GUINEA-BISSAU'S BUDGET TRANSPARENCY IS IMPROVING

UNCLAS DAKAR 000483 SIPDIS DEPT FOR EEB/IFD/OMA: JJACOBY; AF/W, AF/EPS TREASURY FOR AFRICA DESK, OASIA/E.BARBER E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: EAID EFIN ECON PREL GB SUBJECT: GUINEA-BISSAU'S BUDGET TRANSPARENCY IS IMPROVING REF: STATE 28885 ¶1. In response to request for clarification of host country's efforts to make its national budget publicly available, as per Section 7088(c) of the 2009 SFOAA, post provides the following information keyed to reftel's specific questions: ¶A. Yes, Guinea-Bissau's central government is expected to receive a very small amount of USG assistance that may subject it to restrictions under Section 70888(c) and for which a national interest waiver could be required; ¶B. Guinea-Bissau's annual budget is available publically to some degree. The official process is fairly transparent, in theory, but the government has few resources available for printing costs or website maintenance to make the budget readily available. Guinea-Bissau has a very small civil society, which is largely not prepared to participate in discussions on the national budget. The government's proposed budget is debated and approved by the National Assembly. The country's FY09 budget was approved by on April 9; ¶C. Yes, projected income and expenditures are included in the draft budget. However, in a country that is running a large deficit, and is hoping for greater donor assistance to fill its budget gap and to assist with basic social programs, the accuracy and execution of the budget is a moving target. ¶2. In determining whether or not a waiver for Guinea-Bissau should be required, Washington agencies should keep in mind that Guinea-Bissau's public administration has very little capacity. The USG engagement in Guinea-Bissau is increasing, but remains very small in terms of actual assistance, with an estimated USD 1 million programmed for FY 2009. ¶3. Should a national interest waiver be required, Post requests that Washington agencies do so in a timely manner since our small programs could prove highly valuable for much-needed security sector reform and for the critical upcoming presidential elections following the March 2nd assassination of President Vieira. BERNICAT