FELTMAN-SHAPIRO MARCH 7 DISCUSSIONS WITH SYRIAN FM

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 DAMASCUS 000198

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
NSC FOR SHAPIRO
PARIS FOR WALLER, LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/12/2029
TAGS: PREL KWBG KPAL IS SY
SUBJECT: FELTMAN-SHAPIRO MARCH 7 DISCUSSIONS WITH SYRIAN FM
MUALLIM ON GAZA, PALESTINIAN RECONCILIATION

Classified By: CDA Maura Connelly for reasons 1.4 b, d.


1. (S/NF) Summary: Acting NEA A/S Feltman and NSC NENA
Senior Director Shapiro emphasized the strong U.S. commitment
to achieving a two-state Israeli-Palestinian solution and
providing humanitarian relief for Gazans, as demonstrated by
the appointment of Special Envoy Mitchell and the U.S. pledge
of $900 million to reconstruct Gaza. Muallim said Syria had
worked to promote a durable ceasefire in Gaza, facilitate a
Hamas-Israeli prisoner exchange, and support Palestinian
reconciliation. Syrian influence had helped convince Hamas
leaders to make public statements that represented indirect
recognition of Israel and acceptance of a peace agreement
with Israel, subject to its ratification by a Palestinian
referendum. Feltman and Shapiro argued Syria should use its
influence with Hamas to do more. Hamas actions and rhetoric
had undermined efforts to promote peace. Muallim stressed
Syria was seeking to find a constructive approach to
integrate Hamas into Palestinian Authority (PA) and PLO
structures because not doing so would trigger another Gaza
conflict, which would be bad for the whole region. After the
meeting, Feltman met Muallim one-on-one and argued it would
be insufficient for Hamas to make constructive statements
only after the formation of a reconciliation government. He
said there might be Fatah gestures coming and it would be
helpful if Syria could press Hamas to make positive gestures
during the course of reconciliation discussions. End
Summary.


2. (S/NF) Acting NEA A/S Jeffrey Feltman and NSC Senior
Director for the Near East and North Africa Dan Shapiro met
for three-and-a-half hours on March 7 with Syrian Foreign
Minister Walid Muallim, Vice FM Faisal Miqdad, and
Presidential Advisor for Political and Media Affairs
Bouthaina Shaaban. Feltman's delegation was accompanied by
Charge and Pol/Econ Chief (notetaker.) Feltman and Shapiro's
central message was that the U.S. administration was pursuing
sustained and principled engagement with Syria and other
countries as a matter of policy. The President and Secretary
did not view engagement as a reward, but rather as a tool for
achieving concrete objectives. This cable reports on the
parts of the discussion that dealt with Gaza,
Palestinian-Israeli issues, and Palestinian reconciliation.
It should be read in conjunction with septels on discussions
regarding Arab-Israeli comprehensive peace issues, Iraq,
Iran, Lebanon, and Embassy Damascus operations.

--------------
Gaza Ceasefire and Prisoner Exchange
--------------


3. (S/NF) Feltman commented that the Secretary's message at
the March 2 Gaza Reconstruction Conference in Sharm el Sheikh
sought to convey a serious U.S. intent to promote a two-state
solution. For Arab countries, the U.S. wanted to provide
assurances that it would be actively engaging in the region,
while for Israel the U.S. was attempting not to say anything
that would appear as interference in the government formation
process. Senator Mitchell was understandably focused on the
Palestinian track in the aftermath of the Gaza crisis, but it
was important to understand his mandate also included
promoting peace between Israel and its neighbors, including
Syria and Lebanon, Feltman said.


4. (S/NF) Muallim replied Syria was not in competition with
Egypt on the Palestinian file and recognized geography made
Egypt a natural player in Gaza. But Syria had focused on
helping Hamas and other groups, such as the Palestinian
Islamic Jihad (PIJ),which were present in Gaza. In
coordination with Turkey, Syria had sought to promote a
sustainable ceasefire. Muallim said when then-PM Olmert had
announced a unilateral Israeli ceasefire in Gaza, he
(Muallim) had worked with Turkey to encourage Hamas leaders
to announce their own unilateral ceasefire. Syria recognized
that the previous June 2008 ceasefire agreement lacked a
clause for renewal and had at that time recommended to Egypt
to insert language allowing for an automatic renewal if both
sides agreed. The ceasefire in Cyprus, which started
initially with a duration of six months but contained a
renewal clause, had lasted 35 years, Muallim explained, so
why not start with an 18-month ceasefire in Gaza and allow

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for its extension? Hamas, he added, had accepted this
language, so long as Israel agreed to the opening of all
border crossings and new security arrangements at Rafah.
Syria had also advised Hamas, in coordination with France and
Qatar, on a prisoner exchange deal with Israel, but achieving
a ceasefire should be the priority, followed by measures to
ease suffering in Gaza, Muallim said. Muallim noted he had
discussed these issues with Saudi King Abdullah and the
Syrians and Saudis were in agreement on these points.


--------------
Palestinian Reconciliation
--------------


5. (S/NF) Syria had agreed to participate in the March 2
Sharm conference and wanted to play a positive role in
encouraging Palestinian unity, Muallim continued. The SARG
had urged Hamas to participate in reconciliation talks in
Cairo, in part because Damascus had sensed, but still was not
sure, the idea of Palestinian reconciliation was no longer a
"red line" for U.S. policy. Saudi FM Saud al-Faisal had told
Syrian leaders earlier that week that Riyadh was also working
to push the Palestinians to work out their differences.
Shaaban interjected that U.S. statements in favor of
engagement somewhat contradicted its position on Hamas. The
Arab states have committed to recognizing Israel's security,
yet the Secretary refrained from commenting on both Israel's
reluctance to open the Gaza borders fully and the continued
expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank, she said.


6. (S/NF) Feltman stressed the President,s commitment to a
two-state solution and comprehensive peace at a time when
many U.S. commentators believed his sole focus should be on
the U.S. economy. The administration had pledged $900
million to Gaza reconstruction. The Secretary's public
remarks in Sharm were firm on the objective of a two-state
solution and expressed empathy with the plight and suffering
of the Palestinian people.


--------------
Dealing with Hamas
--------------


7. (S/NF) Feltman said that Washington's policy review was
looking at Palestinian reconciliation in terms of whether it
advanced the objectives of a two-state solution and
comprehensive peace. The U.S. believed the Palestinians
needed transparent and accountable political institutions to
achieve their ambitions for an independent state. Washington
regarded the Quartet principles as a means of achieving these
goals rather than as a set of insurmountable obstacles. The
PLO had met the Quartet requirements, so why not Hamas?
Without concrete Hamas gestures to show it was ready to
govern responsibly and negotiate with Israel, the
international community would lack confidence that Hamas
would be willing or able to engage Israel as a partner or to
manage funds from international donors responsibly, Feltman
explained.


8. (S/NF) Muallim replied the Quartet principles would not
work because Hamas was not willing to accept them as
preconditions. Hamas, he said, had won the 2006 Palestinian
elections, which were judged free and fair by U.S. and
international observers. But the international community had
ignored the results and chose not to deal with Hamas. Hamas
remained the actual power in Gaza. A merger of the
Palestinian Authority and Hamas was the only way forward. PA
President Mahmoud Abbas's term had expired, added Shaaban,
stressing Syria wanted to maintain good relations with Abbas
but believed it was up to the PA to reach a realistic
agreement with Hamas.


9. (S/NF) Against this backdrop, Muallim said, imposing
demands on Hamas would only complicate the situation. "But if
you ask us to work constructively to achieve the same goals,
ok," commented Muallim. Syria and Turkey had cooperated to
educate Hamas politically. At their urging, Hamas leaders
had made statements that were tantamount to indirect
recognition of Israel and acceptance of any future peace

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agreements so long as they were ratified by a Palestinian
referendum. Was it more useful to keep Hamas out of
government or teach it how to be part of the political
process? asked Muallim. Senator Mitchell had dealt with all
the parties in Northern Ireland, including Sinn Fein. The UK
was now talking to Hizballah out of recognition of its
political importance in Lebanon. "The U.S. needs to
recognize political realities," Muallim insisted.


--------------
Hamas Has Opportunity to Do More Now
--------------


10. (S/NF) Feltman and Shapiro argued Syria should use its
influence with Hamas to do more. Shapiro commented Hamas
deserved its designation as a terrorist organization under
U.S. law. Washington understood Syria had used its influence
with Hamas, but at the end of the day, Hamas needed to take
the necessary steps to indicate a willingness to be a
productive partner in peace. At present, Hamas was doing the
opposite, but it could send a positive signal by refraining
from rocket attacks and smuggling of weapons, for example.
Muallim replied he had been a negotiator for 18 years and had
achieved nothing; by comparison, Hizballah,s resistance had
forced a unilateral Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. Abbas
had spent a lifetime (sic) negotiating, had achieved nothing,
and was losing support. To convince the Palestinians that a
two-state solution was still viable, it would be necessary to
convince Hamas and PIJ to become part of the PLO and the PA;
how they did so would have to be up to the Palestinians.


11. (S/NF) Feltman and Shapiro argued Hamas's actions and
rhetoric had hurt efforts to promote peace. Muallim and
Shabaan retorted the U.S. needed to do more to restrain
Israel, which was acting to undermine the prospect for peace.
As Israel's friend, the U.S. needed to remind Israel that
demographic trends would create an unmanageable situation
without a two-state solution, commented Shaaban. The U.S.
needed to recognize that the only way to shape Arab opinion
was by creating a new dynamic in the region. The Arab press
had been very critical of the Secretary's remarks during her
trip through the region because they had ignored Israel's
destruction of Gaza and continuation of settlement expansion
in the West Bank. Feltman responded the Secretary had been
very frank with Israeli officials but had carefully chosen
the wording of her public remarks to avoid interfering in the
Israeli government formation process. "We have to recognize
that we could be the last generation to achieve peace,"
Shaaban said. "That's why we're here," replied Feltman.


12. (S/NF) In response to a question from the Charge,
Muallim affirmed the SARG was negotiating with Hamas and PIJ
to move them toward joining the Palestinian political
process. Syria recognize that not doing so would likely
trigger another Gaza conflict, which would be bad for the
whole region. Muallim urged the U.S. to understand this
approach would take time. "If I tell them (Hamas) to
recognize Israel, they will ask when Israel is going to
recognize them?" Muallim said. Shabaan interjected that
Syria had not recognized Israel but was willing to negotiate
with Israel; applying the same principle, the West should not
make Hamas's recognition of Israel the first step.


13. (S/NF) Charge responded that if Hamas joined the PLO,
it would presumably recognize Israel because the PLO had done
so. She asked on what basis Hamas would be allocated
representation in PLO institutions. "This is up to the
Palestinians," Muallim retorted, clarifying that Syria
supported Hamas's integration into the PA and PLO. Feltman
observed there were many issues, such as determining the
percentage of Hamas's representation in the PA and the PLO,
which would require further thought. For the U.S., it was
important for Hamas to recognize the opportunity to take
concrete steps prior to any agreement on reconciliation that
would positively influence how the international community
dealt with it once these agreements were in place. Shapiro
added that, even as the United States viewed Hamas as an
organization that Syria ultimately should not want to host,
Washington would positively view Syrian efforts to push Hamas
toward more constructive positions, as the Syrian Foreign

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Minister suggested Syria had been doing. Muallim replied
Hamas's representation in Damascus was purely political and
was consistent with the Syrian policy of allowing a political
presence for all the Palestinian factions. Syria supported
the objective of achieving a comprehensive peace and believed
the support of all the Palestinian factions would be
necessary to achieve this goal. The Syrian side recognized
and appreciated the constructive U.S. approach and
willingness to address these issues without an agenda of
pre-conditions, Muallim stated.


14. (S/NF) Feltman argued it would be very helpful to be
able to demonstrate to Israel that the Palestinians were
taking steps toward becoming a credible negotiating partner
because Israel tended not to view the Palestinians and
Syrians in the same way. Syria had abided scrupulously by
its 1974 separation agreement with Israel, but there was a
lack of comparable Palestinian behavior that would
demonstrate a recognition of, and respect for the rules of
the road. "People ask us why we haven't established a
Syrian resistance," quipped Muallim. Feltman replied, "The
Lebanese say you want to fight to the last Lebanese."
"Perhaps we need to leave some of these issues for discussion
with Senator Mitchell," Muallim concluded, unable to suppress
a slight grin.


15. (S/NF) In a one-on-one session with Muallim after the
meeting, Feltman argued it would be insufficient for Hamas to
make constructive statements only after the formation of a
reconciliation government. Obliquely referring to the
upcoming Salem Fayyad resignation, he said there might be
Fatah gestures coming and it would be helpful if Syria could
press Hamas to make positive gestures during the course of
reconciliation discussions.


16. (SBU) Acting NEA A/S Feltman and NSC NENA Senior
Director Shapiro cleared this cable.



CONNELLY