FELTMAN-SHAPIRO MARCH 7 DISCUSSIONS WITH SYRIAN FM MUALLIM ON IRAN

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 DAMASCUS 000195

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA
NSC FOR SHAPIRO/MCDERMOTT
PARIS FOR WALLER, LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/12/2029
TAGS: PREL, PTER, IR, IS, SY
SUBJECT: FELTMAN-SHAPIRO MARCH 7 DISCUSSIONS WITH SYRIAN FM
MUALLIM ON IRAN

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Classified By: CDA Maura Connelly for reasons 1.4 b, d.

1. (S/NF) Summary: Providing a lengthy review of Syria's
30-year relations with Iran, Muallim denied Syria,s
dependence on Iran and said Damascus maintained relations
with Tehran because it promoted Syrian interests in resisting
Israeli occupation, among other objectives. Syria had
decided to attend Annapolis and conduct indirect peace talks
with Israel based on its own interests, despite Iranian
objections. On Iran's nuclear program, Muallim said he had
advised FM Solana to drop the Five-plus-One group's
three-tier demands on Iran to suspend enrichment activities.
Instead, the West needed to recognize Iran,s rights under
the NPT to conduct civilian nuclear activities. Feltman and
Shapiro argued there was a lack of trust about Iran,s
intentions. The U.S. policy review on Iran was ongoing, but
the U.S. had offered to invite Iran to an Afghanistan
security conference. Muallim replied this was a positive
step and hoped the U.S. would engage Iran directly. Muallim
recapped his meetings with Saudi King Abdullah and Saudi FM
Saud al-Faisal, noting Syria had agreed it was best for Qatar
not to invite an Iranian representative to this year's Arab
League Summit. End Summary

2. (S/NF) Acting NEA A/S Jeffrey Feltman and NSC Senior
Director for the Near East and North Africa Dan Shapiro met
for three-and-a-half hours on March 7 with Syrian Foreign
Minister Walid Muallim, Vice FM Faisal Miqdad, and
Presidential Advisor for Political and Media Affairs
Bouthaina Shaaban. Feltman's delegation was accompanied by
Charge and Pol/Econ Chief (notetaker.) Feltman and
Shapiro's central message was that the U.S. administration
was pursuing sustained and principled engagement with Syria
and other countries as a matter of policy. The President and
Secretary did not view engagement as a reward, but rather as
a tool for achieving concrete objectives. This cable reports
on the parts of the discussion that dealt with Syria's
relationship with Iran. It should be read in conjunction
with septels on discussions regarding Lebanon, Iraq, and
Palestinian issues, comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace issues,
and Embassy Damascus operations.


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Syrian Interests in Relations with Iran
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3. (S/NF) Summing up a lengthy presentation on Syria's
30-year relationship with Iran, Muallim asserted Syria's
position was motivated by Israel's occupation of Arab land.
He denied Syria,s dependence on Iran and said Damascus
maintained relations with Tehran because it promoted Syrian
interests that included economic ties, a large number of
Iranian tourists traveling to Syria, and cultural ties. As
proof of Syria's free hand, Muallim argued Syria had decided
to attend Annapolis and conduct indirect peace talks with
Israel based on its own interests, despite Iranian
objections. "Syria is not in the pocket of anybody, even the
U.S.," Muallim stated.

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Engaging Iran: Syrian and U.S. Perspectives
--------------

4. (S/NF) At the request of French President Nicholas
Sarkozy, Syria had discussed Iran's nuclear program with
Tehran, according to Muallim. Muallim stipulated Syria
opposed nuclear weapons by any country in the region, as
evinced by Syria's 2003 nuclear free zone proposal to the UN
Security Council. However, as President Asad and Muallim had
told EU Commissioner Solana during his February 25 visit to
Damascus, Syria viewed the Five-plus-One approach to Iran's
nuclear file as fundamentally flawed. Iran lacked confidence
in the good will of Western nations and saw the process as
deeply politicized against it. Syria's advice was that the
West needed to recognize Iran's right as an NPT signatory to
pursue a civilian nuclear program; calling on Iran to suspend
its enrichment activities as a precondition to negotiating
with it violated that principle. If Western countries were
willing to drop this pre-condition and recognize Iran's NPT
rights, then Iran might be persuaded to address concerns

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about the need for greater transparency. This discussion
needed to take place under the auspices of the IAEA, rather
than in the UN Security Council under the threat of
sanctions, Muallim argued.

5. (S/NF) Feltman replied there was a lack of confidence
among various countries concerning Iran's intentions and Iran
had a long way to go before it could rebuild the trust it had
lost. The IAEA had issued a number of damning reports
pointing out inconsistencies in Iran's nuclear program.
Iranian leaders continued to disseminate inflammatory
rhetoric against Israel and even other Arab nations. Feltman
explained the U.S. was currently conducting a comprehensive
review of its Iran policy and whether and under what
conditions engaging Tehran might be possible. The U.S. had
recently decided to invite the Iranians to participate in an
Afghanistan security conference, for example, but it was
unclear how Iranians would react to U.S. efforts to engage.
It would be necessary for Iran to take positive steps, as
well, argued Feltman. Iran's failure to implement relevant
UN Security Council resolutions, such as UNSCR 1747 in the
case of the Monchegorsk, did not portend well for Iran's
behavior.

6. (S/NF) Muallim said that a U.S. decision to engage Iran
was a positive sign, while noting Tehran's reaction thus far
had been negative. He encouraged the U.S. to continue these
efforts nevertheless. Regarding the Monchegorsk, Muallim
claimed the issue had been clouded because of differences in
interpretation regarding whether UNSCR 1747 applied to all
Iranian shipments or only to nuclear-related ones. As of
that moment, the Monchegorsk was a Russian ship under a
Cypriot flag carrying small arms. It had been unloaded and
its contents were now in storage under Cypriot custody.
Launching into one of the few tirades of the morning session,
Muallim argued the ship would not arrive in Syria. Why,
Muallim asked, unable to contain himself, did the U.S. want
Syria to negotiate with Israel from a state of "perpetual
weakness." "What about the illegal (sic) weapons the U.S.
supplied to Israel" he charged, referring to white phosphorus
"Who attacked whom three times last year?" Muallim asked.
This level of concern about a single ship seemed steeply
disproportionate to the fact it was delivering small arms to
Syria. What about U.S. shipments to Israel, some of which
may be been used to commit crimes against humanity? he asked.



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Arab Concerns about Iranian Intentions
--------------


7. (S/NF) Feltman replied that he was not using this
meeting to make any accusations against Syria, but the
broader issue was how to deal with Iran. Shapiro added that
Iran was the only country that could violate UNSCR 1747.
Muallim argued that U.S. policy to isolate Iran had actually
increased Iran's regional influence. Syria recognized Iran's
legitimate interests and influence that extended between
southwest Asia to the Arabian/Persian Gulf. At the same,
Syria had sought to assure Arab countries of Iranian good
will and vice versa. Muallim recounted how former Syrian
President Hafez al-Asad had intervened diplomatically when
Iranian troops threatened to occupy Basra during the
Iraq-Iran War in the 1980s. Likewise, when Tehran recently
issued provocative rhetoric against Bahrain (claiming the
country was a province of Iran),President Asad had called
Bahraini King Hamad Bin Isa to reassure him of Arab support
against any threats against Bahraini sovereignty. Syria's
influence had helped to convince Iran to retract its
statement.

8. (S/NF) Currently, Syria was working to assure Arab
regimes of Iran,s desire for cooperation and to convince
Iran of Arab good will and vice versa, Muallim said. He
discounted Arab fear of Iran as "irrational" and ascribed it
to the previous U.S. administration's policies. Muallim
replied he had heard UAE concerns about Iranian plots to
invade and sought to assure Gulf and other Arab states that
Syria wanted the upcoming AL Summit to succeed. Muallim

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said he had talked to his Saudi and Egyptian counterparts as
well and had agreed to exclude any Iranian presence at the
Doha conference.

9. (SBU) Acting NEA A/S Feltman and NSC NENA Senior Director
Shapiro cleared this cable.

CONNELLY