RE-ENGAGING SYRIA: SYRIA AND HAMAS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 DAMASCUS 000106 SIPDIS DEPT PLS PASS TO SPECIAL ENVOY MITCHELL DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ELA, NEA/IPA NSC FOR SHAPIRO/MCDERMOTT PARIS FOR WALLER LONDON FOR TSOU E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/2/2019 TAGS: PREL KPAL IR SY SUBJECT: RE-ENGAGING SYRIA: SYRIA AND HAMAS REF: A. DAMASCUS 94 ¶B. DAMASCUS 92 ¶C. DAMASCUS 89 ¶D. DAMASCUS 88 ¶E. DAMASCUS 82 ¶F. DAMASCUS 75 Classified By: CDA Maura Connelly for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Consensus is lacking on the extent of Syrian influence over Hamas; some believe the landlord-tenant relationship gives Syria decisive leverage. Others see a Syrian-Iranian rivalry and give Iran with its financial resources an advantage. SARG officials argue that they deal with Hamas as one of the region's "realities," and there would be no need for Hamas, i.e., armed resistance, after a comprehensive peace deal with Israel. Though Syria does not share Hamas's religious ideology, the SARG finds its association with the group useful in enhancing Syria's position in the Arab context, as a card in future negotiations with Israel, and in placating the majority Sunni Syrian population. If, in re-engaging with the SARG, the USG wants to establish markers for judging what Syria is willing to offer in exchange for better relations with the U.S., it may be that Syrian anxiety on its own issues (Tribunal and IAEA) may translate into readiness to press Hamas on Palestinian reconciliation. The chief drawback, however, to using the Syria-Hamas relationship as a gauge of Syrian intent vis--vis the U.S., however, is the continuing lack of clarity as to how much control the SARG enjoys over Hamas. End Summary. ¶2. (C) The SARG's relationship with Hamas is yet another of Syria's associations based on short-term objectives and long-term contradictions. With Hamas claiming victory after the December-January military operation in Gaza, and Syria pretending to agree, both parties have seen their regional positions dramatically improve, putting the moderate Arab leaders on the defensive. Though Syria reportedly counseled Hamas not to end the six-month tahdiya that expired in mid-December, when the bombing started, Syria's support for Hamas was not in question. Syria correctly calculated that Hamas's threshold for victory ) mere survival ) was a much easier bar to cross that Israel's stated goal of destroying Hamas's capability to launch rockets into Israel. The SARG in general, and President Bashar al-Asad in particular, calibrated their public reaction in terms that captured the sentiments on the Arab street, lending legitimacy to Syria's support for resistance at the expense of moderates in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. -------------- Competing for Influence over Hamas -------------- ¶3. (C) The often troublesome relationship with Hamas proved to be useful in several ways during the Gaza crisis. In addition to burnishing the SARG's pro-resistance credentials, the regime's ties to Hamas brought several international visitors to Damascus to ask for SARG help in establishing a cease-fire. Despite indications that Syria responded to early French calls to influence Hamas into accepting a cease-fire, Hamas held firm against Syrian pressure until after Israel announced its January 18 unilateral cease-fire. Egyptian Ambassador Shawky Ismail told Charge that Syria had insisted to Hamas at that point that it must also declare a cease-fire and, this time, Hamas responded. ¶4. (C) Observers in Damascus do not agree on the extent of Syrian influence over Hamas; some believe Syria's ability to interrupt the external leadership's activities forces Hamas to accommodate Syrian preferences. Others see a rivalry between Syria and Iran for control of Hamas. In that context, Iran's financial support for Hamas gives it an advantage. Following the Gaza conflict, Hamas's list of regional patrons expanded beyond Syria, Iran, and Qatar to apparently also include Turkey, although according to Ismail, Turkey stipulates its relationship is only with the political DAMASCUS 00000106 002 OF 004 wing of the organization. Syria's success in championing Hamas during the conflict may now mean it has to compete with others, as well as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, for the ear of Hamas. -------------- Qualified Support for a Strange Bedfellow -------------- ¶5. (C) Politburo chief Khalid Mesha'al's ear is the one that everyone seeks. Mesha'al meets frequently with FM Walid al-Muallim and his chief of staff, Bassam Sabbagh, and intermittently with Asad. Mesha'al's relationship with the SARG is not always an easy one. Reportedly his high profile around Damascus (he travels in a motorcade with a phalanx of bodyguards) and his efforts to build Hamas constituencies in the Palestinian refugee camps in Syria have caused friction in the landlord-tenant relationship. ¶6. (C) When discussing Hamas with Codel Smith January 31 (ref A),Asad defended the group as a resistance movement but was clearly unsympathetic to its religious agenda: "Hamas is the Muslim Brotherhood . . . we outlawed the Muslim Brotherhood here . . . technically, Hamas should be outlawed in Syria." Arguing he was forced to deal with Hamas because of "regional realities," Asad trotted out his standard line that when comprehensive peace was reached in the region, Hamas (and Hizballah) "would no longer be necessary." Tellingly, during the Gaza conflict, Palestinians from the camps were not allowed to join public demonstrations in Damascus and some restrictions were placed on pro-Hamas events even in the camps. Banners still on display around Damascus emphasize the suffering of Gazans but the green flag of Hamas is conspicuously absent. -------------- Mesha'al's Political Immaturity -------------- ¶7. (C) Ismail, who used to meet with Mesha'al and others prior to the Gaza conflict (he refuses to do so now because of the anti-Egyptian line taken by Hamas during the crisis) says that Mesha'al is politically immature. His decision to abandon the tahdiya in December demonstrated his immaturity as did his rejection of cease-fire initiatives during the conflict. The same lack of judgment was behind Mesha'al's announcement in Qatar January 28 that he was forming a new front as an alternative to the PLO, recognized by the Arabs since the 1980s as the "sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people." According to Ismail, the SARG told Mesha'al they didn't object to his announcement but he could not make it from Damascus. Confirming reports from Cairo that the GoE believes Hamas's internal leadership is more flexible on resuming the tahdiya, Ismail contrasted the internal leadership's understanding of the toll of another Israeli attack on the Palestinian population with Mesha'al's apparent insouciance, a lack of concern that was reflected in the external leadership's more rigid positions on a cease-fire. Though he thought Hamas was on the brink of accepting a new 18-month tahdiya, he bemoaned the fact that Mesha'al was currently visiting Tehran where he would probably be pushed to take a more confrontational line. (Comment: Ismail's remarks must be taken in the context of Egypt's unhappiness with Hamas but his comments on Mesha'al's immaturity track with the puzzled reactions of Europeans who met with Mesha'al during the conflict and wondered at his incongruously buoyant mood. End Comment.) -------------- Too Big for Egypt -------------- ¶8. (C) Waddah Abd Rabbo, editor of Syria's only privately-owned and (comparatively) independent Al-Watan told Charge and IO that Hamas does indeed juggle many patrons, but the four capitals (Damascus, Doha, Tehran, and Ankara) enjoy "perfect communication" on Hamas ) "talking to one (about Hamas) is talking to them all." Despite his efforts to DAMASCUS 00000106 003 OF 004 establish an independent journalistic voice in Syria, the well-connected Abd Rabbo generally reflects Bashar al-Asad's views when discussing regional political developments. Speaking in supportive terms of Mesha'al's newly declared front, Abd Rabbo was disparaging of Palestinian Authority (PA) and chairman of the PLO executive committee Mahmoud Abbas: "he is discredited on all the Arab streets, including his own." Abd Rabbo was equally negative about Egypt, allowing that Egypt might be able to negotiate the cease-fire but would not succeed on Palestinian reconciliation because the problem is "too big for them (Egypt) now." He said Syria could play a role in working with other governments to move forward a process that would need another two-to-three months to show results. Abd Rabbo also confirmed that Hamas now views Turkey as necessary to the reconciliation negotiations and wants to make sure it is included. -------------- Conflicting Aims for the Future -------------- ¶9. (C) Abd Rabbo acknowledged that the Syrian public's sympathies were with Gazan civilians and that questions had arisen over the relatively low number of Hamas causalities. (Note: Even Presidential Advisor Bouthaina Shaaban is quoted around town as having asked how only "48 Hamas fighters" had been killed out of a total of over 1,300 fatalities. End Note) Maintaining the line that Syria's support for Hamas is purely about resistance, when pushed to consider the logical consequences of Syria's policy ) that Hamas would prevail politically in a Palestinian state ) Abd Rabbo said that Syria had no interest in seeing the emergence of an "Islamic Republic of Palestine." Nor, he added, would Syria tolerate Hizballah domination in Lebanon. "We'd send in our troops again" if Hizballah took over in Lebanon, he said, but noted that Syria maintains relations with Christian groups as a means of offsetting that possibility. Asked why Khalid Mesha'al should trust Syria and follow its guidance if it was obvious Syria was opposed to Hamas ever coming to power, Abd Rabbo ) in a rare display of unsheathed Syrian claws ) growled, "Mesha'al will listen to Syria ) he has no choice." -------------- Keeping Syrian Sunnis in Line -------------- ¶10. (C) Other observers have told us that the minority Alawite regime needs Hamas as a means of placating the Sunni majority in the country, particularly given its alliances with Shia Iran and Hizballah. Though confessional tensions, if they exist, seldom rise to the surface in Syria, Sunni pietism is a visible and evidently increasing force, enough to prompt the SARG last autumn to initiate a governmental clamp-down on foreign imams, preachers, and ideologies that was aimed at eliminating sources of religious radicalization. But in a country where the slaughter of some 40,000 Muslim Brotherhood members in Hama in 1982 is still not spoken of, the Alawite regime walks a fine line between promoting Hamas as a resistance movement and ensuring that its religious ideology is downplayed. According to Egyptian Ambassador Ismail, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood (in exile) announced during the Gaza crisis that it was suspending opposition activities during the conflict in light of the SARG's support for Hamas, a gesture that was largely empty but no doubt gratifying to the regime nonetheless. -------------- Can Syria Help on Palestinian Reconciliation? -------------- ¶11. (C) As the USG considers whether to re-engage with Syria, the SARG's ability to contribute positively to our efforts on Israeli-Palestinian peace will be a key consideration. Norwegian diplomats in Damascus, who talk to both the SARG and Hamas, assess that the SARG generally supports Hamas's positions on substance but that the two may disagree over tactics. Given the multiplicity of regional DAMASCUS 00000106 004 OF 004 parties who vie for influence over Hamas, Syria, even with the advantages of the landlord-tenant relationship, has not been able to "deliver" Hamas consistently, on the few occasions it has tried to. But Syria has nonetheless provided Hamas with key Arab cover for its antagonistic positions vis--vis Fatah; withdrawal of that cover would leave Hamas looking outside the Arab circle to the Iranians (or now the Turks) for regional political support. (Note: Qatar is not seen here as carrying sufficient weight within the Arab context to fill a void left by Syria. End Note) ¶12. (C) The SARG is reportedly satisfied that the Gaza crisis ended with an apparent up-tick in prestige for both Hamas and Syria. We have repeatedly heard that the SARG is concerned about the opening on March 1 of the Special Tribunal on the assassination of Rafiq Hariri and resumed consideration of the Syria on the IAEA Board of Governors agenda. Ismail thinks that Syria believes the increased value of its Hamas card strengthens Syria as it approaches those two challenges, but it is difficult to perceive a clear trade-off. If, in re-engaging with the SARG, the USG wants to establish markers for judging what Syria is willing to offer in exchange for better relations with the U.S., it may be that Syrian anxiety on its own issues (Tribunal and IAEA) may translate into readiness to press Hamas on Palestinian reconciliation. The chief drawback to using the Syria-Hamas relationship as a gauge of Syrian intent vis--vis the U.S., however, is the continuing lack of clarity as to how much control the SARG enjoys over Hamas. CONNELLY