BUSINESSMAN OFFERS HIS SERVICES AS POLITICAL

S E C R E T DAMASCUS 000254 NOFORN SIPDIS DEPT FOR NEA/ELA; NSC FOR SHAPIRO/MCDERMOTT E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/2019 TAGS: ECON ETRD ETTC PGOV PREL PTER SY SUBJECT: BUSINESSMAN OFFERS HIS SERVICES AS POLITICAL INTERLOCUTOR Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Maura Connelly for reasons 1.4(b,d) -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (S/NF) During a March 30 courtesy call, a prominent Syrian businessman offered his services as a political interlocutor to the Syrian Foreign Minister, Director of Syrian Military Intelligence and Deputy Vice President for National Security Affairs. To establish his bona fides, he claimed to have influenced decisionmakers in both Damascus and Washington in the wake of the September 2006 attack on the U.S. Embassy. He further claimed to have once conspired with SARG officials in an unsuccessful attempt to have Syrian Ambassador Imad Mustafa reassigned to London. Expressing frustration with the continuing political influence of USSR-educated Ba'ath Party officials, he urged the U.S. to invest in education and exchange programs for the next generation of Syrian leaders. Calling U.S. economic sanctions a "PR disaster" for the United States, he argued sanctions had no economic impact on Syria but provided regime hardliners with ammunition to use against President Asad's desire for a better relationship with the U.S. End summary. -------------- A Syrian "Quartet" -------------- ¶2. (S/NF) Prominent Shia businessman and CEO of Nahas Enterprise Group Saeb Nahas (protect) greeted the Charge and Econoff in his Baramkeh office on March 30 and described his efforts to "defend" the U.S. and U.S. Embassy to the regime over the past several years. His son Sabih Nahas -- whom Saeb called the "Crown Prince" -- and the company's director for international relations Shukri Ali were also present. Nahas claimed that he was part of a Syrian "quartet" that met regularly to discuss international affairs, with the other three members being FM Walid al-Muallim, Deputy Vice President for Security Affairs Muhammad Nassif Khayr-Bayk, and Syrian Military Intelligence (SMI) Chief Assef Shawqat. He described all of the "quartet" members as "pro-American" -- even Specially Designated Nationals Khayr-Bayk and Shawqat -- and posited the group as a moderate faction that opposed Ba'athist hardliners within the regime. -------------- Ministries Dominated by Anti-American Ba'athists -------------- ¶3. (S/NF) Nahas blamed much of the SARG's anti-American sentiment on Syria's former relationship with the USSR. Nahas said that there were Ministers and Deputy Ministers throughout the government who had been educated in Eastern Europe in the 1960s-70s, where they had been brainwashed to be suspicious of the West. When the Charge inquired how powerful the Ba'ath Party still was, Nahas related the story of his friend Dr. Hani Murtada's failed attempt to reform the Ministry of Higher Education. When the Canadian-educated Murtada had been Minister of Higher Education (circa 2004-2006),he had attempted to implement a program to evaluate the academic credentials of Ministry officials -) which would have provided justification for firing many of the old guard. According to Nahas, Murtada's proposal provoked an intense backlash from the Ba'ath Party, which unleashed such a campaign of character assassination that Murtada eventually gave up. Murtada, said Nahas, is close to both President Asad and Assef Shawqat by virtue of being their children's pediatrician, but his proximity to the ruling family could not shield him from Party politics. ¶4. (S/NF) Nahas used the Murtada experience as evidence of President Asad's limited ability to change the old-guard mentality in Syria -- despite Asad's "genuine" belief in reform and liberalization. Nahas suggested that the U.S. should invest in education and exchange programs for the "next generation" of Syria's leaders as an effective, albeit long-term, strategy to moderate Syrian political behavior. -------------- U.S. Sanctions a "PR" Disaster -------------- ¶5. (C) Nahas characterized U.S. economic sanctions against Syria as a "PR disaster" that strengthens hardliners' arguments to Bashar against improving relations with the U.S. He claimed he had very little personal stake in the lifting of U.S. sanctions, as his only U.S. business affiliation is with Oshkosh to provide rescue vehicles at Syria's airports. (Note: Post understood that the interagency had taken a decision on a pending export license application for Oshkosh in mid-March 2009, but Oshkosh had not contacted Nahas Enterprises with the result of that decision as of this writing. End note.) ¶6. (C) Nahas lamented, however, that U.S. sanctions are deterring the UK pharmaceutical giant GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) from purchasing Avenzor, Nahas' financially-troubled pharmaceutical factory in Syria. GSK, he said, is afraid that U.S. sanctions would prevent them from importing the necessary automation hardware and software required to manufacture GSK products in Syria. (Note: An executive with Unipharma, the largest pharmaceutical manufacturer in Syria, recently told us that GSK had found Avenzor in violation of its contract to make Panadol a few years ago. According to our contact, Avenzor technicians were discovered using cheap, imported acetaminophen from India instead of a more expensive required ingredient. Following the discovery, Nahas reluctantly signed away his right as the exclusive Syrian manufacturer of Panadol to Unipharma. End note.) -------------- Not "Just" a Businessman -------------- ¶7. (C) Nahas spoke with pride about being the Honorary Consul of Mexico to Syria, and his son Sabih as the Honorary Consul of Djibouti. While Saeb admitted relishing his role in international politics, he seemed to lament that his son was only interested in "making money." Agreeing with his father's assessment, Sabih said that he viewed the potential financial risk of political behavior in Syria as far outweighing any reward. -------------- Nahas's Role In Wake of September 2006 Embassy Attack -------------- ¶8. (S/NF) As evidence of his effectiveness as a political interlocutor, Nahas claimed that he had influenced decisionmakers in both Damascus and Washington in the wake of the September 2006 attack on the U.S. Embassy in Damascus. He said that he had persuaded the Embassy to provide a copy of Post's surveillance video of the attack to SMI, a move that he claimed Washington had been reluctant to authorize. The week after the attack, according to Nahas, Syrian Ambassador to Washington Imad Mustafa refused to issue visas for seven USG security officers intending to investigate the attack and analyze the Embassy's security posture. After learning of the visa refusals, Nahas claimed that he argued to the "quartet" that Mustafa's decision should be overturned on the grounds that (a) Washington had eventually allowed the Embassy to share video of the attack with SMI; and (b) the visa applicants had truthfully declared their USG affiliation and their intentions in Damascus. According to Nahas, FM Muallim then called Mustafa and ordered him to issue the seven visas, which he did. -------------- Engineering a Replacement for Mustafa -------------- ¶9. (S/NF) Nahas further claimed that he had met with the "quartet" to discuss Mustafa's unhelpful behavior in Washington. He recounted how he had persuaded the "quartet" that Mustafa should be replaced, and had conspired with them to engineer a scheme in which Mustafa could be removed while saving political face. The scheme would have entailed sending Syria's Ambassador to London Sami Khayami to fill the then-vacant position at the Syrian Embassy in Paris first, followed by Mustafa's transfer to London. Unfortunately, Nahas said, the SARG needed to fill the position in Paris before it became politically feasible to move Mustafa out of Washington. -------------- Offering Additional Political Bona Fides -------------- ¶10. (S/NF) As additional proof of his political cover, Nahas boasted that he had continued to attend U.S. Embassy representational events long after other prominent Syrian businessmen (then-Chamber of Commerce Chairman Rateb Shallah and Syrian Arab Red Crescent Director Dr. Abdul Rahman Attar, specifically) had stopped coming. He claimed to have told the "quartet" that he understood why they might not want to allow Syrian civil servants to attend Embassy functions, but private citizens should not be deterred. Mustafa's lack of interpersonal skills in Washington, he told them, should not be held against the U.S. Embassy in Damascus. To us, he added that the U.S. Embassy needed Syrian friends more during tough political times than when the bilateral relationship had been better. ¶11. (S/NF) Nahas said that he had offered to go to Washington in October of 2007 to meet with U.S. Congressmen and Senators on the margins of the annual World Bank conference. He had hoped his visit might advance U.S.-Syrian relations after then-Secretary of State Rice's meeting with FM Muallim at Sharm el-Sheikh. President Asad had discouraged his planned visit as "a waste of time" after the Rice-Muallim meeting failed to yield any results, which Asad attributed to the influence of then-NSC Senior Director for NENA Elliott Abrams. ¶12. (C) As a final underscoring of his political influence, Nahas showed the Charge photographs of himself with some 30 foreign heads of state and ambassadors, including Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Iraqi PM Nouri al-Maliki, and Iraqi National Security Advisor Muwafaq al-Rubaie. He ticked off his membership in several bilateral and multilateral business NGOs, including the Franco-Arab Businessman's Council and the Syrian-Russian Businessmen's Council. He claimed that he had been stalling his Russian counterparts' efforts to meet and discuss ways to strengthen Russian-Syrian private sector ties, in the hopes that Syria's political and economic relations with the West would eventually improve. "People tell me I'm stupid for missing the opportunity to make money," he said, "when the other side (U.S.) isn't offering me anything." (Note: Nahas did not mention his long association with the Syrian-Iranian Businessmen's Council, nor why he resigned his position in 2008. End note.) -------------- Comment -------------- ¶13. (S/NF) Even though Nahas probably overstates his political influence, his access to Muallim is known and his depiction of Ba'athist intransigence permeating SARG ministries rings true. Nahas' competitors in the Syrian business community are disdainful of his business acumen, claiming that his model for "success" is simply to obtain exclusive rights to foreign goods (such as Peugeot automobiles),sell them to the Syrian government, and collect hefty commissions. If Muallim considers Nahas an informal economic advisor, his eagerness to be an Embassy interlocutor may prove useful if he will preview SARG positions with respect to U.S. sanctions. CONNELLY