MAY 7 FELTMAN-SHAPIRO MEETING IN DAMASCUS: FM

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 DAMASCUS 000342 NOFORN SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ELA, NEA/IR NSC FOR SHAPIRO/MCDERMOTT PARIS FOR WALLER LONDON FOR TSOU E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/12/2029 TAGS: PREL PTER MOPS IZ SY SUBJECT: MAY 7 FELTMAN-SHAPIRO MEETING IN DAMASCUS: FM MUALLIM NONCOMMITTAL ON U.S.-SYRIAN-IRAQI SECURITY COOPERATION Classified By: CDA Maura Connelly, Reasons 1.4 b and d. ¶1. (S/NF) Summary: In a prolonged May 7 discussion on differing U.S. and Syrian approaches to re-engagement, NEA Acting Assistant Secretary Feltman and NSC NENA Senior Director Shapiro stressed the importance of stopping foreign fighters entering Iraq from Syria. They proposed a visit by a CENTCOM delegation to discuss a possible U.S.-Syrian-Iraqi trilateral dialogue on security cooperation. Feltman said this initiative reflected Washington's desire to pursue concrete objectives that both sides had identified to be in their mutual interest. Muallim claimed Syria remained prepared to engage the U.S. on all tracks but was waiting for Washington to establish a "political umbrella" before agreeing on security cooperation. He repeated numerous times the decision was not his to make; he promised to brief "his leadership" on the U.S. proposal. He cautioned, however, that it would be difficult to present a persuasive case to Syrian officials when the U.S. had just issued its annual report on international terrorism, Secretary Clinton had just visited Beirut, and the U.S. President was about to re-certify Executive Order 13338. Feltman passed tear-line information on four Iraqi foreign fighter facilitators active in Syria, stressing continuing U.S. concerns about foreign fighters entering Iraq from Syria. Muallim accepted the list and replied he had no further information regarding Abu Khalaf al Shamari. In a one-one-one with Feltman, Muallim reported President Asad and PM Maliki had agreed to attend an Iraqi reconciliation conference, with the venue and timing still to be determined. End Summary. ¶2. (S/NF) Returning to Damascus two months after their March 7 visit, NEA Acting Assistant Secretary Jeffrey Feltman and NSC Senior Director for the Middle East and North Africa Dan Shapiro met May 7 for four hours with Syrian Foreign Minister Walid al-Muallim, Vice Foreign Minister Faisal Miqdad, and the President Asad's Political and Media Advisor Bouthayna Shaaban. This cable focuses on their discussions on Iraq. It should be read with septel reports on general views of re-engagement, sanctions, Palestinian reconciliation, Syrian-Israeli peace discussions, Iran, and human rights. -------------- Proposal for Security Cooperation on Iraq -------------- ¶3. (S/NF) Acting A/S Feltman and NSC Senior Director Shapiro emphasized the high priority the U.S. attached to combatting foreign fighters entering Iraq through Syria. They acknowledged Syrian PM Utri's April visit to Baghdad and the positive trade and security agreements reached by the two sides. Improving Syrian-Iraqi relations had increased the prospects of advancing U.S.-Syrian cooperation. Since his Feltman and Shapiro's initial March 7 meeting with Syrian officials, the security situation in Iraq had deteriorated, particularly in the last few weeks. The U.S. suspected that at least a couple of the recent suicide bombing attackers had entered Iraq via Syria. Feltman said he was not trying to speak in an accusatory tone, but rather in the spirit of seeking to pursue a cooperative dialogue. ¶4. (S/NF) Feltman informed FM Muallim that Washington wanted to explore whether Syria would be willing to move beyond the confidence building phase to a concrete area of cooperation to enhance Iraqi security. Both sides had emphasized their common interest in seeing a stable, secure, unified Iraqi government, and Syrian officials had stated their desire to help the U.S. successfully achieve its withdrawal strategy. If the Syrian government agreed, Washington proposed sending a CENTCOM-led team to begin preliminary discussions, and the U.S. would raise this potential initiative with the Iraqi government. -------------- DAMASCUS 00000342 002 OF 005 Syrians Pursue "The Relationship Talk" -------------- ¶5. (S/NF) Muallim responded that the Syrian regime was ready to cooperate with the U.S. on Iraq, but not without a "political umbrella." Muallim maintained the Syrian regime had perceived overtly negative messages coming from the recent release of the U.S. report on terrorism, its U.S. decision to renew E.O. 13338, and Secretary Clinton's recent visit in Beirut. Bad experiences with previous U.S. administrations had taught the Syrian regime to be more cautious. Syria had enjoyed success in renewed relations with Turkey, the UK, and France by agreeing not to let policy disputes on some issues color the relationship as a whole. Syria wanted reassurances about the U.S. administration's intentions, Muallim said. ¶6. (S/NF) Feltman and Shapiro asked pointedly for Muallim to explain what he meant by "political umbrella." From the U.S. perspective, Iraq remained a critical issue. Foreign fighters coming through Syria were killing Americans and Iraqis. Washington's preferred approach was to cooperate with Syria on addressing what both sides had stated was a mutual interest in stopping this source of violence. Muallim replied "political umbrella" meant "normal relations," like the relations Syria enjoyed with France and the UK. In this relationships, there had been exchanges of high-level visits to facilitate security cooperation on Iraq and counterterrorism issues. ¶7. (S/NF) Shapiro replied, "We're here with an important message of our desire to cooperate with you." Muallim replied, "I welcome you here. But Secretary Clinton just visited Beirut. And you warn us about interfering in the Lebanese elections?" Feltman disputed this characterization, noting the Secretary had been open about what she said and about the purpose of her trip. Washington viewed cooperating on Iraqi security as the most important key to building normal relations with the U.S. because of the threat posed by foreign fighters to Iraq and U.S. soldiers. U.S.-Syrian cooperation would be important to enhancing Syrian-Iraqi security discussions and help to move Syrian-Iraqi relations to a higher level. ¶8. (S/NF) Presidential Advisor Shaaban argued that political cooperation should lead to security cooperation, not the other way around. Feltman asked whether the two sides would be at a stalemate if the U.S. took viewed security cooperation as a necessary step to a deeper political relationship. Vice Minister Miqdad replied that Syria was already cooperating with Iraq. "If the U.S. wants to join, it has to be respectful of our national interests," he said. Muallim opined that Syria and the U.S. shared mutual interests in fighting al-Qaeda and in normalizing bilateral relations. Both sides therefore should move in tandem on security cooperation and creating a political umbrella. This process had only taken a month with the UK, he said. Syria's relationship with Turkey had made great progress over the years because both sides had learned to pursue areas of common interest while downplaying differences. Muallim then repeated his astonishment that the Secretary had visited Beirut. "She flew over Damascus and didn't even wave before landing in Beirut to join the campaign," he said. "These are not the signals you should be sending." ¶9. (S/NF) Shapiro argued he and Feltman were visiting Damascus for the second time and were seeking to move the bilateral relationship forward. He urged Muallim to recognize that the new U.S. President was committed to comprehensive peace and principled engagement. If the Syrian government had concerns about its relationship with past administrations, the current U.S. administration hoped Syria would not expect it to correct their mistakes. In that light, the U.S. urged the Syrian regime to seize the fresh opportunity. Shapiro asked whether Muallim was saying no to DAMASCUS 00000342 003 OF 005 the U.S. proposal to send a CENTCOM-led team to Damascus. "I didn't say no, but I tried to explain what would be necessary to build effective security cooperation," replied Muallim. Syria was ready to help but needed assurances of U.S. intentions. Would Syria be willing to receive a U.S. delegation as part of a process? asked Shapiro. "It's not my decision," averred Muallim. "Before you send an ambassador?" asked Shaaban. Muallim asked whether the U.S. was ready to build a natural relationship with Syria. "That's why we're here," reiterated Shapiro. No, said Muallim, "I don't mean just visits but a natural relationship." ¶10. (S/NF) The Charge suggested that a political umbrella could include a spectrum of actions that might involve visits by Special Envoy Mitchell and CENTCOM Commander Petraeus. No, responded Muallim, "we don't care if they come. If Mitchell comes, that's his decision. But how I read his decision about why he didn't come here is another matter." The same applied to Secretary Clinton's trip to Beirut, he added. Shaaban argued that the high-profile nature of the Secretary's Beirut stop and Mitchell's vist to North Africa, along with the renewal of E.O. 13338 had been "insulting." How could Syria endorse security cooperation with the U.S. on Iraq? "We have public opinion," she said. ¶11. (S/NF) Muallim mentioned that Omani FM Yousef bin Alawi had asked him during Asad's early-April visit to the Gulf if CENTCOM Commander Petraeus would be welcome in Syria. Asad, Muallim reported, had agreed. Muallim then recounted that Iraqi FM Zebari had passed a similar message to the Syrian government the previous year, but then President Bush "had denied permission." In principle, Syria was ready to cooperate, but it wanted a "political umbrella," under which such cooperation would be managed. Petraeus remained welcome in Damascus, he conveyed. ¶12. (S/NF) Feltman responded both sides had worked to build confidence. The U.S. was now proposing cooperation on issues of mutual interests. While Syria and the U.S. would continue to disagree on Hamas and Hizballah, did that mean they could not work together? Shapiro added that both sides could use security cooperation on Iraq to demonstrate to their publics the value of U.S.-Syrian engagement. President Asad was willing to help the U.S. withdraw from Iraq successfully, Muallim asserted. But if Syria began security cooperation with the U.S., it would then deny Syria export licenses for planes because of its support for Hamas and Hizballah. Disagreements over these issues had driven a wedge between Syria and the U.S. in the past. Syria would therefore be very reluctant to pursue limited cooperation unless it had assurances that relations would proceed despite disagreements over Hamas and Hizballah. "I need to be able to convey your clear intentions," he said. -------------- FF Tear-Line Information Passed -------------- ¶13. (S/NF) Clarifying that the U.S. administration sought to cooperate with Syria to advance mutual interests, A/S-designate Feltman passed tear-line information on four suspected Iraqi-national foreign fighter facilitators believed to be operating in Syria. Muallim responded that Syrian authorities had been unable to locate the facilitator Feltman had named during their March 7 meeting (Abu Khalaf). Miqdad said the MFA was waiting for additional information. Charge clarified that the Embassy had passed that information through Vice Minister Miqdad's office in April. "Sometimes they change their names and it's hard to find them," remarked Muallim. -------------- DAMASCUS 00000342 004 OF 005 Back to the Relationship Talk -------------- ¶14. (S/NF) Discussion on the U.S. proposal for U.S.-Syrian-Iraqi security cooperation resumed over lunch. A/S-designate Feltman and NSC Senior Director Shapiro urged the Syrian side not to let this golden opportunity slip. It would be difficult for Washington to understand how Syria was unable to cooperate on an issue on which the two sides agreed. The President had spoken clearly on his new approach to foreign affairs and was committed to pursuing comprehensive peace in the region. U.S.-Syrian cooperation on Iraqi security would send a strong, positive message about both countries' ability to move beyond their confrontational past. ¶15. (S/NF) Muallim explained that the problem was Syria's long historical memory and its desire to avoid bad experiences that it had endured with previous U.S. administrations. For example, Syrian President Hafez al-Asad had taken an historical decision to stand by the U.S. during the first Gulf War. "We fought with the U.S. to liberate Kuwait from Iraq, but we were still on the terrorism list." Meanwhile, Jordan, who had opposed the U.S. military operation, became a close U.S. ally. He then recalled former NEA A/S Burns' 2004 mission to Syria, during which the U.S. proposed a trilateral security discussion. President Asad agreed, and U.S., Syrian, and Iraqi representatives met in September of that year. Syrian officials asked for equipment to increase their border security capabilities, e.g., night vision goggles. The U.S. delegation explained they could not provide this equipment but promised to see whether the UK could. After three UK military delegations examined the border and assessed Syrian military needs, nothing happened, and the trilateral process ended. Though the Syrian regime had been the first Arab country to recognize the new Iraqi government, the first to sign agreements with Baghdad, and the first to send an ambassador, Washington publicly blamed Damascus for sabotaging Iraqi security. The new administration, therefore, would be wise to acknowledge the positive steps Syria had taken in Iraq. "We appreciate Obama," Muallim concluded, "but we have memories that you don't have." ¶16. (S/NF) Shapiro and Feltman argued the current U.S. administration should be judged on its own merits, not those of previous U.S. presidents. They stressed that the U.S. proposal represented a chance to move forward to the kind of relationship Syria claimed it wanted. Being able to demonstrate effective U.S.-Syrian security cooperation with Iraq would provide the administration with a compelling argument to counter the arguments of critics who favored the continuation of sanctions against Syria. Feltman added that both sides needed to show their own domestic audiences something positive and tangible, and cooperation on Iraq would be in both their interests. U.S. sanctions and the lack of any decision on a U.S. ambassador were problems to which Washington did not have an answer today. But that should not exclude U.S.-Syrian cooperation on advancing tangible mutual interests together in Iraq. ¶17. (S/NF) Presidential Advisor Shaaban replied that a visit by a U.S. military delegation would not be tangible. But a letter from the USG to European aerospace companies that working with Syria would be acceptable could represent a tangible step that helped to maintain Syria's ailing civil aviation sector. Shapiro explained that U.S. legal procedures required private firms to contact the Department of Commerce on their own; they agreed to look for an opportunity to see if more could be done in this area. Feltman answered the U.S. wanted to move beyond the transaction mode to something on which they could work together. Iraq appeared to Washington to be a natural fit for cooperation because both sides had identified it as an area of mutual interest. DAMASCUS 00000342 005 OF 005 ¶18. (S/NF) Muallim pledged to report the U.S. proposal for U.S.-Syrian-Iraqi security cooperation to "his leadership." He reiterated the timing of the E.O. 13338 renewal, the Secretary's visit to Beirut, and the publication of the terrorism report had created a negative backdrop. "We were looking for more signs of the new Obama policy, but instead saw a renewal of initiatives from the Bush era," Muallim said. He emphasized that the way the U.S. played the E.O. 13338 renewal in the press would be important, as would the way in which the USG explained the action to European governments. He urged the U.S. to make clear that re-certification of E.O. 13338 would not affect laws on civil aviation or conflict with U.S. export license procedures for safety-of-flight issues. "Moving together is the only way to build a normal relationship," he said. Feltman and Shapiro reiterated the importance of the opportunity to cooperate on Iraq. They stressed the President's commitment to pursuing more normal relations and pledged to explore what might be possible regarding Syria's request for assistance with civil aviation issues. -------------- Syrian-Iraqi Reconciliation Conference -------------- ¶19. (S/NF) In separate one-one-one sessions with Muallim and Shaaban, respectively, Feltman and Shapiro pushed their Syrian counterparts to argue favorably for embracing the U.S. security cooperation proposal. Muallim confided to Feltman he would do so, but warned that President Asad had expressed great sensitivity to Secretary Clinton's stop in Beirut and the appearance that Washington's re-engagement of Syria "ran through Beirut." Feltman reiterated the U.S. commitment not to interfere in the Lebanese elections and urged Muallim to convey President Obama's firm commitment to dialogue with Syria. Meanwhile, Shapiro urged Shaaban to give serious consideration to accepting an invitation from the Brookings Institute to visit Washington. He assured her she would have no problems arranging official meetings. (Note: Shaaban last visited Washington in 2005, where she experienced a long delay in clearing immigration/customs and was unable to arrange any meetings with Executive Branch officials.) ¶20. (S/NF) Muallim told Feltman that PM Maliki and President Asad had agreed on holding an Iraqi reconciliation conference, with the timing and venue still be determined. Some Iraqi Ba'athists, but not all, would participate. ¶21. (SBU) Acting A/S Feltman and NSC Senior Director Shapiro cleared this message. CONNELLY