DAMASCUS MORE SINNED AGAINST THAN SINNING IN SPAT

S E C R E T DAMASCUS 000647 NOFORN SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA, NEA/I, IO NSC FOR SHAPIRO/TALWAR/PHEE/MCDERMOTT PARIS FOR NOBLES LONDON FOR LORD E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/02/2019 TAGS: PREL PTER UNGA IZ SY SUBJECT: DAMASCUS MORE SINNED AGAINST THAN SINNING IN SPAT WITH BAGHDAD, MIQDAD MAINTAINS REF: A. BAGHDAD 2363 ¶B. DAMASCUS 627 Classified By: CDA Charles Hunter per 1.5 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Syria remains ready to take appropriate action once presented with "concrete evidence" from Baghdad that individuals resident in Syria were behind the recent bombings of the Iraqi Foreign and Finance Ministries, Vice Foreign Minister Faisal Miqdad told diplomats September 2. Repeatedly stressing that destabilizing Iraq would contradict Syria,s commitment to its neighbor's unity, security and territorial integrity and the duty to support over one million Iraqi refugees on Syrian soil, Miqdad touted the SARG's restrained reaction to Iraqi accusations and opined that "internal factors" were likely driving intemperate statements by PM al-Maliki and his spokesman (although a role by "foreign interests" wanting to damage Syrian-Iraqi relations "could not be ruled out"). Visits in recent days by the foreign ministers of Iran and Turkey had confirmed Iraq's insistence on baseless accusations, he said, but not really mooted any new prospects for reconciliation or provided data relevant to the specific incident under discussion. ¶2. (C) Summary continued: Miqdad's remarks were temperate, eschewing the charges of "immoral" accusations that President al-Asad had leveled only two days before. While there may be greater willingness to let the past week's media duels subside, however, the briefing showed the SARG's irritation with Baghdad's handling of "Bloody Wednesday" has not been salved. Nor has there been any lessening of the SARG's stubborn insistence that it does not harbor terrorists. Amidst disingenuous calls for former regime elements in Damascus to be incorporated into Iraqi politics, and despite claims of disappointment over lost goodwill, Miqdad held out little hope that bilateral tensions could be eased by anything short of an Iraqi retraction or the presentation of incontrovertible evidence for the SARG to act upon -- the latter a step we may find ourselves compelled to make in time as well. End Summary. ¶3. (SBU) Syrian Vice Foreign Minister Faisal Miqdad convoked diplomats to the ministry's brand-new building in Kafar Sousseh on September 2 for three separate briefings for Arab, American, and European embassies to lay out Syria's version of events since the August 19 bombing of Iraq's Foreign and Finance Ministries. Reading from a prepared text, he walked listeners through a chronology that began with FM Walid Muallem's condolence call to his Iraqi counterpart immediately after hearing of the attack, and ended with the September 1 visit to Damascus of Turkish FM Ahmet Davutoglu. He then took a few questions before drawing the exchange to a close. -------------- -------------- SYRIA SURPRISED AT CONTENT AND VEHEMENCE OF IRAQ ACCUSATIONS -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) The SARG had "not been expecting," according to Miqdad, the allegations that individuals residing in Syria were culprits in a tragedy that claimed so many innocent lives -- including fellow diplomats, he pointedly noted -- so soon after hopes had soared that the Syrian-Iraqi relationship was turning a corner. Syria had welcomed over two million Iraqi refugees at one point, he asserted, and its solidarity with Iraq, to which Syrian "hearts and doors" remained unconditionally open, informed its immediate and firm condemnation of the August 19 attack. A call to FM Muallem from Iraqi spokesman Ali Dabbagh a week after the bombing was when matters veered off course. Demanding that Syria turn over Mohammed Younis Al-Ahmad and Sattam Farhan, Dabbagh also informed Muallem that Iraq would go to the United Nations to request an international tribunal and would withdraw its recently arrived ambassador from Damascus. Neither Dabbagh nor FM Zebari, in Muallem's follow-up call with him, would listen to the Syrian view that such a course of action would be a regrettable mistake, and that Baghdad should send a delegation with proof about which to have a discussion. Zebari had rejoined that Iraq would take its case to the UN and to the media too, and "minutes later" Dabbagh issued a statement that the Syrians took as a political decision to deal a "heavy blow" to the two countries' ties. -------------- "SHOW US THE EVIDENCE" -------------- ¶5. (C) Since then, according to Miqdad, contradictory Iraqi statements had abounded. Some emphasized internal political tensions, with the approach of elections, as the catalyst for the bombings. Others indiscriminately accused neighboring countries, while still others fingered Al-Qaeda (which itself had claimed responsibility). Throughout this period, Syria exercised "self-control," not wanting the situation to escalate. The lack of any tangible evidence to substantiate the allegations proved to Miqdad and his compatriots that the GOI was trying to use these "heinous explosions" simply as an excuse to demand the hand-over of former regime elements (FREs) resident in Syria. Maliki himself had lived in Damascus during Saddam's era, Miqdad observed; then as now Syria had refused to deliver dissidents back to the regime in Baghdad knowing that the door was closed to their political participation. But of course if evidence were produced, the SARG would take action: any FREs shown to be more than simply political opponents of the Maliki government "would not be allowed to stay one second" in Syria. In that case, taking decisive action would be not just Syria's responsibility but its obligation in "helping combat terrorism wherever it occurs." ¶6. (C) Continuing his rhetorical flourishes, Miqdad repeatedly asked "what is Syria,s interest" in standing behind the Baghdad attacks and thereby going against its "principles and traditions?" Syria, after all, had been "the first among Arabs" to open an embassy in the Iraqi capital and exchange ambassadors. It had sent its Prime Minister to visit Iraq, had signed a strategic agreement with Maliki, and had encouraged the proposed trilateral military cooperation to assess border security. But border security was "impossible without cooperation on both sides of the border." Despite all this, Syria would continue to work for the preservation of Iraqi unity, security and territorial integrity and -- though President al-Asad had said this should be regarded as a duty and nothing out of the ordinary -- maintain its support for the million-plus Iraqi refugees within its borders. Syria's self-control was the best proof of its intention to preserve good relations, Miqdad said in conclusion. -------------- NO CLEAR WAY FORWARD -------------- ¶7. (C) After the group had sat in (perhaps stunned) silence for a long moment, Charge ventured a question on whether the consultations in Baghdad and Damascus by Iranian FM Mottaki and Turkish FM Davutoglu had helped identify any further steps to move things beyond the current impasse. Miqdad replied that the two officials brought word that the Iraqis insisted that Al-Ahmed and Farhan be turned over, and that an appeal to the UN Security Council for a tribunal remained a possibility. Apart from confirming those facts, the visits, while welcome, had not clarified a way forward. Miqdad cited as very positive, however, a statement he had seen attributed a short time earlier to Davutoglu recommending against the involvement of any international organizations in solving differences between the parties. Later in the question-and-answer period, Miqdad allowed that he personally viewed internal Iraqi politics as the catalyst for the attack and its aftermath, though a role by "foreign interests" wanting to damage Syrian-Iraqi relations "could not be ruled out." ¶8. (C) The Foreign Ministry later issued a press release through the official SANA agency recapping the main points of Miqdad's briefing. The statement's penultimate sentence, in an apparent reference to the information-sharing reported in ref A, reads "As for claims of Iraqi officials that they provided the evidence available to them through the Turkish Foreign Minister, the Ministry affirmed that the evidence provided is unrelated to the recent bombings, but was rather a subject of discussion between Syria and Iraq in the past." Miqdad may have conveyed this information to Arab ambassadors, whom he had briefed earlier in the day, but he did not discuss it with the group in which Charge was included. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶9. (S/NF) In the first MFA briefing for diplomats since the alleged October 26, 2008 Abu Kemal raid, Miqdad's presentation signaled the SARG's desire to sway international opinion and perhaps reflected lingering concern that Iraqi actions might put Syria on the defensive at the upcoming UN General Assembly. Miqdad's even tone, as he painted his country as the aggrieved party, betrayed no acknowledgment of the irony his audience may have sensed listening to a someone who only days earlier had actively participated in the verbal jousting between Baghdad and Damascus (though never going as far in his word choice as Bashar al-Asad's charge of "immoral" accusations). Syrian officials appear to have taken the decision to exercise greater self-control in their public handling of the rift with Iraq over the Baghdad bombings. The SARG is showing no signs, however, of backing away from the contention that Syria would not knowingly have allowed such a grievous act to be prepared or launched from its territory. ¶10. (S/NF) Miqdad's narrow focus on Iraq's inability to present evidence specifically linking FREs or Syria to the August 19 attacks defines the terms upon which Syria is seeking to have this debate. The Syrian News Agency's terse dismissal of information the Iraqis reportedly provided through the Turks is a strong indicator that Syria seeks to avoid a broader discussion on the SARG's relations with foreign fighters and former regime elements. Though we understand the Turks are working hard to convene an FM-level meeting between Iraqi, Syrian, and Turkish officials in Turkey as a first step, we've also heard Syria might seek to involve the Arab League. Whatever the venue, Miqdad's briefing held out little hope that bilateral tensions could be eased by anything short of an Iraqi retraction or the presentation of incontrovertible evidence upon which the SARG could act. ¶11. (S/NF) As we contemplate our own way forward with Syria on the issue of Iraqi security and foreign fighters, a tough, honest, evidence-based conversation appears inevitable. Keeping the discussions out of the public eye and addressing our concerns with the government's only fully enabled decision-maker (President Bashar al-Asad) offer the most direct and effective way to present sensitive information that contradicts the SARG's public statements and involves the subterranean activities of the Syrian security services. Convincing senior SARG officials that better relations with the U.S. and Iraq offer more benefits for Syria than continuing to harbor foreign fighters, however, will require more than solid evidence of destructive Syrian behavior. It will also necessitate a positive vision that would result from the SARG's willingness to make the right choice, as well as a review of the potential consequences that would follow if Syrian behavior did not change. The present bilateral dispute between Syria and Iraq may in fact offer the best opportunity in years for the U.S. to pose a clear choice to Syrian leaders that they have done everything in their power to avoid. HUNTER