HAMAS WARY OF, BUT PARTICIPATING IN, CAIRO TALKS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DAMASCUS 000042 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA, NEA/IPA NSC FOR ABRAMS LONDON FOR TSOU, PARIS FOR WALLER E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2018 TAGS: PREL KPAL KWBG PTER IS SY SUBJECT: HAMAS WARY OF, BUT PARTICIPATING IN, CAIRO TALKS ON GAZA REF: A. DAMASCUS24 ¶B. DAMASCUS 31 ¶C. DAMASCUS 32 Classified By: A/DCM George Novinger, American Embassy Damascus, Reason s 1.4 b and d. ¶1. (C) Summary: Hamas Politburo Chief Khaled Mesha'al delivered a regionally televised harangue late January 10 criticizing the international community's response to Gaza, calling on Israel to cease hostilities, withdraw its forces, and lift the siege, and dismissing the possibility of a "permanent" cease-fire. Some observers in Damascus were quick to conclude Mesha'al had rejected Egyptian-brokered talks mentioned in UNSCR 1860, while others pointed to the arrival of a Hamas delegation in Cairo on January 10 as a sign that Mesha'al was setting parameters for a future agreement without rejecting anything. The Egyptian Embassy here noted discussions in Cairo had thus far struck a cordial tone, and a source told us EGIS chief Omar Soleiman was intent on addressing Israeli concerns about arms smuggling. French President Sarkozy, meanwhile, planned to travel to Cairo as soon as a ceasefire was at hand, according to a French non-paper passed to the Egyptian Embassy in Paris. Though France's notional timetable for the trip has slipped, the French have proposed that a ceasefire be followed by an international conference in Paris to negotiate the details. End Summary. -------------- Mesha'al Responds to UNSCR 1860 -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Local Syrian TV aired a taped version of Mesha'al's January 10 speech at 2145 local and that was replayed on regional cable stations. The speech praised the resistance of Gazans and heckled Israel for having failed to achieve its aim of wiping out or weakening Hamas and for having lost international support, increasing Palestinian resistance, and "shortening the life of your state." Regarding UNSCR 1860, Mesha'al commented this resolution could have been passed with U.S. support "a week ago," but "they wanted to give (Israel) more time to get rid of the resistance." The absence of Chapter VII provisions suggested it was "not meant to be implemented." Mesha'al argued Israel alone bore the burden of implementation and demanded it cease "aggression," withdraw its troops, end the siege, and open all crossing points, beginning with Rafah. "We deal with an open mind on the basis of these fair demands, which are not subject to compromise," he said. "Once these issues are determined, we can discuss the truce." ¶3. (SBU) Mesha'al added other demands to a potential agreement. First, he said, the truce would "always be temporary. We will not exchange resistance for food and relief." Second, Hamas would not accept international forces. "If imposed upon us, they will be treated as occupation forces." Third, Hamas rejected any restrictions on "importing weapons as long as the occupation and aggression continues." Fourth, he noted, Hamas had sent a delegation to Cairo. Mesha'al then called on PA President Mahmoud Abbas to review the 2005 Rafah agreement, release Hamas prisoners in the West Bank, lift restrictions on demonstrations in the West Bank, and "not only suspend, but end" security cooperation and negotiations with Israel. Mesha'al repeated his call for a third intifada, an Arab League summit, and continued resistance. -------------- Local Observers Put Hamas Views in Context -------------- ¶4. (C) Diplomats and other observers in Damascus were divided on whether Mesha'al's speech signified the rejection of UNSCR 1860 and Egyptian mediation. The Norwegian Ambassador confirmed January 11 that Norway understood Hamas's four conditions, as outlined by Mesha,al, to be the group's current position, with the proviso that Israel must meet its side of a cease-fire deal before Hamas stops sending rockets into Israel. Hamas also viewed a renewed Egyptian reconciliation effort with almost DAMASCUS 00000042 002 OF 003 no enthusiasm and wanted more Arab parties involved, including Egypt and Saudi Arabia from among the "moderates" as well as Syria, Qatar, Algeria, and Sudan from among those countries friendly to Hamas. Hamas did not appear to mind a Turkish role but was currently focused on an Arab line-up. Although Hamas believed Abu Mazen's term ended on January 9, they were not making an issue of rejecting Abu Mazen publicly right now; they would deal with him during this crisis. (Note: The Norwegians did not say it directly, but we understood them as being prepared to deal now with Abu Mazen as the head of Fatah, not the Palestinian Authority). ¶5. (C) The Jordanian Ambassador here voiced deep suspicion of Mesha'al, observing that Hamas, as an offshoot of Muslim Brotherhood international, took some of its instruction from the "guidance office" (maktab al-irshad) in Cairo. He argued the Egyptian Government remained very concerned about what the MB was telling Hamas to do because the GOE believed the MB wanted eventually to use Hamas as a political weapon against Mubarak. He also suggested that in addition to Iranian financial inducements and Syrian moral support, Hamas was receiving guidance from the MB continue firing the rockets and reject a cease-fire. In that sense, Mesha'al and company were sacrificing Palestinian lives for the MB international agenda, he said. ¶6. (C) By comparison, an Egyptian Embassy contact told us January 11 that Mesha'al's speech primarily sought to boost morale in Gaza. Mesha'al's demands for a cease-fire did not reject any proposals outright. The five Hamas representatives (two from Damascus and three from Gaza) in Cairo engaged in "cordial" talks with EGIS Director Omar Sulayman, in stark contrast to the shouting match that had occurred between Hamas and EGIS reps a week earlier. EGIS Director Omar Soleiman was committed to responding to Israeli concerns about combatting weapons smuggling, our contact reported. The Egyptian Embassy here believed UNSCR 1860 underscored the importance of Egypt's mediation role despite Syrian, Iranian, and other countries' attempts to sabotage Egypt's regional image. Even the Egyptian Embassy's Syrian contacts were now acknowledging Egypt's unavoidable central role, our contact reported. "They know the bulk of Gaza's food, medicine, and weapons come through Egypt. They were stupid to try to marginalize us." -------------- What are the French Up to Now? -------------- ¶7. (C) Our Egyptian contact was cautiously optimistic that Egyptian mediation, in concert with continuing French involvement, would ultimately convince Israel and Hamas to agree on a ceasefire. According to the Egyptians here, the Egyptian Embassy in Paris had received a non-paper from the Lysee working out a timeline for diplomatic activity: (1) By January 11, Egypt and Israel would agree on measures to interdict weapons smuggling and strengthen border security, including the possibly of "technical training" by the Germans on the Egyptian side of the border; (2) On the basis of its agreement with Egypt, Israel would announce a cessation to hostilities and open its crossings into Gaza for goods and fuel and Egypt would open the Rafah crossing with EU monitors in Gaza on/about January 13, after which Hamas would announce its cessation of rocket attacks; (3) Sarkozy and German Chancellor Merkel would travel to Cairo and announce plans for further discussions to resolve remaining issues at an international conference that would convene in Paris 10 days later. The agenda would include "everything," including reopening crossings, ending weapons smuggling and rocket attacks, and resuming talks on Palestinian reconciliation. Participants would be likely to include Israel, Egypt, France, Russia, the U.S., Turkey, Syria, Qatar, the UK, Germany, and informal representation of Hamas. ¶8. (C) With Israel's ground campaign continuing, the Egyptian diplomat thought the timeline would slip, possibly another five-to-seven days. He remained encouraged by Hamas's continuing presence in Cairo but had not received a detailed readout of the groups meetings with EGIS. Much would depend on decisions made by the GOI on whether to extend the fighting or move toward a ceasefire, he suggested. DAMASCUS 00000042 003 OF 003 France continued to push Syria to use its influence with Hamas, and Egypt was expecting Amos Gilad to return January 12 for continued talks on border security. Egyptian mediation may be a "weak reed" for reconciling Hamas's desire for political survival and Israel's desire for a decisive military victory, he explained, "but right now, we're the best and only option there is. Neither Hamas nor Syria can ignore this." ¶9. (C) Comment: Several factors may help to explain the contrast between Mesha'al's defiant rhetoric and his willingness to continue discussions in Cairo. Externally, Mesha'al is receiving advice from Iran, Qatar, Egypt, Algeria, Sudan and Syria and may be trying to strike a balance that keeps all doors open. Inside Hamas, we are hearing the group's Damascus-based leadership is increasingly sensitive to suffering in Gaza and wants to avoid being blamed for blocking an agreement that would bring relief. At the same time, Hamas craves regional and Western acceptance as a legitimate, democratically-elected representative of the Palestinian people. The absence of any mention of Hamas in UNSCR 1860 could not have escaped the attention of Hamas leaders, who are loathe to be excluded as recognized players and would be likely to support Mesha'al's fiery rhetoric. Of all of Mesha'al's conditions and demands, the rejection of a "permanent ceasefire" seems the most important because accepting such a formula might imply Hamas's acceptance of Israel and an end to its armed resistance. Whether Israeli military operations in Gaza can soften this position, or whether Hamas and Israel could agree to a ceasefire without any specified time limits, remains to be seen. NOVINGER