Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09DAKAR1261
2009-10-06 11:02:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Dakar
Cable title:
Casamance rebels kill Seven Senegalese soldiers
VZCZCXYZ1678 RR RUEHWEB DE RUEHDK #1261 2791102 ZNR UUUUU ZZH R 061102Z OCT 09 FM AMEMBASSY DAKAR TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3160 INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS DAKAR 001261
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
DEPT FOR AF/W, AF/RSA, DRL AND INR/AA
PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHER
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINS KDEM ECON SG
SUBJECT: Casamance rebels kill Seven Senegalese soldiers
UNCLAS DAKAR 001261
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
DEPT FOR AF/W, AF/RSA, DRL AND INR/AA
PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHER
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINS KDEM ECON SG
SUBJECT: Casamance rebels kill Seven Senegalese soldiers
1. (SBU) Summary: 2009 has had an uptick of violent assaults by
gunmen allegedly belonging to MFDC (Movement of Democratic Forces of
Casamance) resulting in numerous civilian deaths. However, a more
worrying development is the resumption of attacks against the
Senegalese army. On October 2, MFDC rebels ambushed an army vehicle
on a muddy road in the Kolda region. They killed six soldiers and
wounded four; a day later one of the wounded died. It is feared
that if these attacks continue that the army will respond in kind
thus increasing the intensity of the conflict. End Summary.
Escalation of violence
--------------
2. (SBU) On the afternoon of October 2, a Senegalese army vehicle
was ambushed in the village of Sare Boya, in the Kolda region, two
miles away from the Bissau-Guinean border. When the vehicle was
bogged down in a muddy pool, soldiers got out to help extract it
from the mud. It was at that moment that gunmen believed to be
members of MFDC ambushed the unit with guns and RPG-7s. Six
soldiers died at the scene and four were wounded. A day later, one
of the wounded soldiers passed away. One of the dead is reported to
be an army captain. The Senegalese army has not sustained such
heavy casualties since the 1990s. With President Abdoulaye Wade's
election in 2000, the GOS has been generally successful in
restraining the army's use of force in Casamance. A civil society
leader who follows the conflict closely told Embassy that the attack
was conducted by men affiliated with Edouard Diedhiou, Commander of
the Fouladou rebel base in the Region of Kolda. This group is
believed to be close to dissidents of the Kassolol branch of the
MFDC that attacked the Senegalese army last month and killed one
soldier on the outskirts of Ziguinchor.
A deadly message
--------------
3. (SBU) This attack comes on the heels of a meeting that President
Wade held with Casamance leaders (The "Cadre Casamancais") to get
their views on how to resolve the conflict. A journalist, who is a
native of the Casamance, told the Embassy that MFDC hardliners
reacted violently as they felt that they had not mandated these
leaders to speak on their behalf. He added that rebels in the
Maquis have told him that they do not trust the numerous
self-appointed intermediaries that Wade meets and that they are
faced with the problem of how to engage the GOS and to identify
credible interlocutors within the government.
Senegalese soldiers must leave Casamance
--------------
4. (SBU) A recurrent MFDC demand has been that Senegalese soldiers
return to their positions of 1982, before the conflict started, when
they were confined to their barracks in the regions of Ziguinchor,
Bignona, and Kolda. The MFDC has aggressively opposed the recent
deployment of many small combat units by the Senegalese army in an
attempt to deter the hijacking of passenger vehicles by rebels. An
Embassy source noted that the increase in patrols conducted by
Senegalese soldiers is likely to result in more clashes with the
MFDC. He added that another reason why MFDC rebels are frustrated
and demand the departure of the soldiers is their view that "all
Senegalese soldiers do here is impregnate our women."
COMMENT
--------------
5. (SBU) As the government keeps the Casamance conflict on the back
burner, so will the frustration and concomitant violence increase.
In the meantime the MFDC is believed to have used the prolonged
ceasefire to acquire weapons and, although their force and logistics
remain primitive, it would be very difficult for the GOS to fund a
large scale counterinsurgency in the region. Negotiations seems to
be the only viable solution but as long as the government remains
hesitant and seeks peace without political concessions, granting the
region more say in its governance, then all efforts will be for
naught.
SMITH
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
DEPT FOR AF/W, AF/RSA, DRL AND INR/AA
PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHER
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINS KDEM ECON SG
SUBJECT: Casamance rebels kill Seven Senegalese soldiers
1. (SBU) Summary: 2009 has had an uptick of violent assaults by
gunmen allegedly belonging to MFDC (Movement of Democratic Forces of
Casamance) resulting in numerous civilian deaths. However, a more
worrying development is the resumption of attacks against the
Senegalese army. On October 2, MFDC rebels ambushed an army vehicle
on a muddy road in the Kolda region. They killed six soldiers and
wounded four; a day later one of the wounded died. It is feared
that if these attacks continue that the army will respond in kind
thus increasing the intensity of the conflict. End Summary.
Escalation of violence
--------------
2. (SBU) On the afternoon of October 2, a Senegalese army vehicle
was ambushed in the village of Sare Boya, in the Kolda region, two
miles away from the Bissau-Guinean border. When the vehicle was
bogged down in a muddy pool, soldiers got out to help extract it
from the mud. It was at that moment that gunmen believed to be
members of MFDC ambushed the unit with guns and RPG-7s. Six
soldiers died at the scene and four were wounded. A day later, one
of the wounded soldiers passed away. One of the dead is reported to
be an army captain. The Senegalese army has not sustained such
heavy casualties since the 1990s. With President Abdoulaye Wade's
election in 2000, the GOS has been generally successful in
restraining the army's use of force in Casamance. A civil society
leader who follows the conflict closely told Embassy that the attack
was conducted by men affiliated with Edouard Diedhiou, Commander of
the Fouladou rebel base in the Region of Kolda. This group is
believed to be close to dissidents of the Kassolol branch of the
MFDC that attacked the Senegalese army last month and killed one
soldier on the outskirts of Ziguinchor.
A deadly message
--------------
3. (SBU) This attack comes on the heels of a meeting that President
Wade held with Casamance leaders (The "Cadre Casamancais") to get
their views on how to resolve the conflict. A journalist, who is a
native of the Casamance, told the Embassy that MFDC hardliners
reacted violently as they felt that they had not mandated these
leaders to speak on their behalf. He added that rebels in the
Maquis have told him that they do not trust the numerous
self-appointed intermediaries that Wade meets and that they are
faced with the problem of how to engage the GOS and to identify
credible interlocutors within the government.
Senegalese soldiers must leave Casamance
--------------
4. (SBU) A recurrent MFDC demand has been that Senegalese soldiers
return to their positions of 1982, before the conflict started, when
they were confined to their barracks in the regions of Ziguinchor,
Bignona, and Kolda. The MFDC has aggressively opposed the recent
deployment of many small combat units by the Senegalese army in an
attempt to deter the hijacking of passenger vehicles by rebels. An
Embassy source noted that the increase in patrols conducted by
Senegalese soldiers is likely to result in more clashes with the
MFDC. He added that another reason why MFDC rebels are frustrated
and demand the departure of the soldiers is their view that "all
Senegalese soldiers do here is impregnate our women."
COMMENT
--------------
5. (SBU) As the government keeps the Casamance conflict on the back
burner, so will the frustration and concomitant violence increase.
In the meantime the MFDC is believed to have used the prolonged
ceasefire to acquire weapons and, although their force and logistics
remain primitive, it would be very difficult for the GOS to fund a
large scale counterinsurgency in the region. Negotiations seems to
be the only viable solution but as long as the government remains
hesitant and seeks peace without political concessions, granting the
region more say in its governance, then all efforts will be for
naught.
SMITH