Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09DAKAR793
2009-06-23 18:25:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Dakar
Cable title:  

DAKAR ACCORD: THINGS MAY FALL APART

Tags:  PGOV MR SL KDEM 
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RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
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RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT 5167
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RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0439
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RHMFISS/COMSOCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
C O N F I D E N T I A L DAKAR 000793 

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (DECL)

SIPDIS

NOUAKCHOTT FOR AMBASSADOR BOULWARE AND DCM DENNIS HANKINS

E.O. 12958: DECL 06/23/2019
TAGS: PGOV MR SL KDEM
SUBJECT: DAKAR ACCORD: THINGS MAY FALL APART

REF: DAKAR 792

CLASSIFIED BY: AMBASSADOR MARCIA S. BERNICAT FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND
(D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L DAKAR 000793 C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (DECL) SIPDIS NOUAKCHOTT FOR AMBASSADOR BOULWARE AND DCM DENNIS HANKINS E.O. 12958: DECL 06/23/2019 TAGS: PGOV MR SL KDEM SUBJECT: DAKAR ACCORD: THINGS MAY FALL APART REF: DAKAR 792 CLASSIFIED BY: AMBASSADOR MARCIA S. BERNICAT FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) ¶1. (C) Summary: The Mauritanians claim they are still committed to the Dakar Accord. Nevertheless, after four days of intense negotiations, consensus over the wording of the High State Council (HSC) communiqueQ remains elusive. Sharp divisions are emerging within the International Contact Group (ICG),with the French representative questioning the need for President Abdallahi's resignation and asserting the election will suffice to bring Mauritania back to constitutional rule. The United States, Russia, and the United Kingdom representatives will not accept anything short of a consensual solution. Senegalese facilitator Foreign Minister Gadio, while tempted by the French proposal to move forward with elections and barely hiding his exasperation with President Abdallahi, remained, for the moment, strongly committed to saving the Dakar Accord in its consensual nature. Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade will travel to Nouakchott on June 24 for a last high-level negotiation. -------------- NOBODY HAS WALKED OUT, YET -------------- ¶2. (C) ICG members met with Senegalese Foreign Minister Cheikh Tidiane Gadio late in the evening of June 22 to discuss next steps (Reftel). Gadio explained the negotiations were still at a standstill and intimated he suspected the parties had reached the end of their negotiating authority. As a result, he decided against inviting them to participate in the ICG meeting. While noting all the parties remained committed to saving the agreement, he stated he was afraid that, as time runs out, they might be tempted to engage in unilateral actions. Mauritanian press published reports saying that Aziz's delegation had decided to walk away from the negotiations and was traveling back to Nouakchott that evening. The same sources stated Aziz's campaign director and Dakar Accord negotiator Ould Raiss was organizing a press conference to mark their return. These reports caused anguish among Mauritanians present at the Meridien Hotel. When Ambassador Bernicat and PolOff Sola-Rotger arrived a man frantically approached the Ambassador pleading with her "not to let the delegation go." Ironically, flights to Mauritania were cancelled that evening due to a ma
ssive dust storm in Nouakchott. The delegation remained in Dakar, leaving everybody wondering whether reports were false or whether they were forced to stay due to flight cancellations. -------------- GADIO SAYS THE "E" WORD -------------- ¶3. (C) Gadio summarized all the options, which included proposing new wording to both parties and bringing President Wade to Nouakchott to negotiate directly with leaders as the leaders had reportedly been requesting. Gadio highlighted how difficult it had become to negotiate with President Abdallahi, who was perceived as "capricious". Then, surprisingly, he revived an earlier idea of beginning election preparations while continuing negotiations to solve the HSC issue. He said principles were important, but with the elections only a few weeks away, practical considerations become more pressing. Gadio suggested that the Front National pour la Defense de la Democratie (FNDD) and opposition leader Ahmed Ould Daddah's Rassemblement des Forces Democratiques (RFD) wanted to participate in the elections and would gladly distance themselves from Abdallahi's demands vis a vis the HSC. The Spanish Ambassador to Mauritania supported this idea and said that for the RFD the election was a clear objective. The French Ambassador to Senegal stated Abdallahi and the FNDD were no longer one and the same and that FNDD negotiators wanted to move forward but were being held hostage by Abdallahi. ¶4. (C) The US, the UK and Russia rejected the idea of moving forward with elections as contrary to the Accord's spirit of consensus and potentially problematic as it would scuttle the Dakar Accord itself if no agreement was reached before the election. They stressed the opposition had been very consistent in their position of resolving the HSC issue and doubted they would accept to move forward with elections without consensus. The Russian Charge d'Affairs to Senegal pointed out that pressuring Aziz to accept the wording that had already been accepted by the opposition made more sense than pressuring Abdallahi. ¶5. (C) The French Ambassador to Senegal further argued that the crux of legitimizing the Government of Mauritania lay in holding free and fair elections. He dismissed President Abdallahi as an obstructionist element and questioned the need for his resignation. He stated never before in the history of Africa had a deposed President been brought back to resign and that the ICG had put the bar too high as it was obvious Mauritanians were incapable of coming to a consensus. "Maybe it is simply not possible to bring him back," said the Ambassador, while stressing the international community should be proud of having gone this far in bringing opposing factions together, even if the original plan was not feasible. -------------- NO CONSENSUS, NO LEGITIMACY -------------- ¶6. (C) Ambassador Bernicat, the UK Ambassador to Senegal and the Russian Charge pushed back vigorously, reiterating that the international community had signed on to a consensual process with Gadio's promise that President Abdallahi would return to power, form the transition government and step down. Absent a consensus triggering that event, we could not endorse elections as the sole "fix." The UK Ambassador stressed that credible and transparent elections depended on the dissolution of the HSC and underlined the importance of solving this question before moving forward. The European Commissioner, while saying he was willing to provide technical assistance to the electoral commission and start working on the revision of electoral lists, asked Gadio to make a last attempt to achieve consensus. -------------- NEXT STEPS -------------- ¶7. (C) Gadio highlighted it was important for the ICG to remain united to save the Dakar Accord. He stated he would "assume" president Abdallahi was acting in good faith and would make a last attempt to draft a suitable statement that he would provide to ICG and Mauritanian parties to review no later than noon on June 23. He also decided to ask President Wade to fly to Nouakchott on June 24 for a last high-level negotiation. The Ambassadors cautioned sending Wade to Nouakchott as risky because it was a measure of last resort that, if unsuccessful, would leave the international community without further options and would mark the failure of the Accord. The US and the UK reiterated yet again that, absent a consensus, we would not/not endorse elections. ¶8. (C) Comment: The Senegalese and the French seem willing to move forward with elections if consensus is not reached soon, even if that course of action is contrary to the Dakar Accord. They are increasingly critical of President Abdallahi, who has become a scapegoat of sorts, while failing at times to acknowledge that General Aziz has also been obstructionist. The opposition, because of its position of weakness, is expected to sacrifice the most and their unwillingness to budge on the HSC issue, which many perceive as irrelevant, is increasingly irritating to some. It would not be surprising if the Senegalese and the French attempt to put the blame for the failure of the agreements on Abdallahi, thus forcing the opposition to take their distance from the deposed president and buy into the election process in a frantic move to avoid exclusion. This "divide and conquer" tactic could work, but is contrary to the spirit of consensus and future stability in Mauritania. From a practical point of view, Aziz's current pressing problem is really Ely Vall's candidacy and the real threat it poses to Aziz returning to power legitimately. If Aziz has calculated he can make no further concessions and remain electable, the HSC issue - and the Dakar Accord with it - will be lost. End comment. BERNICAT

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