Syria's
relationship with Hamas, Hadad said Syria had tried to
convince Hamas to exercise restraint, but that Israel's Gaza
operation had left Hamas leaders with little choice. Hadad
charged that Israel's indiscriminate killing of women and
children had only emboldened extremists. Charge countered
that Hamas bore some of the responsibility for hiding in
civilian buildings and using human shields. Hadad responded
that continuing occupation of Arab territory and reliance on
military intimidation of the Palestinians was driving

DAMASCUS 00000088 002 OF 002


populations to embrace extremism.


6. (C) Hadad reported that Syrian security services had made
several arrests of al-Qaida affiliated individuals in Syria
trying to go to Gaza. By comparison to al-Qaida elements who
were establishing a foothold in Gaza, Hamas represented a
reasonable and democratically-elected voice. Hamas leader
Khaled Misha'al had implicitly recognized Israel by
proclaiming Hamas's acceptance of a Palestinian state within
1967 borders. Syria had worked in the past on Hamas to take
positive steps in reconciling with the Palestinian Authority.
But the situation was complicated by deep divisions within
the Arab world, part of which supported America's position
and part of which opposed America's strong alliance with
Israel. President Asad had been consistent in his support for
Hamas's right to conduct armed resistance against Israel's
illegal occupation. But Syria was open to the idea of
reconciliation with Saudi Arabia after Saudi King Abdullah's
positive gestures at the Arab Economic Forum in Kuwait.
Bashar might visit Saudi Arabia if the Saudi King formalized
his invitation. Egypt, he said, "would be more difficult"
because of Gaza.


7. (C) Hadad argued the roots of the problem in Gaza and
the occupied Palestinian territories came back to Israel's
unwillingness to adhere to existing UNSC resolutions. If
Hamas were to recognize Israel, Israel would still refuse to
accept 1967 borders and Jerusalem as the capital of a
Palestinian state, which would collapse any chances for
peace. The U.S. should play a role in promoting the 2002 Arab
League initiative. Convincing Israel to accept the 1967
borders and share Jerusalem would be impossible without U.S.
influence. Other issues, such as the right of return, might
become more manageable if Israel accepted these two pillars.
Israel had nothing to fear from the Arab world or
Palestinians if it were willing to accept the general
framework of the Arab League Peace initiative, Hadad
insisted. The alternative was more violence, an apartheid
state, and/or attempting to wipe out millions of
Palestinians.

--------------
Iran-Hizballah
--------------


8. (C) Charge suggested that Israelis were not necessarily
afraid of Arab countries as much as they were of Iran. Hadad
responded that peace was important for the region. Syria was
a poor country because it necessarily spent some 40 percent
of its annual budget on defense against Israel. It had no
choice but to ally with Iran. A comprehensive regional peace
would remove Syria's need for a strategic defense
relationship with Tehran, Hadad contended. Moreover,
Hizballah would eventually become a purely political entity
if peace were achieved.


9. (C) Asked why Hizballah had refrained from opening a
second front against Israel during the Gaza crisis, Hadad
responded that Syria had urged restraint. Syria assessed
that Hizballah action would be unnecessary unless Israel went
too far in Gaza. Opening a second front in southern Lebanon
also risked inflaming Lebanon itself. Did Iran agree with
this reasoning? queried Charge. Hadad replied Syria told
Iran it did not want to escalate the situation because doing
so would have risked sparking a regional war that would have
served no one's interests. Iran and Israel were not historic
enemies, he suggested. But Israel's undeniable flouting of
international norms had made it an enemy of everyone in the
region. Eventually a regional war would come unless the U.S.
engaged the region and used its influence to change Israeli
behavior, Hadad argued


10. (C) Comment: Hadad's willingness to receive us is one
indicator of the SARG's cautious optimism about the prospect
of better relations with the U.S. His hard-headed malign of
Israeli policies as the core cause of all regional problems
represents a institutionalized mindset that we will encounter
when and if we do engage seriously. Hadad's somewhat
rehearsed doctrinaire responses to tough questions was offset
by his warm and welcoming manner.
CONNELLY