SEIDNAYA PRISON TROUBLES BOIL OVER AGAIN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 000006

SIPDIS

PARIS FOR WALLER, LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/05/2019
TAGS: PGOV PTER PHUM SY
SUBJECT: SEIDNAYA PRISON TROUBLES BOIL OVER AGAIN

REF: A. DAMASCUS 00482

B. DAMASCUS 00517

C. DAMASCUS 00884

Classified By: CDA Maura Connelly for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Muhanad al-Hasani (strictly protect),a human
rights lawyer and president of the Syrian Organization for
Human Rights (SWASIAH) told us of two new violent events at
Seidnaya prison. On December 27 violence between inmates and
Syrian soldiers resulted in approximately 50 deaths, and a
fire -- cause unknown -- broke out inside the prison on
December 31, seriously damaging an interior wall. Al-Hasani
explained that the image of Seidnaya as a repository for
hardened terrorists was largely a SARG fabrication meant to
gull local and Western observers into believing the SARG is a
bulwark against violent, Islamic fundamentalism. END SUMMARY.

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Two New Events
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2. (C) Al-Hasani, a prominent human rights lawyer who counts
many of the Damascus Declaration National Council members
among his client base, reported January 2 that security
contacts inside Seidnaya had claimed prisoners and Syrian
soldiers clashed on the morning of December 27, resulting in
approximately 50 inmate fatalities. A military officer had
allegedly entered a "room" in the prison with a group of
soldiers and threatened to shoot the prisoners gathered
there. Al-Hasani stated he did not know why the threat was
made but according to his source the threat was meant simply
to scare the inmates. The inmates were apparently scared
enough, and took the threat seriously enough, that they
responded by rushing the soldiers. In the ensuing melee,
soldiers fired rounds at the crowd, killing roughly 50
inmates. Al-Hasani did not have any information on military
casualties or the number injured.


3. (C) SWASIAH sources in the area of the prison reported to
al-Hasani that a new fire appeared to have broken out on
December 31, destroying part of a wall of a building inside
the prison. Al-Hasani also observed that the military
presence in and around the prison had increased since the
events of December 6 (ref C),including tanks. How much of
this increase stemmed from the December 27 and 31 incidents
particularly is unknown.

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From the Rumor Mill
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4. (C) Beginning with the riots of July 5 (ref A),human
rights observers and a number of our like-minded diplomatic
colleagues increasingly believe that the numbers of Seidnaya
prisoners killed in clashes with guards and soldiers may be
larger than originally expected. The SARG, however, has kept
all information on the prison under a tight lid. No local
press outlets have covered any Seidnaya incidents since their
initial coverage of the July 5 riots. Al-Hasani reported
that a "big rumor" about security forces shuffling Seidnaya
inmates to other prisons in the country had begun to
circulate. He believed this might be a SARG tactic to
confuse perceptions on actual number of individuals held in
Seidnaya prison. By preventing any unwanted observers from
ascertaining the actual prison population, so the rumor goes,
it would be more difficult to determine the actual number of
fatalities over the six months. Al-Hasani estimated the
current prison population to be between 5,000 and 6,000. As
we reported in the past (ref B),moderate Sunni Sheikh Saleh
Kuftaro (strictly protect) put the number at 4,000.

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Terrorism and SARG Prestidigitation
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5. (C) Throughout the meeting, Al-Hasani was at pains to
correct what he felt were Western misconceptions about
Islamist terrorists in Seidnaya prison. "We can count on two
hands the number of real terrorists in Seidnaya," al-Hasani
said. He argued that in the past, the SARG had made a public
display of arresting low-level Islamists as part of a
sleight-of-hand illusion where "one hand works out of sight
while the other is in view and empty." Trumpeting an
Islamist population in Seidnaya was the SARG's "attempt to
show Syrians and the West that they (SARG) are fighting
Islamic extremism." Yet behind the scenes, the SARG

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"security services and Palestinian groups have a cooperative
agreement to train fighters in Syria and Lebanon." He named
Fatah al-Islam (FAI) leader Abu Khalid al-Amleh and Nayef
Hawatmeh (aka Abu an-Nuf),the General Secretary of the
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP),as
two prominent Palestinian politicians living in Damascus and
cooperating with the SARG security forces to train fighters.
From these training camps, he claimed, the SARG exerts power
over Lebanon. The SARG's paramilitary proxies, he contended,
gave it the same leverage with the GOL as it had before
withdrawing its military from the country in 2005.


6. (C) COMMENT: Ongoing violence inside Seidnaya prison,
coupled with the steady increase in the Syrian military
presence at the prison, begs the question of whether prison
officials have meaningful control over the prison population,
and whether the SARG ever actually re-established control
following the initial July 5, 2008 riots. Many contacts tell
us the SARG's current response is relatively "constrained" in
comparison to the heavy-handed, high fatality crackdown on
prison uprisings in the 1980s. In fact, some sources suggest
that the government's inability to establish control over
Seidnaya has made it appear weak. At the same time, others
argue the SARG wants to avoid focusing international media
and government attention on human rights abuses at a time
when relations with the west are improving. However great an
actual threat the prisoners are at the time of their
incarceration, it is most probable that the experience inside
Seidnaya pushes the prisoners toward ever increasingly
extremist positions, making them more vulnerable to
recruitment by Islamic extremists.


7. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: Rumors of terrorist training camps
in Syria abound, but we have yet to be able to locate and
identify such camps. From our perspective, al-Hasani's claim
that FAI and DFLP fighters trained in Syria provide the SARG
leverage equal to what it enjoyed during its occupation of
Lebanon seems to be an overstatement of dubious credibility.
END COMMENT.
CONNELLY