MAY 7 FELTMAN-SHAPIRO MEETING IN DAMASCUS: IRAN

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 DAMASCUS 000363 NOFORN SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ELA, NEA/I NSC FOR SHAPIRO/MCDERMOTT PARIS FOR WALLER LONDON FOR TSOU E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/20/2029 TAGS: PREL PTER IR IS LE SY SUBJECT: MAY 7 FELTMAN-SHAPIRO MEETING IN DAMASCUS: IRAN AND LEBANON DAMASCUS 00000363 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: CDA Maura Connelly for reasons 1.4 b, d. ¶1. (S/NF) Summary: In a wide-ranging May 7 discussion on differing U.S. and Syrian approaches to re-engagement, NEA Acting Assistant Secretary Feltman and NSC/NENA Senior Director Shapiro asked the Syrian side led by FM Muallim for a readout of Iranian President Ahmedinejad's May 5 visit to Damascus and for Syrian views on the upcoming June 7 Lebanese elections. Muallim praised U.S. efforts to engage Iran but predicted Tehran would not be likely to respond until after Iran's June 12 elections. Iran, according to Muallim, believed Syria's efforts to liberate the occupied Golan were "worthless," but it nonetheless respected Syria's right to pursue its national interests. The Syrian regime continued to believe the international community could best resolve its differences with Iran by recognizing Iran's right to pursue a civil nuclear program and by removing the issue from the UN Security Council. On Lebanon, Muallim complained about the prolonged detention of four Lebanese security officials who had been released, saying their imprisonment without charges revealed the lack of due process by UN investigators working on the assassination of former Lebanese PM Rafiq Hariri. Muallim stated Syria was not interfering in Lebanese elections and supported holding peaceful elections on time. End Summary ¶2. (S/NF) Returning to Damascus two months after their March 7 visit, NEA Acting Assistant Secretary Jeffrey Feltman and NSC Senior Director for the Near East and North Africa Dan Shapiro met on May 7 for four-and-a-half hours with Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Muallim, Vice Foreign Minister Faisal Miqdad, and President Asad's Political and Media Advisor Bouthaina Shaaban. Charge and Pol-Econ Chief (notetaker) accompanied Feltman and Shapiro. Muallim's Chief of Staff Bassam Sabagh joined the Syrian side. This cable focuses on their discussions on Iran and Lebanon. It should be read with septel reports on general views of re-engagement, Iraq, sanctions, Palestinian reconciliation, Syrian and Israeli peace issues, and human rights. -------------- Syrian-Iranian Relations -------------- ¶3. (S/NF) FM Muallim reported that Iranian President Ahmedinejad's May 5 visit to Damascus lasted roughly six hours and represented a reaffirmation of strong Syrian-Iranian relations. He said relations with Iran would continue to remain "very important" so long as Israel continued to occupy Syrian land. Though Ahmedinejad believed peaceful Syrian efforts to liberate the occupied Golan were "worthless," Iran nonetheless respected Syria's right to pursue its national interests as it saw fit. "We stuck to our position," Muallim said, characterizing Syria's desire to pursue negotiations with Israel. ¶4. (S/NF) Muallim reiterated Syria's position that Iran had the right to pursue a peaceful nuclear energy program. The Iranians, he said, see the West's approach on the nuclear file as "extremely confrontational." Muallim maintained no evidence existed to support allegations that Iran was pursuing a nuclear weapon. "The way to solve this problem is to acknowledge Iran's right to enrich uranium, remove the issue from the UN Security Council, and deal with the transparency issue through the IAEA." Syria, he added, continued to play a constructive role. ¶5. (S/NF) Asad had publicly praised President Obama during Ahmedinejad's visit, and Damascus had urged Tehran to take advantage of the opportunity afforded by U.S. efforts to engage Iran. Presidential Advisor Shaaban added that Syrian officials had "encouraged" Iran to adopt a more constructive position on Afghanistan and Pakistan. "We're deeply worried about what might happen in these countries," she said. "It would be a disaster for us if Pakistan collapsed." Muallim predicted Tehran would be more responsive to U.S. overtures after the Iranian elections in June. ¶6. (S/NF) NSC Senior Director asked if the Syrians had seen DAMASCUS 00000363 002.2 OF 003 any concrete example of disrespect in President Obama's language toward Iran. Iranian officials had complained about Washington's lack of respect for the Iranian regime, but Washington's sense was that they were not judging President Obama by his actions. Muallim replied that Asad had told Ahmedinejad on May 5 that "we need to help Obama." ¶7. (S/NF) Shapiro asked if Iranian rhetoric, particularly Ahmedinejad's denial of the Holocaust during the Durban II Conference in Geneva, was contradictory. Muallim replied Syria judged neither Iran's nor America's rhetoric in Geneva. Shapiro queried whether the Syrian regime judged Ahmedinejad's rhetoric in Geneva as helpful to advancing regional stability and comprehensive peace. Shaaban replied that Ahmedinejad's language was helping to increase Iran's popularity in the Arab world and allowing "Iran to become the spokesman for the people of the region." Muallim argued the issue was not whether Syria agreed or disagreed, but whether the Iranian leader's words reflected the sentiments of Arab people. "Then why don't you say the same thing if it's popular?" asked Shapiro. "We don't want to be popular, but right," retorted Shaaban. After more back and forth, Muallim reluctantly conceded that Ahmedinejad's rhetoric in Geneva had "not been helpful." ¶8. (S/NF) Muallim commented the Holocaust represented a historical fact, but that did not exempt it from study and different interpretations. "But does the German Holocaust justify the Israeli Holocaust against the Palestinians?", he asked. Muallim added, "We know how to address this issue. We're not in Iran's or anybody else's pockets." Feltman replied that, unfortunately, Syria looked as though it remained on the same side of the issue as Iran. "And you're not on the same side as the Israelis?" asked Muallim in response. Feltman said Iran had been silent on the issues of pursuing a two-state solution and advancing Gaza relief assistance; Syria needed to understand that Washington audiences would draw their own conclusions when they saw President Asad side-by-side with Ahmedinejad. "He's not evil," replied Shaaban. ¶9. (S/NF) Shapiro reiterated that Iran had not responded to U.S. overtures. "Maybe after the (Iranian) elections," responded Muallim. Shaaban argued it was better to "talk to everyone," as Syria was doing with Jordan, Turkey, Iran, and Palestinian faction leaders. "We stood against Saddam with Iran when you were supporting him. That was the right decision. Now it's time to encourage everyone to talk to everyone," asserted Shaaban. -------------- Lebanese Elections and Special Tribunal -------------- ¶10. (S/NF) In response to a question from Acting A/S Feltman, Muallim said the situation in Lebanon appeared to be "much better." Syria's improved relations with Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries reflected better Lebanese-Syrian relations, he added. The atmosphere remained calm with a month to go before elections, continued Muallim. Syria had avoided any confrontational rhetoric and emphasized its commitment to regional peace. ¶11. (S/NF) Syria had nonetheless taken note of the increased number of Israeli espionage cells in Lebanon, Muallim observed. "What type of reflection do these activities have on Lebanon's security?" he asked. Shaaban argued the release of the four Lebanese security force generals had reflected poorly on the integrity of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL). Feltman replied that it was actually the UN investigators who had ordered the generals' detention based on the suspicion that they had compromised the crime scene and hindered the investigation. ¶12. (S/NF) Shaaban responded that "all Arab media" had reacted negatively to the unlawful detention of the Lebanese officials, who had been held for 44 months without charges. Shapiro noted that, had the STL wanted to play politics, they would have delayed the release until after the elections. DAMASCUS 00000363 003.2 OF 003 Muallim commented that the Tribunal depended on the actions of three separate investigators who had not distinguished themselves. In particular, Detlev Mehlis, the first UN investigator, had pointed a finger at Syria based on the testimony of false witnesses. Feltman said the STL had issued no indictments and that it had observed international standards of justice. ¶13. (S/NF) Muallim responded that Mohammed Saddiq, a witness whose testimony had been subsequently discredited, was now under arrest in the UAE. Mehlis had nonetheless used Saddiq as a material witness. Feltman replied that Mehlis had not served as the UN investigator for a long period. Muallim remarked the German government had told him they withdrew Mehlis because he had not conducted the investigation in an objective manner. Still, Muallim acknowledged, the situation in Lebanon seemed to be improving as June 7 elections approached. ¶14. (S/NF) Feltman stated the elections would hinge on the results in a few districts. He suggested that the release of the four generals might play in different ways. Aoun's supporters, for example, vividly remembered Jamal Sayyed's acts against them prior to 2005, which might hurt the opposition, he observed. Shapiro emphasized the importance of non-interference; Muallim agreed and asserted he would not visit Lebanon until after the elections to avoid any suggestion of Syrian interference. Feltman commented Lebanon had remained free of political violence. It nonetheless remained important for all sides to urge restraint among Lebanese actors, not just during the elections, but also during the period of government formation. ¶15. (S/NF) Muallim said Syria's position on the necessity for a national unity government was clear. Shaaban added that if the U.S. objective was to promote Lebanese stability, it should support a national unity government based on cooperation among all parties. Feltman said the U.S. did not oppose a national unity government but believed it should be up to the Lebanese themselves. Muallim agreed. Feltman added that a national unity government might prevent violence, but how would it be able to govern effectively? Shaaban said the Lebanese parties needed to agree to form a new government on the principle of non-violence. "We're against sectarianism," she concluded, "but Lebanon's political system is based on it." ¶16. (SBU) Acting A/S Feltman and NSC Senior Director Shapiro cleared this message. CONNELLY