RENEWAL OF E.O. 13441: SEEKING GUIDANCE ON HOW TO

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 000461 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ELA, PPD TREASURY FOR LEVEY/HAJJAR NSC FOR SHAPIRO AND MCDERMOTT LONDON FOR TSOU PARIS FOR MILLER E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/30/2029 TAGS: PREL ETTC EFIN PTER LE SY SUBJECT: RENEWAL OF E.O. 13441: SEEKING GUIDANCE ON HOW TO EXPLAIN IT REF: JUNE 30 ELA-EMBASSY DAMASCUS EMAIL Classified By: CDA Maura Connelly, Reasons 1.4 b and d. ¶1. (SBU) This is an action request, please see para 9. ¶2. (S) Summary: Washington's anticipated plans to notify Congress of the continuation of Executive Order 13441, which declares a national emergency with respect to the "acts of certain persons to undermine the sovereignty of Lebanon or its democratic processes and institutions" creates a difficult public optic for us in Syria. Coming on the heels of President Asad's public acceptance of the results Lebanon's June 7 elections, which produced a pro-Western March 14 victory, this continuation notice would signal to the Syrian government that the U.S. Administration has failed to recognize Syrian efforts to respect Lebanese sovereignty. It will raise questions from Syrian officials regarding U.S. intentions at a time when we are attempting to convince Damascus to launch a security cooperation initiative on Iraq. Post seeks Department guidance and talking points for use with diplomatic contacts and with local media. End summary. ¶3. (S) Preparations to extend E.O. 13441 may pose a formidable obstacle to advance parallel efforts to re-engage Syria and establish a cooperative security dialogue on Iraq. Just as the May 7 extension of E.O. 13338, which coincided with the second visit of Acting Assistant Secretary Feltman and NSC Senior Director Shapiro, triggered Syrian doubts about U.S. intentions to re-engage on the basis on mutual interests and respect, renewal of E.O. 13441 will be taken by Syrians as U.S. unwillingness to acknowledge improved SARG performance on Lebanon. ¶4. (S) At the time it was adopted, E.O. 13441 froze the assets of a Syrian official (Hafez Makhlouf) and two pro-Syrian Lebanese politicians (Wiam Wahhab and Assad Hardan) who were deeply involved actively blocking Lebanese political institutions from functioning. The E.O. was an effective way to highlight Syria's penetration of the Lebanese political system and to focus international attention on Syria's destructive role at the time. ¶5. (S) Times, however, have changed. The extension of E.O. 13441 will probably be less offensive to Syrian officials for its continued OFAC designation of Makhlouf, Wahhab, and Hardan, than for using these three individuals as a symbol of Syrian perfidy "to undermine Lebanon's legitimate and democratically elected government or democratic institutions, to contribute to the deliberate breakdown in the rule of law in Lebanon, including through politically motivated violence and intimidation, to reassert Syrian control or to contribute to Syrian interference in Lebanon, or to infringe upon or undermine Lebanese sovereignty which contributes to political and economic instability in that country and the region." ¶6. (S) The likely public Syrian response will be to underscore the SARG's respect for the outcome of the June 2009 Lebanese elections, which produced an unexpected victory for the pro-Western March 14 coalition. Syrian officials will argue these results indicate, if anything, interference from other countries that far exceeded any influence Syria sought to exercise. They will also point to the establishment of diplomatic relations between Lebanon and Syria and the exchange of ambassadors between the two countries. Not least, Syrian officials will argue that they have resolved to respect and deal with the Lebanese government that is formed as a result of the elections. Against this backdrop, we expect Syrian officials to ask for concrete evidence that Syria was or is seeking to interfere in Lebanese politics. ¶7. (S) We also would be surprised if our Syrian interlocutors failed to note that the renewal of E.O. 13441 represented another example of the U.S. foreign policy bureaucracy's efforts to thwart President Obama's pledge to engage Syria. The Syrians, already pointing to U.S. DAMASCUS 00000461 002 OF 002 sanctions as a reason to doubt whether the U.S. really wants normal relations, could seize the renewal of 13441 as a pretext to reject U.S. proposals to establish a security cooperation dialogue on Iraq. ¶8. (S) Comment: Our concern is not with the E.O.'s net result of freezing three individuals' assets who have made a career of extending Syrian interference in Lebanon, but rather with the employment of a blunt legal instrument that declares a threat to U.S. national interests in Lebanon after what most here view as successful Lebanese elections. Though there were examples of Syrian government efforts to influence the outcome of Lebanon's June elections (which we probably can't share to buttress the E.O.),Syrian behavior was (in comparison to previous years) relatively restrained. From the optic of our French, UK, and other EU colleagues, Syria has delivered on its pledges to establish diplomatic relations and to respect the results of Lebanon's elections. They are likely to be as puzzled as the Syrians by the timing of the extension of E.O. 13441. Conversely, if we were willing to let this E.O. expire, we might be able to use it to refute allegations of contradictory U.S. signals at minimal cost, under the cover of recent events in Lebanon. ¶9. (S) Action request: In anticipation of a renewal of E.O. 13441, Post requests Department guidance on and talking points to explain the renewal for use with diplomatic contacts and the local media. CONNELLY