FELTMAN-SHAPIRO MARCH 7 DISCUSSIONS WITH SYRIAN FM

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 DAMASCUS 000196 NOFORN SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA NSC FOR SHAPIRO/MCDERMOTT PARIS FOR WALLER, LONDON FOR TSOU E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/12/2029 TAGS: PREL PTER IZ SY SUBJECT: FELTMAN-SHAPIRO MARCH 7 DISCUSSIONS WITH SYRIAN FM MUALLIM ON IRAQ Classified By: CDA Maura Connelly for reasons 1.4 b, d. ¶1. (S/NF) Summary: Syrian FM Muallim and Acting NEA A/S Feltman each expressed support for a united, independent, stable, and secure Iraq. Muallim welcomed the U.S. President,s plan for withdrawing U.S. troops from Iraq in a responsible fashion. Feltman pressed Muallim to do more in the spirit of &our shared interests8 ) namely, work with Iraq more closely on the borders and clamp down more firmly &from the airport to the border8 on foreign fighters. Iraq needed to recognize its responsibilities to do more as we recognize al-Qaeda poses a threat to the region, replied Muallim, who pledged to discuss security cooperation with PM Maliki during his upcoming visit to Baghdad, &to see whether we can do more.8 Muallim said Syria wanted to help the U.S. achieve an orderly withdrawal and ensure a safe and stable Iraq. Syria was willing to work with Iraq and eventually the U.S. on security cooperation. &But we need a political umbrella first." In a one-on-one discussion at the conclusion of the longer meeting, Feltman raised Abu Ghadiyah lieutenant Abu Khalaf as a specific example of an operative who continued to operate in Syria and threaten U.S. and Iraqi lives. Muallim asked for more details from the Embassy. End Summary. ¶2. (S/NF) Acting NEA A/S Jeff Feltman and NSC Senior Director for the Near East and North Africa Dan Shapiro met for three-and-a-half hours on March 7 with Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Muallim, Vice FM Faisal Miqdad, and Presidential Advisor for Political and Media Affairs Bouthaina Shaaban. Feltman's delegation was accompanied by Charge and Pol/Econ Chief (notetaker.) Feltman and Shapiro's central message was that the U.S. administration was pursuing sustained and principled engagement with Syria and other countries as a matter of policy. The President and Secretary did not view engagement as a reward, but rather as a tool for achieving concrete objectives. This cable reports on the parts of the discussion that dealt with Syria's relationships with Iraq. It should be read in conjunction with septels on discussions regarding Lebanon, Iran, Palestinian issues, comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace issues, and Embassy Damascus operations. -------------- Iraq: 70 percent Overlapping Interests -------------- ¶3. (S/NF) Acting A/S Feltman told FM Muallim that he had held a constructive February 26 meeting with Syrian Ambassador to the U.S. Imad Moustafa and had received readouts from several recent U.S. Congressional delegations (CODELs) visiting Syria about their discussions with President Asad and other senior Syrian officials. In particular, Washington had viewed as positive and reassuring the reported remarks by President Asad that U.S. and Syrian interests in the region overlapped by 70 percent. Feltman underscored that his and Shapiro's visit was the first step toward establishing a dialogue with Syrian government (SARG), explaining that Washington was pursuing an alternative policy to promote concrete steps. The U.S. goal was not to present a list of demands or dictate preconditions, but rather to discuss issues of mutual concern and to identify areas where both sides might be willing to cooperate to solve problems. The President would be evaluating possible next steps in the bilateral relationship, he concluded. ¶4. (S/NF) Muallim replied the Syrian government agreed that 70 percent of U.S.-Syrian interests were "non-contradictatory" and said the main elements of confrontation had occurred because of the Iraq war and the previous administration's efforts to isolate Syria. Muallim reported he had asked former Secretary Rice in New York in September 2008 what the U.S. policy toward Syria had achieved in the previous eight years? Rice, according to Muallim, said that she was meeting him in order to change it. Muallim then told Feltman he had asked Rice for one example of a U.S. foreign policy success in the world arena. Muallim explained that this meeting with Rice had been their third and last, and he had "dared" to ask her honest opinion. "She was an DAMASCUS 00000196 002 OF 004 intellectual," continued Muallim. "I don't remember her providing any story of success from the previous administration," he said. Syria therefore welcomed the new U.S. policy of engaging countries with which it had differing views. -------------- "Let's Discuss Iraq First" -------------- ¶5. (S/NF) Continuing his account of an September 2008 conversation in New York with former Secretary Rice, Muallim said he had told her Syria wanted "a united, independent, stable and secure Iraq, with an Arab national identity." This goal served Syrian interests and those of the region, he said. The lack of stability in Iraq had caused Syria to suffer on several fronts, including the 1.5 million Iraqi "guests" who had sought refuge in Syria. Syria had assumed a heavy social and economic burden, but it had agreed to shoulder this onus because President Asad had recognized the importance of providing health, social, education and other benefits to prevent the radicalization of the Iraqi population. Iraq, Muallim continued, required a real national reconciliation that included all political interests (except al-Qaeda). Many Iraqi former regime elements (FREs) and resistance groups were still active in Syria, and the Syrian government was willing to use its influence to steer these groups back into the political process. Syria also wanted to see a true national Iraqi army that reflected the entire nation. Syria, concluded Muallim, wanted good relations with the Iraqi government in all fields, including security cooperation. "Where do our interests contradict?" he asked A/S Feltman. ¶6. (S/NF) Feltman replied that Syria's stated vision for Iraq was similar to that of the U.S. The President's announcement of the U.S. strategy made at Camp Lejeune to withdraw U.S. forces from Iraq emphasized the need for strong Iraqi institutions and to avoid a confessional-based system. Muallim replied that the SARG had long called for a timetable for a withdrawal for U.S. forces and now it had one. "We can help you to achieve this," he said. -------------- Positive Bases for Cooperation -------------- ¶7. (S/NF) Feltman acknowledged Syria had borne a large burden created by the flow of Iraqi refugees. Senior Coordinator for Iraqi Refugee Issues James Foley had publicly recognized Syria's contributions, and the U.S. agreed on the need to create an Iraq that was appealing and welcoming for returning Iraqis. The U.S. also recognized Syria had been a victim of al-Qaeda violence and had taken note of Syria's arrest of some 1,200 al-Qaeda affiliates in the last several years. Given the two countries' shared interests in seeing a secure and stable Iraq, Feltman urged the SARG to do more to help increase security along its borders with Iraq and to help reduce the number of attacks in Iraq by foreign fighters who enter Iraqi territory through Syria. The request was not intended to belittle Syria's efforts, but rather to urge Syria to do more, "from the airport to the border," explained Feltman. The problem of foreign fighters continued to pose a problem for Iraq and the U.S., and additional Syrian actions on the security front would support a shared vision for Iraq's future, Feltman said. NSC Senior Director Shapiro added that this issue was politically important for U.S. leaders and the U.S. people, who wanted to see U.S. soldiers return home safely. ¶8. (S/NF) Muallim replied border security required cooperation on both sides. The situation had improved, but Iraqi cooperation had been lacking in the past. The two countries had established a Joint Security Committee, which had provided a useful venue for meetings and exchanging information. Unfortunately, the Iraqis had provided inaccurate information and names which had decreased the utility of this joint security body. The SARG had instituted a number of unilateral measures, including an increased a border security presence and application of closer scrutiny DAMASCUS 00000196 003 OF 004 of young Arab males seeking to enter the country. Syria had also hosted three separate meetings of the Iraqi Neighbors Border Security Working Group. But no country could control its borders 100 percent, claimed Muallim. "Iraq needs to recognize its responsibilities as we recognize al-Qaeda poses a threat to the region," he said. Muallim agreed that more could be done and said Syria wanted "to tackle the roots of the problem." It was, for example, happy to engage Saudi Arabia and other countries. ¶9. (S/NF) Muallim reported President Asad had recently received the new Iraqi Ambassador to Syria, Ala' al-Jawadi, and after the meeting, Asad had instructed Muallim to travel to Baghdad as soon as possible. Syria had been the first Arab country to open an embassy in Baghdad after the fall of Saddam Hussein and had called on other Arabs to follow suit, Muallim recounted. Syria now wanted better relations with Iraq and saw this opening as an opportunity. Feltman emphasized that the Iraqi government would be open to Syrian actions to improve security cooperation and urged Muallim to raise the issue with PM Maliki in Baghdad. Muallim agreed to discuss the security issue and "to see if we can do more." Presidential Advisor Shabaan added there was a will in Iraq and Syria to increase cooperation and expand relations on every level. The recent Iraqi provincial elections had marked an important step forward for the country. Sectarianism and violence had decreased, but now it was important to exploit the calm to improve conditions for ordinary Iraqis. Vice FM Miqdad offered that Syria shared the U.S. desire to see a decrease in fatalities in Iraq. ¶10. (S/NF) Muallim commented the U.S. President's withdrawal strategy was an "encouraging step" that would cut the ability of the Iraqi resistance to mobilize forces. Syria "hated to see" lives lost in Iraq, but the SARG judged this to be a "natural result" of the U.S. occupation and the reaction of the Iraqi resistance. With a change in U.S. policy, Syria wanted to help the U.S. achieve its withdrawal and the creation of a safe and secure Iraq. "We can start together with security cooperation, but we need a political umbrella first," Muallim stipulated. It was necessary to remain cautious, Muallim continued, because al-Qaeda could surge. -------------- Syrian-Iraqi Relations -------------- ¶11. (S/NF) Asked by Feltman about the state of Syria's relations with Iraq, Muallim said the two countries had exchanged many pledges, but up to now had seen very little progress. The SARG used to blame the U.S. for Iraq's unwillingness to implement the numerous agreements and MOUs signed by the two countries. Muallim recounted that he had asked former Secretary Rice in September 2008 in New York why the U.S. had opposed Iraq-Syrian engagement. "She replied, 'we are not.' Then I asked her if the U.S. was encouraging it. She said, 'we are not,'" Muallim reported. Muallim said he had tried to convince PM Maliki and President Talabani to build stronger bilateral relations based on shared interests, but there had been little movement. Feltman replied the Iraqis had told U.S. officials they were unsure how to deal with Syria in light of continuing irritants in the relationship. For example, Iraqis cited Syria's rejection of GOI requests to extradite former regime elements as a source of tensions. ¶12. (S/NF) Muallim responded that Syria would not respond favorably to these requests. Such a hand over "won't happen," he emphasized, explaining this was an issue with a long history. Syria had sought the extradition of Syrian Muslim Brotherhood members during the reign of Saddam Hussein, to no avail. Syria had sought their extradition after the fall of Saddam's government, only to be told the U.S. would reject such a request. "Now the Iraqis are in charge," responded Feltman. As Muallim and other Syrians were suggesting, the Iraqis were evaluating their options in terms of defined interests. Shaaban offered that there was now evidence of Iraq reintegrating itself back into the region, which was necessary and positive. Feltman replied that the State Department had taken note of this shift by removing the position for a Senior Advisor for Iraq and DAMASCUS 00000196 004 OF 004 integrating Iraq back into the Bureau for Near Eastern Affairs. The same had occurred at the NSC, Shapiro reported. -------------- Wanted: Abu Khalaf -------------- ¶13. (S/NF) In a private one-on-one session with Muallim at the conclusion of the longer meeting, Feltman raised Abu Ghadiyah lieutenant Abu Khalaf as-Sammani as a specific example of an al-Qaeda operative who continued operate in Syria and threaten U.S. and Iraqi lives. Muallim sought information on Abu Khalaf's nationality and location; Feltman told Muallim the U.S. believed him to be active in Qamishli area. Saying he had not heard about the issue previously, Muallim asked for more details from the Embassy. ¶14. (SBU) Acting NEA A/S Feltman and NSC NEA Senior Director Shapiro cleared this cable. CONNELLY