CONFIDENCE BUILDING IN GUINEA-BISSAU: CHOD TOLD TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DAKAR 000562 SIPDIS STATE FOR AF/W AND AF/RSA E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/04/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL SNAR KCRM PU XY SUBJECT: CONFIDENCE BUILDING IN GUINEA-BISSAU: CHOD TOLD TO END ABUSES, REFORM ARMED FORCES REF: A)DAKAR 477 B)DAKAR 460 Classified By: Classified by Ambassador Marcia Bernicat for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This cable was cleared by U.S. Africa Command Deputy Commander for Civil-Military Activities Mary Carlin Yates. ¶2. (C) SUMMARY: On April 23, Ambassador Bernicat and U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) Deputy Commander for Civil-Military Activities (DCMA) Mary Carlin Yates told the head of the Bissau-Guinean Armed Forces, Navy Captain Zamora Induta, that U.S. engagement with the country,s military is predicated on an end to human rights abuses and on confidence-building measures in security sector reform and in the fight against narcotics trafficking, the latter of which was primarily a civilian function. Ambassador Bernicat expressed concern about a lack of cooperation in the investigation into the March assassinations. The Ambassador and DCMA, called on the military to demobilize a significant percentage of its forces prior to any new recruitment, noting there would be scant support among many of the donors for any further buildup, however temporary, of the military. Induta suggested that the rough treatment of civilians may be warranted and said that new recruitment of enlisted men and women should happen prior to the June 28 presidential election, and insisted that he is a ready partner in the counter-narcotics fight who can be trusted. END SUMMARY. ¶3. (C) On April 23, 2009, in Bissau, Ambassador Bernicat, U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) Deputy Commander for Civil-Military Activities (DCMA),PolCouns, OSC Chief, EmbOffs, and AFRICOMOffs met with Navy Captain Zamora Induta, the interim chief of staff of the armed forces of Guinea-Bissau, as part of a series of high-level meetings in Bissau (Septel to follow). Alluding to the April 20 round table conference in Praia, Cape Verde, on security sector reform (SSR) in Guinea-Bissau, the Ambassador began the meeting by noting that Induta possessed an historic opportunity to transform the Bissau-Guinean military. However, essential to any transformation must be the subordination of the armed forces to the civilian leadership, she emphasized. Responding in part to Induta's previously stated plan to recruit 1,000 new soldiers prior to the June 28 presidential elections (ref A),the Ambassador noted that the international consensus was for Guinea-Bissau first to demobilize a significant percentage of the approximately 4,500 soldiers and sailors (many of whom are veterans of the 1973 war for independence) and only then recruit new members to join the armed forces. USG CONCERNS -------------- ¶4. (C) The Ambassador expressed the USG,s strong concern regarding the recent human rights abuses, threats and intimidation by the military, noting that they had created an atmosphere of fear that would negatively impact the June 28 poll (ref B). The Ambassador also stated she was troubled by reports that the armed forces are not cooperating fully with the inter-ministerial investigation into the dual assassinations of Armed Forces Chief of Staff General Tagme Na Wai and President Joao Bernardo Vieira, particularly given that the USG had responded quickly by sending FBI experts to assist the effort. She also called on Induta to turn the results of the military inquest into Na Wai's death over to the broader investigative commission. ¶5. (C) Explaining her high-profile visit to Bissau, DCMA stated that AFRICOM must assess the will of regional leaders to reform their security sectors prior to committing to bilateral military engagement. Echoing the Ambassador's comments, DCMA noted that AFRICOM has serious concerns about reports of Bissau-Guinean military,s recent human rights abuses and takes military subordination to civilian leadership very seriously. DCMA further urged Induta first to follow through on demobilization and decommissioning prior to any addition military recruitment. INDUTA: A MAN TO BE TRUSTED? -------------- ¶6. (C) Induta agreed that security sector reform in Guinea-Bissau is "necessary." He asserted that the population is confident that the much-delayed reforms will finally be implemented because unlike previous SSR attempts, DAKAR 00000562 002 OF 003 the international community now appears to be "sincere" about backing the proposed changes. Induta suggested, however, that recruitment must precede any mass retirement or demobilization. Many of the enlisted soldiers and sailors, he claimed, had entered the armed forces during periods of conflict and had never received proper training. These illiterate fighters, trained only to use a weapon, are easily manipulated by politicians, Induta said. The rapid recruitment and deployment of at least 500 soldiers with a minimal level of education and training will serve as a crucial check on their malleable colleagues in the run up to the June 28 election, he asserted. Without recruitment, Induta said that he could not guarantee security during the election. The Ambassador responded that Induta,s points argued more in favor of demobilization than to the contrary. ¶7. (C) Induta claimed that following the March assassinations, he was asked by politicians to formally seize power. The same politicians, he claimed, later approached members of the armed forces, requesting their support ) and possibly their interference ) in the June 28 election. Induta said that he has already detained some military personnel suspected of plotting to interfere in the poll. (Note: During a subsequent meeting, interim President Raimundo Pereira said that military personnel recently complained vigorously in a public forum about politicians exploiting the armed forces for their short-term political gain. According the UK ambassador, former defense chief General Na Wai made similar complaints in the lead up to the November 2009 legislative elections. End note.) ¶8. (C) Turning to narcotics trafficking, Induta repeated his claim that representatives of criminal organizations approached him and offered to pay him to allow narcotics trafficking to continue in the country (ref a). Induta noted the enormity of the task of monitoring and controlling Guinea-Bissau's archipelago and borders, and asked for USG assistance to fight drug traffickers. The Ambassador replied that U.S. law limits the Embassy,s ability to support armed forces that engage in human rights violations. Furthermore, she said, the USG first must have confidence in its partners prior to providing support. The USG, the Ambassador emphasized, believes members &up to the most senior level8 of the Bissau-Guinean armed forces are still involved in drug trafficking, noting that she had delivered the same message to Na Wai. ¶9. (C) Induta suggested that with a change in the leadership of the armed forces, so too should come a re-evaluation in U.S. policy vis--vis the Bissau-Guinean military. He insisted that he could be trusted in the fight against narcotics trafficking. On the subject of human rights violations, Induta said that Guinea-Bissau was analogous to a long-sick patient for whom a change in medicine may be the best treatment. COMMENT -------------- ¶10. (C) The optics of the joint meeting with Ambassador Bernicat and DCMA Yates were carefully crafted to reinforce the importance the USG places on civil-military relations and the subordination of the armed forces to civilian leadership. The DCMA,s unique position as a civilian within AFRICOM,s leadership structure further underscored this point. ¶11. (C) Induta, who wanted to prolong the conversation in an apparent effort to convince his interlocutors that he is a man to be trusted, seemed eager to curry favor with the USG. Listening in English while responding primarily in Portuguese, Induta sought to portray himself as a reluctant public servant with strong Western ties, called to the dangerous task of modernizing an ill-trained, ill-equipped, aged, undisciplined military. His obvious skill as a communicator, however, made his appeal for counter-narcotics assistance appear even more transparently self-serving, while his justification for abusing civilian critics demonstrated a tin ear for international human rights concerns. ¶12. (C) Induta,s insistence on first recruiting, then demobilizing, likely reflects his urgent need to consolidate his leadership within the armed forces. Given that winning the loyalty of current soldiers and sailors is proving to be a difficult task, and since any effort to shed his opponents through demobilization poses inherent risks to his leadership, Induta,s most expedient recourse is to recruit DAKAR 00000562 003 OF 003 loyalists quickly and place them in strategic positions throughout the armed forces. ¶13. (C) Given Induta,s desire for international recognition in hopes of reinforcing his domestic credibility, he will hopefully heed a firm and unambiguous message from the USG as to what the international community deems to be democratic behavior. Since Induta,s leadership of the military is likely a fait accompli for the foreseeable future, Post will seek to build upon the parameters set forth in the April 23 meeting to develop a roadmap to assistance with the U.S. and other donors, bolstered by further confidence-building measures he and the Guinea-Bissau government can take. BERNICAT