Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09DAMASCUS185
2009-03-11 08:34:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Damascus
Cable title:  

MOVEMENT FOR JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT SEEKING TO

Tags:  PHUM PGOV PREL SY 
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VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHDM #0185/01 0700834
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 110834Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6087
INFO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
S E C R E T DAMASCUS 000185
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ELA, NEA/MEPI, DRL
PARIS FOR WALLER, LONDON FOR TSOU
NSC FOR SHAPIRO/MCDERMOTT
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/11/2019
TAGS: PHUM PGOV PREL SY
SUBJECT: MOVEMENT FOR JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT SEEKING TO
EXPAND ROLE IN SYRIA
Classified By: CDA Maura Connelly for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
S E C R E T DAMASCUS 000185
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ELA, NEA/MEPI, DRL
PARIS FOR WALLER, LONDON FOR TSOU
NSC FOR SHAPIRO/MCDERMOTT
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/11/2019
TAGS: PHUM PGOV PREL SY
SUBJECT: MOVEMENT FOR JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT SEEKING TO
EXPAND ROLE IN SYRIA
Classified By: CDA Maura Connelly for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

1. (C) Summary: In an effort to assess the current
activities of MJD in Syria and XXXXXXXXXXXX, we met XXXXXXXXXXXX
with XXXXXXXXXXXX has connections to the Movement for
Justice and Development (MJD). XXXXXXXXXXXX reported on the MJD’s effort
to expand in Syria and the current coordination between the MJD
and the Damascus Declaration. XXXXXXXXXXXX also explained the MJD’s
antipathy to the Muslim Brotherhood and its effort to
participate in Damascus Declaration committees abroad. End
Summary.
--------------
BACKGROUND
--------------

2. (C) The MJD, currently banned in Syria, was formed in
London in 2006 and took the bulk of its initial membership
XXXXXXXXXXXX from exiled "liberal, moderate Islamists,"
some of whom were formerly members of the Muslim Brotherhood.
MJD’s approach toward democratic change in Syria is
non-ideological, XXXXXXXXXXXX. When POLOFF pressed him to
explain this stance further, XXXXXXXXXXXX, "They don’t
believe in Shari’a law, for example."

3. (C) In 2006 there was a sense among activists inside and
outside Syria that the release of the Mehlis report on the
assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri,
combined with increased U.S. pressure on the SARG, had made
President Bashar al-Asad’s regime vulnerable, XXXXXXXXXXXX
recounted. "(Former Syrian Vice President Abdel Halim)
Khaddam left in 2005 because he feared the government would
fall and he’s the kind of guy that wants to be on the safe
side. Also, he thought he could gain followers if the regime
fell," and he had political distance from it, XXXXXXXXXXXX,
adding that this wave of thinking was pervasive even among
many Ba’athists. XXXXXXXXXXXX argued it was precisely this
atmosphere Ba’ath party members were responding to when they
had earlier pushed an economic and political reform agenda
during the 2005 Ba’ath Conference.

4. (C) The MJD began as a small network, was not
appropriately security conscious, and spoke openly on
unsecured channels, XXXXXXXXXXXX. As the organization began to
grow and the SARG began targeting civil society activists,
especially in late 2007, the MJD "backed away" from its
organizational efforts in Syria and concentrated on
operations in Europe and the U.S. "Now," XXXXXXXXXXXX continued,
"the MJD is trying to build back up. Still, 90 percent of the
people in the street don’t know anything about the MJD,"
XXXXXXXXXXXX said.
--------------
MJD AND THE DAMASCUS DECLARATION

--------------

5. (C) On its website the MJD states it is a member of the
Damascus Declaration. (Note: the MJD is not an original
signatory. "Membership" in the Damascus Declaration is
essentially open to anyone who supports the Declaration’s
goals.) Over the past year MJD has participated in symposiums
with XXXXXXXXXXXX in Europe and the United States, including
co-sponsoring the April 25, 2008 "Syria in Transition" round-table
that included former high-ranking State Department guests.
XXXXXXXXXXXX intimated, however, that some Syrian-based Damascus
Declaration members felt uncertain as to how close they should
be to the MJD.

6. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX

7. (S/NF) While the MJD presence in Syria is small, it could
become more significant in the future, XXXXXXXXXXXX stated,
especially now that the MJD was coordinating with XXXXXXXXXXXX
on "satellite television." (Note: We understand
this refers to a MEPI/MJD plan to broadcast television
programming into Syria from abroad.) XXXXXXXXXXXX added, referring to
the broadcasting, "They are saying the Ford Foundation is
supposedly financing this." XXXXXXXXXXXX also revealed XXXXXXXXXXXX
had been contacted by the MJD and asked to help strengthen their
network in the country. XXXXXXXXXXXX
--------------
MJD AND THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD
--------------

8. (C) According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, the MJD does not enjoy a
cooperative relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood.
XXXXXXXXXXXX, MJD has tried to take an increasingly active role
and endeavored to prevent Muslim
Brotherhood members from being elected to any XXXXXXXXXXXX committees.
When the MJD first formed, XXXXXXXXXXXX explained, the relationship
was not as tense as it is now. XXXXXXXXXXXX speculated that, with
the Damascus Declaration’s increased exposure internationally,
competition for influence is fueling conflict between the two groups.
Like the MJD, the Muslim Brotherhood has declared itself in support of
Damascus Declaration goals. During the recent Israeli
incursion into Gaza, however, the Muslim Brotherhood
announced it would "cease" to be part of "the opposition" in
order to promote Arab solidarity in the region (Comment: Our
understanding is that the Muslim Brotherhood only suspended -
vice "ceased" - opposition activities in light of the SARG’s
position on Gaza. End Comment.)
-------------- --------------
SIDEBAR: MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD AND THE NATIONAL SALVATION FRONT
-------------- --------------

9. (C) The Muslim Brotherhood’s announcement that it would
suspend its participation in "the opposition" during the
recent Gaza crisis, XXXXXXXXXXXX noted, has divided the National
Salvation Front (NSF),which was formed by Khaddam and Muslim
Brotherhood leader Ali Sadreddin Bayanouni following
Khaddam’s 2005 defection from Syria. XXXXXXXXXXXX continued, "The NSF
is facing trouble from inside since Gaza. The Muslim
Brotherhood wanted a stronger reaction from NSF -- to support
Hamas." NSF did not comply, XXXXXXXXXXXX said, and so the Muslim
Brotherhood’s announcement has hurt the leadership. In
addition to the Muslim Brotherhood/NSF leadership split over
Gaza, XXXXXXXXXXXX opined the NSF was on the precipice of yet more
internal strife and predicted more divisions, but XXXXXXXXXXXX would
not elaborate on either the cause or the personalities
involved.

10. (C) When asked whether Khaddam and the NSF had a
significant role to play in Syrian opposition to the Asad
regime, XXXXXXXXXXXX replied, "I think the NSF is important.
Khaddam was a famous corrupted person, but there are 100,000
people like him in Syria." XXXXXXXXXXXX stressed the importance of
not attacking anyone who opted to defect from the regime lest
this send a negative message to those contemplating a similar
move in the future. XXXXXXXXXXXX was that Syrians working within the
regime needed to feel that switching sides was a safe option.
XXXXXXXXXXXX

11. (S/NF) Comment: MJD’s effort to expand its base in Syria
is noteworthy in that it is a moderate Islamist organization
that publicly eschews any ideological agenda aside from
ending the Asad regime through democratic reform. XXXXXXXXXXXX
That said, we have heard numerous unconfirmed rumors by very
nervous democracy-reform advocates that the SARG may have
penetrated the MJD. XXXXXXXXXXXX MJD’s role in organizing an
opposition television platform for broadcasting into Syria would
make it a high priority target for Syria’s security services.
End Comment.
CONNELLY

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