FELTMAN-SHAPIRO MARCH 7 DISCUSSIONS WITH SYRIAN FM

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 DAMASCUS 000194 NOFORN SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA NSC FOR SHAPIRO/MCDERMOTT PARIS FOR WALLER, LONDON FOR TSOU E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/12/2029 TAGS: PREL PTER LE IS SY SUBJECT: FELTMAN-SHAPIRO MARCH 7 DISCUSSIONS WITH SYRIAN FM MUALLIM ON LEBANON Classified By: CDA Maura Connelly for reasons 1.4 b, d. ¶1. (S/NF) Summary: FM Muallim pronounced the Syrian regime's support of Lebanese independence and sovereignty, expressed a commitment to UNSCR 1701 implementation (while explicitly deferring discussion of Hizballah disarmament until a comprehensive peace settlement),and affirmed the Syrian regime's desire for orderly, peaceful, and on-schedule Lebanese elections and the eventual formation of a national unity government, "regardless of who wins." Muallim claimed he and Saudi King Abdullah were in &complete agreement8 on these principles. Acting NEA A/S Jeffrey Feltman welcomed this statement with the caveats that the U.S. wanted to leave the elections and formation of the next government up to the Lebanese, and preferred to address Hizballah's arms sooner rather than later. Prompted by questions on border demarcation, Muallim said the Lebanese had named a team for bilateral talks, while Syria had asked for a delay to allow work on the Syrian-Jordanian border to proceed. Muallim confirmed a Syrian team should be ready to begin work by mid-May, but noted starting with demarcation of the Shebaa Farms area would not work because the area fell under Israeli occupation. Syria, he added without prompting, objected to pressure on sending an ambassador to Beirut. The Syrian regime had established an embassy in Lebanon and would send an ambassador &very soon." In a long discussion on the need to confront Salafist elements in northern Lebanon, Muallim argued the U.S. and Syria shared a common interest in preventing such groups from destabilizing Lebanon. Feltman recounted that the U.S. had supported the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) during the Nahr al-Bared campaign and was expanding its cooperation programs with the LAF. End Summary. ¶2. (S/NF) Acting NEA A/S Jeffrey Feltman and NSC Senior Director for the Near East and North Africa Dan Shapiro met for three-and-a-half hours on March 7 with Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Muallim, Vice FM Faisal Miqdad, and Presidential Advisor for Political and Media Affairs Bouthaina Shaaban. Feltman's delegation was accompanied by Charge and Pol/Econ Chief (notetaker.) Feltman and Shapiro's central message was that the U.S. administration was pursuing sustained and principled engagement with Syria and other countries as a matter of policy. The President and Secretary did not view engagement as a reward, but rather as a tool for achieving concrete objectives. This cable reports on the parts of the discussion that dealt with Syria's relationship with Lebanon. It should be read in conjunction with septels on discussions regarding Iraq, Iran, Palestinian issues, comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace issues, and Embassy Damascus operations. -------------- Syria's "Constructive" Vision for Lebanon -------------- ¶3. (S/NF) In a lengthy back and forth during which FM Muallim and Acting A/S Feltman exchanged humorous digs concerning Feltman's previous position as U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon, Muallim asserted commonality of U.S. and Syrian interests in Lebanon. Syrian President Bashar Asad had decided to withdraw Syrian troops from Lebanon in 2005, and this decision was "irreversible." "We will never return militarily," Muallim claimed solemnly. The Syrian public had supported this move, and the Syrian Parliament had applauded Bashar's announcement for "15 uninterrupted minutes." "So don't believe what you hear from any Lebanese who claim we want to return. We are happy to be out of Lebanon," Muallim said. ¶4. (S/NF) Muallim distinguished between Syrian influence and interference. Syria would exercise the former, just as the U.S. did in its relationship with Canada, because of geographical, cultural, familial, historical, and other ties. "We consider Lebanon to be Syria's window to the West, and we are Lebanon's window to the Arab world." But the Syrian government (SARG) would refrain from interfering inappropriately in Lebanese political affairs because doing so would "cost too much money," without having a decisive impact on elections that will be "too close to call" in any DAMASCUS 00000194 002 OF 004 event. What would Syria gain by spending money for a minimal effect? he asked. ¶5. (S/NF) Syria "supports the independence and sovereignty of Lebanon," Muallim said. President Asad had promised and opened an Embassy in the Beirut market district of al Hamra, "with the Syrian flag flying for all to see," even though Lebanon had yet to open an Embassy in Damascus. "Next you will ask when will you (Syria) send an Ambassador," Muallim continued. "I'll tell you not to interfere in our sovereign affairs. But the answer is, very soon. Why else would we open an Embassy?" Syria also supported a free and fair electoral process in Lebanon and did not want to see the opposition win a majority. "We want the Lebanese people to choose," Muallim emphasized. But whoever won, "one, needs to have a national unity government to preserve stability and, two, should build relations with Syria in the interests of both sides." The Syrian regime did not want to see Lebanon act against Syria and wanted avoid a return to the instability that sent 500,000 Lebanese across the border into Syria. Ten percent of the Syrian population were refugees (from either Palestine or Iraq) and it didn't want any more. "Security and stability is Lebanon is essential for us," Muallim reiterated. Vice FM Miqdad clarified that Syria also wanted Lebanese elections to occur on schedule. "I talked to (Saudi) King Abdullah about this, and we agreed on these principles," Muallim claimed. Feltman replied this was a positive sign, but argued that Arab countries needed to do more to impress the importance of maintaining order during the electoral campaign. Muallim agreed and said Syria would do its part. ¶6. (S/NF) Acting A/S Feltman expressed U.S. appreciation for Syria's assistance in waiving the visa requirement for American citizens who sought refuge in Syria during the July-August 2006 war between Hizballah and Israel. The U.S. maintained the objectives of promoting a sovereign and independent Lebanon and wanted to see free and fair elections held on schedule. The U.S., he stipulated, wanted the Lebanese people to choose their leaders without outside interference; we also want to leave the formation of the next government up to the Lebanese, Feltman emphasized. This policy would not change, Feltman said. At the same time, the President and Secretary saw no contradiction between these goals and promoting healthy relations between Lebanon and Syria or the pursuit of engagement between the U.S. and Syria. The U.S. recognized the strong geographical, family, economic, and other ties between Lebanon, "and if the U.S.-Canada model is your model, then bravo," remarked Feltman. -------------- Counseling Restraint in Run-Up to Elections -------------- ¶7. (S/NF) Feltman told Muallim that he knew how difficult the Lebanese could be, but stressed it was important to allow the Lebanese to decide the elections and how to form their government. The U.S. had its friends in Lebanon, and Syria had its friends. Washington's message was that both sides should seek to minimize tensions during what would be a lively electoral process and to urge restraint to prevent political passions from boiling over. Feltman agreed the election would be close, perhaps determined by a margin of one or two seats in Lebanon's parliament. Muallim agreed, asking Feltman (as he had during their discussion on Iraq), "Where do our interests contradict?" ¶8. (S/NF) Syria's stated vision for Lebanon appears to be similar, Feltman replied, expressing hope that no actors inside Lebanon would do anything to interrupt the political process. "We'll do our best," pledged Muallim. Feltman asked whether Hizballah agreed on the importance of maintaining calm during the electoral campaign. Yes, replied Muallim, "I assure you." Hizballah already knew how many seats in parliament it would win and was not expending energy on shoring up votes in the Shi'a community. Rather, Hizballah's focus was on the Druze and other minorities who would represent the swing vote. Feltman observed that currently, the elections were too close to call. But as we approach June 7, if it became clear that one side was going DAMASCUS 00000194 003 OF 004 to win, it would be important for either side not to take actions to scuttle or delay the elections. Muallim dismissed such concerns as "rumors." "We're telling our friends that we want the elections on time," he reiterated. Shapiro asserted that if, on June 8, all sides could look back on a successful, peaceful election, conducted free of interference, violence, or assassinations, it would be an important marker for improved U.S.-Syrian relations. -------------- Border Demarcation -------------- ¶9. (S/NF) In response to Feltman,s and Shapiro,s questions on border delineation, Muallim said the Lebanese had named their team for bilateral talks, but Syria's experts were finalizing the Syrian-Jordanian border demarcation process. Muallim confirmed a Syrian team should be ready to begin work by mid-May. Shapiro pressed Muallim on whether Syria would consider starting with demarcating the border around Shebaa Farms. Muallim rejected this idea, recalling PM Siniora had proposed it to him in 2006. Demarcation of the Shebaa Farms area would not work because the area fell under Israeli occupation, Muallim said. Unless the Israelis withdrew unilaterally, it would be impossible to do the necessary field work. Besides, he continued, most of the land issues were not border-related but instead involved disputed property claims that could be resolved by comparing land ownership documents held by Syrian and Lebanese authorities. ¶10. (S/NF) Feltman pressed Syria &in the spirit of trying to reduce tensions8 to use border demarcation discussions as a way to address weapons flows from Syria to Palestinian camps along the border (near Qusaya and Hilweh). This task would be easier than demarcating the area around Shebaa Farms and represented an important issue of concern to the GOL. Muallim replied that President Sleiman had raised the issue with Asad in September 2008. Asad responded that the Syrian regime was pleased to see resumption of the Lebanese national dialogue and that Syria was willing to use its influence with the Palestinians to urge them to enter an agreement with the GOL regarding the camps. ¶11. (S/NF) Muallim, however, dismissed the flow of weapons from Syria to the camps as &allegations.8 He said Syria would not interfere in Lebanon,s dialogue with the Palestinians on these camps but would help if the GOL requested it do so. Muallim argued that the Cairo Agreement of 1969 stipulated this was an issue to be sorted out between Lebanon and the Palestinian groups. Syria, he added, was not a signatory to this agreement. After considerable back and forth that at times became heated, Muallim eventually allowed that lack of defined borders between Syria and Lebanon created difficulties in addressing this issue. He agreed that the border demarcation process between Lebanon and Syria might be a constructive way to tackle this issue. -------------- Security Concerns in Tripoli and Hizballah -------------- ¶12. (S/NF) In a long discussion on the need to confront Salafist elements in northern Lebanon, Muallim argued the U.S. and Syria shared a common interest in preventing such groups from destabilizing Lebanon. Feltman recounted that the U.S. had supported the LAF with an airlift of 41 planes during the Nahr al-Bared campaign. Muallim noted the Syrian military had supplied ammunition to the LAF as well. Feltman reiterated the U.S. was expanding its cooperation programs with the LAF as part of its efforts to promote Lebanese independence and sovereignty. ¶13. (S/NF) Feltman and Shapiro raised Hizballah's arms, noting they represented a significant risk to Lebanon's stability. "This is another issue," Muallim responded. "Some issues we can tackle directly. Others we must leave to the (comprehensive peace) settlement." Muallim acknowledged disarming Hizballah was a U.S. priority and contended Syria supported UNSCR 1701. But attempting to disarm Hizballah now would fail and serve only to divide the Lebanese further. DAMASCUS 00000194 004 OF 004 The Syrian government's view was that Hizballah's resistance was justified so long as Israel occupied the Syrian and Lebanese territory. Shaaban interjected the U.S. was selective in its focus on implementing UNSCR 1701 while it ignored other UN resolutions. Shapiro and Feltman disagreed, saying FM Muallim himself had proclaimed Syria's support of UNSCR 1701. Vice FM Miqdad observed that New York-based UN Envoy Terje Roed Larsen's reports on UNSCR 1559 and Beirut-based UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon Michael Williams' reports on UNSCR 1701 implementation were extremely anti-Syrian in tone. ¶14. (S/NF) Attempting to steer the conversation back on track, Muallim interjected that Syria supported UNSCR 1701 but viewed disarming Hizballah as a long-term endeavor that could not be completed without a comprehensive peace framework. He reiterated that he had discussed Lebanon with Saudi King Abdullah and that both sides were in agreement on the need to urge Lebanese actors to exercise restraint. "Sometimes, if you have a cancer, operating will kill you," Muallim observed. Dealing with Hizballah would require "prolonged treatment in an atmosphere of calm," he said. "I know this is a Washington priority, but the Arab-Israeli conflict is my priority," concluded Muallim. Feltman agreed to move on but noted it was important to lay a marker down on this subject. ¶15. (S/NF) In a one-on-one session after the conclusion of the meeting, Feltman warned Muallim that Iranian/Syrian delivery of SA-8 parts to Hizballah would cross a long-standing Israeli redline; he said he was not delivering a message from Israel but expressing U.S. concern for regional stability. Muallim said he was unfamiliar with the issue and would raise it with President Asad. ¶16. (SBU) Acting NEA A/S Feltman and NSC NENA Senior Director Shapiro cleared this cable. CONNELLY