FM MUALLIM TELLS CODEL SPECTER BETTER U.S.-SYRIAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 DAMASCUS 000027 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA NSC FOR ABRAMS LONDON FOR TSOU, PARIS FOR WALLER E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/06/2018 TAGS: PREL PHUM IR IZ LE SY SUBJECT: FM MUALLIM TELLS CODEL SPECTER BETTER U.S.-SYRIAN RELATIONS POSSIBLE THROUGH DIALOGUE, MUTUAL RESPECT REF: A. DAMASCUS 03 ¶B. 08 DAMASCUS 919 Classified By: CDA Maura Connelly, American Embassy Damascus, Reasons 1 .4 b and d. ¶1. (C) Summary: In addition to sharing Syrian views about the situation in Gaza (ref B),FM Walid Muallim told Senator Arlen Specter December 30 the best way to change Iranian behavior related to its nuclear program was to remove the issue from the UN Security Council and pursue a monitoring solution in the IAEA. Muallim dismissed U.S. concerns about foreign jihadis entering Iraq through Syria as "old news," arguing Syria had arrested some 1,200 al-Qaeda fighters and had significantly strengthened security on its side of the border. Asked by Specter about specific charges upon which Syrian courts had sentenced Damascus Declaration National Council leaders, Muallim replied they had received relatively light 30-month sentences with credit for 18 months already served, leaving only a year remaining. The charge was engaging in contact with Walid Jumblatt, who was urging the U.S. to attack Syria, which it did on October 26. Besides, Muallim said, sidestepping the subject, what were these cases compared to the Israeli slaughter of innocent women and children in Gaza? Muallim treated Specter to a slightly biased history of U.S.-Syrian relations and asserted mutual respect and dialogue were the keys to improving ties in the near future. End Summary -------------- -------------- Iran: Pride Prevents Progress As Long as Issue is in UNSC -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) In response to Senator Specter's question about Israel's serious concerns about Iranian President Ahmadinejad's threat to "wipe Israel off the earth," Muallim downplayed the credibility of an Iranian nuclear threat. No one in the region wanted to see Iran become a nuclear weapons state, contended Muallim, including Syria. But the U.S. and Western European countries had erred gravely by seeking to deny Iran its right to enrich uranium for civilian purposes as an NPT signatory. Muallim, echoing President Asad's talking points (ref A),said the current stalemate over Iran's nuclear program had resulted because UN Security Council involvement had elevated this issue to one of Iranian pride, providing a pretext for the government to be stubborn. Moreover, by moving Iran's nuclear program to the international stage, the P5 1 countries had actually helped to enhance the program's popularity inside Iran, Muallim argued. ¶3. (C) Muallim counseled the subject should be treated as a technical monitoring issue rather than used as a political instrument to isolate Iran. The only hope of persuading Iranian decision-makers to cooperate would be to remove the nuclear issue from the UNSC agenda and address it at the IAEA. At the same time, Western nations should signal their willingness remove economic sanctions and offer a non-aggression pact to address Iranian concerns about a preemptive strike by the U.S. and/or Israel. "This is the only way to convince Iran it is safe to back down. You have to show Tehran you will deal with it on a basis of mutual respect," Muallim told Specter. "The important thing is to address the lack of trust in Tehran." Muallim suggested that removing the element of political confrontation would make it easier for Iran to assess its options rationally. "Maybe Iran will reach the conclusion that enriching Uranium in Russia is a better alternative," he suggested, noting the West needed to allow Iran space "to make conclusions on its own and not under pressure." ¶4. (C) Muallim added that, at French President Sarkozy's request in July, President Asad had discussed the issue with Tehran and given Sarkozy his assessment when the French President had visited Damascus in September. The French were considering this advice and continued to discuss the issue with Asad, Muallim said. ¶5. (C) Muallim recalled that Senator Specter had sought his assistance in arranging a meeting with Iran's UN Permrep in DAMASCUS 00000027 002 OF 004 the 1990s. Specter had been wise to reach out, while the Clinton Administration had missed golden opportunities to establish a dialogue with reform-minded Iranian Presidents such as Rafsanjani and Khatami. Muallim recalled that then NEA A/S Indyk had written a book on a dual containment strategy for Iraq and Iran. That idea had failed, he asserted, but that such an idea should be raised had further alienated the Iranian leadership. ¶6. (C) Specter replied he had been the only member of Congress who had gone to hear President Khatami speak in Washington, DC. Khatami had sought to meet with him, but his security team advised against the meeting and it did not take place. Specter agreed with Muallim on the importance of mutual respect and mentioned his recent efforts to meet with Iranian Speaker of Parliament Larijani in Geneva. Larajani, Specter reported, had initially agreed to meet but then insisted he should meet his U.S. counterpart. Muallim credited Specter for being the only member of Congress who had consistently traveled to Syria ("this is your 19th trip to Damascus," Muallim told Specter, "and I look forward to your 20th.") He explained that Middle Eastern customs often emphasized protocol and rank and unfortunately lacked a sophisticated understanding of how the U.S. Government worked. -------------- Foreign Fighters: Still a U.S. Concern -------------- ¶7. (C) Specter raised continuing U.S. concerns about foreign fighters, to which Muallim responded, "this is an old story." Syria and the U.S. had maintained close security cooperation until 2005, when U.S. sanctions and accusations about Syria's involvement in the murder of Rafiq Hariri murder led Damascus to conclude it had no interest in continuing this cooperation. Prior to that, high-level U.S. officials had visited Damascus regularly. Even as U.S.-Syrian relations worsened, Iraq and Syria established a border security cooperation committee and Syria significantly strengthened its security cooperation with other Arab countries. Syria bolstered its side of the Iraqi border, but Iraq failed to take adequate steps on its side. Despite these facts, the situation had improved tenfold since 2004. Syria had more than 1,200 al-Qaeda militants in jail who were in transit either to or from Iraq, Muallim asserted. "The (border security) situation is ten times better than it was in 2004," claimed Muallim. ¶8. (C) Muallim maintained that the U.S. had purposefully ignored positive steps taken by Syria, which included increased scrutiny of foreign males entering Syria, deporting suspicious individuals much to the displeasure of other Arab countries, and tightening security measures on Syria's side of the Syrian-Iraqi border. Even senior U.S. military officials in Iraq credited Syria for making progress, Muallim noted. Nevertheless, the White House and State Department in Washington accused Syria of facilitating foreign fighters, even though Syria viewed Islamic jihadis as a threat just as much as the U.S. Syria believed the Bush Administration's rhetoric reflected a desire to confront Syria no matter what positive steps it had taken. ¶9. (C) Asked by Specter how the U.S. and Syria might better cooperate in enhancing Iraqi security, Muallim replied that there needed to be more dialogue. Syria had gone to great lengths to signal to PM Maliki's government a strong interest in improving relations. Syria had, for example, dispatched an ambassador to Baghdad, received many Iraqi delegations, and generously cooperated at a great cost to the Syrian people in providing humanitarian relief to the 1.5 million Iraqi refugees (sic) in Syria. Syria and the United States shared a common interest in seeing a non-sectarian government in Iraq, said the Foreign Minister. Syria also viewed Iraqi political and security stability as important to its own security. Muallim argued it would be difficult to make any progress with the current U.S. administration, which had shown poor judgment in invading Iraq without international and regional support and in spite of warnings from Syria and other countries in the region. DAMASCUS 00000027 003 OF 004 -------------- US-Syrian Relations -------------- ¶10. (C) Specter asked what the U.S. could do to improve relations. Muallim replied both sides needed to show the could respect each other and one another's interests. The best means of achieving this understanding was through dialogue that could narrow differences and allow them to tackle difficult issues. Dialogue was the most civilized way for diplomats to learn different points of view and analyze competing interests. Through such a process, it would be possible to identify common ground, build trust, and agree on common goals even if there remain differences about preferred tactics, Muallim suggested. ¶11. (C) As evidence of the possibility of better relations, Muallim said he had met with the Secretary four times since the 2005 Sharm al Shayk Iraqi Neighbors Conference. There they had had a meaningful exchange on Iraq's Arab identity and the need for bringing Sunni and Shia under one national umbrella. Muallim said he and the Secretary had followed up this conversation at subsequent conferences. The U.S. had invited Syria to attend the December 2007 Annapolis Conference, which Syria accepted after the U.S. had agreed to include discussion on comprehensive regional peace issues. Muallim reported he had most recently met Secretary Rice in September 2008 on the margins of UNGA in New York. In discussions with her and NEA A/S Welch, Muallim said there had been a candid exchange on Iraq, Iran, Syria's indirect peace talks with Israel under Turkish auspices, and other subjects. Those talks had been interrupted by the alleged October 26 U.S. attack that had killed Syrian civilians in Abu Kamal, however. ¶12. (C) Muallim noted Syria had made great strides in the past 12 months in improving relations with European countries. France, the UK, Germany, and other EU states had recognized Syria's desire to play a constructive role in the region. The Bush Administration's belligerent approach to Syria had left it with little choice but to wait for a new government, Muallim said. President Asad and the Syrian government were cautiously optimistic that the next administration would seek to play a more constructive regional role and pursue better relations with Damascus. But "the ball is in the U.S. court," he claimed, and Damascus was waiting to see what specific proposals would come out of Washington. -------------- Sentencing of Syrian Democracy Activists -------------- ¶13. (C) Senator Specter requested clarification regarding the charges upon which Syrian courts had convicted 12 leaders of the Damascus Declaration National Council, a forum created in December 2007 that had led to a nation wide government crackdown on civil society activists. Muallim responded that these leaders had received 30 month sentences after already having served 18 months in prison, leaving only 12 months remaining. He explained that the principle charge had been maintaining contacts with Walid Jumblatt, who was urging the United States to attack Syria. "It looks like they (Syrian activists) didn't succeed," retorted Specter. "The U.S. attacked Syria on October 26," chided Muallim. "You believe they wanted the U.S. to attack Syria?" asked Specter, a former prosecutor. "I'm not sure," responded Muallim, "it's possible." Muallim asked Specter whether Syria's treatment of these activists was really salient in view of Israel's slaughter of 80 innocent woman and 48 children in Gaza? -------------- Lebanon -------------- ¶14. (C) In a brief exchange on Lebanon, Muallim reported Syria had opened an Embassy in Beirut and would soon appoint an Ambassador to Lebanon, as President Asad had promised President Sarkozy in July. Asad had taken a historic step by normalizing diplomatic relations during Lebanese President Sleiman's August 2008 visit to Damascus, and the two DAMASCUS 00000027 004 OF 004 countries had activated bilateral committees to coordinate border security and demarcation. Syria supported Hizballah as a legitimate Lebanese resistance organization to Israeli occupation. Once Israel relinquished control of the Golan and returned Lebanese territory under its occupation, Hizballah would "blend into the Lebanese political framework," argued Muallim. -------------- Other Subjects: Russia, Pakistan, UBL -------------- ¶15. (C) Toward the end of their conversation, Muallim described Russian President Medvedev as a "dynamic leader," whom he had met during President Asad's trip to Russia last summer. At 42, the Russian President was only three days older than Bashar, and the two leaders seemed to hit off, Muallim said. Specter asked about how the global financial crisis had affected Syria. Muallim said there had been a minimal impact thus far, but Syria expected a decrease in Gulf investment and a downturn in demand for Syrian products abroad. Some in Syria had used the crisis to argue against moving forward with economic reforms, but the Syrian Government was committed to pursuing a liberalization program. Specter asked about Pakistan. Muallim replied that U.S. policy had failed because it backed a highly popular military leader who ignored the needs and rights of the common people. All the U.S.'s efforts in Afghanistan would be a waste if Pakistan collapsed, Muallim asserted. Muallim recounted that Musharaf had asked him in 2007 why Syria "disobeyed" the U.S., as Syria was too small a nation and would be crushed. Muallim recounted his reply that the Syrian government was looking after its own people first, and Musharaf should do the same. A year later, Musharaf was gone, Muallim said. ¶16. (C) So how do we find Usama bin Laden? asked Specter. "What will be the reward," replied Muallim, arguing that finding one man was not the way to fight terror. "Bin Laden could die tomorrow, and Al Qaeda would continue," he said. "You have to fight the ideal he represents." After September 11, Muallim continued, Asad had sent a message to the U.S. President sharing Syria's experience in combatting extremism. No one listened. "We advised you not to go war in Afghanistan and Iraq because it would only lead to the spread of terrorism. Now look at the results. We need to work together to tackle the roots of the problem, financially and ideologically," asserted Muallim. ¶17. Comment: Muallim's cancellation of an office call with Specter at the MFA in order to receive Hamas Politburo chief Khaled Meshaal to discuss the situation in Gaza (ref B) did not seem to affect the positive and friendly tone of their lunch. The Syrian Foreign Minister credited the Senator with having been a "friend of Syria" at a time when many of his colleagues in Congress were "too timid to visit Damascus." Despite the dark clouds of Gaza and other bilateral disagreements hanging over the meeting, Muallim appeared genuinely upbeat about the prospect for better relations with the U.S. At the same time, he seemed to recognize that some of his positions, such as the SARG's justification for sentencing democracy advocates, strained the limits of credibility. ¶18. (U) Senator Specter did not clear on this message. CONNELLY