WFP MANAGEMENT REVIEW TEAM VISIT RAISES MORE

C O N F I D E N T I A L DAMASCUS 000133 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ELA, NEA/I, PRM/ANE E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2019 TAGS: PHUM PREF PGOV IZ SY SUBJECT: WFP MANAGEMENT REVIEW TEAM VISIT RAISES MORE QUESTIONS THAN ANSWERS REF: A. DAMASCUS 792 ¶B. DAMASCUS 820 ¶C. DAMASCUS 847 ¶D. DAMASCUS 857 ¶E. DAMASCUS 874 ¶F. PRM/ANE FEB 6 EMAIL TO POST Classified By: CDA Maura Connelly for reasons 1.5 b and d. ¶1. (C) Summary: World Food Program (WFP) dispatched a Management Review Team to Damascus this past week whose mission was to investigate what went wrong this past December after the SARG turned-around U.S. and Italian-funded rice destined for the Iraqi refugee population here (Ref A, B, C, D, E). The team listed a host of possible explanations as to why the Syrian government might have refused the rice but seemed unsure how to prevent future SARG intransigence. Despite the team's assertions that the investigation was future oriented in nature, we sensed from their questions a strong presumption that WFP representatives here in Damascus may have provoked negative SARG actions. Charge stressed the U.S. interest in seeing food aid resume to the vulnerable Iraqi refugee population and advised WFP's time would be better spent by finding creative solutions to this difficult task rather than trying to rationalize irrational Syrian behavior. End Summary ¶2. (C) A WFP Management Review Team comprised of Cairo-based Sr. Regional Program Advisor Ana Caranan, Sr. Officer Dieter Hannousch (retired WFP Country Director) and WFP-Syria Officer-in-Charge Muhannad Hadi met with Charge and Embassy Officers February 9. Their mission, as they expressed to us, was to determine what caused the SARG to turn around U.S. and Italian funded rice shipments in December 2008 and to draw lessons learned from the incident as WFP seeks to move forward and avoid past mistakes. To this end, the group intended to meet with donor countries, the UN Country Team, and SARG officials during their visit. ¶3. (C) Hannousch suggested there could be several underlying issues which had caused the SARG to turn the rice around, including: rice quality, political/human factors and commercial interests. According to Hannousch, who said he had met with SARG officials, one of the chief SARG complaints was that WFP representatives played one ministry against another during the impasse. In the Syrian mind, this behavior constituted meddling in the internal affairs of the Syrian government. He indicated that former WFP Country Director Pippa Bradford's efforts to find a speedy resolution to the impasse by elevating WFP concerns up through various ministries, as demurrage costs continued to accrue daily on the rice, may have soured the relationship between WFP and the Syrian government. In short, he floated the idea that WFP (Pippa Bradford) could have diplomatically handled the situation more delicately. Finally he suggested that the selling of food rations by a segment of the Iraqi refugee population may have spurred the business community to pressure the government disallow the import of the rice, as these cheaper goods were finding their way into the market. ¶4. (C) Asked for our opinion about what may have caused this incident, Charge responded that the USG looked at the broader picture, rather than seeking to rationalize the action of Syrian government officials. She stressed our interest in how WFP would resume its services to the vulnerable Iraqi population and commented that we had received very little information either in Damascus or Washington from WFP. When Hannousch pressed on the question of a "diplomatic failure" by WFP, Charge said we had heard a number of explanations for the problem between WFP and the SARG but could not provide any evidence to support any of them. She did note that the problem accelerated during/after the visit of WFP Regional Director Daly Belgasmi who, in his meeting with us, seemed to be pursuing a confrontational line against the Syrians and was negative in his description of them. She noted that Belgasmi had informed her during a meeting that he was considering sending a letter to inform the SARG that WFP would end its program here if the SARG did not positively resolve the impasse over the rice imports. ¶5. (C) Acting WFP Director Muhannad Hadi protested that he had attempted to contact the U.S. Embassy in Damascus on several occasions, Charge replied that the important point was that the USG lacked a clear understanding of WFP's strategy for the way forward. She read several questions from PRM on various programming concerns (REF F),to which the acting WFP Director said there had been a meeting in Washington which should have addressed these questions. "Yes," we replied, "PRM's questions had come to us after the meeting." ¶6. (C) Hadi did not present clear or full answers to a number of the questions posed by PRM (REF F) but we were able to glean some information from the muddled answers: - WFP distribution was disrupted in December after the SARG closed WFP's warehouses, but distribution resumed a couple of week later. The January distribution began as scheduled (all food was purchased locally.) The current distribution ends this week. - The pilot voucher program that Belgasmi told PRM had "started" has not in fact started. Hadi said they are "preparing to start." The target date for starting was unclear. Belgami's suggestion that WFP food imports may be reduced as the voucher program takes hold seemed premature, at best. - WFP had received permission to import 10,000 MT of rice from Egypt but would pursue this option as Syria imposed conditions requiring transshipment through Aqaba, Jordan and then overland transport to Syria, making the cost of the rice prohibitive. - Neither Hadi nor Ana could elaborate on WFP plans regarding the $10 million PRM had provided in September 2008. Hadi said initially that the money had been used for the rice shipment from India, to which Charge replied this shipment only accounted for $5 million, according to our understanding. (Note: It wasn't clear to us whether the rice shipment was paid for out of the September donation or a previous donation so we could not pursue the point.) - WFP has sufficient food to cover its needs for the March-April distribution, through local purchase. - Hadi disputed the 2008 recipient figure saying that the December number had been 224,000 refugees, but that 144,000 "might have been a monthly average." He seemed to indicate that they would adjust downward their planning number but it wasn't clear. Given the general lack of specificity, we didn't press on the pre-2003, post-2003 question. - WFP was working with the SARG to reach an agreement on "modalities" toward the goal of resuming WFP rice shipments to Syria. WFP had hired a consultant who was working on finding a way to resume its import program because local purchasing is too expensive. According to SARG counterparts, there would be "no questions" about importing sub-quality products. It remained unclear whether an agreement had been reached. WFP acknowledged there could be no guarantee the SARG would not act as it had previously to block shipments. The best that could be done was to prepare an agreement and then test the SARG's willingness to cooperate as relying on other options would not be cost-effective. (We urged WFP to discuss its options with Washington and to tell Washington if WFP was concluding it could not deliver food aid in a manner consistent with its own and donor standards.) - WFP Permanent Director: No plans yet, probably will announce a person March/April. Unclear when that person would arrive. ¶7. (C) In a separate meeting with UNHCR Representative Laurens Jolles, when asked his opinion on the WFP situation. Jolles grew agitated as he began to explain that the treatment of Bradford was "criminal" as she was "treated like a criminal." Jolles suggested that if there had been a diplomatic failure, it had been on the part of Daly Belgasmi and his not so delicate handling of his Syrian interlocutors. Jolles reported that he had recently met with the Syrian Minister of Planning (the principal point-of-contact for WFP) about his relationship with WFP/Pippa Bradford, to which the minister said he did not take issue with Bradford but with Belgasmi, who reportedly threatened the minister with closure of WFP operations if the rice was turned away. Jolles said the minister was insulted by Belgasmi's threats - which may have cemented the SARG position to turn the rice around. ¶8. (C) Comment: This review team's questions indicated they had already made some initial conclusions about why the SARG rejected the WFP's rice shipments. Our focus on resuming and maintaining an uninterrupted food aid supply to the many Iraqi refugees residing in Syria seemed to resonate, but we are not entirely sure where the group's "investigation" will lead. Our secondary concern, as the primary donor to WFP-Syria, is that the USG receive accurate information in a timely manner, which has been sorely lacking since the departure of Bradford. Others, such as ECHO have expressed similar frustrations and we believe this will hurt WFP's ability to raise funding for its food distribution program here. (ECHO representatives reported to us they will no longer fund WFP activities in Syria.) We are hopeful WFP leadership in Rome recognizes this fact and will seek creative ways to address donor concerns and ensure food aid continues to reach the tables of the Iraqi refugee population. Time will tell if the SARG is ready to adhere to international norms in meeting the needs of a refugee population. Doing business in Syria is difficult during the best of times; WFP and the refugee community at large are unfortunately among the most recent victims of the Syrian regime's penchant for obstructive behavior. CONNELLY