FELTMAN-SHAPIRO MARCH 7 DISCUSSIONS WITH SYRIAN FM MUALLIM ON IRAN

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 DAMASCUS 000195



NOFORN

SIPDIS



DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA

NSC FOR SHAPIRO/MCDERMOTT

PARIS FOR WALLER, LONDON FOR TSOU



E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/12/2029

TAGS: PREL, PTER, IR, IS, SY

SUBJECT: FELTMAN-SHAPIRO MARCH 7 DISCUSSIONS WITH SYRIAN FM

MUALLIM ON IRAN



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Classified By: CDA Maura Connelly for reasons 1.4 b, d.



1. (S/NF) Summary: Providing a lengthy review of Syria's

30-year relations with Iran, Muallim denied Syria,s

dependence on Iran and said Damascus maintained relations

with Tehran because it promoted Syrian interests in resisting

Israeli occupation, among other objectives. Syria had

decided to attend Annapolis and conduct indirect peace talks

with Israel based on its own interests, despite Iranian

objections. On Iran's nuclear program, Muallim said he had

advised FM Solana to drop the Five-plus-One group's

three-tier demands on Iran to suspend enrichment activities.

Instead, the West needed to recognize Iran,s rights under

the NPT to conduct civilian nuclear activities. Feltman and

Shapiro argued there was a lack of trust about Iran,s

intentions. The U.S. policy review on Iran was ongoing, but

the U.S. had offered to invite Iran to an Afghanistan

security conference. Muallim replied this was a positive

step and hoped the U.S. would engage Iran directly. Muallim

recapped his meetings with Saudi King Abdullah and Saudi FM

Saud al-Faisal, noting Syria had agreed it was best for Qatar

not to invite an Iranian representative to this year's Arab

League Summit. End Summary



2. (S/NF) Acting NEA A/S Jeffrey Feltman and NSC Senior

Director for the Near East and North Africa Dan Shapiro met

for three-and-a-half hours on March 7 with Syrian Foreign

Minister Walid Muallim, Vice FM Faisal Miqdad, and

Presidential Advisor for Political and Media Affairs

Bouthaina Shaaban. Feltman's delegation was accompanied by

Charge and Pol/Econ Chief (notetaker.) Feltman and

Shapiro's central message was that the U.S. administration

was pursuing sustained and principled engagement with Syria

and other countries as a matter of policy. The President and

Secretary did not view engagement as a reward, but rather as

a tool for achieving concrete objectives. This cable reports

on the parts of the discussion that dealt with Syria's

relationship with Iran. It should be read in conjunction

with septels on discussions regarding Lebanon, Iraq, and

Palestinian issues, comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace issues,

and Embassy Damascus operations.





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Syrian Interests in Relations with Iran

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3. (S/NF) Summing up a lengthy presentation on Syria's

30-year relationship with Iran, Muallim asserted Syria's

position was motivated by Israel's occupation of Arab land.

He denied Syria,s dependence on Iran and said Damascus

maintained relations with Tehran because it promoted Syrian

interests that included economic ties, a large number of

Iranian tourists traveling to Syria, and cultural ties. As

proof of Syria's free hand, Muallim argued Syria had decided

to attend Annapolis and conduct indirect peace talks with

Israel based on its own interests, despite Iranian

objections. "Syria is not in the pocket of anybody, even the

U.S.," Muallim stated.



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Engaging Iran: Syrian and U.S. Perspectives

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4. (S/NF) At the request of French President Nicholas

Sarkozy, Syria had discussed Iran's nuclear program with

Tehran, according to Muallim. Muallim stipulated Syria

opposed nuclear weapons by any country in the region, as

evinced by Syria's 2003 nuclear free zone proposal to the UN

Security Council. However, as President Asad and Muallim had

told EU Commissioner Solana during his February 25 visit to

Damascus, Syria viewed the Five-plus-One approach to Iran's

nuclear file as fundamentally flawed. Iran lacked confidence

in the good will of Western nations and saw the process as

deeply politicized against it. Syria's advice was that the

West needed to recognize Iran's right as an NPT signatory to

pursue a civilian nuclear program; calling on Iran to suspend

its enrichment activities as a precondition to negotiating

with it violated that principle. If Western countries were

willing to drop this pre-condition and recognize Iran's NPT

rights, then Iran might be persuaded to address concerns



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about the need for greater transparency. This discussion

needed to take place under the auspices of the IAEA, rather

than in the UN Security Council under the threat of

sanctions, Muallim argued.



5. (S/NF) Feltman replied there was a lack of confidence

among various countries concerning Iran's intentions and Iran

had a long way to go before it could rebuild the trust it had

lost. The IAEA had issued a number of damning reports

pointing out inconsistencies in Iran's nuclear program.

Iranian leaders continued to disseminate inflammatory

rhetoric against Israel and even other Arab nations. Feltman

explained the U.S. was currently conducting a comprehensive

review of its Iran policy and whether and under what

conditions engaging Tehran might be possible. The U.S. had

recently decided to invite the Iranians to participate in an

Afghanistan security conference, for example, but it was

unclear how Iranians would react to U.S. efforts to engage.

It would be necessary for Iran to take positive steps, as

well, argued Feltman. Iran's failure to implement relevant

UN Security Council resolutions, such as UNSCR 1747 in the

case of the Monchegorsk, did not portend well for Iran's

behavior.



6. (S/NF) Muallim said that a U.S. decision to engage Iran

was a positive sign, while noting Tehran's reaction thus far

had been negative. He encouraged the U.S. to continue these

efforts nevertheless. Regarding the Monchegorsk, Muallim

claimed the issue had been clouded because of differences in

interpretation regarding whether UNSCR 1747 applied to all

Iranian shipments or only to nuclear-related ones. As of

that moment, the Monchegorsk was a Russian ship under a

Cypriot flag carrying small arms. It had been unloaded and

its contents were now in storage under Cypriot custody.

Launching into one of the few tirades of the morning session,

Muallim argued the ship would not arrive in Syria. Why,

Muallim asked, unable to contain himself, did the U.S. want

Syria to negotiate with Israel from a state of "perpetual

weakness." "What about the illegal (sic) weapons the U.S.

supplied to Israel" he charged, referring to white phosphorus

"Who attacked whom three times last year?" Muallim asked.

This level of concern about a single ship seemed steeply

disproportionate to the fact it was delivering small arms to

Syria. What about U.S. shipments to Israel, some of which

may be been used to commit crimes against humanity? he asked.







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Arab Concerns about Iranian Intentions

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7. (S/NF) Feltman replied that he was not using this

meeting to make any accusations against Syria, but the

broader issue was how to deal with Iran. Shapiro added that

Iran was the only country that could violate UNSCR 1747.

Muallim argued that U.S. policy to isolate Iran had actually

increased Iran's regional influence. Syria recognized Iran's

legitimate interests and influence that extended between

southwest Asia to the Arabian/Persian Gulf. At the same,

Syria had sought to assure Arab countries of Iranian good

will and vice versa. Muallim recounted how former Syrian

President Hafez al-Asad had intervened diplomatically when

Iranian troops threatened to occupy Basra during the

Iraq-Iran War in the 1980s. Likewise, when Tehran recently

issued provocative rhetoric against Bahrain (claiming the

country was a province of Iran),President Asad had called

Bahraini King Hamad Bin Isa to reassure him of Arab support

against any threats against Bahraini sovereignty. Syria's

influence had helped to convince Iran to retract its

statement.



8. (S/NF) Currently, Syria was working to assure Arab

regimes of Iran,s desire for cooperation and to convince

Iran of Arab good will and vice versa, Muallim said. He

discounted Arab fear of Iran as "irrational" and ascribed it

to the previous U.S. administration's policies. Muallim

replied he had heard UAE concerns about Iranian plots to

invade and sought to assure Gulf and other Arab states that

Syria wanted the upcoming AL Summit to succeed. Muallim



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said he had talked to his Saudi and Egyptian counterparts as

well and had agreed to exclude any Iranian presence at the

Doha conference.



9. (SBU) Acting NEA A/S Feltman and NSC NENA Senior Director

Shapiro cleared this cable.



CONNELLY