GUINEA-BISSAU DEFENSE CHIEF DEFENDS ACTIONS AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 DAKAR 000477 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF/W, AF/RSA, AND INR/AA E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/13/2019 TAGS: PU XY PGOV PREL SNAR KDEM KCRM SUBJECT: GUINEA-BISSAU DEFENSE CHIEF DEFENDS ACTIONS AND ASKS FOR U.S. ASSISTANCE REF: DAKAR 470 Classified By: Ambassador Marcia S. Bernicat for reasons 1.5 B/D. ¶1. (C) Summary: On April 2, PolCouns met with Naval Captain Jose Zamora Induta, the de facto head of the armed forces of Guinea-Bissau. PolCouns expressed U.S. concern regarding the apparently unconstitutional designation of Induta as chief of the armed forces, the recent political violence carried out by military members against critics of the armed forces and the government, as well as the military's failure to cooperate with the inter-ministerial commission established to investigate the assassinations of former President Bernardo Vieira and former Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces General Batista Tagme Na Wai. Like the Prime Minister, Induta insisted that the country's constitution and laws regarding the nomination of the armed forces chief of staff were being respected and he defended the military's actions in the recent arrest of the defense attorney of the former chief of staff of the Navy (reftel). He denied that the members of the armed forces had beaten the audit court chief justice and argued that someone is conducting a campaign to denigrate the military. ¶2. (C) Induta told PolCouns that he needs the assistance of the United States to fight drug traffickers. He claimed that traffickers had contacted him to ask for authorization to continue transiting through Guinea-Bissau and offered him 1,000 euros per ton transshipped. He said he would be unable to fight the traffickers without assistance from the United States because the traffickers are better armed and prepared. Polcouns assured him the U.S. could only provide assistance to credible, reliable partners. End summary. Induta: The Constitution Is Being Respected -------------- ¶3. (C) PolCouns conveyed USG concern regarding the apparent constitutional and legal violations with regard to Induta's creation of a military commission to manage the crisis following the death of Na Wai and his subsequent nomination to be chief of the armed forces. Induta denied that there was anything unconstitutional or improper in the process that resulted in his nomination. He reiterated what he told PolCouns and DATT in the week following the assassinations: he and the other members of the military's crisis management commission stepped in to fill a void that the service chiefs had failed to fill. He criticized the service chiefs for not taking the necessary initiative and said that he and his fellow commission members had done what was necessary. ¶4. (C) As for his nomination as chief of the armed forces, Induta argued that the military had behaved appropriately with regard to the law. In fact, he said the armed forces had gone beyond what was required in the law to ensure that there was a consensus of support within the officer corps. According to Induta, the law calls for the armed forces to convene a panel to select and provide a name for the chief of the armed forces nomination to the Minister of Defense. This is exactly what the armed forces did on March 6; a meeting was convened with all the senior officers in attendance including the battalion commanders of the various zones. (Comment: It is Post,s understanding that the meeting was attended by only senior Balanta officers not seen as close to Vieira. For example, the colonel serving as director of national defense policy in the office of the Minister of Defense was not invited to participate because, according to him, because he is only half-Balanta. Moreover, in all likelihood, he is viewed as having been too close Vieira. End comment.) ¶5. (C) Following the meeting of senior officers, the armed forces proposed Induta as the chief of staff of the armed forces and the battalion commander of the Northern Zone based in Mansoa, Colonel Antonio Indjai, to be the vice chief. Induta said, as far as he is concerned, the military has done its part and the matter of military command had been settled. PolCouns pointed out that the constitution bars the interim president from acting on the nomination. Induta replied that the question of confirmation of the nominations was a civilian matter. When asked if he should be referred to as "chief of staff," "ad interim chief of staff," or "chair of the military crisis management commission," Induta hesitated and then said, "I suppose chair of the military commission, because the president hasn't confirmed my nomination yet." (Note: Nevertheless, Induta provided PolCouns with several DAKAR 00000477 002 OF 004 documents he had signed as chief of staff and in which he is addressed as chief of staff by the offices of the prime minister, minister of defense, attorney general, and director of the Judicial Police. End note.) Induta grudgingly acknowledged that the next president would have the authority to dismiss him, but he said he assumed that the elected president would do so only if he had a good reason and that the president would not want to "fight with the armed forces." Defends and Denies Military Actions -------------- ¶6. (C) PolCouns told Induta that the USG is troubled by the extrajudicial arrests and violence being carried out by the military. Induta said the military is a victim of an active campaign to denigrate it and its members. In the case of the arrest of Pedro Infanda, the defense attorney of former naval chief of staff ex-Admiral Bubo Na Tchuta, Induta insisted that the armed forces had taken the necessary actions to ensure stability. He accused Infanda of incitement and disturbance of the peace. He said the military acted because the attorney general's office had failed to do so. On April 1 he met with Attorney General Louis Manuel Cabral to urge him to take action in the future, so the military would not have to do so in the future. When asked on what legal basis the military had arrested Infanda and why Infanda had been beaten, Induta said it was the armed forces, responsibility to maintain stability and guarantee the peace. He did not address the beating of Infanda. ¶7. (C) With regard to the assault of Francisco Fadul, the chief justice of the audit court and head of a political party, Induta denied that the armed forces were involved. He said had the armed forces been involved, it would have happened during the day, as had been the case of Infanda, because the military has nothing to hide. He noted that all of the security forces use the same uniforms and suggested that someone was impersonating the military. Induta claimed there was a campaign to make the armed forces look bad. Induta: We Are Cooperating with Inquiry; Ours Almost Done -------------- -------------- ¶8. (C) Induta denied that the armed forces had failed to cooperate with the inter-ministerial commission of inquiry. He noted that the armed forces were represented in the inter-ministerial commission of inquiry and argued that no other group was more interested than the military in establishing who is responsible for the assassinations. He called the people who are accusing the armed forces of failing to cooperate "liars, who do not want to work." He said the military's internal commission of inquiry had already determined who was responsible, the suspects were in custody and that the report would be finalized soon. Asked if the report would be shared with the inter-ministerial commission of inquiry, Induta said, "Yes, if they ask for it." He also said that the suspects would be handed over to civilian authorities. PolCouns asked why the armed forces were investigating the death of Na Wai, but not that of Vieira. Induta replied that the death of the chief of staff of the armed forces in a military installation, ostensibly at the hands of or in cooperation with members of the armed forces, was a military matter, but the same was not (entirely) true in the case of the death of the president. However, the military would be happy to conduct an investigation into the death of Vieira, if asked to do so by the government, he said. Induta: We Need Resources to Fight Narcotics Traffickers -------------- -------------- ¶9. (C) Induta told PolCouns that the Bissau-Guinean armed forces needed U.S. assistance to fight narcotics traffickers. The de facto chief of defense said he was reforming the armed forces to be able to take on the traffickers and to ensure stability. To that end, he said he would be recruiting 1,000 new troops. According to him, this is necessary because 80 percent of the current armed forces personnel are officers. He emphasized that he would be recruiting people who had at a minimum completed high school, "so they can resist influence and manipulation from politicians." This would only be the first phase in the reforms. He claimed he needed at least 1,500 additional new troops, beyond the initial 1,000, to maintain stability and fight the traffickers. Ideally, he needed a total of 3,000 new troops, he said. Asked how he would reconcile adding DAKAR 00000477 003 OF 004 3,000 troops to the current 4,500 troops given the 3,500 total force limit called for in the country's National Assembly-approved national defense strategy, Induta said there was some confusion regarding the total number of troops the country is supposed to have and that the total number is still under discussion. According to him, Na Wai wanted 6,000, but Induta believes that a total force of 4,500 would be sufficient in the long term. In the interim, he added, it would be necessary to simply add forces without decommissioning and demobilizing current troops. ¶10. (C) Induta said the armed forces had identified 15 different networks of narcotics traffickers operating in Guinea-Bissau. According to him, representatives of the traffickers met with him at their request to seek authorization to continue using the country as a transit point. Induta said that these representatives offered to pay him 1,000 euros per ton of product transshipped through Guinea-Bissau. He claimed that the armed forces had seized a suspect ship off the coast of the country because it was neither a fishing vessel nor a passenger vessel, but it was making regular visits to different islands for some undefined purpose, which he assumed was related to trafficking. Asked if the armed forces had recovered any narcotics on the ship, he replied no. Induta also claimed to have information about airfields being prepared in different parts of the country for use by traffickers. ¶11. (C) Unfortunately, he said "I am not in a position to tell the traffickers I will fight them because the traffickers are better armed and prepared." Induta asserted that he is ready and willing to fight the traffickers, provided the United States and other donors provide him with the resources to do so. Until that time there is nothing he can do. He acknowledged that the armed forces had been involved in trafficking in the past, but claimed that was no longer the case. While he said he had no desire to investigate people for their past activities,) narcotics-related corruption would no longer be tolerated. However, he emphasized, that without outside assistance he would not be in a position to combat the traffickers, "because they are better armed and better prepared." Therefore, "We will only start the fight when you give us resources." Induta stressed that the matter is urgent and said that he had discussed the problem of narcotics trafficking with President Yahya Jammeh during his recent trip to The Gambia. PolCouns assured the de facto chief of defense that he would transmit the message, but explained that the United States would not be able to provide any assistance unless it had credible and reliable partners with which to work. Comment -------------- ¶12. (C) Induta comes across as cocky, completely sure of himself and utterly unconcerned about any questions regarding his legitimacy. Having trained in the United States on three occasions, he behaved as though he thinks he knows and understands Americans. Induta said repeatedly during the meeting with PolCouns that his goal is to make Guinea-Bissau "just like the United States," yet during a previous meeting with PolCouns and DATT, when challenged about his apparent usurping of command, Induta explained, "This is Africa. Things are done differently here." While he has stated publicly on numerous occasions that he and his fellow officers are not interested in taking over the government, his actions belie any claim that he seeks to head a military that is subject to civilian authority. Induta also displays a disdain for the political/intellectual classes of Guinea-Bissau, repeatedly referring to the "lawyers and other people with degrees and the politicians who are not willing to work" or do what is necessary to develop Guinea-Bissau. This attitude may reflect inter-ethnic prejudices rather than political differences. Non-Balanta elites speak of the Balanta in patronizing terms saying they make good fighters but are not good for other things, a sentiment that no doubt grates on Induta and his fellow Balanta officers, who regard themselves as the guardians of Bissau-Guinean freedom. Finally, Induta's clumsy claim that he is ready to combat the narcotics traffickers only if the United States provides assistance managed to include "official" confirmation that members of the military have been involved in trafficking. ¶13. (C) Post believes Induta regards security sector reform (SSR) as a means to consolidate his hold on power within the DAKAR 00000477 004 OF 004 armed forces. Lacking combat experience, he is regarded by informed local observers as having limited support within the military. This probably explains why he has teamed with Indjai, an independence fighter and reported nephew of Na Wai, as his vice chief, although no such position existed during Na Wai's time as chief of defense. Induta's desire to recruit additional forces -- before he is willing to risk antagonizing any of the current military with demobilization -- underlines his precarious situation. ¶14. (C) Induta's somewhat precarious grip on power ironically offers the international community an opportunity to counterbalance his ambition to continue the cycle of wielding political power from the defense chief's office. Demobilization and SSR are the essential prerequisites to political stability in Guinea-Bissau and an effective counter-narcotics strategy for the country (and are key to any successful regional counter-narcotics strategy as well as efforts to prevent Guinea-Bissau from becoming a source of political instability for the region). While there is risk involved, donor countries can make use of Induta's argument for additional resources both to persuade the government to request some formal ECOWAS/CPLP force presence and to compel certain security sector reforms. End comment. BERNICAT